In the historiography of Catalan culture, both the external continuity of the historiographical reflection and the internal discontinuity of such “reflections” are surprising. The History of institutions and the cultural movement in Catalonia (1900-1936) by Alexandre Galí is perhaps a good example of this.
The aim of this article is to present the Haskamot of Barcelona of 1354 in their political and legal context. These agreements were a response to the difficult situation faced by the Jews of the Crown of Aragon in the 14th c., when natural and human disasters threatened the survival of their communities. The target of this project was to assemble all the aljamas of the Crown in a supra-communal assembly of representatives. The drafters also wished to achieve a number a measures from the King and the Church improving the delicate situation of Catalan-Aragonese Jewry. These Haskamot, despite they did not succeed on their objectives, are a perfect starting point for any research on the legal and jurisdictional relations between Christians and Jews.
Late Medieval anti-Jewish violence is a well-known phenomenon, but its origins and institutionalization are still blurred and enigmatic. In thirteenth and fourteenth century Catalonia, the denouement of the increasing popular hostility against the Jewry was particularly dramatic. The seeds of violence were the result of a long and complex process of social, theological and political interactions. In this contribution, we will discuss the intellectual matrix of medieval anti-Semitism in Catalonia and its relationship with the rising of scholastics and with the theoretical foundations of Catalan politics. We will also approach its counterpart: the Jewish response to collective suffering.
Renaissance humanist Joan Lluís Vives (Ioannes Lodouicus Viues) explained his views on Law, its origin, its elements, and its corruption mainly in the De disciplinis (1531). However, he had already outlined some relevant key notions in early works such as the Praefatio in Leges Ciceronis (1514) and, especially, the Aedes legum (1519). The aim of this article is twofold: on the one hand, to provide the reader with a succinct introduction to the latter work and, on the other hand, to identify some of its key concepts and describe their meaning.
Our goal is to investigate the extent of the appropriation, by hermeneutic phenomenology, of the concept of transcendental at work in descriptive psychology, where it plays the role of a universal principle of the constitutive genesis of intentionality. We aim to clarify how the very mode of operation of Husserlian phenomenology is crucial to the elaboration of fundamental ontology. Our hypothesis is that intentionality leads Heidegger to the discovery of time as a transcendental principle, of being as an a priori, and of comprehensibility that enables the signification of entities in general as a previous structure of the a priori.