



Book reviews

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Mary Hirschfeld, *Thomas Aquinas and the Market: Toward a Humane Economy* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2018)

In her *Aquinas and the Market*, Mary L. Hirschfeld initiates a conversation regarding a Thomistic economics. Certain parts of this book will be of interest to a general public, while others are quite technical. It is noteworthy that Hirschfeld concentrates on the limitations of the rational choice model and economists' conception of human nature. These are features of microeconomics. Chapter two, devoted to the rational choice theory, will be less palatable to non-economists. The author starts with the observation that economics as a discipline cannot determine the higher ends that material wealth is meant to serve. She concludes that theology could provide the anthropological framework necessary to help us determine these ends. What we would then get is what she calls 'theological economics'. She is acutely aware of the difficulty of such a project. As an economist and a theologian, she appears to have a hard time integrating the two disciplines. Her solution to an uneasy, if not impossible, dialogue is to make theology the dominant partner in a theological economics.

Hirschfeld's struggle to bridge the gap between two clashing paradigms is reflected in the chapters. The bulk of chapters three and four is devoted to a Thomistic anthropology. Chapter three, which is about Thomistic metaphysics, is unlikely to appeal to the non-theologian. In chapter four, Aquinas' conception of happiness and

the virtue ethics are expounded. Rational choice is here contrasted to prudence as understood by Aquinas. In these chapters, Hirschfeld does not go beyond the juxtaposition of conflicting positions. A more fruitful conversation might have been possible if she had addressed the conflict at a more fundamental level. Indeed, she repeatedly observes that economic thought rests on metaphysical premises, but she never really works these out.

Chapter six is the most engaging part of the book, where Hirschfeld straightforwardly addresses the question of economic justice without any forced dialogue. Ironically enough, she successfully re-appropriates the Thomistic legacy in addressing the issue of justice. Such integration involves a critical reappraisal of that same legacy. Hirschfeld thus correctly points out that Aquinas accepted the prevailing social norms and institutionalized inequalities of medieval societies. Giving people their due in that context is giving them what is due to them according to their social status, and not their needs. Hirschfeld wonders why for Aquinas ‘the high standards of living of the lords [did] not constitute robbery with respect to the many peasants who lived on the margin of survival’ (p. 171). The same question can be raised today even if the wealthy are no longer aristocrats.

In that same chapter, Hirschfeld reintroduces the concept of limited needs and points to a paradox. There is a widespread belief, voiced by Keynes, among others, that prosperity is necessary to fulfil our economic necessities and that as these are fulfilled, we would become more virtuous persons. Hirschfeld shows that the opposite has happened. Growth has led to rising living standards, and our wants have accordingly increased. Keynes assumed limited needs, in line with Thomistic thought. The distinction between limited needs and unlimited wants has been lost in economic thinking. Hirschfeld invites us to re-introduce the notion that material goods are instruments to a good life, to think about what we need for a good life, and to distinguish the necessary from the superfluous. More than Aquinas, she emphasizes the role of genuine sacrifice in achieving economic justice. Hirschfeld’s appeal ‘to delink social status from income’ deserves special attention (p. 184). She thereby touches upon the sociocultural roots of economic malfunctioning.

Hirschfeld, unfortunately, does not address the limitations of markets. Though she points out some of the failures of markets, she is oblivious of the private economic forces behind markets, those who determine the rules of the game, and thus prices. She really seems to believe that there is an invisible hand regulating demand and supply. Especially regarding just wages, to which she is committed, she should have acknowledged the fact that these cannot be determined by the price mechanism. Labour (people) and land (nature), including the sand of beaches, are no commodities. This is what a Christian economics should make clear. What is blurring Hirschfeld’s vision is her (unconscious) commitment to liberal individualism. This leads her to speak of a ‘market society’ (p. 8). She should have known that ‘market society’ is a contradiction in terms because society, properly understood, is a community. In this regard, she could have learnt from Aquinas, who, as Hirschfeld notes (while not

agreeing with him), thinks that ‘the production of order in a society requires direction from political leaders’ (p. 28). In slightly different words, a good economy is one that is governed by a political community, led by wise leaders, and in accordance with the vision of the good life endorsed by that community. The fact that both community and leaders are missing today does not make them less necessary.

