

Global Competences of Hungarian Young People in the Light of New Nationalism

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Abstract:

Introduction: In the context of national and global events of the last few years (wave of refugees in 2015, terrorist attacks, climate change, strengthening of far-right and radical parties, fake news and manipulation, etc.), the ability of making an independent opinion, making resolutions based on facts and knowledge, being able to see through the flooding information dumping, and creating the routine of selection are becoming extremely important issues. How do we think about ourselves and others, about “the Other” and “the Stranger”? More importantly, how do young people think about these social and public issues, how do they see themselves, the country and the world where they live, the present and the future that they will be shaping?

Purpose: The primary goal of the study is to examine the global competences of Hungarian youngsters aged 15-29.

Methods: For mapping global competences the data of Hungarian Youth Empirical Research (2016) are used.

Results: The vast majority of Hungarian youngsters aged 15-29 are not interested in social, public life-related or political issues. As for the examination of the questions concerning attitudes, the choice of medium options on the scales was typical, which reflect either indifference, disinterest, insecurity or the lack of knowledge that would be necessary for expressing an opinion. Youngsters are the children of the “Technological Age”, online world is the most important scene for entertainment, communication, social life; however, they do not deal with public-life-related issues on their favourite social network sites. They also tend to keep distance from offline public-life, party- or political youth organisations. Among youngsters, the fear of strangers and migration is highly visible, a so-called “exclusionary attitude” describes them, global thinking is typical for only few of them.

Discussion: The study confirms the previous research statements: Political passivism is typical for people aged 15-29 as their public and social life activism is extremely low. Their distrust towards the representatives of the

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democratic institutional system is also associated with a low-level interpersonal trust. However, as for their value preferences, the dominance of traditional values (family, love, friendship) is clearly conspicuous, and the role of nation and social order is gaining more importance. With regard to all these factors, the communication and free time spending habits of the young, we can state that their public life-related disinterest does not primarily stem from their smart phone and entertainment-centred attitude but it is mainly due to their disillusionment, their social discomfort and the erosion of their future beliefs. Among youngsters, a new nationalist tendency has also appeared, which means that they value their own group more and strongly devalue other, strange groups.

Limitations: The Hungarian Youth Research, which analyses 8000 participants aged 15-29, can be regarded representative from the aspects of gender, age, education, settlement type and region. We can compare the research findings with all parts of the youth research series that started in 2000. Questions applied in the questionnaire are based on the previous waves (Youth 2000, Youth 2004, Youth 2008, Hungarian Youth 2012), so the database provides the possibility of outlining the trends.

Conclusions: Concerning the attitudes and values of youngsters aged 15-29, close-mindedness, moderate tolerance, low personal and institutional trust, keeping distance from public life, and a high degree of disinterest are typical. The young, as well as the whole society, typically claim for national isolation, and they are not really willing to collaborate with “the stranger”, “the other”.

Key words: OECD, PISA, youngsters, global competences, new nationalism.

Introduction

The OECD¹ (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) that brings together developed states provides a unique forum and knowledge centre to change data, statistics and experience, and to share well-adopted practices. The most important field of the organisation is education, which is basically connected with two issues: the OECD attaches a great importance to human resources and abilities in economic growth. Furthermore, they consider education as an effective tool for economic prosperity and social solidarity (Halász & Kovács, 2002).

Every three years, the organisation collects big data that highly affect the progress of developed countries' education systems. Student achievement is measured in three fields of knowledge: Reading literacy, Mathematical literacy

¹ It has been an inter-governmental organisation since 1961, which makes it possible for its members to share their policy-related problems, to have an insight into each other's policy practices and to assess each other mutually. Hungary has been a member country since 1996 (<http://www.oecd.org/about/>).

and Science literacy. The aim of the survey is to measure to what extent those 15-year-old students, who leave school education soon, possess skills and abilities that are essential for prospering in life, further education or fulfilling a job. In 2018, a new element was added to the latest survey², global competences (<http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisa-2018-global-competence.htm>) of 15-year-old students are also measured. In other words, those attitudes, knowledge elements and values are assessed that can reflect global knowledge of students. It is highly important to know whether students are able to analyse local, global and intercultural issues, whether they are capable of understanding viewpoints of other peoples who belong to different cultures, whether they are able to make themselves understood, and whether they can work together with people coming from a different country, culture or religion. It is also noteworthy whether respecting human dignity and diversity is important to them, whether they can responsibly handle diverse media platforms, how they can see through fake news and find their way in the world of opinion bubbles, whether they are aware of the dangers of global warming or xenophobia, whether they can take responsibility for sustainable development, for a liveable, fairer future. Project Zero Institution³, the organisation dealing with educational innovation at Harvard University Faculty of Pedagogy, took part in elaborating the framework.

According to the OECD, youngsters should be prepared for an inclusive and sustainable world, where it is getting more and more important for people belonging to diverse cultures and religions to work together effectively, to trust each other in spite of the differences. The Cognitive Assessment Test was not filled in by the Hungarian participants, but the assessments measuring media consumption and cultural attitude were⁴.

In our opinion, teaching students to take global responsibilities is particularly important at diverse levels of school education. Schools play a decisive role to help with developing global competences as they should teach youngsters to develop the ability of having fact-based critical thinking, they ought to popularise diversity, the value of emphatic understanding, encourage students to get to know different cultures, customs and worldviews. Youngsters grow up as citizens of a globalised world; they face such challenges of the 21st century daily as environmental protection, climate change, migration, regional conflicts, more and more intensive religious conflicts, social and global inequalities.

