Summary. The Cold War that shaped the societies of late modernity had penetrated everyday life with constant messages about the nuclear threat and demonstrations of military power. On the one hand, Soviet republics such as Lithuania were occupied by the enemy of Western democracies, and the nuclear threat would apply to their territory as well. On the other hand, many people secretly sided with the West. But information about the world behind the Iron Curtain was filtered ideologically. Images of Vietnam War and civil unrest in Western countries were broadcasted by the state controlled media as a counterpoint to the orderly and optimistic Soviet life idealised in chronicles and photographs. This positive image was shown to rest on the victory of the Great Patriotic War as well as October Revolution. Those events were represented by iconic monuments in the public space as well as by memorialization rituals taking place every half-year. Their visual documentation was an important part of Soviet culture. Photo journalists like Ilja Fišeris were assigned to record the parades of May the 1st, the 9th and November the 7th. Art photographers treated such images as a tribute to authorities exchanged for a measure of artistic freedom. But in the 1980s, the memorialization rituals, the monuments and other ideological signs became the focus of “rogue” art photographers and cinematographers: Artūras Barysas-Baras, Vytautas Balčytis, Vitas Luckus, Alfonas Malduitis, Algirdas Šeškus, Remigijus Pačėsa and Gintaras Zinkevičius. Their ironic and reflective images worked as dislocating counter-memorials against the stale reconstructions of the past. Referring to theories of Svetlana Boym, Verónica Tello and Ariella Azoulay, the paper discusses the complicated relationships between the different memorializations of war, including the absence of the Holocaust in collective memory.

Keywords: Kaunas Biennial, The Cold War, The Great Patriotic War, October Revolution, memorialization rituals, counter-memorial, photographic event, dislocation.

The 11th Kaunas Biennial, which opened in September 2017, has re-actualized the issue of memorialization and the political battle over as well as among monuments in Lithuania. The collateral exhibition Coming or Going?, curated by Laima Kreivytė, focuses on the diverse positions of contemporary art in this war over people’s memories and minds. Its introductory image, Dislocation by Gintaras Zinkevičius (b. 1963), links our present mindset with that of the Cold War.

Dislocation is not dated, but each photograph has a date underneath (Fig. 1). In 1982, another photographer, Remigijus Pačėsa (1955–2015), is posing in front of the statue of Lenin in Vilnius. It is the last summer before Leonid Brezhnev’s death, but both photographers do not know that and that the “Stagnation” is ever going to end. The statue’s raised hand points to the left, and Pačėsa is smiling, keeping his hands in the pockets. In 1992, Lithuania is already independent, the square is covered with snow, and Pačėsa occupies the place left empty after the statue has been removed in 1991. He mimics the memorized pose, but his raised hand points to the right. In 2002, we see only a blank sheet of photographic paper, cropped to suggest the sequence has no end. Zinkevičius left this blank space in 1992 as a sign of uncertain future.

The photograph also features a quotation from a Lithuanian dictionary of international words, conveniently placed on the snow. It defines dislocation as referring to bodily injuries, tectonic activity and stationing of military forces. The military reference
explains the significance of the middle date: 1992 was the year of negotiations over the removal of Russian army from Lithuania. The removal started in September 8 and continued until the end of August 1993 with decepitions and treacheries – hence, the stationing of its forces (dislokacija) was an important word in public discourse. Yet the play with Lenin’s statue suggests that monuments were also a kind of symbolical army stationed around Lithuania (and every other Soviet republic), protecting the correct version of history and ideology. Below, there is another word in the photograph, “accidentally” following dislocation in the alphabetic order, dysmenorrhea (spelled dismenoroja in Lithuanian): sickly menstruations. The casual juxtaposition colours the military conflict and also points to the loss of blood (people had been killed by the Soviet army) and pain in the process of regaining independence and forming the new state. Such a layering of meanings is the reason why I have chosen this triptych as the title image for this paper seeking to understand the role of representations of monuments as military icons in the Cold War.

