The Russian Military Reform 2005-2015

Unlike previous downsizings of the military forces which were called reforms, the present military reform is designed to essentially change all the forces. Its preparation took a long time. Although officially it was launched at the end of 2008, the first ideas that the Russian Military would have to be effective, used at peacetime and in war and be maintainable by the country emerged as early as 2005. This reform is going to take a long time and will be carried out in stages. Though it is planned to be completed by 2020, it has reached the point today that makes it impossible to go back to the pre-reform state. With the Russian political authorities showing their strong will to complete it, in 2012-2015 nearly all structural reorganizations will be finished and the remaining years will be devoted to rearmament. After successful implementation of the reform, the Russian Armed Forces may become one of the best militaries in the world. This study is intended to discuss the objectives of the reform, peculiarities of its stages, the foreseeable result as well as the ways which the Russian political authorities plan to use to achieve this result.

Introduction

The military reform that the Russian Federation is undergoing at present is widely discussed by the military personnel, it is daily referred to by top leadership and politicians, reports on it are provided by the country’s mass media. The Western press shows far less interest in this reform. To many countries, Russia is no longer an ideological adversary posing a military threat and has become just a national state trying to establish itself among the states of the world.

This study has been prepared on the basis of information provided in the Russian press, the Internet, TV and other mass media sources. An attempt has been made to reconstruct the changes that have already taken place in the Armed Forces and forecast what may happen and what result can be expected.

Reorganizations of Russian military structures have taken place since the very collapse of the USSR. There have been plenty of them, so it is difficult

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** Evaluations and ideas presented in this article exclusively belong to the author and can never be considered an official position of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Lithuania or its departments.
to track down when one of them ended and another one began. The present reform, too, at its beginning was considered by many to be one more venture of the new minister. Nevertheless, a closer look taken at what has been done, is being done and is planned to be done, makes it possible to state that what Defense Minister Anatoly Serdiukov and President Dmitry Medvedev are doing today is a well thought out reform which President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov started long ago. It is worthwhile to remember that when Putin came to power, the first step for stopping the disintegration of the Armed Forces of that time was the promulgation of the new military doctrine. Reorganizations launched before were based merely on reducing forces, therefore they did not yield the desired results, and the military forces were getting weaker and disintegrated.

Being aware of that, the political authorities of the country then made a decision not to make cosmetic changes but to carry out a fundamental reform of the Russian military. In October 2003, then Minister of Defense S. Ivanov presented a document drafted by the Ministry of Defense “Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” which was unofficially named the Ivanov doctrine. He specified what kind of armed forces Russia wanted to have. On October 2, 2003, this document was approved and the Ministry of Defense was ordered to outline a vision for the reorganization of the military so that it would be able to carry out tasks assigned to it.

1. The Concept of the Future Russian Military

In September 2005, at a Defense Ministry Collegium meeting headed by S. Ivanov, Chief of the General Staff Army General Yuri Baluyevsky delivered a report on the improvement of combat readiness of the Russian Armed Forces. In his report the General presented not only the proposed vision of the military which complied with the Ivanov doctrine’s requirements, but also a concrete development plan. Of course, at that time the plan was not made public; nor is it made public now. Nevertheless, having looked through the changes that have occurred in the recent years, having assessed statements made by the authorities and commanders, it becomes obvious that the plans are to establish essentially new armed forces. The reform will have an impact not only on the military, but also other armed structures of the country (the system of internal affairs, state security institutions, etc.). Upon its completion, “the Russian Armed Forces, maintaining strategic deterrence potential and combat readiness of the forces, at peacetime and in emergency, must be capable of successful participation with its standby readiness capabilities, without additional mo-

1 This Doctrine was approved by the Russian President’s Decree No 706 of 21 April 2000 and was renewed by Decree No 146 of 5 February 2010, http://www.mil.ru/849/11873/1062/1347/1818/index.shtml.
2 Мясников В, „Сергей Иванов обкатывает свою доктрину“, Независимая газета, 19 августа 2005 г.
bilization, simultaneously in two military conflicts of any type as well as be capable of performing peacekeeping operations both autonomously and as part of international forces.\(^3\)

To fulfill these requirements, the Russian General Staff has planned:

- to change the concept of employing the Armed Forces (to foresee the employment of the Armed Forces in peacetime and war);
- to change the composition of the Armed Forces (to form new structures of military forces for peacetime and war);
- to make military command and control system (C2) effective;
- to change the composition of the military personnel (the corps of officers – noncommissioned officers – soldiers);
- to create an effective state system of the maintenance of the military (to change personnel training and armament systems, etc.)

Unlike the USSR military, which could be used only in wartime and with additional preparation, i.e. mobilization, the new Russian military in peacetime must be ready to successfully participate in 2 military conflicts (local conflicts, regional wars) and one peacekeeping operation immediately, without preparation, i.e. rely not on mobilization but on the ready reserve.\(^4\) In this case, the use of nuclear weapons is not foreseen. Besides, it must be capable of waging a global conflict after a preparatory period, i.e. after completing mobilization and turning into a wartime structure. In this case, nuclear weapons may be used.

To achieve this goal, the suggestion has been made to reform the Armed Forces by applying the principle of functional employment of forces. According to it, the military forces must be divided into two parts. The first, the bigger part, is to be forces ready to execute and executing military actions, or, as it is now popular to say, operational forces. The second, the smaller part, is to be forces designed for military administration, strategic planning, training and supply of the military personnel and forces, etc., i.e. the institutional army. This distribution will have to remain in wartime, too. The reserve and mobilization will be used to increase only the operational forces.

The operational forces would consist of strategic, operational and tactical level capabilities. At the strategic level, these would be strategic commands. Each of them would be in charge of all land, air and sea conventional capabilities within the territory assigned to them (i.e. it would be a joint command). It would act in the strategic direction intended for it without any changes either at peacetime or in war. They would replace the now existing military districts

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\(^3\) The original: “Вооруженные силы РФ должны быть способны в мирное время и в чрезвычайных ситуациях, сохраняя потенциал стратегического сдерживания и выполняя задачи поддержания боеготовности, войсками (силами) постоянной готовности без проведения дополнительных мобилизационных мероприятий успешно решать задачи одновременно в двух вооруженных конфликтах любого типа, а также осуществлять миротворческие операции как самостоятельно, так и в составе многонациональных войск”, Мясников В, „Сергей Иванов обкатывает свою доктрину“, Независимая газета, 19 августа 2005 г.

\(^4\) Литовкин В., „Сердюков пересматривает стратегию“, Независимая газета, 23 декабря 2008 г.
which in peacetime have preparatory and administrative functions and can wage war only after having undergone a relevant reorganization, i.e. having formed fronts on their basis.

An intermediate link between these commands and fighting forces would be operational commands. They would be responsible for the implementation of particular objectives of the operation and would fight using several or a dozen brigades assigned to them. In essence, this would be the equivalent of modern armies and corps. A new self-sustaining brigade should become the key fighting unit.

The institutional part would be under the control of the significantly decreased Ministry of Defense. Strategic, i.e. nuclear, the planned space and air defenses\(^5\) and, possibly, the strategic reserve (rapid reaction, mobile) forces would remain under its subordination. Besides, it would also have land, air, sea forces staffs, administration, mobilization, personnel training, supply, etc., capabilities. The institutional part would be responsible for the supply of operational forces and the total readiness of the country for fighting (mobilization).

After this reform, the Russian military structure would be similar to modern Western (e.g. USA) military structures, where armed forces branches are given forces training tasks, whereas strategic or regional commands “wage war”.

### 2. The Process of the Military Reform of the Russian Federation

#### 2.1. Preparation for the Reform: Experiments and the Fight with “the Old Thinking” (2005-2008)

As early as 2004-2005, the General Staff headed by J. Baluyevsky prepared the concept of the Strategic Command. 2006 was devoted to the preparation of a plan of reform of the Russian military structure and its implementation.

Prior to launching the reform, it was necessary to not only practically test by experiments the effectiveness of the new military organization\(^6\), but also break through the resistance of the military elite who were saturated with the thinking of previous eras. The first opposition to the proposed concept emerged right after its preparation began in 2004\(^7\); however, a true conflict occurred only at the beginning of 2006 when at a meeting on the reform held in Moscow, a part of the then Russian Armed Forces command showed fierce opposition to it. To appease the opposing generals, Ivanov then called the reform “an

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\(^5\) Бабакин А., “Надвигается существенная реорганизация вооруженных сил”, Независимая газета, 9 декабря 2005 г.

\(^6\) „На пути к новым Вооруженным Силам“, Красная звезда, 25 января, 2007 г.

\(^7\) Плугатарев И. „Военачальники бунтуют“, Независимая газета, 5 ноября 2004 г.
experiment”, but, at the same time, he said that approximately three hundred generals would have to be dismissed. Most probably, the reform opponents were appeased by the idea that by the time the experiment was completed with the ideas verified and a new structure of the Armed Forces created, most of them would have retired already.