² From 26.03.2018 to 27.04.2018 altogether 81 OECD members took part in the assessment.

³ The project was based on the comprehension of the nature and development of human cognitive potential, from intelligence, ethics, creativity and thinking. (<https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/17/12/pisa-2018-test-include-global-competency-assessment>)

⁴ Global Competency Assessment Test was not filled in almost half of the participant countries (<https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42781376>).

Youngsters' awareness plays a key role in these matters; moreover, it is also vitally important that their interest and curiosity should be aroused as they have to adapt themselves to ever-changing circumstances in a flexible way, and they also have to be able to take part in public matters, and future-shaping.

It would be extremely crucial in Hungary now, where those tendencies have appeared in the last few years which are in sharp contrast with global thinking and responsibility-taking: national isolation opposed to collaboration, new nationalism encouraged by governmental political propaganda, which formulates and reinterprets national identity built on national pride. Old-fashioned and negative interpretations of national identity have appeared again recently.

Furthermore, in our opinion, not only should the 15-year-old students' knowledge be tested and assessed but also the whole young generations'. In our research paper, with the help of utilising the big data collection of 2016 youth research, we attempt to gain a clearer picture of how people from age 15 to 29 react to the issues of the globalised world economy and society in the 21st century. How the individual thinks about issues related to multicultural societies or globalisation is determined by the individual's political belief. Regardless of what political party the individual belongs to and what religious beliefs he/she has, it is without doubt that these matters have become the central issues of our world today. Global competence is also about how much youngsters can feel that our surrounding world has dramatically changed.

1 Theoretical starting points

We tend to consider globalisation as an especially complex, standardised process evoked by technological development, and primarily its economic, political and cultural aspects are examined. We pay particular attention to the phenomenon of homogenisation, which is the consequence of cultural and financial globalisation, and it entails the appearance of a common consumer culture. Critics of globalisation are opposed to this phenomenon mainly as they point out that these processes go hand in hand with identity disappearance of countries and peoples (T. Kiss, 2008). The phenomenon of multicultural society is closely connected with globalisation tendencies. As a matter of fact, centuries ago, it was a known phenomenon that diverse cultures, languages, customs, traditions, religions and lifestyles coexisted and even mixed together, however, the evolvement of multicultural societies became a world-wide, more intensive process only after the Second World War (from 1960-70s). Globalisation goes hand in hand with a more dynamic employee-turnover, a common market, common currency, and even with diverse conflicts and more and more intensive migration processes. The economy and the population of a country depends on the changes in other countries and societies; to put it differently, it is the era of interdependency, the era of mutual and international dependence. The world, where we live, has been dramatically changing in the 21st century. Not only does globalisation not eliminate ethnic, national and religious differences in the

world but it intensifies them. At the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st, a new world order appeared where the war is not between classes but among civilisations if we want to refer to Huntington (Csepeli & Örkény, 2017). Locality problems seem to merge into global problems nowadays, and nobody could think that it is only their problems and it does not affect anyone in Europe if Siberian forests or Amazon rainforests are on fire, or the air is irrespirable in China. Youngsters are getting socialised in an environment-conscious world, where warming atmosphere, melting glaciers, natural disasters, floods and storms are getting more and more common. From the deserted flooded or war-stricken zones, millions of people head for less dangerous or seemingly secure areas. “Besides this, due to the world-wide information network, distances disappear among people, which make the unfair distribution of goods visible” (Csepeli, 2016, p. 510).

As a result of globalisation and technological advancement, no matter where the young live, they are formed by exactly the same trends, technologies and events, they use social media and online technology actively as geographical and cultural distances do not divide them into groups. From China through Buenos Aires to Brisbane, they check the same websites, download the same music, watch the same movies and are influenced by the same brands (McCrinkle & Wolfinger, 2009).

The first global generation of the world was born, who can have common experience, considered as a generational factor by Mannheim, without any geographical limits.

Empirical research also suggests that this young global generation has strong responsibility-consciousness. Due to abundant and unlimitedly available information, they are aware of the issues of our globalised world, and Generation Z, who were born after 1995, expect from manufacturers to pay attention to what effects brands and goods have on the environment, for example, carbon-dioxide footprint. Furthermore, members of the generation already denied buying certain products or using specific services offered by some manufacturers because they had thought that their effect would be negative on the environment (see Global Millennial Survey 2019, Grail Research 2011). In sociological research, attitudes related to ethnic, national and minority group members are assessed with a so-called social distance scale⁵. The notion of

⁵ In 1928, the first social distance scale was made by Bogardus, with which more examinations were carried out later in the US. Bogardus was sure that the function of distance-keeping between groups was not only for maintaining social status. The scale made by Ezra Park assumed that people felt different degree of resentment, remoteness and distance towards national-ethnic groups, and this distance could be characterised with lack of communication and interaction. Bogardus ranked the most important interactive-communication samples with regard to how much they sign “closeness” or

social distance has a long history in social - psychology. The degree of remoteness between a member of one social group and the members of another can be determined by the accepted interactions from the individual's perspective, and it is possible to draw conclusions about the degree of judgments and discrimination towards the other group (Csepeli, Fábíán, & Sik, 2006). As a result, the social distance between the groups is steady, which means that by using standard social variables - including ethnicity - it shows invariability, and it is a fairly stable phenomenon in time.