[Roshnee Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, Tilburg University]

Domenic D’Ettore, *Analogy after Aquinas: Logical Problems, Thomistic Answers* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2019)

One of the dangers that threatens vitality of philosophy and theology is the prejudice that certain topics are self-understandable once and for all. This implies a clear insight into the emergence, development and final clarification of the topic into the current structure that makes it then accessible for application. This is also sometimes at stake with the question of analogy, which is then handled in an unquestioned manner, enabling a shortcut way to operationalization of this fundamental way of communicating the relation between God and creatures.

Domenic D’Ettore’s book is a valuable cautioning that we are far away from settling the question of analogy. What is customarily passed on to the future generations is a tip of the iceberg beneath which there is a genuine richness of crucial discussions about constitutional and paramount issues of the doctrine of analogy.

Analogy after Aquinas opens to readers insight into this richness by exploring Dominican Thomists between fourteenth and the middle of the sixteenth century who had an important influence on the development of the doctrine of analogy. These authors are defenders of Thomas Aquinas’ approach to the analogy when facing charges developed by John Duns Scotus, who argued that in metaphysics and natural theology terms are predicated univocally and not analogously.

D’Ettore provides a swift and straightforward introduction to the structure of the doctrine of analogy. From Aristotle and Boethius to the Middle Ages, the reader is brought to the heart of the problem. As author himself states, this book deals with Thomists and only secondarily with Aquinas, indulging into the main arguments of the given answers by his devotees when facing problems and criticism of the master’s doctrine of analogy. D’Ettore provides a lucid insight into these responses by positioning them in relation to the three interrelated perspectives or problems of the doctrine.

The first perspective includes the question whether in analogy a single *ratio* is predicated analogously or are many *rationes* predicated in ways that are analogous to each other. D’Ettore names this perspective the “*Rationes* Problem”. The second perspective deals with the role of analogy of proportionality in Aquinas’ metaphysics and the relationship between analogy of proportionality and other modes of analogy. Author names this perspective the “*Analogy Model* Problem”. The third perspective deals with the question how analogous terms can mediate demonstrations without

falling into the fallacy of equivocation. This is named as the “Equivocation Problem”. This division will provide excellent landmark of all further work in this book.

Let us provide a short scheme of the book. With the Introduction and Conclusion, the book has six main chapters. In the first chapter, we are presented with the objections from John Duns Scotus (1265-1308). In the second chapter, first two defenders of Aquinas analysed, namely Thomas of Sutton (ca. 1250 -1315) and Hervaeus Natalis (ca. 1250 – 1323). In the third chapter the French Dominican John Capreolus (1380 – 1444) is investigated with remarks about Peter Auriol (1280 – 1322), in whose writings Capreolus found inspiration for his approach of confronting the problems. In the fourth chapter, the fifteenth-century Dominicans Paul Soncinas (d. 1494) and Dominic of Flanders (1425 – 1479) are assessed. In chapter five, Thomas de Vio Cajetan’s (1469 – 1534) understanding of the question of analogy is considered, while the sixth chapter evaluates the critical reception of Cajetan by Francis Silvestri of Ferrera (1474 – 1528) and Chrysostom Javelli (1470 – 1538). In conclusion, a brief overview of analysed issues is provided with authors suggestion that any further investigation of the perspectives or problems listed above needs to take into consideration Aquinas’ understanding of the development and application of the concepts by the intellect.

D’Ettore has given us a truly clear insight into the fundamental issues of the Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy, into the objections that were raised against it and into the imagination and ingenuity with which Thomists tried to further develop the doctrine. One of the important contributions to the clarity of reasoning in this book are the tables that author prepared, which clearly convey important landmarks, both of the individual thoughts of certain authors and of all authors. The book is also markedly valuable as an example of a luminous approach to complex issues, developing coherently all the important ideas and stages of the development of Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy in the writings of Thomists. For these reasons, we recommend this book to all those who are interested in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas (in which analogy maintains a crucial role), in Thomism as such, or in the doctrine of analogy itself, which is still the cornerstone in metaphysics and natural theology when articulating the relationship between God, the world and creatures.