In May 2006, Defense Minister Ivanov traveled to the Eastern Military Districts of Russia where he introduced the principles of the concept and declared the start of the experiment. To guarantee success of the reform, it was important to carry it out by those interested in attaining the best result; therefore, middle link generals were chosen. In case of success, they would be offered the implementation of the reform as well as leading positions in the new organization. Being aware of that, the Russian authorities concentrated all personnel matters under single control. As early as September 2005, by the President’s decree Army General Nikolay Pankov became the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense responsible for all military assignments. The search for reliable and confident of successful reform generals as well as a very strange practice of appointing commanders to their positions may be considered to be distinctive features of the preparatory stage of the reform. It seems that those commanders who were trusted at the beginning were appointed by the President’s decrees. Those commanders who had to be verified were appointed by the Defense Minister’s orders. This principle was adhered to until the very official beginning of the reform. When the reform was launched, all appointments of the commanders were made solely by the President’s decrees. Here are some examples.

In September 2006, by the President’s decree General Colonel Vladimir Bulgakov was appointed as the Commander of the Far East Military District. Under his command, during the exercise “Baikal 2006”, the concept of the Strategic Command, i.e. how this Headquarter could wage war, was first tested. By the President’s decrees, the following appointments were made to command: the Siberian Military District - General Colonel Alexander Postnikov (April 2007), the newly created Experimental Strategic Command – General Colonel Nikolay Tkachiov (September 2007). In the exercises “Vostok 2007” and “Vostok 2008”, this command further tests the capability of the Strategic Command to fight. As early as 2007, by the President’s decrees the following appointments were made: Air Force Commander-in-Chief General Colonel Alexander Zelin, Black Sea Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Alexander Kletskov, North Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Nikolay Maksimov, Pacific Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Konstantin Sedenka and Baltic Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Viktor Mardusin. All the appointees are young, capable of serving in the military in the coming 8-10 years, or are highly experienced generals who have participated in wars, and who are well aware of the situation in the military and are interested in the necessity and success of the reform. Most of them have successfully coped with the assigned tasks during the experiment and are successfully continuing their service.
In July 2008, with the experiment nearing the end, one of the initiators of the reform and its mastermind Y. Baluyevsky was promoted by the President’s decree. Since he had completed his job in the General Staff, he moved to the position in the Security Council of the Russian Federation and would be in charge of monitoring the overall execution of the reorganization.

During the preparation period, it was by the Defense Minister’s orders that in September 2007 Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky was appointed who was shortly afterwards informed about the decision to transfer the Navy authorities to St Petersburg, and in December 2007 Leningrad Military District Commander General Colonel Valery Gerasimov was appointed. It was already by the President’s decree that the latter was appointed to the position of the Commander of the Moscow Military District in February 2009, i.e. after the declaration of the official start of the reform. By the Defense Minister’s orders others were also appointed: Chief of the General Staff General Colonel Nikolay Makarov and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General Colonel Vladimir Boldyrev. Boldyrev has already been replaced. The new Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General Postnikov, has been appointed by the President’s decree.

Apart from Y. Baluyevsky’s promotion, some other interesting events took place at the end of the experiment. In February 2007, Ivanov, a former military, was replaced by Serdiukov, a civilian. Ivanov moved to the position in the Government and remains one of the patrons of the reform. The appointment to the post of the Minister of Defense of a civilian who had never before had anything to do with military personnel should help implement new decisions and fight against the opposing military personnel. After the experiment ended at the end of 2008, the already mentioned experimental Strategic Command headed by Tkachev was disbanded.

The President’s decision, announced on October 15, 2008 by Serdiukov, on approving the new organizational structure of the Russian military encompassing three levels –military district (strategic command), regional (operational) command and brigade – meant the official beginning of the reform. For the first time, having introduced the vision of the future military, the Minister also presented a wider draft of the institutional military organization. He announced that in 2012, from the 21,813 military personnel of the central military body and military command and administration structures only 8,500 will remain, from then existing over 355,000 officers only approximately 150,000 will be left after the reform and from 1,107 generals – only 877. The number of high-ranking officers will be reduced, but the number of lieutenants will increase. The downsizing will be executed in stages. Although the functions of the General Staff will not practically change, nearly 1,000 positions will be eliminated. The Main Operations Directorate will undergo the greatest changes: from 500 only 200 will remain. Other directorates, including the Main Intelligence Directorate, will also be downsized. Previously, the General Staff

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Гафутулин Н., „Мобильность, боеготовность, престиж“, Красная звезда, 15 октября 2008 г.
prepared all plans and they were implemented in other staffs. After the reform, the Staff will be executing only strategic planning. Operational plans will be prepared by strategic commands in the directions entrusted to them and they will be implemented by operational commands and forces.

2.2. The First Stage. Reorganization of the Tactical Link – Transition to Brigades (2008-2009)

The reform itself was planned to be carried out in stages. The first stage of the reform, the end of which was intended to be December 1, 2009, whether accidentally or not, became “hidden” from outsiders. As early as December 2007, the moratorium declared by Russia on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) no longer allowed foreign military inspectors to conduct inspections and monitor Russian forces. The Russian Federation also stopped supplying information about its Armed Forces provided for in the CFE Treaty.

During the first stage of the reform, it was planned to disband divisions and create new brigades. It is difficult to explain why the first stage of the reform was divided into two parts: by July 1, 2009 and by December 1, 2009. Considering the fact that in March 2009, 5 brigades of the new organizational structure had already been formed and the first experimental exercises of this type of the brigade had been carried out in the Siberian Military District, an assumption can be made that most probably the emphasis on the first part of the stage was the last test of the new structure. After that, massive formation of new brigades started. During the first part of this stage, 46 brigades of the new type were declared to be formed, while during the second one 40 more new brigades were declared. Having looked through a huge pile of information sources, as of July 2009, 141 motorized rifle, tank, artillery, rocket, Special Forces, communications, logistics, etc., brigades were found in the Russian Ground Forces. As many as 54 of them were brigades of the new type and had been created since the beginning of the reform. The majority of them, as many as 30, were motorized rifle and tank brigades. In the European part of Russia, in the Leningrad Military District, four new brigades appeared, two of which were motorized rifle brigades. The Moscow Military District already had five of them: three motorized rifle and two tank brigades, while in the North Caucasus District there were eleven, including nine motorized rifle brigades. Still more brigades of this type came into being in the military districts situated beyond the Urals. In the Volga-Urals Military District ten new brigades were found, three of which were motorized rifle, one tank and two rocket brigades.

9 Поросков Н., „Товарищи потенциальные противники...“, Время новостей, 11 ноября 2008 г.
10 Поросков Н., „В российской армии созданы пять общевойсковых бригад“, Время новостей, 19 марта 2009 г.
11 Миранович Г., Тихонов А., Худолеев В., Земляниченко А., „Бригада набирает силу“, Красная звезда, 17 февраля 2010 г.
12 Тихонов А., „Ночная проверка боем“, Красная звезда, 18 июня 2009 г.
Siberian Military District there were thirteen – three motorized rifle, one tank, two artillery and one rocket brigades. In the Far East Military District there were thirteen brigades, ten motorized rifle brigades included. As can be seen, at the beginning, just like the experiment, the reform was being carried out in the East; therefore the majority of brigades were formed there, too. The results of the first part of the stage (by July 2009) are presented in Table 1.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>MOSCOW MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>NORTH CAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>VOLGA-URAL MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>SIBERIAN MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>FAR EAST MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigades Motorized rifle</td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>13 (6)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne assault</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket artillery</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defence</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiotechnical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special forces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic reconnaissance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>141(54)</td>
<td>16 (4)</td>
<td>21 (6)</td>
<td>29 (8)</td>
<td>18 (9)</td>
<td>27 (14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After July 1, new brigades continued to be formed. As of December 2009, there were already 164 motorized rifle, tank, artillery, rocket, special forces, communications, engineer, logistics, etc., brigades found in the Ground Forces. Thus, twenty-three more completely new brigades appeared. The total number of the new brigades which until then did not exist amounted to seventy-eight. It is highly possible that the previously existing brigades were also being re-

13 The summary table compiled by the author, recording Ground Forces brigades mentioned in various open sources. The number of the newly formed brigades from the beginning of the stage to 1 July 2009 is given in brackets.
organized into brigades of the new structure. Similarly to the first part of the stage, the majority of brigades were formed in Siberia and the Far East; however, some of them were also established in the European part of Russia. One more peculiarity of this stage of the reform is the planned redeployment of nearly thirty newly formed brigades and their location in completely new places\textsuperscript{14}. The results of the second part of the stage are presented in Table 2\textsuperscript{15}.

