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4 Institutional Change in Norway: The Importance of the Public Sphere⁶

The goal of this chapter is to provide a new and better theoretical account of the overall pattern of institutional change in modern Norway by emphasizing the importance of the public sphere. One effective way to describe the modernization of Norway is as a cumulative process whereby new categories of individuals – peasants, workers and women – have gradually been included as full members in society (Koht, 1953; Furre, 2000; Slagstad, 1998, pp. 417–418; Rokkan, 2010; Sejersted, 2005, 2000, pp. 18–20 and 23–25). This social transformation has taken place through large-scale institutional changes that sociologists need to explain. This chapter argues that the four currently dominating theoretical models of institutional change are not fully up to this task for two reasons. Models that accentuate either external shocks or incremental accumulation cannot account for the highly ‘political’, goal-oriented and reflexively monitored aspect of overall institutional change in Norway, whilst the two dominant models of political collective decision making, voting and bargaining, cannot account for the high level of consensus that have fed into processes of institutional change both as their input and outcome. To overcome these deficits, this chapter takes a different approach, what might be called ‘deliberative’ or ‘discursive’ institutionalism (Schmidt 2008). It emphasizes what has been an essential aspect of Norwegian society at least since the middle of the nineteenth century: deliberation in the public sphere. To create such an alternative model founded upon public deliberation, which is the overall goal of this chapter, three tasks must be solved: 1) explaining how important and powerful societal actors can be motivated to play by the rules of the public sphere; 2) integrating public deliberation into a more general model of institutional change that also accommodates the obvious importance of external impulses, incremental changes, voting and bargaining; 3) and illustrating the empirical benefit of such a model for the case of Norway. In what follows, after a brief presentation and critique of the four competing theories, I will address the three tasks in that order. As the overall goal of the chapter is to develop a new theoretical approach, more space and effort will be devoted to theoretical discussion than empirical analysis.

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4.1 Exogenous and Endogenous Theories of Institutional Change

Institutions are important because they impose order – predictability and cooperation (Elster, 1989, pp. 1–15) – on social life. I define a social institution as a regular and rule-governed social practice (Giddens, 1984, pp. 17 and 28–34). Regularity implies that a social practice – a particular way of doing things, such as teaching, voting or negotiating wages – is repeated across extended slices of time-space. The same kind of people (teachers) do the same kind of things in the same way (teach) at the same occasions (classes). Therefore, at the everyday level, participating in an institution is experienced as *déjà vu*: been here and done this before. Furthermore, social institutions are rule-governed as their regularity is caused by people conforming to shared rules that specify what to do and not to do in a particular type of situation. Such rules may be entitlements or prohibitions, unconditional ((do not) do x) or conditional (if y does z, (do not) do x), formal or informal, social (moral) or cognitive, may enable or constrain action and may be followed for internal or external reasons.

Institutions change when rules and the regularity they create change. This can go both ways. New rules can create new practices as people start orienting their actions to new rules, and new practices can create new rules, as old rules bend to a new way of doing things. An array of specific mechanisms is involved here, but I will not go into the details (see Pierson, 2004 for a discussion). Instead, I will address the more general question of what causes institutions to change in the first place. That they do is beyond question. Even the Roman and Soviet empires fell. So the question is: why? If we examine the literature on institutions, we find two dominant general answers: external shocks and internal incremental accumulation – what I will call the exogenous and endogenous models. Neither one, I will argue, is fully up to the task of explaining institutional change in Norway. I will first briefly discuss the models before I criticize them.

A cluster of exogenous models posit that due to the inherently inert character of institutions, it takes an external shock to alter them. To see why, I will take Hall & Taylor's (1996) tripartite categorization of 'institutionalisms' as my point of departure. Historical institutionalism depicts institutional rules and regularities as the product of conflicts between groups with different interests and differential access to resources. As institutions to a large extent come to express the interests of the most powerful actors, those in a position to change them, such as feudal lords or capitalists, have little interest in doing so. The result is inertia. Rational choice institutionalism portrays institutions as solutions to cooperative problems that actors in recurrent prisoner's dilemma situations face. By imposing costs on actors who chose the non-cooperative strategy, institutions make cooperation the optimal choice and create an equilibrium that no rational actor has any incentive to unilaterally disturb. Finally, sociological institutionalism describes institutions as mostly consisting of informal social and cognitive rules that actors draw on to overcome the existential, cognitive and social anomie inherent in all social life. As such, rules are internalized and have

become 'second nature'; it is therefore very hard for actors to break the rules. According to the cluster of exogenous models, institutions are therefore resistant to change because powerful, rational and meaning-seeking actors have little reason and/or capacity to alter them (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, pp. 4–7; Schmidt, 2008, pp. 313–314). For this reason, it takes some kind of external shock to change them. For instance, feudalism would not have been abolished in Europe if not for the external shock of the Black Death (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013, pp. 96–101).

According to the exogenous models, institutional life is dualistic: long periods of stability are periodically interrupted by externally caused upheaval (punctuated equilibrium), whereupon social order is again restored. The endogenous model starts out with a critique of this view. According to it, institutions change in spite of external shocks. As systematized by Mahoney & Thelen (2010), the theory of internal incremental institutional change starts with the fact that all institutions produce winners and losers. Some actors benefit from the current division of labour within the household, and others do not. Thus, there will always be losers looking for opportunities to change existing institutions. And as institutional rules must be interpreted and implemented in a discretionary manner, there will always be some scope for this. The result is a set of actors with both the desire and opportunity to gradually push institutions in new directions. What they create is incremental institutional change that, when accumulated over time, can be quite substantial. Therefore, this model breaks both with the external and dualistic assumptions of the exogenous models.

An overall evaluation of these two clusters of models falls outside the scope of this chapter (see Pierson, 2004 and Mahoney & Thelen, 2010 for a general discussion of sources of stability and change in institutions). However, while it is not hard to find examples of external shocks and incremental accumulation causing institutions to change, I will argue that neither of the two models is sufficiently equipped to explain the main path of institutional change in Norway.