[Saša Horvat, University of Zagreb]

Nicholas Kahm, *Aquinas on Emotion’s Participation in Reason* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2019)

The book by Nicholas Kahm entitled *Aquinas on Emotion’s Participation in Reason* is a very good compendium presenting the issue of human emotionality and the responsibility of man for its direction and formation. It must be remembered, that according to Aquinas, all desires, including the sensual (*appetitus sensibilis*) is in a strict sense an active authority, whose formal subject is the being, something perceived as good that is the aim of aspirations and desires. An acting man can become good, or

- when he does not act in accordance with reason, when he chooses such a good that does not correspond to his rational nature - evil. In agreement with the rational anthropology of Thomas Aquinas, and as the first part of the book (Part I: *The Soul as a Potential Whole*) indicates, sensual desire is located in the human soul, in the frame of reference of its authorities, in some close "vicinity" of the intellect and will, although it belongs to a different sphere of activity, in this case dependent on corporality. Sensuality (*sesualitas*) and emotionality of the soul (*passionibus animae*) go together, just as the sensual desire (*appetitus sensibilis*), which characterizes not only humans but also animals, surely the higher positioned ones, which are equipped with feelings as well (*passiones*). In humans, feelings occur not only in the sphere of sensual life, but likewise on the level of mental or spiritual life (*vita intellectiva*). In addition, spiritual feelings retain the vital content of *passio* that is important to them, but in being the acts of mental power of desire (*appetitus intellectivus*), namely the will (*voluntas*) they are given their own name "affect" (*affectus*), which Kahm mentions in the context of his reflection on the contents of Thomas's Quaestio XXVI from *De veritate*.

However, the main topic of interest by the author is emotionality understood as a sensual desire. The action of feelings is different in animals than in humans, completely deprived of freedom, due to instincts which solely determine their actions. While humans are faced with the total possibility of freely managing the emotional and sensual sphere. The author highly designates this in the subsequent analyzes of Aquinas' works, both in the *Commentary on Peter Lombard Sentences*, and in *Summa Theologiae*, as well as the discussed issues of *De veritate*, *De malo*, *De virtutibus in communi*, or in his *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*. This is the content of the second part of the book reviewed here (Part II: Participating in reason). The author pays particular attention to the participation (*participatio*) of feelings in the morally improved responsible action of man. The hierarchy of mutual dependencies was very clearly emphasized, on top of which Thomas situates universal reason (*ratio universalis*), that has a managerial role towards the particular reason (*ratio particularis*), in direct management towards the emotionality of man. The task of reason is superior here in the sense that it defines what is good in itself, and therefore is also worthy of the human will when it sets it as a goal. In this way, reason directs the whole human being and sets the path for its development and improvement. Moral virtues enable reason to make such advancements in the area of its managerial activities that it permits feelings to be expressed and to partake in the decision-making and activity. In the framework of human acts feelings have "something of their own", which simultaneously demonstrates that reason does not work according to them - as Thomas says - "despotically", but "politically" and "royally" (cf. S. Th., I, q. 81, a. 3). Reason regards feelings with a full approval of their partaking, especially in accepting their spontaneity, which, however, does not indicate losing their managerial role and the power of judgment in relation to them. Reason gives its consensus for them to possess what is their own: the element of true pleasure, joy and contentment. This decision of reason implies that the will which strives to achieve its ultimate goal will

have the opportunity to move rightly towards it, and this enables the "royal" approach of reason to feelings. Here, the will as *liberum arbitrium* prompts reason that in the field of increasing perfection in human deeds, feelings should in fact remain free, only by providing them with strength and impetus to act. The need for such shaping of feelings contains its close connotation in the efficiency of moral virtues, both in the internal space of the human soul as in the context of social references, which is highlighted by the author in the third part of his book (Part III: The Plausibility of Aquinas' Position). Apart from the leadership role of reason, a thorough understanding of the will and its role in directing feelings is just as important for Aquinas. In this point, Aquinas strongly opposes what Kant thinks on this subject, who, concerning only about the "purity of reason" excluded the participation of anything and anyone in the causative reason of human deeds.

The author should be congratulated on such an in-depth study on human emotionality, which, as he correctly points out, attends as an irreplaceable matter of human acts, naturally with the consent of reason.