Table 2. **Brigades of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation as of December 1, 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>MOSCOW MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>NORTH CAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>VOLGA-URAL MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>SIBERIAN MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
<th>FAR EAST MILITARY DISTRICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorized rifle</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>13 (6)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>11 (9)</td>
<td>15 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne assault</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket artillery</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defence</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiotechnical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special forces</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Electronic</td>
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<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>reconnaissance</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>164 (78)</strong></td>
<td><strong>29 (14)</strong></td>
<td><strong>29 (9)</strong></td>
<td><strong>18 (9)</strong></td>
<td><strong>33 (20)</strong></td>
<td><strong>37 (20)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results almost correspond to the data officially published in open sources and speeches of military command, indicating the number of brigades remaining after the reform (172 brigades\textsuperscript{16}) and that of the newly formed

\textsuperscript{14} Литовкин Д. „Генерал армии, главком Сухопутных войск Владимир Болдырев: Сухопутные войска должны стать компактными и мобильными“, *Известия*, 25 июня 2009 г.

\textsuperscript{15} The summary table compiled by the author, recording Ground Forces brigades mentioned in various open sources. The number of the newly formed brigades from the beginning of the stage to 1 December 2009 is given in brackets.

\textsuperscript{16} Божьева О. „Незаконное вооруженное реформирование“, *Московский комсомолец*, 12 ноября 2008 г.
brigades (80\textsuperscript{17} - 82\textsuperscript{18} - 85\textsuperscript{19}). As can be seen from the tables presented, some of the brigades are not known. It does not mean that they do not exist; simply no information was found about them in open sources.

Nearly each newly formed brigade participates in exercises shortly after its formation. For example, during the exercise “Kavkaz 2009” conducted in the North Caucasus, 7 new brigades were tested\textsuperscript{20}. Brigade exercises took place in training ranges beyond the Urals, in the Moscow Military District (Mulino range), in the Western part of Russia (“Osen-2009”: Ladoga-2009 and Zapad-2009). After the exercises, each new brigade practically became a standby readiness military unit.

It is planned that the number of standby readiness brigades capable of acting within one hour after receiving the signal will increase from 76 to 90\textsuperscript{21}. They will be staffed 95-100 percent. The remaining brigades will, most probably, be reserve brigades. They will be staffed with a smaller percentage of personnel or will have just received new military personnel; therefore, they will have a longer period for preparation to respond.

All the brigades have conscripted and contracted servicemen, but their numbers are different in different type brigades. For example, a motorized rifle brigade can have 80 percent of conscripts and 20 percent of contracted servicemen\textsuperscript{22}, whereas in an air defense brigade the situation can be the opposite.

Another interesting fact is that after the reform all units of the new military structure, the new brigades included, will have new flags. In his interview, the Director General of a company producing military heraldry said that for the year 2009 they have to produce 90 new flags, whereas in previous years the company had already produced about 200\textsuperscript{23}.

Almost simultaneously with the reform of the Ground Forces, the Air Force reform was being carried out, while the Navy was likely to be left for later time\textsuperscript{24}. At present, previously existing Air Force regiments and divisions have already been reorganized. An air force base in the Air Force has become an analogue of a Ground Forces brigade. Squadrons of fighters, fighter-bombers, helicopters and other aircraft are going to be deployed there. It has been declared that the bases will be of three categories\textsuperscript{25}. The first category will include bases of 5-10 squadrons and they will be designed to support all the forces. Lower category bases will support specific forces, e.g. the Ground Forces or the Navy. It is interesting that only part of the air bases are under the Air Force. Today, there are several dozens such bases; however, statements have already
appeared that only eight of them may be left\textsuperscript{26}. A great number of the new air bases will probably be placed under the Air and Space Defense Forces (ASD), the Navy, and, probably, the Ground Forces (helicopter bases).

Different Russian sources mention 69 new air bases. This makes more than “55 new air bases” referred to in different statements\textsuperscript{27}. The distribution of air force bases at the end of the first stage is presented in Table 3\textsuperscript{28}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE COMMAND</th>
<th>NUMBER OF AIR BASES</th>
<th>AIR BASES (No)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF STAFF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2457, 6996 uav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>86, 877,714, 922, 6960, 6965, 6992, 6996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>320, 6978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>265, 6984, 6986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>999, 3624, 6969, 6970, 6971, 6972, 6973, 6974, 6975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distant aviation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1449, 3918, 6950, 6951, 6952, 6953, 6954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport aviation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3919, 69??, 6956, 6957, 6958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air and Space Defence</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>?, 30, 420, 4215, 6956, 6959, 6962, 6963, 6964, 6967, 6968, 6975, 6977, 6979, 6980, 6981, 6982, 6985, 6987, 6988, 6989, 6990, 7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52, 2512, 7050, 7051, 7053, 7054, 7057, 7058, 7061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems that already at this stage 24 air bases and 13 new Air and Space Defense brigades are subordinate to the detached from the Air Force and newly formed Air and Space Defense Operations Command\textsuperscript{29}. They are distributed over the entire territory of Russia. The Air Space brigades were created on the basis of part of Air Defense units which had earlier belonged to the Air Force and they are armed with the S-300, S-400 systems and fighters. Some of them have their own air bases. Together with missile attack early warning stations belonging to the Space Troops they should provide the basis for the establishment of the Russian Air and Space Defense.

\textsuperscript{26} Садчиков А., „Уйдут на базу“, Известия, 9 июня 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{27} Литовкин В., “Минобороны приоткрывает карты”, Независимая газета, 14 ноября 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{28} The summary table compiled by the author, recording different Air Force bases mentioned in different open sources. “?” stands for the bases the deployment site of which is known, but their numbers have not been identified yet.
\textsuperscript{29} Собщение Интерфакс-АВН, 21 ноября 2008 г.
2.3. The Second Stage. The Operational and Strategic Link – Operational and Strategic Operational Command (2010-2012)

The main emphasis of the second stage of the reform, which apparently is taking place today, is the reorganization of the higher part of command and control of the Forces. It is officially said that the new structure will help to get rid of one command link – the division. The old structure had the following chain of command: regiment-division-corps-army-military district (wartime front). In the new structure, the regiment-division link will become the brigade, the corps-army will become the operational command and the military district (one or some of them joined) will turn into the joint strategic command. Thus, in essence, not only brigades will be introduced, leaving no regiments or divisions, but the level of the corps and army will be joined, i.e. one of them (corps, most probably) will be eliminated.

Very little is said about operational commands. According to the available information, in the Ground Forces and in the Air Force these commands are formed on the basis of previously existing armies, while in the Navy – on the basis of flotillas and fleets. It may be stated today that about ten operational commands are being or have been created in the Ground Forces and seven operational commands have already been formed in the Air Force. There have been first hints about some flotillas or even fleets being transformed into Navy operational commands. For example, plans to reorganize the Caspian Flotilla into an operational command and include it in the Black Sea Fleet have been mentioned\(^\text{30}\). The Russian President’s Decree of September 1, 2009 puts the Black Sea Fleet under the control of the Commander of the North Caucasus Military District and thus significantly lowers it status\(^\text{31}\). Alongside commands being formed on the basis of fleets, specialized operational commands, e.g. submarine forces, start coming into being as well\(^\text{32}\).

The establishment of new commands, foreseen in the concept of the reform and, tested by experiments, is inevitable; however, due to different reasons, their establishment has not been widely spoken about. For quite long even the supreme command had claimed that there would not be any strategic commands, simply every military district would be reorganized. The first official confirmations about their establishment but not necessarily in every district appeared at the end of 2009. Summarizing the results of the exercise “Ladoga 2009”, the Commander of the Ground Forces stated that the President’s decree on establishing strategic commands instead of military districts was to be signed by the end of the year\(^\text{33}\). According to him, strategic commands will concentrate huge forces in their hands. Not only the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Airborne Troops assigned to their territories, but also the

\(^{30}\) По материалам информационных агентств, „Каспий соединили с Черным морем“, Независимая газета, 17 июля 2009 г.
\(^{31}\) Литовкин В., „Со стратегическим размахом“, Независимая газета, 11 сентября 2009 г.
\(^{32}\) Интерфакс-АВН, „В ВМФ России создано командование подводных сил“, 12 декабря 2009 г.
\(^{33}\) Гаврилов Ю., „В ожидании времени “Ч“, РГ (Неделя), 8 октября 2009 г.
forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Federal Security Service and other departments will be under their subordination. Strategic commands will carry out all necessary planning in the directions entrusted to them and will be responsible for all executed or planned operations not only on the Russian territory but also outside its borders.

As has already been mentioned, regardless of the voiced ideas that each military district will be turned into a strategic command, it seems that the reform is going to be carried out according to the plan developed in 2005. This plan intended not to tie to the existing structures, i.e. military districts, but follow the strategic lines. Four Ground Forces Strategic Commands will most probably be formed, one for each strategic direction: in West, South, North and East. It is likely that the established Air and Space Strategic Command will also retain its status of a strategic command and in the future – a structure which will have control over the Russian nuclear forces.