One initial problem with applying the exogenous model to Norway is the discrepancy between clear-cut examples of external shocks, which are few, and institutional change, which has been extensive. They are Sherlock Holmes' dog that did not bark. We find only two clear-cut examples of external shocks in modern Norway. The first was the Napoleonic wars, which made it possible for Norway to claim independence from Denmark in 1814, abolish absolutism and set up one of the world's first liberal constitutional monarchies (see Seip, 2010 part 1, pp. 15–60). However important this was – and it was – this external shock only explains how the *rules* of subsequent institutional change in Norway came into being and not how a continuous stream of actors have applied them to conduct institutional change. Therefore, it has limited direct explanatory value. The institutional implications of the second external shock, the occupation of Norway by Nazi Germany in 1940–1945, was essentially to push Norway further along the 'social democratic' path it had chosen in 1935 (Furre 2000, pp. 119–146; Lange 2005, pp. 153–178). This shock can thus explain the increased acceptance and momentum of institutional change, symbolized by The Joint Program

(*Fellesprogrammet*) of 1945, but not its *direction*. This brings me to the major problem with the exogenous model, namely that it cannot adequately account for the *political mediation* of external impulses. In Norway, the overall path of institutional change has been *chosen* by political actors – ‘national strategists’ (Slagstad, 1998) – embedded in social movements and ideological–epistemic frameworks. Therefore, reflexively monitored and feedback-controlled collective action on behalf of society as a whole has been an essential part of the Norwegian modernization process. Now of course, if not shocks, Norwegian institutions have been subject to many external influences, such as migration, financial crises, new technologies, fluctuating oil prices and new ideas. Yet such influences have been processed by a political system that has, with a considerable amount of autonomy in terms of interpretation and response strategies, monitored and steered society according to an overall political, collective vision of a good, just, solidary and efficient society. Take the oil crisis of 1973 as an example. This exposed some flaws in the Keynesian economic policy of the social democratic order. But it was not until a conservative government from 1981 onward implemented policies such as those deregulating the financial sector and the real-estate market and privatizing public corporations that the social democratic order was replaced by a more deregulated ‘neo-liberal’ institutional order (Furre, 2000, pp. 266–268), although some historians rightly question the extent to which this really was a systems shift (Sejersted, 2000, pp. 113–130). In other words, it was not until an external influence became politically mediated that it created institutional change, this according to a clearly demarcated, widely shared political vision of society. Indeed, in Norway, such overall political steering has been a key part of institutional change. As Slagstad (2006, p. 169) says: ‘Politics has been the centre of the Norwegian modernization project’. That is to say, conscious political choices have been made regarding the goal of institutional change and the means for realizing it, and the implementation of these plans have been continually monitored and revised by the political system to great success. I will later outline in more detail how this process has unfolded. For now, the conclusion is that the exogenous model by itself has problems accounting for the highly ‘politicized’ nature of institutional change in Norway.

Let us turn now to the endogenous model. In the absence of external shocks, a model emphasizing the accumulated results of local everyday conflicts between institutional winners and losers looks more promising. And of course, such conflicts and the change they produce are a routine part of institutional life in Norway, as is in any Western or other society in which non-authoritarian institutions allow for voicing some dissent. Be that as it may, the major problem with this model applied to the Norwegian case is again that the overall pattern of institutional change does not fully fit the model. The modernization of Norway, understood as a set of institutional changes whereby more and more groups are included in society, is not the unintended or ‘blind’, aggregated consequence of local institutional conflicts. Rather, it is, as I have just emphasized, to a large extent the result of politically initiated and monitored processes of collective action whereby broad social movements have used an increasingly

democratic political system to fight for social inclusion. In this process, we find clear goals and ideas about appropriate and efficient means, a democratic political system to allow for implementing goals, and collective actors fronted by elites who have used the political system to successfully fight for their goals. Therefore, its importance notwithstanding, the endogenous model cannot on its own account for the high level of political mediation in Norway.

To sum up, despite their important contributions, at the general level, the exogenous and endogenous models display the same weakness. They both exhibit a *teleological deficit*: they systematically underestimate the extent to which the overall course of institutional change in Norway has been *designed* by means of reflexively monitored political steering by collective actors motivated by widely shared goals and values. To avoid a possible misunderstanding here, let me add that the problem with the two models is not that they leave out *individual agency*, which they do not. What they tend to omit for systematic reasons, if I am correct, is agency at the collective level of political steering of *society as a whole*. The two aspects they emphasize – external influences and incremental accumulation – cannot on their own account for this. Therefore, we now need to look at collective decision making in the political system.

4.2 Voting and Bargaining as Causes of Institutional Change

To overcome the teleological deficit in the exogenous and endogenous models, I will now examine models of political, democratic collective decision making. With collective decisions, I have in mind attempts to regulate matters of common concern – including external influences and incremental accumulation – by making decisions that are binding on all members of society (Elster, 2007, p. 401; Parsons, 1967, p. 308). Collective decisions are democratic to the extent that all affected persons can influence the outcome. According to Elster (2013, pp. 27–36, 2007, pp. 401–424), there are only three pure types of collective decision making: voting, bargaining and argumentation. They cannot be reduced to each other, but they can occur together or in sequence (for instance, if argumentation over different collective courses of action does not yield a determinate outcome, one might vote on alternatives, which opens the way for negotiations and vote-trading). I will now apply Elster's typology to the study of institutional change in Norway.

According to many political philosophers, political scientists and sociologists, voting is the essence of collective decision making in representative modern liberal democracies. Thus already Rousseau, in *The Social Contract*, argued that it is through the secret ballot that the 'collective will' of the people is constituted. And in perhaps the most influential post-war definition of democracy, Dahl (1989, pp. 108–115) emphasizes 'voting equality at the final stage'. More recently, Fukuyama (2011, p. 322),

in his monumental study of the emergence and nature of modern political institutions, puts periodic elections at the centre of democracy (what he calls ‘accountability’). In Norway as well, this model has been influential among social scientists and historians. For instance, the Norwegian Power and Democracy Study (1998–2003) took voting as its point of departure when assessing the conditions of democracy in Norway at the entrance of the 21st century (Østerud, Engelstad & Selle, 2003). Voting, in combination with an appropriate principle of demarcation of the franchise (for example, all sane adults) and an aggregation mechanism (such as the majority principle), makes it possible to register and implement the will of the people. Therefore, voting enables us to understand the political mediation of external influences and incremental accumulation in Norway as a sort of two-step process. In the first step, in itself an important institutional change, the circle of eligible voters was gradually expanded to include all adult citizens, as the constitution of 1814 only provided the right to vote to a small percentage of mostly property-owning males (6 percent of the total population vs. 75 percent today) (SSB, 2010). This took a hundred years: from 1898 on, all men could vote; from 1907 on, some women could vote and from 1913 on, all women could vote. In the second step, social groups such as peasants, workers and women used their new political leverage to vote for political delegates and parties that would fight for their interests in the political system, resulting in major changes in institutions, such as working life, education and the family.

It goes without saying that voting is a collective decision-making device that has allowed the political mediation of external influences and incremental accumulation in Norway to stay in touch with the collective will of the population. Yet the voting model has been criticized for painting a partial and incomplete picture of collective decision making. In particular, it has been criticized for overlooking the importance of bargaining: negotiating about different collective outcomes by making (credible) threats and promises and where the goal is not the simple aggregation of preferences, as in voting, but attaining a compromise that reflects the negotiating strength of the participants. Collective decision making via bargaining has been a seminal cause of institutional change in Norway. For instance, institutional development in Norway has been described as being shaped by elite compromises regarding foreign policy, geographical centre/periphery, gender equality and working life (Gulbrandsen et al., 2002, pp. 34–42 and 268–272). Indeed, in perhaps the most influential account of the emergence of democratic mass politics in Norway (and Western Europe), the Norwegian political sociologist Stein Rokkan (2010) criticized the voting model from the perspective of the bargaining model. According to Rokkan, important social groups ordered along geographical (centre/periphery), functional (class) and ideological (religion) lines have organized into interest groups that collectively fight for their interests. They do so in ‘segments’ of the state apparatus in which relevant interest groups, government officials, bureaucrats and others meet and negotiate collective outcomes. The emergence of a semi-corporatist system in Norway made Rokkan come to his famous conclusion that bargaining (‘corporate pluralism’) is a more impor-

tant mechanism for collective decision making and thus collective self-regulation and monitoring than voting ('numerical democracy'). In his oft-quoted catchphrase: 'Votes count, resources decide' (Rokkan, 2010, p. 95 and 206).