The military meaning of dislocation is absent in the English definition, though. It is known rather as an indirect military strategy to upset the enemy’s equilibrium: “to replace what the enemy thinks should be occurring with something that is happening faster than he can understand.” The strategy encompasses four components: positional, functional, temporal and moral. In terms of position, the action should be decentralised so that the enemy had to fight in multiple locations simultaneously. Functional dislocation occurs when dissimilar weapons are used in asymmetric action and the flow of information is disrupted in order to “degrade the enemy’s ability to understand his environment in a timely and accurate manner.” Temporal dislocation seeks to control the tempo of actions through deception and multiple simultaneous problems, making it hard for the enemy to control its forces. The permanence of threat, the lacking sense of connection and meaning creates a moral dislocation. Being indirect, dislocation strategy is a useful concept in discussing the conflict of representations under the Soviet occupation in Lithuania where a successful direct action of resistance was impossible. Its key terms, decentralised action, the disrupted flow of information, deception, creating multiple problems and lack of meaning, when disconnected from precise military definitions and linked to bodily and tectonic dislocations, can be translated into artistic strategies. Combined with Ariella Azoulay’s theory of photography as a political tool, Verónica Tello’s version of counter-memorial aesthetics and Svetlana Boym’s restorative and reflective nostalgia, the concept of dislocation can be used to explain why some artists focused on the icons and rituals of the totalitarian state during the last decade of the Soviet Union.

THE PHOTOGRAPH AS A DISLOCATING COUNTER-MEMORIAL

In her book on refugee histories in contemporary art, Verónica Tello observes that neither traditional monuments, nor counter-memorials are suitable for the struggle of Diasporas to be recognised as socio-political entities. Traditional monuments consolidate the dominating national narrative and leave no other way but to identify with their message. James E. Young’s counter-memorials do not reiterate the aesthetics of totalitarian art and instead they are “celebrating the fall of their monuments” by playing against their didactic function “that reduces viewers to passive spectators.” Yet temporary counter-memorials inviting acts of remembrance and compassion in the present moment do not preserve memory for the future, nor do they activate the spectator enough, Tello claims. The past is buried together with the counter-monument and anything can take its place. Instead of counter-memorials as a “utopia without monuments” she suggests constant battle without end, sustained disagreement, which is part of the process of remembrance.

To achieve that, political art has to practice ambiguity and “displacement, disorientation or rupture” in the fabric of everyday life. As an example of such art, Tello cites the Dadaist movement in Zurich where the artists were immigrants during World War I. They unravelled coherent narratives and assembled fragments of reality into a meaningless jumble in order to show their “experiential terms of geopolitical dislocation” as an ignored diaspora.
a dislocating strategy at work here: a group of artists acts on their own initiative, disconnected from the central artistic trends; with their works they disrupt the flow of information and prevent it from forming a coherent meaning, hence occupying the ignorant audience’s attention with making sense of what they are doing.

But a photograph has an added political potential, suggests Ariella Azoulay. It is a performative event – a process with many participants next to the photographer. And they are not only the photographed people or witnesses, but also the others who know nothing about the photograph or even are not allowed to look at it. Thus, Azoulay argues, photography is a “potential event” even when there is no camera around. Every encounter with a photograph leaves traces on its surface, which turns into another event, still enriching its ontology. Hence, “the event of photography is never over. It can only be suspended, caught in the anticipation of the next encounter that will allow for its actualization (...).” That makes any photograph potentially dangerous to all warring sides. It is always open to reinterpretation and along with it, the photographed reality, which becomes vulnerable or empowered in the process. Thus, the photograph acts as a dislocating agent – misinforming, deceiving, robbing the photographed object from its intended meaning and replacing it with something else, its many prints creating multiple problems of interpretation in diverse situations.

THE EMPTY BATTLEFIELD OF THE COLD WAR

The Cold War was not exactly a war: there was no military action, at least between the two opposing major powers. But it shaped the world of late modernity and was deeply rooted in the minds of people and their everyday lives. The leaders of the U.S. and S.U. kept throwing threats at each other, supporting them with the accelerating production of weapons of mass destruction, which granted the “empty battlefield”. Photography played an important part in construing this war as reality in the West “through iconic images that served manifold functions, the most important of which were the flexing of military muscle and the waging of ideological battle.” The U.S. government sponsored cultural propaganda in the West and, Frances Stonor Saunders claims, “defining the Cold War as a “battle for men’s minds,” it stockpiled a vast arsenal of cultural weapons: journals, books, conferences, seminars, art exhibitions, concerts, awards. It was a tool to monger the fear – one of the few mediums to make the threat real.”

Needless to say, that such propaganda did not reach Soviet republics, at least not in the official media. Lithuania’s position in this war was ambiguous. On the one hand, the country was occupied by the enemy of the U.S. and the nuclear threat would apply to its territory. On the other hand, people secretly sided with the West and felt disconnected from Soviet ideology and threatened by its military power. To counter that, the state controlled media transmitted only representations of Vietnam War and civil unrest, showing western “workers” oppressed by the capitalist system struggling to achieve something the Soviet people allegedly had. Local photography was given the task to construct the image of what they had: the visual altreality of communist utopia.

