Old age, illness, and/or physical and/or mental disabilities may limit the ability of an individual to generate enough income to cover basic costs of living. Most developed nations provide financial assistance to persons with limited abilities. In 1974, an Icelandic government passed an act of law providing a tax credit, payable to taxpayers under certain conditions. The tax allowance was applied first to settle the taxes and public levies owed by the taxpayer, with any amount remaining paid out to the individual. This system can be seen as a first, limited attempt at establishing a partial universal basic income of sorts. This social interaction between stakeholders on how to share the tax revenue between the taxpayers led to a government crisis. The shareholders in this partial universal basic income system, the state and municipalities, the old age community, the trade unions, and the employers all have different financial and political interests and were affected by this reform. The lesson is that a basic income would need strong supporters if implemented, where the role of the government and/or the parliament would be mapped. Its supporters must be able to withstand the pressure from the social partners in the labor market because of the interactivity of the social security system and the pension fund system, which is not a part of the fiscal system in Iceland. The conflict of interests becomes apparent.
For a correct application of tax laws, it is central to know at what time or period the conditions of each case are to be tested against the respective tax rule. For example, in many questions, the conditions at the time of the transaction are decisive, but not seldom the tax rules take aim at the conditions at the end of the year – or some other time or period. It is also important to know what significance should be given to events after this time or period, not least when the income declaration is made and assessed. Here, these partly overlooked questions are presented and analyzed from the Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish income tax-perspectives.
The Constitution’s declaration of war requirement, superficially straightforward but actually full of ambiguities, originated in a fear of presidential usurpation and recklessness. Yet Congress has responded to political incentives and has declined the assertive role assigned to it. The check on usurpation and recklessness has eroded almost to the vanishing point.
The implications of incommensurability for rights’ adjudication tend to be overlooked in much of contemporary constitutional theory. This paper criticizes the dominant “one right-answer” approach to conflicts of rights, and develops an alternative approach that is better suited to constitutional rights’ adjudication in contemporary pluralistic legal orders. It is submitted that the normative reasons for having courts undertake the value-choices implicit in constitutional rights’ adjudication, and for preferring certain legal methodologies over others, must reflect the role of courts in resolving social disputes in the light of specific aspects of the economic, social, and legal life of the polities in which those courts operate. It is further argued that any theory that builds from this approach needs to answer two inter-related questions: when is constitutional rights’ adjudication by courts appropriate, and how rights’ adjudication should be pursued.
Since Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States, the sanctuary movement has gained prominence as a form of resistance to federal immigration policy. Sanctuary cities and states have attempted to frustrate the Trump administration’s immigration agenda by refusing to cooperate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE’s) efforts to remove aliens illegally residing in the United States. Academics, pundits and politicians have compared this resistance and non-cooperation to “nullification,” a doctrine typically associated with the South Carolina Nullification Crisis of the 1830s and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798.
This article rejects comparisons between the sanctuary movement and nullification as false equivalencies and explains why the sanctuary movement is not a form of modern nullification. Rather, it suggests the movement is better understood as being similar to “interposition”—a doctrine related to, but distinct from, nullification. In doing so, this paper will clarify the meaning of nullification and interposition by analyzing the developments of these doctrines. Part 1 of this article discusses the historical, theoretical and practical aspects of South Carolina-style nullification, and compares these to that of the sanctuary movement. Part 2 explores the development of nullification and interposition more broadly, with a particular focus on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. Finally, Part 3 directly compares the sanctuary movement, nullification and interposition, and it connects the movement to the “anti-commandeering” doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in the 1990s.
The early eighteenth-century English ecclesiastical courts are a case study in the secularization of a legal system. As demonstrated elsewhere, the courts were very busy. And yet the theoretical justification for their jurisdiction was very much a matter of debate throughout the period, with divine-right and voluntaristic conceptions vying for precedence. Placed in this context, the King’s Bench decision in Middleton v Crofts (1736) represented an important step in the direction of limiting the reach of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and did so on grounds that undermined divine-right justifications of the ecclesiastical court system as a whole.
Statelessness affects around 10 million people globally, many of whom are children. Many public law initiatives to diminish and eradicate statelessness exist, yet the problem persists. This article explores the potential for the private law to contribute to a solution to this problem, leading to increased awareness of the plight of stateless children among the public, investors, governments, and multinational corporations. In doing so, the article examines the role of the private law in regulating the use of so-called “conflict minerals” in the United States and internationally. It recognizes the contribution made by conflict minerals legislation towards finding an effective solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The article proposes, amongst other initiatives, a legislative solution to the enduring problem of child statelessness, adapting provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act which requires corporate reporting and disclosure in relation to international supply chains of public limited companies in respect of conflict minerals, and applying them instead to the causes of child statelessness.
Prescribed levels of acceptable tax risk are increasingly used to articulate degrees of corporate tax responsibility, but the theoretical basis for doing so is not well established. This article (i) develops a theory of the relationship between tax risk and tax responsibility and (ii) shows that acceptable levels of tax risk could be used as a meaningful metric for these purposes, provided that the filing positions a n ticipated from proposed planning are reviewed against the prescribed level of acceptable risk without taking into account any mitigation of the risk factors that are introduced by the planning. Further, the article reviews the evolving tax risk policies of 20 large European companies, showing that while some progress is being made towards meaningful discourse, even the companies with the most well-developed policies are still making their claims in such a way as to conflate socially responsible tax behavior with diligence in implementing antisocial tax behavior.
The article analyzes whether the investment in a private equity fund may create a permanent establishment (PE) for foreign investors. The analysis is divided into two main parts, as the question of creating a PE for the foreign investors is considered with respect to both the main PE rule and the agency PE rule. The amendments to the PE definition prescribed in the OECD/G20 BEPS report on Action 7, and incorporated into the 2017 version of the OECD Model with Commentary, are taken into consideration. It is concluded that the final outcome depends on the specific setup of the private equity fund at hand and that some degree of uncertainty may often remain. Moreover, the recent amendments to the PE definition do not appear to have reduced this uncertainty—rather the contrary.
Florin Dumiter, Ștefania Amalia Jimon and Florin Gheorghe Bene
International double taxation represents one of the main problems’ for which taxpayers have to deal within a world fulfilled with globalization, uncertainty, risk, asymmetrical information and moral hazard. In this sense, in this article it is provided a qualitative overview regarding the appearance and evolution of the main double taxation conventions and their legal framework. In this article it is tackled some important issues, namely: the rationale behind the construction and engaging in double taxation conventions; the need for a coherent and just application of those conventions; the historical appearance and evolution of the double taxation conventions, as well as the quid pro quo OECD Model Convention and UN Model Convention. The conclusions of this article highlight the importance and ultimately need for construction of best practices new and complex multilateral tax convention at the UE level in order to diminish the contagious effects of the treaty shopping practices. The case study presented in this article from the Romanian jurisprudence highlights the multi-faced concept of double taxation and the comprehension approach which must be undertaken in order to solve the complex issues of the international taxation via double taxation treaties.