Again, an overall assessment of these two models falls outside the scope of this chapter (see Elster, 2007, pp. 401–424). Voting and bargaining certainly have been crucial aspects of the political mediation of external influences and incremental accumulation in Norway and thus of collectively designed institutional change. Nevertheless, I will argue that they cannot fully account for the overall pattern of institutional modernization in Norway.

Starting with voting, the expansion of the franchise and the subsequent use by social movements of representative democratic institutions to conduct institutional change is a key aspect of the modernization of Norway. Voting addresses the teleological deficit of the exogenous and endogenous models by emphasizing reflexively monitored collective self-regulation carried out via the representative political system. Yet the voting model cannot account for one essential fact, namely what has aptly been called 'the trend towards political consensus' in Norway (Torgersen, 1962). This political consensus is characterized by a high level of convergence regarding the goals and means of collective decision making: what kind of institutional orders one wants to create and the corresponding allocation of rights and obligations, opportunities and burdens among citizens. Since 1814 in Norway, the political consensus has centred on the liberal idea of *equal individual freedom for all*, and subsequent social movements have not diverted from it but added new layers. I will have more to say about this later. The problem with voting in this respect is that it cannot *by itself* explain the emergence of political consensus. Voting is simply a mechanism that aggregates *pre-established* preferences and beliefs. So, political consensus is a given exogenous input in the voting process that makes it possible to steer a course into the future that the majority can agree on when voting on different political parties and programmes. In itself, voting cannot explain the trend towards political consensus.

Neither can the bargaining model explain the trend towards political consensus, although it too presupposes it. To paraphrase Durkheim (1984), there is a 'non-bargaining element' in bargaining. Successful bargaining presupposes a framework of not only shared rules but also common goals, values and norms – that is, a political consensus. Otherwise, bargaining would be nasty, brutish and short. Now, I do not doubt that political consensus – shared goals, values and norms and trust – might be the outcome of bargaining processes. However, I doubt that it is the bargaining itself that explains it. Bargaining models, such as Rokkan's, start with the existence of collectively organized interest groups with conflicting rankings of collective outcomes. These rankings then clash in the semi-corporate political system where compromises are made that reflect the parties' negotiating strength. In this connection, Rokkan (2010, pp. 209–210) particularly emphasizes 'exit' opportunities: the threat of withholding important resources. However, there is nothing in this process that can account for how the parties converge towards common goals, values and norms.

To do so, the parties would have to be willing to change preferences and beliefs as a result of interacting and exchanging perspectives and arguments with each other, and that would not be bargaining anymore. That would be deliberation. Furthermore, even though the bargaining model can to some extent explain the political mediation of external influences and incremental accumulation, it leaves a rather ‘segmented’ (Egeberg, Olsen & Sætren, 1978) picture of politically created institutional change. As different parties fight for their special interests, there is no one to overlook the overall steering of society (Hernes, 1978; Sejersted, 2001b, pp. 256–273). Therefore, bargaining has quite a lot in common with the model of incremental accumulation, and so the teleological deficit partly re-enters.

To sum up, even though the voting and bargaining models of institutional change take steps toward solving the teleological deficit by emphasizing collective decision making, they encounter another problem: the *consensual deficit*.

4.3 Deliberation in the Public Sphere

This brings us to Elster’s (2007, pp. 405–409) third model of collective decision making: argumentation. The rest of this chapter argues that deliberation in the public sphere has been an important element in institutional change in Norway and one that can account for both the high level of conscious design (teleological deficit) and political consensus (consensual deficit). Some important attempts by historians to do so already exist (Slagstad, 1998; Sejersted, 2000), and what I have to say is inspired by these previous attempts. My contribution in this chapter is creating a much more explicit *theoretical model* of institutional change. This model, which might be called deliberative or discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008), combines deliberation with the four other causes we have discussed. Furthermore, it is based on a new model of public deliberation combining insights from Habermas (1996, 1992) and Elster (1986, 2007, 2013, 1998a) that I will now present.

Public deliberation is a mechanism of collective decision making based on argumentation. Its goal is neither the aggregation of preferences and beliefs nor compromises but rather unanimous agreement – that all participants come to hold the same preferences and beliefs for the same reasons. For deliberation to be important in politics, a demarcated social arena where argumentation can take place must exist. According to Habermas (1992, pp. 14–56), such public spheres started to emerge in north-western Europe in the second half of the 18th century, and they became politically very influential during the nineteenth century. The public sphere is a physical or virtual (technologically mediated) arena where private persons meet as citizens to discuss issues that affect them as a collective and that can only be resolved by means of collective action (Habermas, 1992, p. 26). According to Habermas (2005, p. 89), four social norms regulate public deliberation: all affected parties must be able to

take part; all issues and arguments may be raised; the power of the better argument rules and all participants must be sincere (mean what they say and say what they mean). Together, these norms constitute a social sphere where arguments rule and from which emerges a historically new kind of political power: *communicative power* (see Høibraaten, 1999 for a discussion).

The challenge of this model of collective decision making, if it is to be more than simply a normative model of how rational and fair political decisions *should* be conducted, is to explain how and why people in fact *are* motivated to play the game of public deliberation and feel obliged by the consensus thus produced. Habermas' (1984, chapter III) response to this challenge is basically a rationalist one: we are rational animals that cannot but be persuaded and swayed by the peculiar 'forceless force' of the better argument. This raises the question of what makes an argument rational and binding. What kind of arguments will persuade a rational person? Based on Habermas' (1984, pp. 19–23, 2004, chapter 7; see also Elster 2013, pp. 44–60; Schmidt, 2008, pp. 306–307) distinction between theoretical and practical discourses, I propose that in addition to the overall constraint of consistency, two kinds of arguments will in particular persuade rational people. First, corresponding to debates addressing factual questions of truth (including questions of causal connections, predictions and counterfactuals), empirical evidence is the benchmark. Second, corresponding to normative debates regarding what is fair and just, arguments invoking impartiality ('good for all and not only for me/mine') are the yardstick.