Photographic and cinematographic representations of The Great Patriotic War and memorialization rituals around monuments were part of that altreality. Such images were only a tribute to the state in the eyes of art photographers and film directors, in exchange for a measure of creative freedom. Yet at the beginning of the 1980s, some “rogue” art photographers and amateur filmmakers started shooting ideological signs.

US, AN ARMY OF THE PAST

In 1979, Artūras Barysas-Baras (1954–2005) was banned from screening his films at amateur film festivals, because he showed naked bodies in Her Love made that year. Next year he responded with Us (Mes). His cameramen filmed the May 9 parade of The Great Patriotic War veterans on the 35th anniversary of victory. The veterans look happy to be filmed as the cameramen treats us to close-ups. Nobody suspects that treacherous intentions might be directing the cameras.
The film begins with fireworks rising into the black sky, accompanied by the song *Den Pobedy* – *The Victory Day*. Then we see the veterans: men in military uniforms, two women in dresses – everybody’s chests are covered with medals (Fig. 2). Brezhnev is waiving to them from a huge poster on the wall of a building, his chest also covered with medals; a small girl dressed in red waives a red flag. The women veterans look funny when they march, because their huge bodies wobble. This is the first sign that something is odd in the film, although the parade goes according to the script, familiar from countless repetitions on television: they march along the Lenin’s Prospect decorated with red flags, put flowers at the monument of the General Ivan Chernyakhovsky. Accompanied by the military orchestra, the parade heads towards Lenin’s monument and puts flowers there, greeted by children carrying carnations. The Chairman of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Petras Griškevičius, congratulates the veterans. Next, we see a moment of silence in the military cemetery, while pioneers bring a huge wreath. Women in stylised national dresses hold wreaths too. Then flowers are placed around the eternal fire and the film ends with what it started: *Den Pobedy* and fireworks. After the subtitles, numbers 3 – 2 – 1 tick and fireworks with the song restart, followed by the same numbers. It looks like the tape is stuck and the glitch might repeat again and again. The audiences of amateur film festivals did not know what to think – what happened to Barysas?

**CHOREOGRAPHY OF THE CROWD**

The Cold War reality in Soviet Union, although filled with the dread of nuclear war and displays of military power, was peacefully revolving through annual celebrations of The Great Patriotic War, Worker’s Day and October Revolution. The rituals were also spectacles, thus the urban setting was carefully constructed during Stalin’s era to emphasise the correct historical narrative. The monument of Chernyakhovsky (sculptor Nikolai Tomsky, 1950) was erected above his grave in the city centre because he participated in the “liberation” of Vilnius from the Nazis (but died outside Königsberg). His coat floating in the wind, his proud posture symbolised the military power of the USSR. The monument of Lenin (Tomsky, 1952), a copy of statues in Voronezh, Irkutsk and Leningrad, was erected in the centre of a large square. Straight alleys sprinkled with red brick powder and a “carpet of flowers” led to it. Lenin commanded the space not only by his solitary presence: he was giving a speech and pointing his hand towards the tribune where the leaders of the party would be standing during the parades.

The monuments and urban spaces, designed according to the same style all over the Soviet Union, had to legitimise the new totalitarian regime and “synchronise the uniform version of the ideologically approbated past”. They also set examples of model Soviet citizens, like the sculptural ensemble on the Chernyakhovsky Bridge completed in 1952: *Academic Youth* (sculptors Juozas Mikėnas, Juozas Kėdainis), *Guarding Peace* (Bronius Pundzius), *Agriculture* (Bernardas Bučas, Petras Vaivada) and *Industry and Construction* (Napoleonas Petrilis, Bronius Vyšniauskas). The four pairs of sculptures raised above a busy bridge, connecting the old centre with the outskirts still to be developed, seemed to supervise the motions of everyday life.

Rasa Antanavičiūtė divides the addressees of monuments and ideological sculptures into three categories. First, the narrative of revolution and liberation from Nazi’s represented by the monuments was meant to prove to the citizens in the “patrimony” (i. e. Russia) that the government was “acting lawfully” in the republic. For the locals who supported the regime (many of whom had come from Russia) the monuments “colonized the places of memory”. The other locals were not important and had to accept the loss of their own places of memory if they did not want to end up in prison, psychiatric hospital or Siberia). In the context of the Cold War, the second group may be treated as a potential army of the Soviet regime, and the third group, as their “enemy” that could only resort to indirect action, but mostly did nothing and merged with the second group. In terms of the dislocation theory, the monuments served as central assembly points for the “potential army” and strengthened their sense of connection and meaning. They were also stable and
permanent objects, informing them visually that the situation was not set to change.