The “Western” Strategic Command will encompass the forces which today are under the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts as well as the Baltic and the North Sea Fleets. The Strategic Command Headquarters will be located in St Petersburg. It is planned to be called the Western Military District. The attachment of the Baltic and the North Sea Fleets even more strongly supports the above mentioned claims that Naval operational commands may be formed on the basis of fleets, too.

The “Southern” Strategic Command, or the Southern Military District, will comprise the present North Caucasus Military District Forces, part of the territory and forces of the Volga-Urals Military District as well as the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla. As has been mentioned, it is highly possible that the flotilla will be incorporated in the Black Sea Fleet, whereas the latter will be reorganized into a Naval Operational Command. The District Headquarters is planned to be located in Rostov-on-Don.

The “Central” Strategic Command will be assigned a major part of the Volga-Urals Military District and the Forces of the Siberian Military District. It will be called the Central Military District and its Headquarters will be in Yekaterinburg.

The “Eastern” Strategic Command will have under it the Far East Military District Forces, the Pacific Fleet and the Kamchatka Flotilla. It will become the Eastern Military District with its Headquarters in Khabarovsk.

It is possible that alongside the Ground Forces strategic commands, specialized strategic commands responsible for specific activities, e.g. air and space defense, nuclear weapons or mobile rapid reaction forces, may come into being. The end of this stage is planned to be the year 2012, but some strategic commands seem to have already been formed (e.g. Air and Space Defense). The establishment of the four Ground Forces Strategic Commands itself will be completed by 1 December 2010. The boundaries and the directions of actions of these strategic commands are presented in Figure 1.

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34 РИА Новости, „Количество военных округов сократят до четырех“, Правда.Ру, 28 мая 2010 г.
2.4. The Third Stage. The End of the Reorganization – Optimization and Rearmament (2012-2020)

Several tasks are likely to be dealt with in this stage. First of all, it is planned to complete the optimization of the entire structure, which comprises not only the forces of the Ministry of Defense but also those of other Russian armed structures; it is also planned to create the wartime structure and provide armaments to the forces. All this should be finished by 2015-2016. Another task consists in substantial rearmament of the formed organization with a new type of armaments. This must be done by 2020.

The total number of the Russian military personnel planned after the optimization period will be around 1 million\textsuperscript{35}. Almost all Armed Forces will be ready to wage war at once\textsuperscript{36}. The Ground Forces should consist of 270,000 servicemen\textsuperscript{37}. These forces will be compact. From 1,890 Ground Forces military units and formations, 172 will remain, 76 to 90 of which will be standby readiness units\textsuperscript{38}. The rest will be reserve units, each of them having a fixed period of preparation for action\textsuperscript{39}. From 340 Air Force military units, 180 will

\textsuperscript{35} Коновалов А., „Армия для страны, а не наоборот“, Огонёк, 8 июня 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{36} Божьева О., „Незаконное вооруженное реформирование“ Московский комсомолец, 12 ноября 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{37} Коновалов А., „Армия для страны, а не наоборот“, Огонёк, 8 июня 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{38} Литовкин В., „Сержанты командуют генералами“, Независимая Газета, 19 июня 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{39} Черняк И., Гаврилов Ю., „Армия при цели“, Российская газета, 24 сентября 2009 г.
remain\textsuperscript{40}, the number of strategic-missiles units in the Armed Forces will be reduced from 12 to 8, number of units in the Space Troops – from 7 to 6, and in the Airborne Troops – from 6 to 5\textsuperscript{41}. The number of mobilization storehouses and training institutions, rear bases and other military installations which are not standby readiness units will also decrease.

During this stage, reserve and mobilization units are planned to be formed\textsuperscript{42} and issues related to the establishment of military territorial infrastructures (defense regions) are planned to be solved. A number of brigades of the new organizational structure created today are most likely to become key units of the reserve. On a regular basis or as required, they will be staffed with reservists and conscripts, refreshment training done and, if need arises, will be capable of reinforcing forces in a particular region. It has also been discussed as to how to transform them into standby readiness units faster. They are planned to be staffed with servicemen from other standby readiness brigades deployed in other regions of the country, redeploying them to a new location by military or civilian aircraft. Upon arrival at the new location, they will take over the armaments of the reserve brigade and will be ready to act\textsuperscript{43}. Such reserve brigades (about twenty infantry and artillery brigades) have already been formed in the Siberian and the Far East Military Districts. As to the remaining part of Russia, reserve brigades will, most likely, be far fewer in numbers, while in some places, e.g. in Kaliningrad Region,\textsuperscript{44} the Leningrad Military District\textsuperscript{45} or North Caucasus they are not planned at all. Another part of the wartime structure will be military equipment storages, officially called arsenals. They will probably have the structure of the new brigade and the necessary armaments and will become the basis for the formation of wartime units.

Finally, steps will be taken to establish the place and role of other Russian military structures and departments, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the like, within the overall military organization. According to Defense Minister A. Serdiukov, the reconstruction process of these structures has also started\textsuperscript{46}.

The optimization process of the structure is accompanied by a comprehensive renovation of the standard military procedures and norms base. Judging from commanders’ speeches, the tempo of renovation is fast. In June 2009, General V. Boldyrev speaks about a ready package of forty new military norms, standards, methodical instructions, statutes and other documents required for military activities, which will be verified during the exercises “Ladoga” and

\textsuperscript{40} Литовкин В., ,,Минобороны приоткрывает карты“, \textit{Независимая газета}, 24 ноября 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{41} Гаврилов Ю., ,,Наступление на штаты“, \textit{Российская газета}, 12 мая 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{42} Литовкин В., ,,Публичный день генерала Макарова“, \textit{Независимая газета}, 17 декабря 2008 г.
\textsuperscript{43} Бондаренко А., ,,Оперативный резерв для островного гарнизона“, \textit{Красная звезда}, 22 мая 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{44} Интерфакс-Северо-Запад, ,,Россия-Балтфлот-Реформа“, 21 ноября 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{45} Интерфакс-Северо-Запад, ,,Россия-Ленво-Реорганизация“, 29 ноября 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{46} Гаврилов Ю., ,,Наступление на штаты“, \textit{Российская газета}, 12 мая 2009 г.
“Zapad”. In March 2010, Chief of the General Staff N. Makarov mentioned 148 more new documents to be verified during the exercise “Vostok 2010”. By October 2010, all the necessary documents were planned to be prepared, approved and started to be used on 1 January 2011.

Nevertheless, the main stress of the optimization of the structure lies in the final restructuring of combat support and combat supply links, military training institutions and the like but not of combat forces. Radical changes are planned within the structure of military rear. One of the key amendments provided for in the Ivanov doctrine suggests that the principle of exterritorial supply of the forces should be refused. Previously, a lot of effort, forces and expenses were devoted to transporting stores from one arsenal in one region of Russia to another. Now the forces will be supplied on a territorial basis. The new brigades will practically have everything they need in their own arsenals, whereas the necessary replenishments will be provided from local resources. This will help to significantly reduce the number of rear forces, storehouses, arsenals and the amounts of the necessary stores. The Ministry of Defense is planning to disband 277 now existing military storehouses and installations and establish on their basis 34 complex bases of rear logistics and technical maintenance of all forces.

To enhance the logistics supply, understaffed rear military units will be disbanded. Regiments have been discarded. All of them will be replaced with fully staffed standby readiness units—brigades and battalions. By the end of 2010, in every military district it is intended to form at least two logistics brigades directly subordinate to it. All nine understaffed automobile brigades previously belonging to the rear forces have already been disbanded. Instead of them, 20 standby-readiness fully staffed separate automobile battalions have been formed. Each operational command will have one, and the strategic command will have two such battalions. Some of the new battalions have been transferred to new locations of permanent deployment. For example, the standby-readiness separate automobile battalion, formed on the basis of an automobile brigade of the former Moscow Military District, was redeployed to North Caucasus. To guarantee everyday supply to the brigades in their permanent deployment areas, it is planned to hand over all non-military services to civilian structures or even private companies. To this end, an experiment is being carried out in one of Moscow and three of Siberian Military District brigades. During the experiment, all service work of military units (food and laundry service, territory maintenance, etc.) is done by civilian enterprises.