Despite the fact that rationality may be constitutive of the human mind (Davidson, 2001, essays 11 and 12), Habermas' position is challenged by the fact that there are many social and psychological forces countervailing the power of the better argument, even in public deliberation: deliberation sometimes takes too much time ('too many Friday afternoons,' as Oscar Wilde said of socialism); even without time limitations, participants may fail to reach an agreement due to irreconcilable differences in preferences and beliefs (Elster, 1983, p. 38); the consensus they reach may reflect differences in economic, cultural, social or other resources (Bourdieu, 1984); the way discussions are framed might benefit some participants (Bråten 1973); differences in authority might influence argumentation processes (Bourdieu, 1991); acting before an audience might induce participants not to lose face rather than be swayed by arguments (Elster 2007, p. 408; Goffman, 1967, pp. 5–45); and so on. Consequently, despite the remarkable self-correcting nature of public deliberation, Habermas' rationalist answer needs to be supplemented by further arguments that can explain why public deliberation can motivate people to create and adhere to consensus. To do so, I will support Habermas' rationalist argument with a set of social constraints that all have one thing in common: in a weak social sense, they 'force' participants in public deliberation – even the cynical egoists – to respect the rules of the game, that is, to reach an agreement via argument and to adhere to it. Following is a list of some important constraints (the sequence is arbitrary and does not reflect importance), most taken from Elster (1986, 1998a, 2007, 2013).

- *The legitimacy constraint.* Legitimacy is vital to gain support for one's proposed solution to a collective action problem because it provides an indispensable scarce resource: voluntary compliance (Weber, 1978, p. 31). In liberal Western democracies, debate in the public sphere is the primary source of legitimacy. Therefore, even the rich and mighty must argue their case in the public sphere and play by the rules there (Habermas, 1992, 2006).
- *The impartiality constraint.* In public deliberation, no one will be persuaded by an argument that a proposed collective solution is 'good for me/mine'. Instead, only arguments claiming that a solution is 'good for all' will have merit. Therefore, public deliberation acts as a kind of filter sifting out biased solutions that serve only the few (Elster, 1986, pp. 112–114).
- *The imperfection constraint.* Often, actors faced with the impartiality constraint and encountering a menu of different principles of justice and fairness will choose the one that best fits their interests. Even so, if actors argue in favour of principles that too obviously support their particular interests, this will provoke suspicion and weaken their position in the debate. Therefore, even rational egoists motivated solely or mostly by their private interests are forced by their selfish rationality to choose principles that only imperfectly match their interests (Elster, 1998a, p. 102).
- *The consistency constraint.* Assume you have invoked a general principle in a context or debate in which it favoured your interests. Lest you be seen as an opportunist and lose credibility in future debates, you must stick to this principle in subsequent debates, even when it does not serve your interests (Elster, 1998a, p. 104).
- *The civilizing force of the hypocrisy constraint.* The consistency constraint is backed up by a psychological mechanism. When a rational egoist, in order to disclose his or her real interests (to maximize personal gain), is pretending to act according to a principle of fairness, cognitive dissonance will result as one's desires (egoistic) and one's actions (proclaiming fairness) clash. Subconsciously, that person's desires might adapt to his or her actions and make him or her less egoistic. Therefore, it is dangerous to fake impartiality; one might actually become impartial (Elster, 2007, p. 406).
- *The symmetry constraint.* Once you enter into debate with someone, you must recognize that person as a rational subject who can only legitimately be influenced by arguments and not by non-argumentative means, such as manipulation, deceit, power, money and brute force. This presupposition of reciprocal recognition (symmetry) is built into the very pragmatic infrastructure of argumentatively coming to agreement with someone about something (Habermas, 2005, pp. 31 and 39–45). Put differently, argumentation brackets social differences. To rephrase Saint Paul (Galatians 3:28): here there is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in deliberation in the public sphere.

- *The strength of weakness and weakness of strength constraint.* In public deliberation, there will often be a bias against the rich and powerful, as everyone knows they have many ways of securing their interests. Therefore, when they argue in favour of their interests, they will often be met with suspicion – the weakness of strength. Indeed, the whole idea of a public intellectual, a role emerging together with the modern public sphere, is based on the idea of someone – a Zola, Russel, Sartre, Foucault, Bourdieu or Habermas – speaking truth to power, that is, criticizing the rich and powerful. However, there will often be an inverted bias in favour of the less resourceful, as is seen in the favours granted ‘victims’ in public debates. This is the strength of weakness.

Public deliberation subject to these rational and social constraints explains how it is possible for citizens to reflexively address and collectively solve problems that society as a whole encounters. Indeed, the deliberative model challenges the view that politics is just about solving conflicts of interest. Politics is also about engaging in debates about the good society – what it is and how to create it (Sejersted, 2000, pp. 56–59; 2001b, pp. 256–273). Therefore, public deliberation addresses the teleological deficit. Furthermore, as public deliberation subject to the set of constraints described above changes (or makes people act as if they change) preferences and beliefs (Elster, 1986, pp. 112–114), it makes it possible for individuals and groups to reach a consensus about the good society. Therefore, public deliberation addresses the consensual deficit. As I will soon argue, public deliberation has in fact been a seminal political force in Norway. Therefore, to explain the broad pattern of teleological and consensual institutional change in Norway, we need a model that depicts how external influences and incremental accumulation are politically mediated not only by voting and bargaining but also by public deliberation. I will now develop such a model.

4.4 The Democratic Power Circuit

To develop this model, I turn again to Habermas. Not the pessimistic Habermas of *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* who worries that the public sphere has been ‘re-feudalized’ by large public and private organizations using the public sphere to manipulate voters, workers and consumers nor the gloomy Habermas of *The Theory of Communicative Action* who laments the way the ‘system’ (capitalist markets and state bureaucracies) by way of money and administrative power ‘colonizes’ a communicatively structured ‘lifeworld’, including the public sphere. Rather, I will start with Habermas’ discourse-theoretic theory of law and democracy, as presented in the 1992 *Between Facts and Norms*. Here, Habermas’ (1996; see Elster, 1998b for a general discussion) starting point is a ‘deliberative’ theory of democracy, which depicts the essence of democracy as ‘decision making by discussion among free and

equal citizens' (Elster, 1998c, p. 1). How can such a deliberative democracy be institutionalized? This is accomplished first and foremost by setting up a public sphere, a demarcated social arena where citizens can come together and discuss how they want to live together. However, this is not enough, for three reasons. First, the public sphere needs a constant input of issues to discuss and resolve. Second, procedures for making efficient collectively binding decisions need to be institutionalized. Third, such decisions need to be implemented and monitored via some institutional apparatus. Habermas (1996, pp. 341–387) has included all these elements in *Between Facts and Norms*, although I will reorganize and simplify them somewhat in the *democratic power circuit* (DPC) model. This is a dynamic, sequential and recursive model for collective meaning and will formation in liberal democracies based on five arenas with five different tasks.