The colonization of urban space helped to “nationalize time” with visible rituals of memorialization – obligatory parades. But they were a “degenerated” version of mass spectacles of the October revolution created in the 1920s Russia to compensate for the lack of documentary footage. In post-war Lithuania the parades were the model ideological situations whose meaninglessness, the historian Tomas Vaišeta claims, drove the “society of boredom” to drinking, doublespeak, inventive skiving and constant performance to cover up the split between the perceived reality and the altreality of propaganda. But when the “mobilized” people reached the Lenin’s Square, they would pull themselves together and march with one accord – or live up to the image, and that would be broadcasted back to all the citizens as a fact: “Thus we could read the parades as a message that the society, as if drowned in daily routine, as if unhinged, as if having lost a clear shape, recreates its ideal structure, which it really had never lost: the image seen at this moment is its true condition, not obscured by everyday inertia.” We may add that the parades showed the supporters of the regime and the locals who secretly opposed it as one homogeneous “army”.

This is what the photographs of parades were supposed to convey. For example, the Jewish photojournalist Ilja Fišeris (1927–1983) would wait at the Lenin’s Square to document the “culmination” of the event every half-year from 1946 to 1953. According to Matulytė, “the photographer creates a testament to the discipline instilled by the totalitarian system, while the participants are involved into the Soviet ideological game, rendering the boundary between reality and performance impossible to trace.” It seems reality is performance, which repeats itself endlessly, like daily life. The script, the liturgy and its insignia are recognisable from my future of stagnation: people shouting valio! (hurray!), portraits of Lenin, the coats of arms of the USSR and LSSR, tanks, soldiers, sportsmen, children and women clad in national costumes. Some photographs of the parade in 1946 are particularly gloomy – women in headscarves march like soldiers, men look like exhausted prisoners, their faces stiff with fatigue. There is not much room for displaying the as if here, because people are well aware that the photographs may be used against them – they cannot afford the luxury of individualization or desertion.

But even such photographs of unified march show vibrations of daily uncertainties. Eventually faces stop being so uniform. Some are even smiling. But why are they smiling? Is this an approval of the regime? It is possible to interpret the photographs this way, and that is how they were “read” during the Soviet occupation. But it is equally possible that somebody said something funny and the photographer candidly captured the reaction. It is nearly the end of the preparations, the waiting, and the marching after all. In 1948 two women eat ice cream with indifferent faces. A boy is pointing at the photographer. More and more people notice him. They smile and women sometimes flirt. Even during Stalin’s rule, the fear seems to be fading. Yet the change of mood is overshadowed by the repetition of the same. Celebration after celebration, it looks like “nationalized time” is passing through the main street of Vilnius as the masses perform the narrative of history and gradually internalize the as if attitude. But that did not make the locals who were against the regime to accept the meaning of war conveyed by monuments and rituals, thus being a part of the “army” that would disconnect at the first opportunity.

“US” AND “THEM”

When Barysas filmed Us, he focused not on the obedient crowd, but on the true believers who earnestly performed the ritual around the “colonized places of memory”. There are no deviations from the liturgy in Us, no curious discrepancies: the veterans follow the script, ideally repeated every year. They are Boym’s “restorative nostalgics” who recreate a selected fragment of the past projecting the image of unity, because they are “forever under siege” by the imaginary enemy – “Us” versus “Them” who “conspire against “our” homecoming.” Yet at the same time we know that something must be off course here. To sustain the ambiguity, Barysas does not explain much in his interview: “everyone was
so shocked that they didn’t know what to do with Barysas, what to think of it. And I think it has been left unnoticed as a film. Only Estonians noticed it. They came to me during the Baltic Festival, shook my hand and said: “It’s a truly erotic film.”

Eroticism is granted by the women who march smiling in front of the parade, climb the steps to Chernyakhovsky’s monument with grotesque effort, their huge breasts swinging. The film is full of juicy details, as if the filmmaker is relishing every moment of the spectacle. To make his point he resorts to montage only once: a veteran looks up at Chernyakhovsky with respect; in the next shot Chernyakhovsky looks back at him from the sky. The straightforwardness of the metaphor is funny. And it is enough to make the attitude legible to those educated in culture. They would no longer confuse the film with a documentary chronicle. “They” are the sceptic locals who did not count and were supposed to adapt. So “They” do adapt by turning into voyeurs – invisible, they stare at the fat and wrinkled faces, almost surreal, worn by age. “They” are like anthropologists who have discovered an indigenous tribe performing bizarre rituals, closed in their backward world, for the camera shows nothing outside the parade. The same actions are repeated throughout the film, which will be repeated again and again, as if the time of history has stopped and nothing new will ever be created. And while the camera lingers on “Us”, “They” relish in the thought that “Us” have no idea what “They” think. In retrospect, “They” probably think of dislocating or, to repeat the definition, of replacing “what the enemy thinks should be occurring with something that is happening faster than he can understand.”