48 Васенин В., „Обойма Макарова“, Российская газета, 23 марта 2010 г.
49 Литовкин Д „Минобороны в поисках нового облика“, Известия, 18 ноября 2009 г.
50 Интерфакс-АВН, „Россия-Армия-Тыл-Реорганизация, 11 ноября 2008 г.
51 Тихонов А., Потехина А., Елисеева М„ „На передовой и в тылу“, Красная звезда, 25 июня 2010 г.
52 Интерфакс-АВН, „Россия-Армия-Прообразования, 21 ноября 2008 г.
53 Интерфакс-АВН, „Войска Северо-Кавказского военного округа (СКВО) усилены 474-м отдельным автомобильным батальоном“, 26 октября 2009 г.
54 Литовкин В., „СиБО переходит на аутсорсинг“, Независимая газета, 25 июня 2010 г.
The result of the optimization should lie not only in the changed number of the military personnel but in its composition as well. As has been mentioned, all peacetime military forces will comprise about 1 million, whereas wartime forces will comprise 1.7 million servicemen. It is planned to cut approximately 200,000 officer positions and totally discard 140,000 praporshchiks (warrant officers). The first step has already been taken, discarding about 40,000 unfilled military positions. As of 1 December 2009, the Russian Military has no praporshchiks and only about 20,000 of them were left to serve in the newly created sergeant positions. The next step was to gradually discard lieutenants who graduated from military departments of civilian higher education institutions and were called up for their two-year military service. They make up about 7,500 and there will be none of them left by 2010. 26,700 officers who were serving during the declaration of the reform and have already reached the age set for service, will not be spared either. It is planned to dismiss all of them together with those 9,100 servicemen who by the end of the first stage, i.e. by December 2009, will have served the set time of service. Downsizing of military positions is being carried out. As assessed by the Ministry of Defense, the reorganization of military storehouses and bases as well as automobile brigades alone will make it possible to eliminate approximately 12,500 military positions, including almost 5,600 officers and praporshchiks. Positions of military medical personnel and some educational institutions are being turned into civilian ones. In the Air Force, it is planned to eliminate about 50,000 officer positions. Moreover, in order to cut the number of officers and to increase the number of servicemen employed by contract, a step was taken which, most probably, has been unseen throughout the entire history of the existence of the Russian military. Officers who graduated from military schools are either immediately dismissed or they are offered a job by service contract in the position of a sergeant or even a private. Such facts have been recorded in the Railway Troops and the Northern Fleet.

Although it has been announced that all these reductions should be completed by 2016, it is likely that this will be done earlier. The situation is presented in Table 4.
Table 4. The Number of Officers in the Russian Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>BEFORE THE REFORM</th>
<th>THE END OF 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generals</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonels</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-commissioned officers/midshipmen</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As has been foreseen\(^{61}\), the military training system is undergoing essential changes. Instead of the previously existing fifteen military academies, four military universities and forty six different military higher education institutions, ten large educational institutions are planned to be established. Three of them will be military scientific and research centers, six military academies and one military university. This year already, in Moscow, Podmoskovie and St Petersburg military scientific and research centers will start functioning\(^{62}\). They will be responsible for officer training and for scientific research work in specific areas of military science\(^{63}\). In total, the number of military higher educational institutions has been reduced by nearly one third, while the remaining were assigned to respective scientific and research centers and will become their branches. Today, a number of schools have been closed, and twenty more are going to be closed by 2013. It has been decided to temporarily stop the training of new officers; therefore, starting with 1 September 2010, all military schools in Russia will train sergeants\(^{64}\). In nineteen\(^{65}\) of them Sergeant Training Centers are at present being established. One of the first was founded in Riazane\(^{66}\). Conscripts will be trained in separate Training Centers. The entire new professional military training system should look like this (Figure 2)\(^{67}\).

\(^{61}\) The Ivanov doctrine foresaw that the military training reform had to be completed in 2010.
\(^{62}\) Иванов В., „Военная реформа: мнения Минобороны и экспертов“, Независимая газета, 18 декабря 2009 г.
\(^{63}\) Гафутуллин Н., „Мобильность, Боеготовность, Престиж“, Красная звезда, 15 октября 2008 г.
\(^{64}\) Литовкин Д., „Погонный минимум“, Известия, 29 июня 2010 г.
\(^{65}\) Белоусов Ю., „За содействием – к журналистам“, Красная звезда, 19 мая 2010 г.
\(^{66}\) Александров Л., „Миссия выполнима“, Красная звезда, 16 июля 2009 г.
\(^{67}\) A composite drawn by the author table fixing educational institutions mentioned in different open sources.
The last task of this stage is to rearm the new structure. By 2010\textsuperscript{68}, the amount of new armaments in the forces should make up not less than 30 percent. Later, by 2020, it should reach 70-100 percent\textsuperscript{69}. At present, new brigades are being armed with available new armaments and their modernized versions. In 2009, several motorized rifle brigades had already been rearmed by new tanks T–90 and armored combat vehicles BMP–3\textsuperscript{70}. Old armaments were altogether eliminated in some military districts as well. In the forces of the Moscow Military District, at the beginning of 2010, there remained only new and latest modification armaments (T–90, BMP–3)\textsuperscript{71}. In 2010, the forces will see an additional influx of about 250 tanks T–90, the new air defense system “BUK–M3”, the missile system “Smerch”, “Uragan”, “Grad”\textsuperscript{72}. In 2011, over three thousand items are planned of completely diverse new materiel and armaments, such as tanks T–90A, combat infantry vehicles BMP–2M, BMP–3, self-propelled artillery systems “Chosta” 2C–19, “Msta–S, armored personnel carriers BTR–70M, BTR–80, trucks “Kamaz”. It is planned to arm 5 brigades with the aforementioned weaponry\textsuperscript{73}. Most of the new brigades in Siberia and the Far East were organized on the basis of armed military units equipped with

\textsuperscript{68} Other sources (for example, A. Medvedev (24 05 2010), names the year 2015, not 2012.
\textsuperscript{69} Черняк И., Гаврилов Ю., “Армия при цели”, Российская газета, 24 сентября 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{70} Бородин Ю., “Экзамен на профпригодность”, Красная звезда, 20 ноября 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{71} “Russia moves forward with modernization”, Jane’s Defense Review, May 12, 2010.
\textsuperscript{72} Худолеев В., “Сухопутная мощь отчизны”, Красная звезда, 26 февраля 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{73} „Генерал армии, главком Сухопутных войск Владимир Болдырев: Сухопутные войска должны стать компактными и мобильными” , Известия, 25 июня 2009 г.

Figure 2. The New Military Training System of Russia
old armaments since no new armaments were available. Newer armaments are being rapidly transferred from the European part of Russia to these areas. The Air Force is also being renovated. It was declared that in 2010, 30 helicopters and 28 combat aircraft should be acquired and by 2015, it is planned to obtain about 400 new helicopters Mi–28, Ka–52, Mi–8M.

Apart from armaments, acquisition of other military equipment is particularly important; for example, equipment intended for the improvement of the command and control (C2) of the army. In addition to procedures, effective C2 of the forces depends on the state of the means of transmission of information and commands (in essence, equipment of communications). If C2 procedures are almost ready, tested during exercises Kavkaz 2009, Ladoga 2009, Zapad 2009, Vostok 2010 and will be approved, then the state of the means of communications in the Russian military today is rather poor. About 85 per cent of the means of communications in use are hopelessly outdated. President N. Medvedev, visiting the headquarters of the Moscow Military District and inspecting communication equipment used in the military, expressed satisfaction that the new-generation radio station “Azar” had already been created. At the same time, he ordered to replace all old, analogous means of communications by new digital ones by 2012. Today, they are already being supplied to tactical units of brigades and, by the end of 2010 the entire tactical chain of the military should be equipped with new means of communications.

To ensure lacking and later complete rearmament, general plans and programs for the rearmament of the forces are being revised and financing for the acquisition of armaments and equipment is being augmented. The new rearmament program, covering the period 2010–2020, will shortly be approved. The program plans to specifically name the types and amounts of the necessary armaments submitted by forces, whereas financing should be channeled directly to the producers but not to the forces. For the financing of the new program it is foreseen to allot 13 billion roubles by 2020 – which would approximately make up 1.3 billion roubles each year. The Ministry of Defense holds that the amount is not sufficient and asks for more – 36 billion roubles. It is likely that the allotted amount may increase. Recently a decision has been adopted to compensate the inflation in 2009–2011; therefore, the financial means assigned at present will be supplemented by additional 40–70 billion rubbles. State orders of Russia for the financing of the military complex are illustrated in Figure 3.