The first arena is the *lifeworld* of individuals who in their social capacities as parents, employees, employers, students, passengers, taxpayers, consumers, etc. encounter problems they cannot solve on their own. Therefore, the 'task' of the lifeworld is simply to generate *private problems* in need of collective solutions. The second arena is the legally protected sphere of *civil society* in which citizens spontaneously come together as activists and members of non-governmental organizations to form a Weberian (1978, pp. 938–939) 'party', an organization that makes it possible for people to act in concert to procure their common interests, such as fighting inefficiency, exploitation, injustice, discrimination, etc. Therefore, the role of the civil society in the DPC model is to *alert* society of problems in need of collective solutions. This brings us to the third arena, the *public sphere*, which I have already described as the physical and virtual social space where free and equal citizens discuss issues that collectively affect them. The task of the public sphere is to establish a *public opinion*: a sort of collective will of the people. Therefore, public opinion – the consensus formed among citizens *after* publicly debating issues such as tax reforms, educational policies and gender quotas – acts as a rational filter for members of society selecting problems and solutions according to urgency and problem solving capacity. However, the rather dispersed public opinion is one thing; making collectively binding decisions is another. This brings us to the fourth arena, the *political system*, which I define as the institutions – parliament and executive branches – where *collective decisions on behalf of society* are made. Much such collective decision making takes the form of voting on competing courses of collective action, which also allows for strong bargaining elements (logrolling). However, deliberation also takes place within the political system, not least because political processes are monitored by the public and require legitimacy through good arguments. Moreover, public opinion influences political decisions (which it must if public deliberation is not to end up merely as inconsequential 'talk') not only by its argumentative strength but also by virtue of 'anticipation of retrospective control by voting' (Elster, 1998c, p. 2). That is, politicians know voters will punish them in the next election if they do not respect public opinion. In addition, political parties help bridge the gap between public opinion and

the political system because they are civil society organizations that recruit engaged citizens, talk to ordinary people, take part in debates, and so on, which makes them sensitive to public opinion. But at the same time they are also major actors in all modern representative political systems, which means they have the power to directly influence formal political decisions and thus channel public opinion into the political system. The fifth and last arena is the *legal-administrative system*, the task of which in the DPC model is to *implement* political decisions. This is partly achieved by a politically controlled administrative bureaucracy that prepares, implements and monitors political decisions and partly by giving political decisions the form of laws that individuals and organizations typically will respect because they are backed up simultaneously by the 'hard' power of the state's monopoly on the use of legitimate violence and the 'soft' power of legitimacy that laws have due to their democratic origin. Therefore, members of society have both instrumental and normative reasons to comply with laws.

The process in the DPC model can be summarized thus: *lifeworld*: problems → *civil society*: alert society → *public sphere*: public opinion → *political system*: binding decisions → *legal-administrative system*: implementation. Because members of modern societies encounter a continuous flow of problems (often caused by previous political decisions), there is no 'end of history'; the DPC model consists of a recursive process that never comes to an end.

The DPC model has several strengths. First, by accentuating deliberation in the public sphere, it explains how members of a society can converge on important societal issues via an argumentatively induced change of preferences and beliefs. Therefore, it addresses the consensual deficit. Second, the model also depicts how members of complex modern societies can reflexively adapt their institutions to the goals they have and the problems they encounter via democratic collective decision making. Therefore, it also addresses the teleological deficit. Third, the model recognizes that institutional change is a never-ending process of trial and error. It therefore does not commit the intentional fallacy of describing institutional change as the perfect implementation of a societal blueprint. Institutional change is of course much messier than this, as the recursive element of the DPC model recognizes. Fourth, the model acknowledges that many of the problems it is invoked to solve stem from external influences and incremental accumulation, such as fluctuating oil prices, migration and demographic explosions. Nonetheless, according to this model, how a society responds to such challenges is politically mediated by the DPC model whereby such influences are perceived, interpreted and responded to. Therefore, institutional change is not merely sightless evolution but is at least partly politically monitored and designed. The watchmaker is not always blind. Fifth, voting is important in the DPC model because at some point discussion must come to an end and decisions made. However, in the DPC model, voting comes after and is influenced by public deliberation of the issue at hand. Voting thus takes place in the shadow of public deliberation. Sixth, the same goes for bargaining, which in the DPC model occurs within the politi-

cal system but is constrained by public opinion because politicians are themselves rational actors, belong to parties, must legitimize their decisions and need to win future elections. Thus, bargaining too takes place in the shadow of public deliberation. Seventh, the DPC model incorporates seminal insights from *all* four models into an integrated model of politically mediated institutional change. Finally, I will now argue that empirically this model fits the Norwegian case quite well.

4.5 Instituting the Democratic Power Circuit Model in Norway

In arguing that this model fits the Norwegian case, I will proceed in two steps corresponding to the two empirical conditions that must be satisfied for the DPC model to have explanatory value: first, the institutional infrastructure of the DPC model must be in place (scene), and second, influential social movements must employ it to create institutional change (actors). It is important to bear in mind that the scene and the actors developed in tandem. The scene (DPC) created political opportunities for actors (social movements), who then used these to broaden the DPC. However, for analytical purposes, I find it useful to separate them. I will look first at how the scene was assembled.

The question of when the DPC model was institutionalized has a reasonably straightforward answer: in 1814. In that year, thanks to the external shock of the Napoleonic wars, Norway declared sovereignty from its colonial power Denmark, abolished absolutism (its political system since the assembly of estates was dissolved in 1660) and set up a liberal constitution inspired by the American and French revolutions. National sovereignty was soon tempered due to the union with Sweden (1814–1905), but the political system has remained a liberal constitutional monarchy ever since (with a brief interlude during the Nazi occupation).

The first two parts of the DPC model to be institutionalized in Norway were the legal–administrative and political systems. According to Fukuyama (2011, pp. 15–16; 2014, pp. 23–25), a modern liberal political and legal–administrative system has three pillars: a bureaucratic state, rule of law and accountable government. In 1814, Norway inherited a reasonably efficient bureaucratic apparatus from the absolutist period, a system that was further developed in the subsequent decades (Sejersted, 2001a, pp. 14–24). The most novel and radical aspect of the new constitution was rule of law. The 1814 constitution gave people a catalogue of individual rights that would, for instance, protect their freedom of speech and protect their private property from the state (Seip, 2010 first part, pp. 49–51; Sejersted, 2001a, pp. 15–17). Therefore, people went from being ‘subjects’ to being ‘citizens’. Finally, absolutism was replaced by a much more accountable form of government whereby an elected parliament passed laws (although the king could veto them) and overlooked the decisions of the king and his government. However, as only a minority of six percent of the whole population

had the right to vote and as political positions in parliament, government, the legal system and state bureaucracy were more or less monopolized by a bureaucratic elite consisting of no more than one percent of the population (Sejersted, 2001a, p. 171), the political system created in 1814 was in no way a full democracy. This democratic deficit notwithstanding, a new political order containing the political and legal-administrative elements of the DPC model was more or less in place from 1814.