DISLOCATING MONUMENTS AND IDEOLOGICAL SIGNS

Barysas was not “the only soldier in the field”. Vitas Luckus (1943–1987), known for his experimentation with various forms of photography, sometimes captured the discrepancy between everyday life in the streets and ideological posters while travelling around the Soviet Union in 1981. The transience of people, a hurrying, waiting, blurred mass of bodies dressed in nondescript grey clothes, is like an antithesis of the static and permanent ideals expressed in bold, eye-catching letters and images. The juxtaposition is often ironic. The unity declared in a slogan is dismantled into an accidental co-presence of absent minded and disconnected people in the street below. The incentive for the “Leninist friendship of nations” to “strengthen and flourish” is made flesh immediately in the encounter of a veteran’s decorated uniform and an old woman’s flowery headscarf (Fig. 3). To make the series complete, a naked woman is rowing towards the sublime future promised by the relief portraits of Marx, Engels and Lenin carved on the scarp of a mountain in Bashkiria.

Back in Lithuania, Zinkevičius started photographing poster cases on the walls in 1982 (Fig. 4). The posters kept replacing each other, but until perestroika their discourse revolved around the same old ideals of revolution, Lenin, victory, proletariat and the conquest of cosmos. The permanently young faces and bodies in the pictures seem to have been designed with the purpose to distract passers-by from noticing the crumbling walls. The feeling that the unflinching optimism of propaganda existed in a different time zone from the decaying city attracted many photographers. Alfonsas Maldutis (b. 1955) captured the word schastye (happiness) on a derelict building with barred windows and icicles hanging from the roof in 1985 (Fig. 5). Next year Vytautas Balčytis (b. 1955) shot the same word melting in the rays of the rising sun (Fig. 6). The building was the Vilnius railway depot and it featured other iconic words as well: mir (peace), druzhba (friendship) and svoboda (freedom). The latter was also photographed by Maldutis with the shadow of a passing truck, reminding of mass deportations to Siberia.

Algirdas Šeškus (b. 1945) had the biggest issue with ideological signs. During the 1980s he photographed the poster cases, the portrait of Brezhnev staring coldly at a derelict street, at trolleybuses, or even waving from behind linden trees (Fig. 7). He also captured slogans looking forgotten on gloomy buildings, the statue of Lenin in the distance or close up – but too large for the frame, and the four pairs of statues on the Chernyakhovsky Bridge near which he grew up (Fig. 8). The photographer’s eye is always
moving, but stays fixed on the statues as reference points, sometimes hardly visible at the horizon, but looming above the city like shadows of the past. Šeškus shows life revolving around them: the cars, the buses, the people are as transient and depressed as the air, heavy with clouds, ready to erupt.

In 1991, when Soviet monuments were being removed, Pačėsa made a montage of the renamed Green Bridge statues that were going to stay for a longer while (until 2015): two pairs walk majestically in the clouds, the spire of the Stalinist building – the Scientists House – is in the worker’s heart (Fig. 9). Pačėsa wrote under one of his prints: “Momentalno v more”, which means “Immediately to the Sea”, but the alliteration brings another expression to my mind: “Memento mori”.

This phenomenon of using Soviet ideological signs to express something else was not exclusive to Lithuania. Recycling started with the Russian alternative art movement, Sots Art, invented by Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid in early 1970s. The Ukrainian photographer Boris Mikhailov also overemphasised ideology’s presence in everyday surroundings in his Red Series (1968–1975). In 1987–1988, the Latvian photographer Gvido Kajons photographed people in the streets of Riga, walking or sitting among giant portraits of Soviet leaders. “Avoiding the declarative and the actual, the impudent and the undignified, the splendour and the poverty, Kajons produces caricature-like images which simultaneously have the meaning of banal comics and a real, tragic, social catastrophe,” observed the Estonian photographer Peeter Linnap who also appropriated photos of a soldier shooting at something in his own series Summer 1955 (1993). The caricature in photographs was less concealed than in the film Us. The darkness of overdevelopment, the placing of monuments off centre or into the distance “dislocated” them as less important and simultaneously ominous figures amidst the mundane reality.