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74 Литовкин Д., „Генштаб отчитался о сокращении командиров“, Известия, 23 декабря 2009 г.
75 Интерфакс-АВН, „В ВВС России к 2015 году поступят 400 новых вертолетов“, 20 мая 2009 г.
76 Гаравский А., „Связь решает все“, Красная звезда, 22 мая 2010 г.
77 ТВ РТР передача „Вести“, 19:00, 23 мая 2010 г.
78 ИТАР-ТАСС, „Госпрограмма по вооружению на 2011–2020 годы будет утверждена
79 Литовкин В., „Россия в арьергарде гонки вооружений“, Независимая газета, 4 июня 2010 г.
Apart from budgetary means for the acquisition of armaments, the Ministry of Defense was empowered to take measures in order to obtain supplementary, non-budgetary financing. The Ministry of Defense sells military infrastructure and old armaments that have become available during the reform and retains the obtained money. This generates quite a lot of supplementary resources. For example, the initial price of an object on sale in St Petersburg is 400 million rubles\textsuperscript{81}. In Podmoskovie and in Moscow it is 212 million and one billion five million rubles\textsuperscript{82} respectively. The reform produced hundreds of such objects available for sale. A decision has been made to allow military personnel to organize lotteries as well. The Ministry of Defense hopes to pool about 3 billion rubles in 5 years\textsuperscript{83}. Though all the money can theoretically be used elsewhere, apparently the greatest part of it will be assigned to priority programs, among them for the acquisition of new combat materiel and armaments.

To more effectively resolve problems concerning rearmament and the supply of new military equipment, by the decree of the President, Vladimir Popovkin was nominated the Vice Minister of the Defense Minister. Previously, he was just a deputy of the Defense Minister responsible for armaments.

\textsuperscript{81} Presentation “Управление государственного заказа Министерства обороны Российской Федерации сообщает о проведении аукциона по продаже высвобождаемого недвижимого военного имущества, Красная звезда, 25 мая 2010 г.

\textsuperscript{82} “Управление государственного заказа Министерства обороны Российской Федерации сообщает о проведении аукциона по продаже высвобождаемого недвижимого военного имущества”, Красная звезда, 17 июня 2010 г.

\textsuperscript{83} Интерфакс-АВН, „Министерство обороны РФ предложило провести 16 государственных лотерей, чтобы профинансировать развитие Вооруженных сил“, 24 мая 2009 г.
will further be in charge of the rearmament of the military, yet his status has been elevated. The former Federal Subordination Agency for the provision of armaments to the Armed Forces is being assigned to the Ministry of Defense\textsuperscript{84}. Its new head, who used to work in the area of state taxes, will be responsible for the reduction of corruption and implementation of state orders. Thus, the implementation of the new armaments program should improve and the part of the orders by the Ministry of Defense in the general portfolio of orders will substantially increase.

3. The Military of the Russian Federation after the Reform

3.1. The New Brigade

Establishing a new brigade structure, Russia grounded it on the standpoint that in the future, even during a global conflict, warfare would not be conducted on entire fronts. That means that primary combat units should be autonomous, strong and mobile. Divisions are obviously too large for this. A brigade has become an optimal combat unit. The latter in most cases will have to fight independently without “neighbors on the right and left”. The USA, having a well-developed global positioning system (GPS), quite a lot of particularly precise armaments (PPA) and a powerful Air Force, has made it sure that it will always and everywhere in the world be able to support its brigades by fire. Russia is not capable of that yet. In spite of great efforts, Russia’s global positioning system “Glonass” is still inoperative and particularly precise armaments cannot be used without it. Besides, the Air Force has no and in the nearest future will have no sufficient aircraft to always support its forces by fire from the air. Thus, the new brigade in combat will have to rely on its own fire capabilities. Lack of precision will be compensated by a larger amount of artillery shells and missiles; therefore, instead of previous 1–2 artillery battalions the new brigade will have four: two self-propelled, one antitank and one reactive “Grad” artillery batteries. Motorized rifle battalions will also be reinforced by support fire capabilities. With reference to its fire power, the new brigade will nearly be equal to the old division.

To defend itself from the adversary, it will have a strong air defense component – two air defense battalions. In addition to these, their brigade will probably have three motorized rifle and one tank battalions\textsuperscript{85}, reconnaissance, engineer and logistics battalions, staff supply, radiological, chemical and biological defense, electronic warfare and medical companies. In comparison

\textsuperscript{84} Сообщение РИА Новости, 17 мая 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{85} However, there were some hints that a variant of a brigade with four motorized riflemen battalions each of which possesses a tank company is also possible.
to the old divisions which were large, heavy and immobile, the brigade will be sufficiently strong and very mobile: 4-5,000 troops, 41 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, 36 self-propelled and 18 reactive artillery systems, a lot of antitank and air defense systems. The planned new motorized rifle brigade structure is provided in Figure 4.

Figure 4. The Planned Organizational Structure of the New Russian Motorized Infantry Brigade

After the fire power, the capability to rapidly re-deploy within large distances is one of the most significant characteristics of the brigade capability. Though in the new brigade all combat systems will be self-propelled, in addition to that a sufficient number of other means of transport are planned. The Russian military personnel think that the main brigade employment arena will be our continent; therefore, its re-deployment will be mainly ensured by railway and by self-propulsion. Numerous exercises demonstrated that the new brigade can re-deploy within several days over hundreds and even thousands of kilometers in the combined manner (railway–self-propulsion).

A particularly rapid method of long-distance re-deployment of the brigade has also been foreseen. It is likely that this method will be applied in case a demand arises to strengthen the eastern borders of Russia. As we have already mentioned, in Siberia and the Far East areas, a presence of tens of ar-

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86 The figures are by the author obtained by generalizing data supplied in various sources.
87 The scheme is drawn by the author and registers structural parts of the new brigade mentioned in various open sources.
88 Сергей Своков, начальник главного штаба сухопутных войск РФ, интервью, Эхо Москвы, 10 октября 2009 г.
89 Литовкин В., „Гремя огнем, сверкая блеском стали”, Независимая газета, 2 октября 2009 г.
maments arsenals has emerged. They have all brigade-level armaments and materiel, but few personnel. It is planned to staff such arsenals–brigades with the personnel of other brigades, by simply taking the troops of one stand-by readiness brigade and moving them to the necessary area by air. The troops will just draw armory weapons and materiel and in twenty-four hours or more will be ready for combat actions. This re-deployment method is planned to be tested during “Vostok 2010” Exercise90.

In addition to motorized rifle brigades, Russia’s Ground Forces will also have new-structure tanks, artillery, reactive artillery, special purpose, communications and other separate brigades. Self-sustainability and mobility requirements, just as motorized rifle brigades, are applied to all of them. There is very little information about their structure and capabilities in open sources. All those brigades will be distributed to operational commands, so that they could support primary carriers of the military burden – motorized rifle brigades.

### 3.2. The New Operational Command

The new operational command will take the intermediate link between the strategic command and military capabilities – brigades. The exact number of operational commands is not disclosed, yet it is probable that there may be 15–20. The great majority – about 10 – will belong to the Ground Forces. The primary task of the Ground Operational Command will be planning and execution of concrete military ground operations. They will be supported by corresponding capabilities from air and sea. In most cases land operational commands will be established on the basis of former armies. It is likely that each of them will have under their subordination from two to six stand-by readiness motorized rifle and tank brigades, one–two artillery and reactive artillery brigades, several smaller units, such as an separate automobile battalion and so on.

At present, in the Air Force there are seven operational commands, four from which – the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th are ordinary operational commands of military forces. They have aircraft at their disposition to support the Ground Forces. Since their number coincides with that of strategic commands, it is likely that each strategic command will receive one such command. The remaining three operational AF commands are specialized, that is their mission will apparently be not just support of Ground Forces operations, but specialized missions. For example, the operational command of distant aviation will probably be responsible for strategic bombers, strategic air command and, perhaps, reconnaissance organization. The operational command of transport aviation will probably be responsible for strategic re-deployment and ensuring the activity of other forces (for example, airborne troops, etc.). The operational command of Air

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90 Бондаренко А., „Оперативный резерв для островного гарнизона“, Красная звезда, 22 мая 2010 г.
and Space Defense will probably be in charge of air and antimissile defense organization on the territory of the state.

The Navy is now only known to have established the operational command of Submarine Forces. This specialized command should be responsible for the activity of submarine vessels armed with nuclear missiles. On the basis of present fleets several ordinary operational commands will be established, the main task of which, as in case of respective AF commands, will be support of Ground Forces actions. Though no more information about the establishment of planned specialized military naval operational commands is available, it is feasible that after Russia has received the ocean-going fleet or has created capabilities for the transfer of expeditionary forces by ocean, there may be established commands for the planning and execution of these activities.

Speaking about the forces that are being reformed or restructured at present, such as airborne, strategic missiles or space troops, it should be pointed out that there are indirect signs indicating that they may also be reorganized into corresponding specialized operational commands.

Thus, an operational command is the intermediate part of the command and control link with concrete tactical capabilities assigned to it with a concrete strategic command in the lead. Depending on the tasks assigned to the command, strategic commands will be able to reinforce them by attaching to them the necessary capabilities from their reserves.