When we perceive diverse groups of people in society, the perception is simplified and accelerated by categorisation. Categorisation is a typical feature of human thinking; as a matter of fact, it is a kind of urge so as to estimate the likelihood of the occurring events in our human relationships. According to Allport (1977), with the help of categorisation, people simply adapt themselves to abundant, unprocessed information. It helps with fast identification, which means that people are able to react to certain situations in time, so their behaviour is said to be rational as it is based on likelihood.

During categorisation, the differences between groups are exaggerated. By exaggerating the empirically existent differences, it is possible to arbitrarily extrapolate the differences referring to those dimensions that are said to be empirically unavailable or difficultly available (for example, intelligence, temperament, personal traits). The perceiver of human groups is also a group member, so his categorisation is based on the most simplified and oldest distinction: the difference between his own group and the strange one. As a consequence, value differences also appear (Csepeli, 2001). In the case of in-group, the role of a symbolic community, tradition, and values are more determining while in the case of out-group, labour market competition, threatening feelings connected with globalisation, effects of globalisation on everyday situations and lifestyle together with personal or group-level socio-demographic influences are more prominent (Tardos, 2016). Positive identification with in-group appears in the form of national pride, and the causes of national pride can be the diverse fields of reality formed by national existence⁶. Nationalism integrated into national identity, which originates from national pride, makes it possible for the individual to regard himself superior to the members of other nations regardless of what abilities and achievements the individual has (Csepeli & Örkény, 2017). As a rule, specific historical events

“remoteness” towards a specific person identified by group categorisation (Csepeli, 2001, p. 127).

⁶ Themes that can be connected with National Pride: (1) Facts that cannot be justified empirically, symbolic themes such as historical successes, cultural and scientific achievements, sport successes. (2) Themes of classical modernisation such as economic growth, political influence in the world. (3) Postmodern values such as democracy, human rights, wealth (Csepeli & Örkény, 2017, p. 45-46).

result in nationalism and xenophobia, which can be regarded as answers for diverse challenges that affect the society. The refugee wave 2015 followed by the crisis of the European Union intensified the role of far-right, national, populist parties as they became more and more popular, and in the meantime, racism, white supremacy, homophobia, and anti-Semitism occurred in common talk more often.

2 Methodological outlook: the sample and the variables adapted in the analysis

For mapping global competences assessed by the OECD, the data of Hungarian Youth Empirical Research (2016) are used⁷. The Hungarian Youth Research has been organised every four years since 2000, which collects data about the situation, the most important events and specific problems of Hungarian youngsters aged 15-29. 8000 youngsters were examined in 2016 as well, so the sample can be considered representative according to gender, age, location and settlement type⁸.

For mapping global competences that are characterizing the pattern of Hungarian youngsters, we adapted the following variables from the available database:

- I. Socio-demographic variables
 - Demographic data: gender, age (3 categories)
 - Social strata: education (3 categories), economic status (3 categories), subjective material situation (5 categories)
 - Regional status: type of settlement (4 categories), region (7 categories)
- II. Ideological-political identification, perspective orientation
 - Ideological left-wing or right-wing⁹, liberal-conservative, moderate-radical, thinking from the nation's point of view and from mankind's point of view (1-7 point-rating scale)

⁷ In 2019, empirical big data research among the youngsters of Generation Y and Z was carried out by Deloitte, and he examined similar questions. Sadly, the sample did not contain any Hungarian youngsters (<https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/millennialsurvey.html>).

⁸ Sample-taking consists of more steps, done with stratified probability sample survey. During the sample, four sub-samples are taken, each consisting of 2000 persons, which represent the settlement structure of the country with regard to location and settlement-size. Participants were selected based on two aspects: gender and age. In order to avoid minor distortions, weighting procedure was applied, during which school education was taken into account. As a result, both the master and the sub-samples referring to youngsters aged 15-29 can be regarded representative with regard to gender, age, school education, type of settlement and region (Székely, 2018).

⁹ "Please characterise yourself with the help of feature-pairs." 1- liberal 1-conservative 1- left-wing 7- right-wing 1- moderate 7- radical 1-thinking from the nation's perspective 7- thinking from the mankind's perspective.

- Institutional¹⁰ - personal trust¹¹
- III. Attitudes towards strangers, own group, communities
 - Social distance¹²
 - Attitudes towards own group and strangers
- IV. Interest towards issues related to society, public affairs, responsibility-taking, activism.¹³

During the analysis, we mainly examine the interest related to public affairs and social issues and analyse the role of determining factors. Later, we map to what extent youngsters are connected to offline organisations, how active they are, and it is also checked to what extent they have trust in diverse social institutions. The final step of the empirical research is to reveal the attitude of Hungarian young people aged 15-29 towards Hungarians and strangers, and to examine what thinking patterns they have.

3 Research findings

Youths can be characterised by similar features in every era: experimental lifestyle, questioning status quo, idealism, pushing the boundaries, however, it cannot be stated that those youngsters who grew up in the 70s are the same as those ones who grew up in the 90s or nowadays. Youngsters participating in the big data youth research are the members of Generation Y and Z, who are characterised by different attributes due to diverse social, economic, political and cultural influences that are typical for a given country. The members of Y generation are called Millennium, Google, MySpace and Dot.com in western

¹⁰ “How much do you trust the following: absolutely, more yes, more no or not at all? Constitutional Court, the President of the Republic, the Parliament, the government, politicians, NGOs, the Hungarian Defence Forces, churches (in general), police, courts (in general), the mayor of the settlement (or district), banks, insurance companies.

¹¹ “How much do you trust the following: absolutely, more yes, more no or not at all?” people in general, your family, neighbours, acquaintances.