[Mirośław Mróz, Nicolaus Copernicus University]

Reginald Lynch, *The Cleansing of the Heart: The Sacraments as Instrumental Causes in the Thomistic Tradition* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2017)

The Cleansing of the Heart is a systematic and historically-grounded account of sacramental instrumental causality that, while technical, does not sacrifice clarity for precision. The title refers to Thomas Aquinas' view that the "cleansing of the heart" (a phrase originating in Augustine) requires a sacramental and moral realism in which the sacraments are the causal instruments of preparing someone, through grace, for beatitude. As Reginald Lynch, OP explains, this is a cleansing that renews the person "after the heart of Christ in the divine friendship of charity." (201) Sacramental causality, thus construed, entails consideration of how the natural elements of the sacraments have spiritual effects. Consequently, though this is primarily a theological study, it repeatedly invokes natural principles from philosophy in order to explicate its thesis. In other words, any answer to this critical theological question must be informed by a philosophically robust view of causality. This study does require familiarity with philosophical and theological terminology, but Lynch carefully guides his reader through the distinctions needed for his exposition which guards against loss of comprehension by the non-specialist.

This study opens with an extensive account of the historical context of viewing the sacraments as causes. In this first chapter, Lynch presents the early Augustinian and Victorine traditions, the developments of Peter Lombard, then Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic Tradition before outlining the historical and theoretical connections between sacramental efficacy and moral causality. He then considers the "major watershed" of sacramental theology—the Council of Trent—which recalled key issues

from Victorine Augustinianism while countering the Protestant tendency towards occasionalism. Lest one regard sacramental efficacy as concerning only early theological thought, Lynch provides an extensive account of this topic in the twentieth century.

In the second and third chapters of this study, he considers Thomas Aquinas directly, beginning with his *Commentary on the Sentences* in chapter two. Here Lynch notes that in order to understand Thomas' view of causal efficacy one must first understand his understanding of God and creation. Because Thomas views the sacraments as *instrumental* causes one must see the source of their efficacy in God and their effects in creatures. The presentation of the *Sentences* commentary is extensive and admirably clear, providing an exposition of the foundational principles of sacramental efficacy. In chapter three, he advances to the accounts in *De Veritate* and *De Potentia Dei* before arriving at the treatment of sacramental causes in the *Summa Theologiae*. Helpfully, Lynch employs the development and commentary of other early Thomists to clarify these accounts of grace in its relation to the sacraments as causes, a practice he continues in the fourth chapter. The fourth and final chapter treats in special detail the account of sacramental causes of Melchior Cano, who proposed that they serve as "moral" rather than "natural" causes. Lynch shows how this view follows from an occasionalist conception of the sacraments, which is counter to the view of Thomas. Of particular note in this chapter is Lynch's demonstrating of how methodology and philosophical stances have significant theological implications.

Seeing in the work of Thomas Aquinas not only "a nuanced response to metaphysical occasionalism but a sapiential synthesis of theological doctrine," Lynch maintains that "it is the task of the Thomistic school to articulate that synthesis in our own time." (200) To this end, he carefully traces the historical development of viewing the sacraments as causes while presenting the pertinent metaphysical and theological issues that must be grasped if one is to adequately understand sacramental causality. As Lynch explains, "the lesson of historical experience is this: unless core metaphysical questions which concern the sacraments, grace, and anthropology are addressed directly, new rhetorical modalities, be they drawn from Patristics, the Bible, or contemporary philosophy, can do little to improve upon the perceived deficiencies of previous models." (200) In sum, Reginald Lynch offers in his work a concise and clear account of the meaning and development of Thomas Aquinas' views of sacramental causality. *The Cleansing of the Heart* is primarily a work of speculative theology, but its philosophical background and systematic approach make this interesting not only to Thomistic philosophers and theologians but also to scholars who are generally interested in the sacraments, causality, grace, and the development of theology.