The two more informal parts of the DPC model (civil society and the public sphere) were created partly in response to the modernization of the political and legal-administrative systems and partly as a response to broader economic, social and cultural modernization processes. They also developed in tandem: an emerging public sphere was immediately populated by civil society parties that subsequently gave substance and vitality to the public debates. However, let me describe them separately. A public sphere in the Habermasian sense appeared in the decades immediately after 1814. According to Sejersted (2001a, pp. 190–203), it emerged first as a mostly artistic scene connected to new institutions in the city such as theatres, galleries, museums, publishing houses, clubs and restaurants where citizens (mostly the bureaucratic elite and the upper middle class at first, soon followed by other groups) came together to interact outside of both the private intimacy of the family and the bureaucratic regulations of the state. It did not take long, however, before the public sphere took on political functions. Neither did it take long before a political public sphere proper was created in relation to newspapers, journals, seminars, lectures and parliamentary debates, where the use of political power was discussed and criticized. Moreover, in this period, a material infrastructure was assembled by means of roads, railways, telegraphs and steamships. Thus, a ‘communication state’ (Sejersted, 2000, pp. 61–64) gradually took shape that ‘disembedded’ (Giddens, 1990) public debates and stretched them across the whole nation–state. This process was mainly propelled by a liberal bureaucratic elite who believed public debate was needed to discipline the collective will of a people gradually moving from the ‘loyalty’ of absolutism to the ‘voice’ of liberal democracy (Hirschman, 1970). Subsequently, around 1850, a public sphere was in place in Norway, producing a new kind of communicative power and also the need to legitimize political decisions by arguments.

The public sphere was immediately inhabited by new kinds of collective actors, namely non-governmental and non-commercial organizations springing out of broader social movements. As a result of the modernization of Norway, traditional and local forms of community, support and trust began to break down. New social movements and associations, connected with issues such as language, religion, geography, poverty, economic interests and social status, moved in to create a new basis of community, support and trust. They gave Norway a rich associational life resembling the nineteenth century America described by Alexis de Tocqueville, where citizens organize spontaneously from below to solve collective problems.

So, by 1850, not only was a modern liberal political and legal-administrative system assembled, it was besieged by a vibrant public sphere inhabited by a broad

collection of civil society organizations. Therefore, around 1850, although in no way perfect, the DPC model was firmly established, creating opportunities for a new way of conducting institutional change.

4.6 Applying the Democratic Power Circuit Model: Peasants, Workers and Women

I will now look at the three social movements that have most successfully employed public deliberation within the context of the DPC model to conduct institutional change in Norway: those involving peasants, workers and women. I will organize my rather brief and schematic analysis around four axes: the institutional barrier each movement encountered, how they used the DPC model to overcome it, the institutional change that followed and how that added a new layer to the Norwegian political consensus. First, however, some words about the liberal bureaucratic elite of 1814 are necessary. The institutional barrier the bureaucratic elite faced was absolutism, a society where people were being treated as docile subjects instead of free and equal citizens. Taking advantage of the external shock of the Napoleonic wars, as noted above, the result of their effort was striking, namely to set up a constitutional monarchy based on bureaucracy, rule of law and accountable government. In other words, they erected the DPC. Doing this, they were motivated by the cultural–normative ideal that has been the basic element in Norwegian political consensus ever since, guiding 200 years of Norwegian modernization – *equal individual freedom for all*. In the words of the influential count Herman Wedel Jarlsberg, Norway was to become a ‘temple of freedom’ (quoted from Slagstad, 1998, p. 11). This makes Norway part of a broader Western (today even global) modernization project built on what Eisenstadt (2000, p. 5) calls the ‘cultural program’ of modernity, individual freedom. In what follows, I will analyse the three social movements’ use of the DPC model. I will in particular emphasize public deliberation, in line with the basic theme of this book.

4.6.1 The Peasants

The first movement in Norway to successfully fight for institutional change using the DPC model was what I will call the peasant movement, even though it also consisted of intellectuals and members of the lower middle class (the *petite bourgeoisie*). The institutional barrier they faced was an agrarian elite society in which peasants, 85 percent of the population (Helle et al., 2013, p. 212), were ruled by a small one percent bureaucratic elite that had more or less monopolized political power. Despite rule of law and some governmental accountability, the few still ruled the many. In particular, from 1830–1840 onwards, the peasants challenged the bureaucratic elite in order to

disperse power by democratizing society. Rokkan (2010, pp. 216–236) has famously labelled this the centre/periphery conflict, but we might just as well call it the elite/people conflict. In broad terms, the political mobilization of the peasants followed the DPC model. Important in our connection is how the peasant movement made extensive use of the public sphere to fight for their cause. They did so partly by employing institutions already established by the bureaucratic elites, such as theatres, the university, publishing houses, newspapers, municipal bodies and parliament, where they participated in and influenced artistic, intellectual and political debates. Subsequently, they created their own institutions – theatres, publishing houses, journals and newspapers – in order to disseminate their ideas and influence public opinion. And they did this to great effect. Not for nothing did the emerging Norwegian nationalism become so tightly connected to the (often idealized) peasant culture.

Another important reason for the peasant movement's success was their efficient organization in civil society. As the traditional agrarian order started to break down in Norway, new social movements and associations emerged that gave ordinary people a sense of community, security and trust. These associations, which were locally embedded but also worked on the national level, in particular dealt with three important issues where the periphery (peasants) challenged the centre (the bureaucratic elite): religion, language and teetotalism. As a result, an associational society – a 'counter culture' – emerged in opposition to the hegemonic culture of the bureaucratic elite. Moreover, the peasants were able to use the political system to implement the anti-elitist public opinion they created. Before 1884, their leaders did so as members of parliament. But from 1884 onwards, when they founded their own political party, *Venstre*, they conquered government, where they would dominate until 1935 when the labour party seized the political system. Access to the political system made it possible for the peasant movement to pass laws on educational reform, social security, expanded suffrage, communal self-governance and restrictive financial politics that all suited their interests and then to apply the legal-administrative system to implement them.

Two legacies stand out from the peasant movement's use of public deliberation within the context of the DPC. On the institutional level, the peasants fought down the bureaucratic elite and democratized society. The crowning moment of this achievement was the transition to parliamentarianism in 1884 (Seip, 2010 second part, pp. 239–254). From then on, the government, which was by then the last retreat of the bureaucratic elite, had to resign without mandate from the almighty parliament (the people). Being the first group to successfully employ the DPC to create institutional change also made the peasant movement an inspiration for later social movements, particularly the labour movement. On the level of political consensus, the peasant movement further expanded the idea of individual autonomy by incorporating democracy: rule by the people. Indeed, the peasant movement's democratic ethos has been called 'Norway's gift to the modern world' (Slagstad, 1998, p. 93). What this ethos implies is best understood in light of the republican concept of freedom as non-domination (Pettit, 2014). A person is only free to the extent he/she is not subject to

the arbitrary will of others, which at the political level implies democracy. People should only be subject to laws they give themselves and not to those given them by the (bureaucratic) elite.