¹² “What kind of closest relationship would you accept with one-one member of the mentioned social groups?”

¹³ “How often do you speak about public affairs or social problems with your family members?” “And how often do you speak about public affairs or social problems with your friends or acquaintances?” 1-regularly 2-occasionally 3-never.

Question referring to organisational participation and commitment: “Organisations, communities and groups are listed below. Please tell us whether you joined any organisation, foundation, voluntary union, group, movement or community. For example, think it over whether you took part in any kind of work, activity related to an organisation, whether you went to any kind of events related to an organisation, etc. Did you join...?”

Question referring to an active activity: “Different activities are listed. Please tell us whether you joined any of them.”

societies, Pope John Paul II Generation in Poland, “ken lao zu” or in other words, the generation who eats the old, Ni-Ni in Spain, “ni trabaja, ni estudia” meaning they neither learn nor work. Generation Z is called “digital aboriginals” as they have not lived in a world where there is no mobile phone or internet (Fekete, 2018, p. 82). According to the data of Hungarian Youth (2012), young people aged 15-29 are called “a new silent generation”¹⁴ by Levente Székely (2012, p. 18), and silence can be found in different social environments, so even in alternative social environments like in the field of civil, public life activism. With regard to the trends, it can be stated that the number of unsatisfied youngsters who expect a gloomy future is increasing, however, this dissatisfaction does not appear in political activism as youngsters do not have any coherent reflective reactions (Székely, 2012, p. 25).

3.1 Interest towards public affairs and social issues

Abundant information, empirical analyses and theories are available about the interest of young people aged 15-29 towards social institutions, political systems, politicians and their political, public life culture (Csákó & Sik, 2018; Gázsó & Laki, 2004; Murányi, 2013; Oross, 2012). Previously conducted youth research based on big data collection showed that the political interest of Hungarian youngsters was steadily low. Most research pointed out that disinterest in politics, political passivism; strengthening negative opinions about politics and very low level of social-public life activism were typical for the young. In Hungarian youth research (2016), in order to get a clearer picture about the connection to the society, public life interest, the extent of the integration to different civil and political organisations, researchers asked numerous questions. Figure 1 depicts that most youngsters are not interested in public affairs and social issues, only 15% say that they are interested or more or less interested in the issues, while almost the half of them (47%) state that they have no interest towards the reality in which we live (either not interested or not that much interested). Most participants prefer the so-called “neutral” medium options. Hungarian youngsters typically choose the medium options (38%), which can be the signs of indifference, disinterest, insecurity or the lack of necessary knowledge. This attitude can be recognised later, in the case of further research questions as well.

¹⁴ The Silent Generation is formed by people born between 1925-1942, whose socialisation was determined by the Great Depression and World War II. They are grey collar conformists, the parts of the lonely mass, who accepted their parents’ traditional civic values and culture (Fekete, 2018, p. 78).




Figure 1. “How much are you interested in public and social life-related questions?” (%) (N=2.025).

In the information society, where every piece of information is available limitlessly regardless of time and place, where free time is mainly spent with telecommunication and entertaining electrical devices by youngsters, where time spent with friends is as important as time spent on Facebook or chat; family, friends and the Internet are the most significant sources of information for young people aged 15-29 while the least important sources are books and printed newspapers for them (Table 1).

Table 1

Judgement of the validity of information resources (N=1.827)¹⁵

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Deviation</i>
Family	4.48	0.77
Friends	4.34	0.83
Internet	4.31	1.07
Television	3.74	1.20
Online social network sites	3.50	1.35
Radio	3.08	1.31
Books	2.85	1.37
Local (where you live) clubs, social	2.43	1.28

¹⁵ 1-5 point rating scale, where 1= not important at all, 5=absolutely important.

organisations, religious communities	2.37	1.31
printed newspapers		

In connection with it, we also examined how often they speak about public affairs and social issues with their family members and friends, who actually are their primary relations. More than one quarter of the examined youngsters never speak about public affairs or social issues¹⁶, more than half of them (63%) talk about these issues only occasionally (Figure 2). Almost one tenth of young people speak about public affairs or social issues regularly during conversations with family.




Figure 2. The frequency of conversations about public and social life-related issues (%) (N=2.025).

As far as the conversations with friends are concerned, the situation is less favourable as more than one third of the examined youngsters never speak about these issues with friends. More than half of them occasionally and only 6% is the ratio of those who regularly talk about social problems.

Nowadays public affairs and political activism are getting more and more widespread, and the most popular form of it is online commenting. The data of the research carried out in 2016 reveal that cyberspace is not limited for the young by lack of devices as 85% of youngsters have a computer and a smart phone, 87% of them have broadband internet subscription at home. Almost one

¹⁶ People aged 15-19 and people with low school education (63%) overrepresented. Every second person lives in the Northern Great Plain or in the middle of Hungary.

quarter of the participants (24%) are always available and are online perpetually; furthermore, almost half of them (43%) are connected to the internet several times a day (Fekete & Tibori, 2018, p. 264). The questions examining the connection to diverse social network sites show similar tendencies to the availability of ICT devices. More than three quarters of youngsters (79%) are members of a social network site, and they basically use it for entertainment and getting information (Table 2).¹⁷

Table 2

*The primary aim of using social network sites*¹⁸ N=8.000

	<u>Number of elements</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Deviation</u>
Entertainment	6115	3.42	1.932
Asking for help, advice	6110	1.81	1.710
Keeping business (job-related) contacts	6099	1.21	1.704
Looking for jobs	6102	1.00	1.471
Getting information about local news	6117	2.62	1.898
Getting information in general	6116	3.08	1.898
Looking for a boyfriend/girlfriend	6090	0.75	1.347

Most popular social sites have been functioning as social news servers in the last few years; however, at the beginning, this was not their original goal. As a result, youngsters think that news is what appears on Facebook, what is liked and shared by most people. In parallel, the validity of news has not become the primary aspect. It is also apparent that people aged 15-29 do not intend to map public life-related issues primarily on the Internet. 68% of them never search for this kind of information; furthermore, three quarters of them never share any news or opinions related to public life (Figure 3).