[Catherine Peters, Loyola Marymount University]

Matthew Levering, *Aquinas's Eschatological Ethics and the Virtue of Temperance* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2019)

The book consists of seven chapters, the first of which clearly serves as an introduction, providing keys to interpret the principles of moral theology of St. Thomas Aquinas in view of the inauguration of the Kingdom of God. In this light, the temperance ceases to be an unsurpassed ideal for some (e.g. ascetics), but becomes a form of self-control, because it refers to areas of life (e.g. food, drink, reproduction), which instead of becoming a source of joy, through disorder and lack of measure, lead to the breakup of man. Thus, temperance leads to the peace that is considered to be proper to the new creation and due to the fact that man is a social being, makes it a virtue necessary for families and social relations. However, this is not the only horizontal dimension here: Thomas perceives the action of this virtue from the perspective of the goal of moral life, which is the eschatological perfection of man thanks to the Holy Spirit taking place in the body of Christ (p. 27).

In the following chapters, Levering presents further aspects of the virtue of temperance, beginning with shame and *honestas* that are integral parts of the virtue, i.e. those that are part of the virtue, belonging to its essence. Both aforementioned virtues are part of the concern for the renovated temple, since believers are temples of the Holy Spirit. Shame expresses self-respect and serves to make people refrain from destructive tendencies, alerting us to the costs of our behavior. In contrast, *honestas* refers to the spiritual beauty and integrity of the virtuous person.

The next two chapters - the third and the fourth - already deal with the subjective parts of moderation, abstinence, fasting, sobriety and chastity, which Levering associates with the renewal of God's people as God's family, linking it to the consequences of the Holy Spirit's acceptance by believers.

Levering devotes the last three chapters to the discussion of virtues that belong to the potential parts of temperance and are responsible for moderating our desire for non-bodily goods. They are certain 'allies' of the main virtue (temperance in this case), supporting its efforts.

Among the many issues that Levering addresses in an interesting and original way, I would like to draw attention to two, illustrating both the author's method and his ability to extract many contemporary inspirations from the traditional approach.

The first example is humility, which Levering interprets in the relational manner as an attitude of respect and recognition of being created, and therefore the true humble man is subject to God. The opposite of this virtue is pride: a proud man, unlike the humble one, does not want to depend on others. Pride becomes a form of self-sufficiency and an understanding of yourself as a non-relational being. According to the classic definition of Aquinas, we remain a true creation as humility moderates our desire for greatness. This is the etymology of *humilitas*, which refers to the earth (*humus*) and thus to the truth about ourselves, about keeping our feet firmly on the ground. Submission to God, expressed in humility, provokes a human flourishing,

because since we are an image of God, the closer we get to Him and submit to His Word, the more we can develop.

As a second example, I would like to point out how Levering presents a Thomistic interpretation of Adam and Eve's sin as a manifestation of a lack of moderation (pp. 146-150). This does not mean, however, that pointing to pride as the essence of original sin loses its significance: the desire for certain goods beyond our means testifies to intemperance. The first parents' sin is, therefore, a rebellion against their own creatureliness, and therefore a rejection of God's law that aimed at flourishing in them. Adam and Eve also wanted to flourish, but in an autonomous way, independent of the order of relational creaturehood. It is a rejection of the wise order of Divine rule, which explains the sense of the traditional indication of death as a result of sin: before sin, man was sustained free from bodily decay, but breaking relationships results in the detuning of a man in which the lower parts begin to rule the higher. There is one conclusion: "Once we no longer reflect God's wise order because of our rebellion, our disordered relational creaturehood results in problem for all our relationships, not least in family life as well as in the shame that we feel due to lust" (p 150). Therefore, as Levering observes, Christ as New Adam, being tempted to desire beyond measure, does not succumb to this temptation, but in his answer to Satan points to divine measure (Matt. 4: 4).

Concluding, Levering's book is characterized not by a simple exegesis of fragments of *Summa Theologiae*, but a thought-provoking procedure involving dialogue with contemporary theologians and biblical scholars. The reader is surprised by the multitude of people who are invited to dialogue with St. Thomas, from many different Christian denominations, but also the consistency with which Levering always begins to analyze individual virtues related to temperance by presenting first a biblical background. Therefore, each chapter, somehow reflects on a proposal of Biblical Thomism, whose main claims do not consist in just referring to or quoting biblical commentaries of Aquinas, but rather in the method of practicing theology (in the spirit of *sacra doctrina*), in which the Holy Bible as a testimony of Revelation is located in the center of theologian's reflection.