4.6.2 The Workers

As Norway started to industrialize towards the end of the nineteenth century, a new social group employed the DPC model to conduct institutional change: the workers' movement. The institutional barrier they faced was a capitalist economic system producing stark inequalities in life opportunities. Therefore, their overall goal was to tame capitalism and let workers be treated with dignity and share in the productive output of the rapidly expanding industrial market economy. As in the case of the peasants, the labour movement would use the DPC model to mobilize politically. One of the first things the labour movement would do was to put the 'worker question' on the public agenda. To do so, they partly worked within the already existing 'bourgeois' public sphere. But like the peasants, they also established new institutions, such as newspapers, journals and publishing houses, thus expanding the public sphere. The result was striking. Benefitting in particular from the impartiality and the strength of weakness constraints of the public sphere, the labour movement put the need to monitor and improve the conditions of workers in Norway at the centre of public opinion, where it has stayed ever since as a sort of 'social democratic' egalitarian background consensus framing voting and bargaining processes. As in the case of the peasants, a key to success in the public sphere was complementary organizational activities in civil society. After a brief but ultimately unsuccessful attempt in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions led by Marcus Thrane (Seip, 2010 first part, pp. 183–206), Norwegian workers started to organize again towards the end of the nineteenth century, this time very successfully. This first unionization happened at the level of plants, then industries and then nationwide with the Workers' National Trade Union (today the LO) in 1899. Ever since, the LO has been the biggest labour federation in Norway, currently with 900,000 members out of a population of five million (Nergaard, 2015, p. 39, figure 1). Furthermore, as with the peasants, the workers created their own political party to make sure their interests were properly looked after in the political system. Founded in 1887, the Labour Party first moved into government in 1928 and then again in 1935 as part of a red–green coalition with the peasants. They would remain in power until 1965, interrupted only by the Nazi occupation in 1940–1945 (and a brief four-week conservative intermezzo in 1963), making commentators label the period from roughly (the exact dating varies a bit) 1935 until 1980 the 'social democratic order' (Furre, 2000), the 'social democratic age' (Sejersted, 2005), the 'labour party state' (Slagstad, 1998) and even the 'one-party state' (Seip, 1987[1963]). When in power, the Labour Party would ambitiously enlarge, empower and employ the legal–administrative apparatus to achieve their political goals.

So what did the labour movement achieve? At the institutional level, although more a *creatio continua* than a *creatio ex nihilo*, it created a welfare society (Olstad, 2010, pp. 161–163; see also Engelstad & Hagelund, 2015). This was founded upon two pillars in particular that constitute much of the essence of the ‘Nordic model’. The first is a heavily regulated work life centred on the tripartite system (labour, capital and the state) dating back from the Basic Agreement (‘Hovedavtalen’) between labour and capital in 1935 (Falkum, 2015). This pillar is both a formal and informal social contract by which the workers accept capitalists’ right to own and steer corporations, whereas workers get the right to collectively bargain over salaries, are protected by workplace laws and are represented on the plant and board level. The second pillar is a universalist welfare state set up to ‘decommodify’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 21–23 and chapter 2) life through socializing risks occurring through the individual’s life-course. This is done by a system of direct economic benefits in connection with sickness, injury, unemployment, child care and disability but also by free or heavily subsidized public services in education, kindergarten, health, housing and old age care. At the level of political consensus, the labour movement added a strong egalitarian element to the cultural programme of individual autonomy (Olstad, 2010, chapter 5; Brandal, Bratberg, & Thorsen, 2011, pp. 11–16). Becoming a member of Comintern 1919–1923, the labour party for a brief period agitated for a Leninist one-party system, which would have meant abolishing the liberal constitution, dismantling the DPC and breaking with the established political consensus. However, the labour party after some tumultuous years chose to follow a reformist strategy, fighting for the interests of the workers within the DPC (Olstad, 2010, pp. 60–70). As a result, they added a strong egalitarian socio-economic ethos to the political consensus revolving around the idea of equalizing income and living conditions among individuals and groups in society. Workers (ordinary people) should benefit as much as capitalists from the capitalist system, therefore providing individual freedom for all and not just for the few. So strong is this ethos that a conservative coalition government in 1967 introduced the National Insurance Act, the law that more than anything consolidated the Norwegian welfare state.

4.6.3 Women

Finally, there is the women’s movement. Even though feminism has come in several waves in Norway, the first being the suffragette movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I will look only at what has been called the ‘second wave’ (Holst, 2009, pp. 36–55). This latter may be said to have lasted from the late 1960s into the 1980s, with the 1970s being its golden age. The institutional barrier the women’s movement reacted against was patriarchy. Despite increasing formal equality between the sexes regarding, for instance, the right to vote, inherit, work and have an education, gender equality was far from achieved in Norway. Society

was still a patriarchal order systematically biased in women's disfavour in relation to political participation, income, labour market participation, access to education, cultural recognition and the burden of unpaid domestic labour. So the women's movement singled out as their target all formal and informal barriers to women's equality, be they economic, educational, cultural, social, sexual or legal. And just like the peasants and workers, women employed the DPC for their own purposes. From the late 1960s, new feminist organizations such as *Nyfeministene* ('The new feminists'), *Kvinnefronten* ('The women's front') and *Brød og roser* ('Bread and roses') emerged. Even though they could not compete with the peasant and worker movements in pure numbers – they numbered only a few thousand altogether (Furre, 2000, p. 261) – they were very efficient in spreading their messages. The main reason for this is their notable success in setting gender issues and gender equality – contraception; sexual freedom; abortion; the division of labour in the family; sexist language; the gender gap in wages; female underrepresentation in work, politics, science, media and art and much more – on the public agenda. And just like the peasants and workers, they achieved this partly by employing the established institutions in the public sphere but also by creating new arenas. In both cases, they produced a prolific amount of pamphlets, films, novels, plays, music and research that exposed and criticized the patriarchal biases inherent in existing institutions and culture (Slagstad, 1998, pp. 422–427). In doing so, and because of their small number, the feminists benefitted greatly from the impartiality and strength of weakness constraints in the public sphere. However, in contrast to the peasant and worker movements, the women's movement never created a feminist party. Rather, they incorporated their agenda into existing political parties, mostly on the left, even though more or less all political parties became sensitive to the feminist agenda. As a result, the women's movement could influence the legal–administrative system to implement their political goals.

What did the women's movement achieve? At the institutional level, they created what has become known as state feminism (Hernes, 1987). That is, feminist organizations expanded and employed state capacity to redeem feminist goals. They did so in the form of laws and regulations, such as the abortion law (1978) and the gender equality act (1978); by quotation measures in education, academia and economic life; by targeting benefits and services to individuals (including women) and not male breadwinners (Esping-Andersen, 1999, chapter 4); by building welfare state facilities that make it possible for women to combine labour market participation with having children (kindergartens and paid parental leave) and by expanding the welfare state, thus providing women with jobs in health and education. The result is that during the last 30–40 years, Norway has gone from a housewife society to a two-income family society, although the discussion continues regarding how much gender equality actually has been achieved (Skjeie & Teigen, 2003; Reisel & Teigen, 2014). At the level of political consensus, the women's movement added a new layer to the ideal of individual freedom, namely gender equality. The basic idea is that women are to have

the exact same educational, occupational, economic, political, cultural and sexual opportunities as men and that society – notably the state – has a major responsibility in making this happen.