¹⁷ The most popular is Facebook; the participants have 514 acquaintances on average (Tóth, 2018, p. 296).

¹⁸ 1-4 point rating scale where 1= several times a day, 2= once a day, 3=once a week, 4=more times a week, 5=more times a month, 6= rarely, 7=never, hoping for a better understanding, the scale values were changed by Transform Record method.




Figure 3. Obtaining information about public and social life-related issues on social network sites, sharing news (%) (N=3.253).

The database of 2016 youth research does not contain any questions concerning why the young can proper in the world of “fake news.” Due to human naivety, disinformation, partiality and social network sites, we are living in a world where fake news is continually spreading and people are deceived deliberately. Additionally, as a result of the application of web 2.0, those people have appeared who deliberately produce fake content, fake news, so-called media hacks. Handling the exponentially growing information mass makes users face serious challenges. Competences concerning assessing and selecting information are quite diverse: people have to judge whether the given information is valid, accurate or up-to-date. The routine of assessing information sources has become one of the central pillars of information education and literacy. It is necessary to teach the young how to assess sources, and schools could be the best places for it. Youngsters have to learn what sources are trustworthy, what the difference is between a serious media product and a propaganda site, how certain they can be whether their views are based on real facts or someone just wants to influence them.

3.2 Joining offline communities

In Hungary, information society was established due to a political, economic, social and technological change after the change of regime. As a result, similarly to Western youngsters, the Hungarian young also started to prefer individual lifestyle more and more, and they exited from the previously compulsory youth organisations, communities.¹⁹ They spend their leisure time in their privacy, in

¹⁹ See Pioneer Movement (HYCL: Hungarian Young Communist League, YWL: Young Workers' League).

the “holy trinity” of the Internet, television and friends (Fekete & Tibori, 2018, p. 60). As far as the tendencies concerned, youngsters’ willingness to participate in the work of different political and non-governmental organisations is low. Based on the data analysed in 2016, we can state that this is an ongoing tendency. We cannot really measure youngsters’ participation in any public life, party or political youth organisation (Figure 4). Among young people, most popular organisations are those ones which are related to sports as more than tenth of the young are members of a sports club. 9% of them are members of a student organisation, and the third place is for culture organisations (5%).




Figure 4. Young people’s attitude to diverse organisations (%) (N=2.025).

Previous youth research reveals that political participation is unpopular among people aged 15-29, the direct democratic participative forms like petitions, demonstrations, flash mobs, and taking part in politics concerning certain issues are relatively unimportant (Oross & Monostori, 2018; Oross, 2012). However, data (2016) show that even these direct forms are not able to attract the young: the simplest way is to collect signatures but only 6% took part in it, while 2% participated in a spontaneous or previously-announced demonstration (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Participation in public affairs, political life by youngsters aged 15-29.

This has been a long, ongoing process, and it seems that there is a relatively little chance for reversing the trend. In the light of the foregoing, we can state that the little interest of youngsters aged 15-29 towards public and social life-related issues goes hand in hand with low social/public life activism.

3.3 Institutional trust

Trust in the members of democratic institutions clearly determines young people's views on politics, public life and organisational membership. Low trust level means legitimacy problems in the political system. One of the main arguments of politology is that politics needs some kind of social support, or at least acceptance. Higher level of trust in institutions and legitimacy increases the collaboration between the government or the state and the citizen (Boda & Medve, 2012). Trust refers to the belief that people or institutions will more likely to act as it is expected socially. Both the whole Hungarian society (Gerő & Szabó, 2015, p. 44), and the young have distrust in Hungarian political institutions, especially in politicians; the young, as well as the whole population, only have trust in the Hungarian Defence Forces and in the police (Table 3). The level of personal trust is even lower than trust in law enforcement forces as every fourth youngster thinks that it is impossible to trust people.²⁰

²⁰ 65% of people aged 15-29 either do not really trust people or do not trust people at all.

Table 3

Institutional trust among young people aged 15-29²¹ (N=6.484)

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Deviation</u>
In the defence forces	2,96	0,83
In the police	2,88	0,83
In the mayor of the settlement (district)	2,87	0,82
In courts	2,80	0,85
In Constitutional Court	2,75	0,87
In the president of the republic	2,75	0,89
In NGOs	2,73	0,86
In churches (in general)	2,59	0,93
In the Parliament	2,52	0,90
In the government	2,43	0,92
In banks, insurance companies	2,42	0,89
In politicians	2,17	0,90

With regard to the given responses, we argue that not only a selfish, indifferent, superficial, smart phone and entertainment-centred behaviour is in the background, which results in disinterest in public life, but also disillusionment, discomfort, and erosion of trust in the change of future. In the complicated frames of society-being, in the experienced unequal relations, in the web of norms and values, in the maze of social issues, abandoned young generations are disinterested, they rightfully feel that they do not have a say in public life and their opinion does not matter at all.²² If they happen to make some criticism, they are not taken seriously at all. Should they get national publicity due to the Internet or any social network sites, they will be cruelly judged and ignored.²³

²¹ 1-4 point rating scale where 1= not trust at all, 4= absolutely trust.