[Piotr Roszak, Nicolaus Copernicus University]

Jeremy D. Wilkins, *Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2018)

Against the criticism that the work of Bernard Lonergan opens the door to a dangerous form of Cartesian subjectivism Jeremy Wilkins seeks to present Lonergan's theology within the tradition of Christian self-knowledge. He argues that Lonergan, very much like Aquinas in his time, worked on an architectonic overhaul of 'how we do theology'. The key question in this process is how we can provide a foundation for normative theological claims. What comes before the axioms and doctrines? "Before

the truth expressed in propositions, there is the existential truthfulness by which we measure up to questions, develop understanding, reach balanced judgment" (3).

The book begins to explore this question in the prelude, which contextualizes the argument of the book. It is followed by sections on Wisdom as Subject, which addresses Lonergan's methodology, and on Wisdom as Object, which explores his development. Wilkins acknowledges that Lonergan is notoriously difficult to understand, but he offers a fierce critique of what he believes are "worthless" and "bizarre" interpretations by respectively Finnis and Rowland.

The second chapter is devoted to the crisis of normativity that theology finds itself in, and that Lonergan sought to remedy. Simply repeating propositions or restoring a theological system will not address this crisis since the presuppositions are no longer agreed on. Yet we cannot opt for "cultural liquidation" either. How then are we to make normative statements?

The beginning of the answer to this question is sought in the third chapter, which is devoted to wisdom. At the heart of it is the self-attention of the theologian and his or her love of wisdom, practice, and moral, intellectual and religious conversion.

Chapters four and five pursue the thread of Lonergan's methodological itinerary, which brought him to Aquinas through his reading of Newman and Augustine. Lonergan took issue with school Thomism that stressed certitude whereas Aquinas prized understanding. Through a detailed analysis of *Verbum* it becomes clear that Lonergan found in Aquinas' theory of knowledge a turn to the subject and that "believed Aquinas himself must have undertaken some kind of program of self-attention" (114). In *Insight* he sought to develop this into a set of exercises for rational self-appropriation. The fifth chapter devoted to this book provides the reader with a clear and concise exposition on Lonergan's metaphysical and epistemological practice, thus clarifying how "understanding what we are doing rests on understanding ourselves" (159). Wilkins argues at length that Lonergan's turn to the subject is radically different from Kant's and Descartes'.

Chapter six presents in a very clear way the foundations of theology according to Lonergan, which leaves room for neither historicism nor anachronism. Theology as any other science is subject to paradigm shifts, but these shifts still build upon what came before it. It is in this continuity that Lonergan sought to position his own foundational methodology, in particular in the eight functions given in *Method in Theology*. Wilkins likens these specialties to the medieval *legere*, *disputare* and *praedicare* (226). This is however the second phase of theology, the first and foundational phase being the conversion of the theologian. The end of the sixth chapter also marks the shift of attention "from the activities of ordering wisdom to the knowledge wisdom orders" (231).

Chapter seven is the first of these, in which Wilkins elaborates on the development of dogma in the early church. The definitions of Nicaea and Chalcedon present a structure of judgments on the question who Christ is in relation to the Father.

It is in this chapter that the material from the first part begins to fall into place. Where the first part of the book can be rather technical for the reader who is a novice to Lonergan's work, here the material is related to concrete case studies.

The case study for chapter eight is Trinitarian theology. Engaging Rahner, Wilkins formulates Lonergan's approach to theology as one that respects the mysteries of faith as such while at the same time enabling the formulation of theological hypothesis.

The final reflection in chapter nine is engages the theory of Christ's immediate knowledge of God, which has become unintelligible to many theologians today in spite of having been universally accepted for centuries. Lonergan sought the resolution to this issue not in a rejection of the received doctrine but in developing a systematic understanding of the *sensus catholicus* on the matter. Wilkins' elaboration of this position on Christ's knowledge is beautifully written and forms one of the high points of the book.

Wilkins aims to both introduce Lonergan to scholars who right now find him too challenging and to defend him against his detractors. He admirably succeeds in this double mission. Time will tell if he is right in his contention that Lonergan, like Aquinas before him, indeed contributed to a theological synthesis fitting for our time.

[Anton ten Klooster, Tilburg University/Thomas Instituut Utrecht]