Arthur C. Danto compared the Sots Art images by Komar and Melamid to those of Roy Lichtenstein and other pop artists who thus assaulted the narrative of high art. Zinkevičius also admits that he started photographing posters because he saw an absurd combination: a propaganda poster anunci-
ing the meeting of Communist Youth in the banned style of pop art. On the other hand, by showing them on the decaying walls as part of less orderly everyday rhythms, the photographer degraded their symbolical value. Other photographers did the same with ideological signs and monuments – irony and laughter helped to “dislocate” their heroic stance and render them innocuous as bearers of alien, imposed memories.

On the other hand, Boym sees a twitch of nostalgia in such combinations. She recounts Walter Benjamin’s visit to Moscow in 1926–1927 when he saw Soviet icons surrounded by old stuff on a market stall and realised that the communist utopia he was looking for was not there:

Somehow these bizarre everyday juxtapositions of past and future, images of premodern and industrial, of a traditional Russian village playing hide-and-seek in the Soviet capital were for Benjamin important clues that defied ideological representations. The incongruent collage of Moscow life represented an alternative vision of eccentric modernity that had a profound influence on the later twentieth century development.

We find the same “eccentric modernity” playing hide-and-seek in a photograph by Luckus: Grigory Tal visits his family home and looks upwards like an exultant pioneer, while a lamp forms a halo behind his back, one of the objects displayed on the wall: a massive key, a folk sculpture of Mary holding baby Jesus and a real hammer and sickle, the largest and the most important sign of all (Fig. 10). During his travels Luckus captures similar assortments, mixing the Soviet ingredient into everyday conversations. For example, two men sit in a small room filled with reproductions of Western paintings: women in all roles and postures pick wines and play music around the portrait of Brezhnev. If it is modernity, it is absurd and surreal. But such images were also politically charged.

A photograph has a special power to destabilize the spectator’s certainties. Perhaps, the fact that Luckus,
Pačėsa, Šeškus and others could not show their photographs in the 1980s, enhances their potential to raise the issue of memorialization of that very past. In a way they mimicked the actions of veterans and communist leaders around those monuments and demonstrated how people did not get their pictures taken in front of them. By always emphasising the empty space, the photographers pointed to the absence of participants in memorialization rituals. Moreover, Dislocation by Zinkevičius who calls himself a Punk, and a Dadaist, fuses different times and meanings into a politically confusing image – a puzzle to occupy one’s mind for a long while without a definite answer waiting at the end. But also, as a local citizen, he is geopolitically dislocated by the monument that has colonized his diaspora’s place of memory. Meanwhile, the memory embedded in the monument acquires a tinge of unreality – an as if, because the photograph is performative. It “dislocates” the viewer’s learned response by piling up possible meanings and absurdities faster than he or she can understand.

Thus, he and other photographers have moved the Soviet monuments through time: from their role as stale reminders of the war and revolution that seemed to have never happened, through ridicule of their powerlessness, to being the absent markers of “seismic zones”, in the words of Kreivytė, which new ideologies tend to neutralize by raising new idols. The photographs of the 1980s, like the works of writers, filmmakers, artists and architects collected into her exhibition Coming or Going?, display the monument as “not the goal, but rather a contemporary medium of communication, a tool for the (de)construction of memory politics.” A counter-memorial photographic event dislocates the certainties of the past by connecting what happened at different points in space-time, including potential interpretations. It is a constantly renewing event whose heterogeneous meanings, ruptures and disorientation do not let it die in our consciousness. As Maldutis explained the title of his photograph Another Place, “the Phantom went to the Desert and died. We excavated Their monuments and laughed. Another place is a mausoleum in the cemetery of the past...”

POST COUNTER-MEMORIALIZATION NOW

After two decades since the restoration of independence, some photographers use their negatives from the 1970s and 1980s to create a new photographic event. The most prominent among them is Šeškus who writes in his book Žaliasis tiltas (The Green Bridge, 2009): “Everything that exists is a background for something (a set). The time of Photography is a background for another time (a set).” The war is another time in the background of his photographs, preserved in the stones and the appearance of the locals for later decades and shot with a Šmena. The photographs must be a set for those memories to play out – Šeškus is like Boym’s reflective nostalgics savouring the textures of time and duration, “temporalizing space.” Such is also his book about the stagnating Soviet time of monuments, A Variation on the Theme of Being Outside: Parts leelya, pure life, blue, yet bluer, created in 2013. The book is like a musical score. The icons of Soviet ideology – the coat of arms, the pioneers, the monument to Lenin – mingle with everyday life, which is grey: people sitting at home, lovers, the streets where passers-by look tiny, because they have dropped down in the frame, are slashed by black strokes. Sometimes the image pales as if blinded. These are the effects of a damaged film, but the artist has turned them into signs of aggression coming from everywhere, directed both at the photographed reality and the photographic image. The black unexposed zones fall onto the city like blocs of threat, and upon reaching the Lenin’s Square they turn into knives stabbing everyone (Fig. 11). Considering their provenance, it is strange that the people look as if they know about the presence of these spectres from the photographic future and carry on resigned, caught in the rituals of memorialization of the past, which is not theirs.