²² According to nearly two thirds of Hungarian youths, they have no say in either national (34%) or local politics (31%). Only a small minority of the participants think that they have a say in either local (7%) or national politics (7%).

²³ Without being exhaustive, some examples from the recent years, (1) “the coffee-maker” Luca, who wrote a desperate post on Facebook after the 2018 national elections: “...being 22, I can’t see my future. Because in my home country, here in Hungary, there are no future prospects for a 22-year-old youngster who will get her degree paper soon, which is actually not worth anything here. Because in my home country, people who work hard have to fight for making ends meet from day to day. In my home country, it is only possible to dream about a coffee-maker. I hope I will be able to buy one abroad...” As the post was spreading fast, Luca was threatened, some people attempted to discredit her, and she was dissuaded to move abroad. (2) Blanka Nagy, the 18-year old schoolgirl, who delivered a passionate speech containing hard arguments in an anti-

Hence, it may seem to them that they only matter because of their reproductive ability²⁴.

3.4 Problem perception

Besides the OECD competence assessment, other international empirical research²⁵ focusing on the youth also examined youngsters' problem perception in the recent years: how do they perceive the world, what do they want to do in order to solve the problems? According to the participating youngsters, climate change and environmental destruction cause the biggest problems²⁶ followed by wars, unemployment and income inequalities.

Since the millennium, almost all of the big data youth research contained some questions concerning Hungarian youngsters' problem perception. 2016 dataset show that the most significant problems for the young are in connection with existence, lack of prospects (57%), material problems, insecurity, poverty (45%). Then the list is followed by the feelings caused by different deviant demeanour, such as concerns of drug and alcohol consumption (23%), which are probably in connection with the previously mentioned two problems. At the end of the list, there are the problems concerning lifestyle and the condition of the environment, merely 1% of the young perceive them as worrying problems (Fazekas, Nagy, & Monostori, 2018, p. 328). It is likely that this result was caused by the way of the question-posing. The option related to concerns of the environment was the following: "The bad condition of the environment (poor air quality, dirt)." This context cannot reflect youngsters' anxiety related to climate change caused by perpetual warm weather records and the recent environmental disasters that predicted a quite dark future. We suggest that during preparing the next questionnaire in 2020, researchers should take these aspects into account

government demonstration in Kecskemét, got national publicity. Against her, the government media started a smear campaign.

(3) Zsigmond Rékasi, a young activist, who took part in the 2018 demonstrations in April. Proceedings against him were initiated many times saying that he had committed urban vandalism.

²⁴ See the policies of the period (2016) aiming to increase birth rates: new home ownership program (2016), launching childcare allowance extra, encouraging people to get married with the help of tax relief, increasing family tax benefits.

²⁵ See: Global Shapers Annual Survey 2017 (http://shaperssurvey2017.org/static/data/WEF_GSC_Annual_Survey_2017.pdf) and Deloitte Millennial Survey 2019 (<https://www2.deloitte.com/hu/hu/pages/emberi-eroforras/articles/millennialsurvey.html>)

²⁶ According to Deloitte Millennial Survey, 29% of the young say that this is the biggest problem for the youth. According to Global Shapers, almost half of the young (49%) think the same. According to GSA, the following problems are world-wide conflicts, wars, and inequality issues (poverty, discrimination) According to Deloitte Millennial Survey, after the climate change, unemployment, income-inequalities and terrorism mean the most serious problems for the young.

and let subjective viewpoints appear in the problem perception, in particular those that are related to climate change.

3.5 “We” and “the Others”

International research papers depict that Hungarian people are quite dismissive and longing for isolation. Hungarian people do not intend to accept anyone, such as foreigners, homeless people, the poor, gypsies, people belonging to another religion, the handicapped, homosexual or people who can be considered as “more different” than “the ideal” image of Hungarians (Messing & Ságvári, 2016). Numerous empirical studies examined the reasons for it (see Sik 2016a; Csepeli & Örkény, 2017; Keller, 2009), and the determining factors were social status, education, societal objectives, economic exposure, existential insecurity, the impact of mass media, party sympathy, political ideologies, and the peculiarities of the Hungarian educational system.²⁷

In the introduction, it was mentioned that school education lacks teaching the young global responsibility-taking, tolerance, open-mindedness, accepting “other” people, unfortunately. As far as the Hungarian school education system is concerned, a selective (see Radó, 2007; Radó, 2018; Lannert, 2018; Messing & Ságvári, 2016) “easy to teach”, homogeneous education environment evolves due to the different adopted selective mechanisms, and it is common to use competitive school methods. These factors result in a dismissive behaviour towards others, enhance non-acceptance, competition, encourage youngsters to defeat each other, and they do not teach the young how to collaborate.

As for the results of the last wave of the youth research, concerns related to xenophobia,²⁸ strangers and migration are typical among youngsters. It is not surprising at all as the recent migration crisis together with the related governmental communication²⁹ and the European terror attacks may have contributed to this result. Chart 6 depicts that the most accepted people for the participants aged 15-29 are cross-border Hungarians, but social distance towards them is fairly big: they could only think of them as colleagues or neighbours (average scale value: 3.8).

²⁷ As for the peculiarities of the Hungarian education system, see Trencsényi, 1994; 2017.