4.7 Concluding Discussion

Institutions – rules and the regularities they create – are the backbone of human societies. Understanding how and why institutions change is therefore crucial if we want to understand how and why societies change. This chapter started with the most common description among historians and social scientists of the overall pattern of social and institutional change in Norway since 1814, namely as a process of successive social inclusion of new groups, particularly peasants, workers and women. I then asked: What *caused* Norwegian institutions to change in this way and incorporate new groups? In this connection, I have criticized exogenous and endogenous models for overlooking the political mediation of external influences and incremental accumulation (the teleological deficit) and have criticized models emphasizing collective decision making by voting and bargaining for overlooking that both voting and bargaining take place in the shadow of public deliberation (the consensual deficit). Therefore, this chapter argues that we need to include what is more or less absent from these four models, namely deliberation in the public sphere. Consequently, my position can be called ‘discursive institutionalism’ (Schmidt, 2008), or even better, ‘deliberative institutionalism’. I have developed a conception of argumentation in the public sphere that calls attention to the rational and social reasons why actors – even rational egoists – might be expected to play by the rules of public deliberation. However, external shocks, internal incremental change, voting and bargaining are obviously also important aspects of institutional change in Norway. For that reason, I have developed a model that integrates them with public deliberation: the DPC model. This model is the basis for my proposed explanation of the overall path of institutional change in Norway since 1814. To support this model, I have tried to show how the DPC model, thanks to the liberal bureaucratic elite, was more or less institutionalized in Norway by 1850. I then explained overall institutional changes in Norway as a result of how peasants, workers and women have employed the DPC model. My empirical analysis has centred on the most important institutional barrier a group faced, how they employed the DPC model to overcome it, the most important institutional change that resulted and what new layer was added to the political consensus. The results are summarized in Table 1.

The analysis presented in this chapter obviously raises many questions. I cannot go into all the details here, but let me end by briefly discussing some important issues related to the results summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: The DPC model and institutional change in Norway since 1814

Political consensus	Institutional change	Institutional barrier	Social movement
Individual freedom	Rule of law	Absolutism	Bureaucratic elite
Rule by the people	Democratization	Elite society	Peasants
Egalitarianism	Welfare state	Capitalist inequality	Workers
Gender equity	State feminism	Patriarchy	Women

First, one advantage of the DPC model is that it reveals the similarities between the empirical cases discussed in the chapter. Therefore, despite different collective actors, goals and results, the process by which they have conducted institutional change is basically the same: the DPC model. However, that must not blind us to the differences between them. The greatest is between the bureaucratic elite on the one hand and the three other social movements on the other. The liberal bureaucratic elite could not apply the DPC model to modernize an absolutist agrarian Norwegian society; consequently, their project of institutional change was much more contingent on an external shock (the Napoleonic wars). Therefore, the exogenous model fits this case rather well. The peasants, workers and women, on the other hand, were not dependent on an external shock to the same extent because they could employ the DPC model when fighting for their interests. For this reason, these cases lie closer to the endogenous model. Furthermore, even among the three ‘endogenous’ cases, I think there is a division between the peasants’ and workers’ movements on the one hand and the women’s movement on the other. The peasants’ and workers’ movements were huge social mass movements organizing hundreds of thousands of people and creating political parties that would seize governmental power for long periods. As a result, they were at times more reluctant to submit their political and legal-administrative power to public scrutiny, especially the labour movement in its most technocratic phase in the first two post-war decades (Slagstad, 1998, pp. 336–364). The women’s movement, however, had a much weaker numerical organizational basis and never formed a political party. For this reason, they put more effort into consciousness raising efforts in the public sphere, where they were particularly dependent on the symmetry, impartiality and strength of weakness constraints. Therefore, the feminist movement is probably the case that most clearly illustrates the importance of the public sphere for institutional change in Norway.

Second, although they are the most important cases, peasants, workers and women are of course not the only groups in Norway that have employed the DPC model to conduct institutional change. For instance, religious, ethnic and sexual minorities have used the DPC model to fight for their interests, and the same goes for the disabled, the peace movement and the environmental movement. And some of them have been quite successful. Taking the gay movement as an example, it too has

founded organizations in civil society and influenced public opinion in the public sphere, subsequently shaping political decisions that have been implemented by the legal-administrative system. The result has been important institutional changes: the legal prohibition against sex between same-sex persons was lifted in 1972; homosexuality was abolished as a psychiatric diagnosis in 1982; the partnership act of 1993 gave same-sex persons the right to enter legally binding partnerships and in 2008 parliament introduced a gender-neutral marriage act, thus legally juxtaposing heterosexual and same-sex marriages.

Third, I may be accused of painting too rosy a picture of institutional development by overlooking tensions and conflicts. For instance, in the nineteenth century, there were a number of conflicts involving peasants, workers and other groups (Seip, 2010 first part, pp. 144–175). In the twentieth century, even in the years right after the war, the epitome of societal consensus, we find harsh ideological conflicts between the political left and right regarding the scope of legitimate state intervention in society (Sejersted, 1993, pp. 271–302). Many more examples could be given. Be that as it may, historians still describe the modernization of Norway since 1814 as ‘amazingly peaceful and harmonic’ (Sejersted, 1993, p. 251). More importantly still, there is no contradiction between conflicts and the importance of the DPC model. On the contrary, the DPC model consists of a set of institutionalized procedures designed to *solve* conflicts in a peaceful, rational and fair way. And overall, in Norway the DPC model can be said to have achieved this remarkably well, as the inclusion processes demonstrate. For instance, both the peasants and the workers in the end chose to work for their interests within the context of the DPC model, while liberal conservatives and social democrats were able to reach a consensus pertaining to the need to balance state intervention and rule of law.

Finally, notwithstanding the success of the DPC model thus far in adapting institutional rules and regularities to the collective goals and values of broad parts of the Norwegian population, it currently faces several challenges. I will briefly mention two, one relating to new challenges of inclusion and the other to the infrastructure of the DPC model. The first challenge consists of including the wave of, in particular, non-western immigrants that have come to Norway over the last 40 years. This has brought up difficult and much debated questions regarding how to finance a generous, universalist and expensive welfare state confronted with immigrants who participate less in the labour market, how to maintain the established social contract and regulations of working life and how to deal with challenges of cultural otherness (Brochmann, 2010, pp. 437–439). I think it is fair to call this the next ‘big’ challenge of social inclusion. The other challenge of the DPC model concerns the rise of social media and its effects on the public sphere. Some worry about echo chambers, new outlets for extremism across the ideological spectrum, lower quality of deliberation due to the unedited character of much debate on social media, problems with financing the old quality media and erosion of the private/public distinction of the public sphere. Others, however, celebrate the deliberative potential of social media, pointing

to the fact that more people now have access to the public debate, that the volume of public deliberation has increased and that it is easier to mobilize citizens politically (see Enjolras et al., 2013 for a discussion). Both migration and the emergence of social media are processes we are right in the middle of; therefore, it is too early to pass judgment on their overall effects on the DPC model, at least for me.

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