“Pure life” looks like a respite, which could be found in cultural spaces – a man is playing a reed under a blossoming tree, ballet dancers, gymnasts show their numbers – and in the slow time of fishing, sitting by a lake, walking along the river. The peace and repetition create an impression of a stable rhythm of daily life. A man, playing on a piano with its lid...
down, sticks his tongue out – madness is contained in artistic circles. But shadows of the buildings and seats in the cinema suggest that danger is imminent. The part ends with a symbolical image: an actress with a fan looking at us through diagonal white bars of a virtual cage smiles artificially. She is the “pure life” of culture locked in the ideological cage. If we look back, all the photographs are somewhat wrong: there is too much emptiness around the artists, diminishing them, despite all of the composition and effort. Now we know this is the effect of the TV studio where Šeškus was a cameraman.

The part “blue” is not blue literally – it is black-and-white. The title suggests looking through the image – to the emotional background, where “blue” is the colourless winter, its lightless white spaces merging the leafless branches of trees, making the world too empty for tiny human figures. Vilnius under the dirty snow looks like a village: horses, fences, wooden sheds everywhere. The only ideological signs are the sculptures on the Chernyakhovsky Bridge in the distance.

But what can be “yet bluer”? Šeškus fills the last part of the book with images of joy shot from high up: pioneers running across the square, a pattern of white flags and hoops, tiny bodies dressed in national costumes drawing ornaments on the grass. “Yet bluer” is when the mechanism of choreography feeds on the bodies to produce artificial happiness, eliminating the sense of reality. Individuality is gone; everyone is only a detail of a total monument, an army stationed everywhere – a diaspora dislocated in its own home.

CONCLUSIONS WITH A LOST MEMORIAL

The concept of dislocation has helped us to see how the photographs of Soviet signs and the film Us could “replace what the enemy thinks should be occurring” with meanings degrading the positional, functional and moral status of monuments. Unmanageable by the authorities, the artists turned them into photographic events burgeoning with alternative and ambiguous meanings prolonging their reading indefinitely, destabilizing their ideological value and power to mobilize an “army” of supporters. On the other hand, these representations unsettling the symbols of war expressed the gaze of people who had been dislocated in time as well as in the occupied territory. Bearing this in mind, the U.S. did not win the Cold War “by default” after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was helped by this secret “army” as if marching in the parades.

But let us return to the Kaunas Biennial. The artist Paulina Pukytė (b. 1966), who is based in the United Kingdom, was invited to curate the biennial and chose the topic of memorialization. Her exhibition There and not There. (Im)Possibility of a Monument is based on James E. Young’s concept of counter-monument, quoted it in the catalogue. She asks: “But how to remember what is NOT THERE? How to forget? How to commemorate something we wish had not been? And, in the face of over-saturation, what monuments do we really need and why do we need them at all?”

The monuments created by artists from various countries are scattered around the city to form a temporary memorial, which both opposes the idea of a totalitarian monument and re-actualises the conflicts of the Soviet past reaching back to World War II. The largest is the theme of the Holocaust: many artists have memorialized the 34,000 Jews, including Pukytė’s grandfather, killed in Kaunas. Some owners of buildings did not allow them to be installed, which only proves their political power as counter-memorials.

One monument struck me particularly. Its author is Adina, an unknown artist born in Kaunas in 1932, invented by the curator (Fig. 12). She has appropriated a rusty shovel, which had been used to stabilize the breaking wall of the Jewish cemetery – right below a crack. Locals have been scribbling on it for decades. Now it is a Memorial Plaque to My Father. In the catalogue Adina says:

My name was Adina. My Father’s name was Samuel. He lived at 12 Ugniagesių Street in Kaunas. But one day in 1941 he was no longer there. He wasn’t anywhere anymore. And his house is not there anymore. And his street is not there anymore. And there, beyond the cemetery wall, I cannot see him. Because he is not there.
“This monument was always here,” Pukytė said. And indeed, it was as was the fenced cemetery, half of it empty. "Why?” someone asked. “There was no one left to bury there,” she answered. We know what the rusty shovel might have been used for. But it is a problem to Lithuanians. The memory of Holocaust has been missing. It was “not there,” so how to remember it or to forget? Now it has to hatch its presence of the past and dislocates our certainties.