²⁸ Xenophobia can be defined as the furthest point of social distance between the majority and the ethnicity, the so-called national minority.

²⁹ At the beginning of 2015, the Hungarian government launched an anti-migrant campaign targeting the whole population, which primarily blamed migrants for the terror attack in Charlie Hebdo’s editorial office in January. Then more national consultations were held about migration. All of these happenings strengthened governmental messages: immigration and terrorism cannot be separated from each other, employees can lose their jobs because of incoming migrants, higher crime rate is caused by immigrants in the country, and the potential victims are women.

In Hungary, for many years, the most rejected people were gipsies; however, the situation has changed a lot recently. Cross-border Hungarians, and gipsies followed by Jewish people who can be accepted more, however, this relative “closeness” refers to the area of a workplace or a settlement. Youngsters aged 15-29 keep the most social distance from refugees, Muslims, illegal immigrants and migrants (Figure 6). The most rejected people are illegal immigrants (6.1) and migrants (6.2 average scale value), which is probably closely connected with the governmental rhetoric and the moral panic generated by mass media (Sik, 2016b).




Figure 6. The desired social distance by people aged 15-29 (average scale value)³⁰ (N=2.025).

Every second youngster (51%) would not let a migrant enter the country, almost half of the young (46%) would not let a migrant in, and 40% would not let a Muslim cross the border (Table 4).

The hierarchy of certain categories seems to be conspicuous in the case of Muslims, illegal immigrants, refugees, migrants and “the Pirez”³¹, fewer and

³⁰ Chart: own construction. Participants had to determine the distance that they could tolerate between the listed people and themselves on a 7-point rating scale. 1= would accept him/her as a family-member (as a boyfriend/girlfriend, as a spouse), 2= only as a flatmate, 3= only as a colleague, 4= only as a neighbour, 5= would only live with him/her in the same settlement (town/ village) 6= would only live with him/her in the same country 7= would not live with him/her in the same country.

³¹ Imaginary group of people; in 2006, Tárki's colleagues attempted to estimate the extent of xenophobia in Hungary with the help of this fictive group of people.

fewer people would let them closer. We are experiencing a loss of hierarchy in the case of gypsies and cross-border Hungarians as more people would accept a Roma or a cross-border Hungarian as a spouse than as a neighbour.

Table 4

Social distance (%) (N=2.025)

	<u>Would accept him/her as a family-member (boyfriend, girlfriend, spouse)</u>	<u>Only as a flatmate</u>	<u>Only as a colleague</u>	<u>Only as a neighbour</u>	<u>Would only live with him/her in the same settlement (town/village)</u>	<u>Would only live with him/her in the same country</u>	<u>Would not live with him/her in the same country</u>
Gipsy/Roma	16	3	11	10	25	12	13
Jewish	9	5	10	14	19	14	13
Pirez	2	3	5	7	14	11	19
Muslim	2	2	4	5	14	16	40
Cross-border Hungarian	19	6	12	16	14	10	10
Illegal immigrant	1	1	3	5	12	17	46
Chinese	3	3	7	12	25	20	17
Refugee	2	1	5	7	17	20	34
Migrant	1	1	4	4	10	13	51

As for the happenings of the last few years, it is conspicuous that new nationalism is getting widespread in governmental policy in Eastern-Middle Europe, and also in Hungary, and radical national right-wing political organisations are becoming more and more active and they are gaining political ground world-wide. Our national governmental communication pervaded by new nationalism focuses on national consciousness, and it perpetually emphasises Hungarian pride, which is constructed by not only historical and sport successes but also governmental (<https://jobbanteljesit.kormany.hu/>). As a result, a new nationalist tendency has appeared among youngsters, which is based on the difference of value between the own group and the strange group. It is also visible that the own group is valued while the strange groups are devalued. This pride-related new nationalist tendency is measured by a questionnaire containing 21 items (Boros & Bozsó, 2018, p. 217). In this research, we highlighted three statements which focus on the attitude towards the own group and the strange (Figure 7).




Figure 7. The difference of value between the own group and the strange group—the average of agreeing with the statements (N=1.931).

The listed statements were evaluated on a 5-point rating scale³² by the participating youngsters. In the chart above, we can see antipathy towards strangers together with the xenophobe, exclusionary dimension of national identity. As for the statement saying that “In general, Hungarians are not better than non-Hungarians”, which supposes the existence of value difference between in-group and out-groups, the value of the mode is five. It means that the determining majority of the participants selected the option of “I entirely agree.” The degree of the agreement was slightly lower in the case of the second and third statements, which are firmly exclusionary (3.38 and 3.33 scale value). As for the middle statement, the value of the mode is three (“I partially agree and partially disagree”). It means that the statement referring to urging strangers to leave, participants opted for the middle item, which indicates uncertainty, balancing, and not revealing a determined viewpoint. The last examined statement can be regarded the most sensitive, here the mode is four, which means that the majority of youngsters selected the option of “I agree.”³³

3.6 Global thinking

By adopting a semantic differential scale (Table 5),³⁴ we got a clear picture of the peculiar features of Hungarian youngsters’ global thinking, which issue was originally raised by the OECD. As previously, opting for the middle items is also conspicuous here: every fourth youngster selected the item 4 (25%). 58% of the participants are in the middle of the semantic field (value of 3-4-5). 15% of the young think strictly from the nation’s point of view; while global thinking,

³² 1-5 point rating scale where 1= I totally disagree, 5= I entirely agree.

³³ 3= I partially agree and partially disagree.