### 3.3. The New Joint Strategic Command

The strategic command will become the supreme link in the future command and control chain. As it was mentioned, by 1 December 2010, four ordinary land strategic commands will be established which will be responsible for strategic planning and activity according to territories and directions entrusted to them. Each of them will be joint and will have at its disposal several Ground, Air or Sea Forces operational commands. Some separate stand-by readiness capabilities will also be subordinated to them. Judging from the available data, strategic commands could enjoy direct subordination of reconnaissance, special forces’, airborne assault, electronic intelligence, logistics, NBC defense, engineer, tactical rockets, territorial communications, material supply and the like brigades. These entire brigades or their parts (battalions) could be attached to corresponding operational commands to execute concrete tasks.

As has been mentioned, strategic commands will be established on the basis of military districts. It is likely that the staff of an ordinary strategic command will be much smaller than the current staff of the military district and will be about 300 military personnel strong.¹

Though this has not yet become public, grounded on certain statements

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¹ Литовкин В., „Зачистка по-сердюковски“, Независимая газета, 11 марта 2010 г.
it is possible to make an assumption that, at the end of the reform, in addition to ordinary strategic commands there may emerge specialized ones. For example, the establishment de facto of operational commands for distant aviation and Submarine Forces prompts the assumption that they will be responsible platforms for shipping nuclear weapons and possible restructuring of strategic purpose missile troops into a specialized strategic purpose missile operational command logically leads to the establishment of joint strategic command of nuclear forces. Another example could be the attachment of already existing transport aviation operational command and possible airborne operational command to a theoretically feasible “rapid reaction or mobile forces” strategic command.

3.4. The New Armed Forces and Branches of the Army, Wartime Structures and the Reserve

Based on the available information, the three current types of the Armed Forces (the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Navy) and the three branches of the Army (strategic purpose missiles, airborne and space forces) will remain. Since today the types of the Armed Forces are in the completion stage of the reform, it is possible to make an assumption that in the nearest future the Army branches will follow.

As has been mentioned, after the reform the Russian Armed Forces will be divided into two groups. The larger part of each of them will belong to the so-called operational forces. These will be strategic commands, operational commands and combat, combat support, combat service support brigades and other units of Ground, Air and Naval Forces. The smaller part will remain in the structures, assigned to administer, train and supply operational forces. Previous, separate staffs of the Ground, the Air Force and the Navy will drastically decrease and will become directorates\(^92\) of the renewed General Staff. Alongside educational institutions and structural units tasked with armaments matters, they will constitute the non-combatant, i.e. the institutional part of the military.

It is possible that a similar future in the coming years will also fall to the staff of the Ground Forces and branches of the Army: strategic missiles, airborne and space troops. The greater part of them will most probably become operational forces. It is also possible that the former airborne troop’s structure will not change and divisions will remain. They are even planned to be reinforced. Air defense and other capabilities\(^93\) are intended to be established in them and some of them will even be assigned subordinated air transport capabilities, such as helicopters. This change as well as the recent decision to

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\(^{92}\) Литовкин В., “Парад реформ не затормозил”, Независимая газета, 14 мая 2010 г.

\(^{93}\) Литовкин В., “Единый государственный экзамен по-сердюковски”, Независимая газета, 26 июня 2010 г.
transfer Airborne Forces aviation to the Air Force makes it possible to assume that these forces will be transformed into mobile rapid reaction forces. Current staffs of the forces will split into operational commands and into small elements in the General Staff. The latter alongside the educational institutions of army branches will become the institutional army.

There is almost no available information in open sources about the intended wartime structure of the Russian military. Judging from common knowledge, it is possible to assume that in wartime quite a lot of new military units will be established in the Russian military by using arsenals of peacetime armaments. The army of the interior that today is under the Ministry of Interior and is facing soon to be carried out reforms94 may be transferred to the military. This is also confirmed by during the recent years established practice to assign officers of the Ground Forces to the commanding positions of the Interior Army.

As early as the beginning of 2009, in several radio interviews, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Russia Gen. Col. Smirnov hinted at the new concept of the military reserve and mobilization. According to it, conscription will remain and will even increase. The reserve will be formed only from troops that have served under contract in concrete positions (e.g. tank driver, section leader). Contracts will be signed with them and they will be assigned to parts of the reserve to carry out the same duties they used to execute during their contracts. They will be regularly trained, will receive salaries and pensions. To fill the rest of the positions in reserve units, conscripts that have already finished their service will probably be accepted and mobilized in case of necessity. They will not be considered reservists. The principles of this concept are not contradicted but rather confirmed by recently voiced ideas of Chief of General Staff that the list of military positions occupied by contract-bound troops will be revised. Their number in the forces may decrease and that of the conscripts may increase95. The only positions that will remain agreed upon as important for combat capability, such as a section leader, tank commander, combat vehicle driver, etc. regular riflemen, machine-gunners, grenadiers, target acquisition specialists of artillery pieces, etc., will be draftees. Thus, it will be possible to improve the training quality of troops serving under contract (future reservists), increase salaries and at the same time to train a greater number of reserve privates (conscripts that have served) for the mobilization reserve96. The necessary documentation is currently in preparation and the system will come into force in 2016. Keeping in mind that Russia’s military after the mobilization will hold 1.7 million troops and comparing that with the old military which after the mobilization had to amount to nearly 5 million97, the downsizing is considerable.

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94 Гаврилов Ю. „Наступление на штаты“, Российская газета, 12 мая 2009 г.
95 Васенин В., „Обойма Макарова“, Российская газета, 23 марта 2010 г.
96 Интерфакс-АВН, „В российской армии существенно сократится численность контрактников“, 26 мая 2010 г.
97 Гаврилов Ю., „Наступление на штаты“, Российская газета, 12 мая 2009 г.
4. Problems and Reform
Implementation Obstacles

Every state attempts to demonstrate its achievements and conceal failures. Russia is not an exception. The reform right after its declaration encountered and continues to encounter a multitude of objective and subjective problems and obstacles. They are rather numerous and diverse as to their origin (political, economic, social, psychological, etc.). This study will expand only on those problems that cause the greatest interest of the society. They can (roughly) be joined into groups. The first comprises economic problems and obstacles. It is the financing of the reform, state of the military industry, provision and employment problems concerning those dismissed into the reserve. The second group covers morale issues in the military. It is the opposition to the reform, military corruption and crimes, hazing, service dodging and so on. Most of them have already been mentioned in the previous parts of the study while speaking about the stages of the reform and their implementation. Here, we will provide only that information that has not been touched upon.

A considerable amount of money was allotted for the reform, but the crisis largely affected its financing. First of all, this prevented the implementation of the plans to staff all stand-by readiness brigades with professional troops. The idea of a hundred percent professionalization of the Russian stand-by readiness forces was ruined. Pay too meager, unresolved everyday-life problems of troops-professionals and other causes precluded the implementation of ambitious plans. Though officially it has been declared that the first stage of universal army staffing with professionals has already been completed, it may rather be the last. Conscripts are coming back to the brigades. First of all, this will reduce the previously mentioned desirable number of 80–90 stand-by readiness brigades to 40–50. Secondly, even in stand-by readiness brigades conscripts will serve. Notably, it has never been in Russia’s plans to renounce conscripts. A more intensive training of conscripts made it possible to cut their training time up to 3–5 months, thus providing conditions to create a system where a brigade staffed by conscripts could become that of a stand-by readiness in half a year. As previously mentioned, troops serving under contract will remain. In the opinion of the Russian military command, their number will be augmented from the today available 150 thousand up to 200–250 thousand at the end of the reform.

The crisis and shortage of financing had a considerable impact on the supply and armaments of the new army. It is often pointed out that the primary problem is old armaments. It is true, yet it should be emphasized that at present not only Russia, but also most other states are not capable of acquiring sufficiently new weapons. Everywhere armaments are being reduced by lea-
ving only the newest ones. Most attention is being paid to their modernization. Russia has chosen the same way. From colossal arsenals only those armaments that were the latest and most suitable have been chosen. Here is an example. Having selected and modernized the best, the least used tanks from a couple of tens of thousands, Russia has produced a rather powerful approx. 4000 strong tank park. Tanks T–90 (on T–72 basis) and modernized T–72BM are capable of fighting in contemporary battles particularly with a similarly armed opponent. The newly nominated deputy of the Minister of Defense for rearmament V. Popovkin said in a radio interview that in 2009 they managed to break the formerly dominating tendency for combat materiel modernization and maintenance. From 2009, the greater part of orders for the military industrial complex is acquisition of new armaments and materiel. In 2010, nearly one third of all means allotted for the military industrial complex were for the acquisition of new armaments. Russia has already taken serious steps towards the creation of new future armaments.