References


Notes

1 The paper is written as part of the research project “The Everyday and the Representation of War Trauma in Late Modernity” ("Kasdiennybe ir karo traumos reprezentacija velyvojo modernybe"), S-MOD-17-1) financed by the Research Council of Lithuania.

3 Ibid., 24.

4 Ibid., 19–33.


9 Tello, 21–22.

10 Ibid., 28–29.

11 Ibid., 31.

12 Azoulay, 21.

13 Ibid., 24–27.

14 Adgie, 17.


19 Pasaulis pagal Barą, ed. Gediminas Kajenas (Kaunas: Kitos knygos, 2012), 293.


21 Ibid., 165.


25 Boym, 59.


29 Boym, 42–43.


32 Ibid., 11.


35 From my interview with Gintaras Zinkevičius in 2014.

36 Boym, 27.

37 Laima Kreivytytė, “Coming or Going?” in There and Not There: (Im)Possibility of a Monument, ed. Paulina Pukytė (Kaunas: Kauno biešnėlė, 2017), 44.

38 Ivanauskas, 9.

39 Algirdas Šeškus, Žaliasis tiltas, ed. Margarita Matulytė and Malvina Jeliskaitė (Kaunas: Kitos knygos, 2009), 11.

40 Boym, 49.


42 Adgie, 1.

43 Paulina Pukytė, “There and Not There: (Im)Possibility of a Monument,” in There and Not There: (Im)Possibility of a Monument, ed. Paulina Pukytė (Kaunas: Kauno biešnėlė, 2017), 3.

44 Pukytė, “There and Not There: (Im)Possibility of a Monument,” 2.

45 Paulina Pukytė, “29 = 42. Refusal of the Afterimage,” in There and Not There: (Im)Possibility of a Monument, ed. Paulina Pukytė (Kaunas: Kauno biešnėlė, 2017), 34.

46 Adina, “Memorial Plaque to My Father,” in There and Not There: (Im)Possibility of a Monument, ed. Paulina Pukytė (Kaunas: Kauno biešnėlė, 2017), 5.
Fig. 1. Gintaras Zinkevičius. Dislocation. Gelatine silver photograph. Collection of Gintaras Zinkevičius

Fig. 2. Artūras Barysas-Baras. Us (Mes). Film still, 1980, Kinomanai

Fig. 3. Vitas Luckus. Azerbaijan. Gelatine silver photograph, 1981. ©Vitas Luckusm, LLCttt
Fig. 4. Gintaras Zinkevičius. From the series Posters. Gelatine silver photograph, 1982. Collection of Gintaras Zinkevičius

Fig. 5. Alfonsas Maldutis. Another Place. Gelatine silver photograph, 1985. Collection of MO Museum

Fig. 6. Vytautas Balčytis. Vilnius. Gelatine silver photograph, 1986. Collection of Vytautas Balčytis
Fig. 7. Algirdas Šeškus. Untitled. Gelatine silver photograph, 1975–1983. Collection of Algirdas Šeškus

Fig. 8. Algirdas Šeškus. Untitled. Spread from the book Žaliasis tiltas, 2009

Fig. 9. Remigijus Pačėsa. The Green Bridge or Momentalno v more. Gelatine silver photograph, 1991. Collection of Gintaras Zinkevičius
Fig. 10. Vitas Luckus. Grigory Tal (at the Luckuses’ Place). From the series Colleagues, gelatine silver photograph, 1969. ©Vitas Luckusm, LLC.

Fig. 11. Algirdas Šeškus. Untitled. Illustration from A Variation on the Theme of Being Outside: Parts leelya, pure life, blue, yet bluer, 2013

Fig. 12. Adina. Memorial Plaque to My Father, found object in situ: cemetery wall, iron spade, 2017. Courtesy of Paulina Pukytė
DISLOKACIJA: FOTOGRAFINIŲ IR KINEMATOGRAFINIŲ KARO REPREZENTACIJŲ KONFLIKTAS SOVIETMEČIO LIETUVOJE

Santrauka


Reikšminiai žodziai: Kauno bienalė, Šaltasis karas, Didysis Tėvynės karas, Spalio revoliucija, memorializavimo ritualai, kontramemorialas, fotografinis įvykis, dislokacija.

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