³⁴ As for the operation of the scale, two bipolar adjectives indicate a semantic field and a seven-point rating Likert scale is integrated. The respondent has to place himself/herself in this field. The closer he/she puts the sign to the adjective, the stronger the attitude is.

which attitude bears in mind the fate of the whole mankind and world, is typical for one fifth of them (value of 6-7). During four years, the number of those youngsters who can exclusively think and reason from the nation's point of view has doubled: in 2012, merely 8% of them opted for the value of 1-2.

Table 5

Self-description by adopting feature-pairs: thinking from the nation's point of view- thinking from the mankind's point of view (N=7.186)

<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
<u>Nation</u>						<u>Mankind</u>
7%	8%	17%	25%	16%	10%	8%

We attempt to explain the thinking pattern, the self-description with the help of a logistic regression model. Variables in the model are education,³⁵ place of living³⁶, subjective financial situation,³⁷ radical-moderate,³⁸ and political orientation³⁹ (Table 6). The model helps with examining whether the young tend to think from the nation's aspect or from the aspect of mankind, whether their thinking is determined by the variables appearing in the model, or whether there are other factors in the background. The binary variable⁴⁰ of the thinking pattern is a dependent variable, the explanatory power of the model can be considered as suitable.⁴¹

Table 6

The explanatory model of the thinking pattern

	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Wald</u>	<u>p</u>	<u>Exp(B)</u>
Subjective financial situation	-0.96	0.183	27.558	0.000	0.383
Ideological orientation	-0.644	0.245	6.886	0.009	0.525

³⁵ 0=low level of education 1=secondary education 2=tertiary education.

³⁶ Settlement type of the living place: 1= capital, 2= county town, municipality 4=town 5=village.

³⁷ 1=good/average financial situation 0=poor financial situation (self-classification).

³⁸ moderate=0 radical=1 (self-classification).

³⁹ left-wing=0 right-wing=1 (self-classification).

⁴⁰ thinking from the nation's point of view=0 thinking from mankind's point of view=1 (dummy variable, self-classification).

⁴¹ Hosmer and Lemeshow Test p=0.004, Chi-square=22.348, Nagelkerke R square=0.243, that is, the combination of the explanatory variables which explains 24% of the variance of the dependent variable

Radical moderate orientation	-1.015	0.216	22.019	0.000	0.362
Settlement type 4 categories			49.183	0.000	
Settlement type 4 categories (1)	1.438	0.293	24.147	0.000	4.212
Settlement type 4 categories (2)	-0.915	0.263	12.132	0.000	0.400
Settlement type 4 categories (3)	0.042	0.196	0.045	0.832	1.042
Highest qualification 3 categories	-0.043	0.135	0.101	0.750	0.958
Age group 3 categories	0.120	0.113	1.137	0.2860	1.128
Constant	2.527	0.449	31.673	0.0000	12.519

In the model, the explanatory power of the living place is highly visible⁴²: in the settlements, villages of the countryside compared to the capital, there is a four times higher chance (4.212) to find youngsters who can exclusively think from the nation's aspect. As for smaller towns, the difference is also significant; however, county towns do not differ from the capital significantly. Education and age⁴³ do not influence way of thinking (whether it is from the nation's perspective or from mankind's). However, the impacts of subjective financial self-classification, ideological orientation and radical-moderate orientation are significant: if the other independent variables are under control and the financial situation is becoming better; on the ideological scale, there is a move to the right and a move to the moderate orientation from the radical, there is a higher chance to find a youngster who can exclusively think from the nation's point of view. Based on these results, we suppose that youngsters who can exclusively think from the nation's perspective live in the countryside; they are ideologically right-wing supporters and conservative members of the lower middle class.

Conclusions

To summarise, we can state that concerning the attitudes and values of youngsters aged 15-29, close-mindedness, moderate tolerance, low personal and institutional trust, keeping distance from public life, and a high degree of disinterest are typical. The young, as well as the whole society, typically claim for national isolation, and they are not really willing to collaborate with "the stranger," "the other."

⁴² Village is the reference category; the others are compared to it.

⁴³ Usual classification of youngsters aged 15-29: people aged 15-19, people aged 20-24, people aged 25-29.

After the shock of 11/09, Elemér Hankiss outlined the peculiarities of closed societies. Can we recognise ourselves in the description? Opposed to open societies, closed societies are typically afraid of otherness, they are intolerant with otherness, other people, peoples, ideas, belief systems, other customs and civilisations (Hankiss, 2002, p. 144). It also seems that the scenario of “Harassed neighbourhoods” (in Hungarian: “Zaklatott szomszédságok”) outlined by Hankiss may come true: strengthening tensions in the world, abundant unsolved problems, growing fight for diminishing natural resources (i.e. water), conflicts, civil wars, growing fear that can be experienced world-wide, increased xenophobia, intolerance.

Continental and regional units are formed; they become isolated and attempt to defend their interests (i.e. “Fortress Europe”). Inside the units, national states are getting stronger and they are willing to establish authoritarianism. In this world, power and security are the basic values, the target and meaning of life is defending Western civilisation against “barbarians”, and frightening rumours become the most typical genre (Hankiss, 2002, p. 155-164).

It is possible for younger generations to discontinue the old-fashioned, negative mechanisms, and to construct an open society, which does not actually support the ideology of nationalism. We have to agree with Elemér Hankiss, if this situation were permanent, it would cause a tremendous disaster. If societies seclude themselves, if people’s minds also seclude, we will have to be prepared for the “long winter of misery.”

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