A great problem that emerged during the execution of the reform was provision of dismissed officers with accommodation and their further employment. According to the data of the Defense Ministry, the number of the dismissed from the service officers with no available quarters amounts to 112.9 thousand. They have all been promised accommodation by 2012. The financing of the construction of flats for retiring and discharged from armed forces military personnel has increased. In 2009–2010, it was planned to obtain 90,700 flats. In 2009, the Ministry of Defense obtained 45,644 flats of this type and is planning to acquire still more in 2010, up to 51,900. True, in many regions the program is still lagging behind, the quality of accommodation and other problems are being encountered; however, these problems are being slowly solved. Understanding how important it is to employ still young discharged captains and majors that constitute about 100 thousand, the Ministry of Defense announced that starting in 2009, it would form an institute of cadre reserve. There are plans to employ most officers having specialties in the subunits of the newly being established controlling company “Oboronservis”, structures of the military industrial complex, assist them in establishing their own business, related to providing services for the Armed Forces, organize re-qualification courses, etc.

Russia plans to resolve all these and other problems by further increasing financing allotted to the national defense, which from 2.6 per cent of the GNP.
declared in 2010 should increase in 2011–2012 up to 2.9 per cent, in 2013 – to 3.0 per cent of the GNP and later will keep increasing up to 3.1 per cent.\(^\text{106}\)

Corruption and crimes among military personnel continue to remain a great problem. This is best confirmed by the behavior of officers or reform opponents who will be dismissed after the reform. The number of financial crimes, thefts in structures and military units that are being restructured and particularly those that are planned to be eliminated has considerably increased when it became clear that the reform was unavoidable. Generals, colonels and junior rank military personnel began to steal military assets and take bribes. Before the declaration of the beginning of the reform, at the end of 2008, this problem was under consideration even in the Federal Assembly of the Russian Parliament. Then, the Ministry of Defense announced that only in the pre-reform year of 2007, military personnel committed 36,530 financial crimes, over ten thousand military personnel were charged with money embezzlement. The total damage caused to the state exceeded 1 billion 856 million rubles. During the second half of the year 2008 alone, more than 1,000 corruption cases were disclosed.\(^\text{107}\) This problem is being fought against. The same presentation points out that in 2007 and during the first half of 2008 more than five hundred officers, among them sixteen generals were sentenced for corruption.\(^\text{108}\) The situation did not improve in 2009 either. Chief Military Prosecutor of Russia, Sergej Fridinsky said in one of his interviews that through the incomplete year of 2009, 20 generals were charged, 1,611 officers were sentenced from which as many as 160 were commanders.\(^\text{109}\) During the three years that Minister A. Serdiukov was in office, 44 generals were discharged, from them as many as 34 had served in positions of the highest military hierarchy.\(^\text{110}\) The Military Procurator’s Office investigated the affairs of most of them, several officers committed suicides. The Military Procurator’s Office of Russia is still very busy investigating criminal acts committed by junior rank officers.

The amount of service pay plays not the least role concerning the troops’ morale. In essence, the inadequate pay has already ruined the first attempts to ensure the attractiveness of the service under contract. Taking this into consideration, military pay will be revised. Chief of General Staff Makarov remarked in many of his interviews and statements that in 2012, the average pay of junior officers will be 58–78 thousand rubles, that of senior officers will be up to 150 thousand rubles. Divisional or brigade commanders’ pay will amount to 200 thousand rubles per month.\(^\text{111}\)

Hazing continues to remain a great headache in the Russian Armed Forces. One of the conditions for its existence is the exterritorial principle of conscription service which is further applied; thus, in units, troops from diffe-

\(^{106}\) Владыкин О., “Деньги оборонке не помогут“, Независимая газета, 10 июня 2010 г.

\(^{107}\) Миранович Г., „Национальная безопасность: военный аспект“, Красная звезда, 9 октября 2008 г.

\(^{108}\) Миранович Г., „Национальная безопасность: военный аспект“, Красная звезда, 9 октября 2008 г.

\(^{109}\) Ямшанов Б., „Форменное безобразие“, Российская газета, 9 июля 2009 г.

\(^{110}\) Литовкин В., „Зачистка по-сердюковски“, Независимая газета, 11 марта 2010 г.

\(^{111}\) Сообщение Интерфакс-АВН, 21 мая 2009 г.
rent regions and nationalities serve. This is confirmed by current mass fighting between different nationality conscripts in one of the newly-formed brigades in Siberia Military District\textsuperscript{112}, ethnic disagreements in one of the military units of Leningrad Military District\textsuperscript{113}, etc. The military command of Russia realizes that in part the problem is caused by the fact that in civilian society life is far from good. Yet, the primary means for the solution of this problem lie in the strengthening of the military legal basis, and the possibility to revise and partly renounce the exterritorial principle of service. It is also planned to improve the general conscription quality by calling up more conscripts with secondary and higher education. One of the possible solutions now being proposed is a change in the age of conscripts. Senior conscripts are expected to behave more seriously. There are also attempts to resolve hazing on the basis of spiritual guidance with the assistance of the church. In December of 2009, an office of the deputy of the commander for work with believers (a military chaplain) was established in the Armed Forces. The first chaplains have already started their service\textsuperscript{114}. However, one of the primary ways for the solution of this problem is considered the employment of forces. If adequate financing makes it possible to constantly keep military units busy in the places of their deployment, training ranges and missions, hazing should be substantially cut.

The possibility to dodge compulsory service has a particular impact on the morale of conscripts. Though in recent years a revised order of the exemption from the conscription and improved conscription quality yielded positive results and reduced the number of those dodging the draft (Figure 5)\textsuperscript{115}, yet, in 2009, having practically completed the reorganization of the tactical chain of the Armed Forces and having called up for compulsory service a record number of conscripts (305 thousand troops\textsuperscript{116}), it grew up to 17,742\textsuperscript{117}. In the opinion of the Military Command of Russia, the year 2010 will be most difficult. It will be necessary to decide the fate of more than 189 thousand Russian citizens who are currently dodging service\textsuperscript{118}.

\textsuperscript{112} Литовкин Д. „И их генералы идут под арест“, \textit{Известия}, 7 июля 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{113} Зея Н., "В Литовкин Д. „И их генералы идут под арест“, \textit{Известия}, 7 июля 2010 г. военную часть атаковала диаспора", \textit{gazeta.ru}, 12 апреля 2010 г.
\textsuperscript{114} Алексеев В., Мельников А., „Батюшки для внеслужебного времени“, \textit{Независимая газета}, 25 декабря 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{115} Белоуза А., Литовкин Д, „Новобранцам не до смеха“, \textit{Известия}, 3 апреля 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Литовкин Д., „15 дивизий отказываются служить“, \textit{Известия}, 2 апреля 2009 г.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
Conclusions

Having evaluated what has already been done in the Russian military, what is currently being done and what is planned for tomorrow, it is obvious that the reform has become irrevocable. One way or another, it will be completed. What conclusions can be drawn and what can be expected?

First of all, it is obvious that this is not an ordinary propaganda reform, many of which have already been carried out. This reform has been well thought out, substantiated by the analysis of the contemporary foreign militaries and latest wars, and adjusted for the establishment of a new type of the military. Its fundamentals are presented in the Ivanov doctrine and theoretically supported. Moreover, before it was begun, it underwent nearly two years of testing and only later was officially begun to implement.

Secondly, it is likely that after this reform, Russia will completely renounce the idea of its stand-by readiness for a global war that has been prevailing until now. The Russian military will be constantly ready to fight local wars and resolve local conflicts. In the Georgia–Russia conflict Russia demonstrated the importance of rapidly winning a local war, aborting military actions and, in negotiations, under the pretence of a nuclear potential, consolidating the achievements reached.

After the reform, the functioning, command and control, and structure of the military personnel will drastically change. Stout generals and colonels, and warm rear positions will have to be forgotten. Redundant or officers with little potential will be mercilessly discharged, many military positions turned civilian. The tempo of reductions is colossal, drastic and cruel. Whatever has been planned for the reduction by 2016, has nearly been reached today. Most newly formed brigades are currently commanded by forty-year-old colonels for whom the success of the reform is the issue of their personal future.

The military will become comparatively small. 1 million troops at peacetime and 1.7 million after the mobilization is a very normal army size for such a
country as Russia. This will considerably reduce its mobilization capacity, and make it possible to practically channel all the financing for the necessary maintenance and operations of the available combat readiness of the military.

Finally, after the completion of the reform, with Russia further retaining the moratorium of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), that is by not following the limitations concerning the deployment of armaments provided for in it, at the borders of the Baltic States and at the same time of NATO, there will emerge, perhaps not so numerous in numbers, but considerably qualitatively reinforced Armed Forces. The deployment sites of new brigades in the former Military Districts of Leningrad, Moscow or even Kaliningrad are thus far unknown. It is feasible that the deployment of brigades, capable of starting actions within several hours after the received signal not far from the borders, and the retained naming of NATO in the current military doctrine of Russia as one of the main sources of threat can have an impact on the security of the entire region.

*Trakai, June 30, 2010*