This article analyzes the institutional architecture and the level of similarity between the social protection system in 11 new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe and chosen Western European countries, representing four different models of capitalism identified by Amable. In the selected institutional area, a comparative analysis was performed, and based on it, similarity hexagons were created. They serve the purpose of comparing Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries with Western European countries of reference. The dynamic approach adopted in this study—two different time periods were compared—allows an analysis of path dependence and the evolution of institutional architecture over time. The analysis indicates that in 2014, in the area of social protection, almost all CEE countries, apart from Latvia and Romania, were most comparable to the Continental model of capitalism represented by Germany. Nevertheless, the variety of results for the individual variables (especially input and output variables) and substantial changes between 2005 and 2014 also show that the model of capitalism prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe in the area of the social protection system is evolving constantly at a very fast pace and thus currently may be called a hybrid or even patchwork capitalism.
This article concerns the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) outflow from India to Poland with some insights to other European countries. This topic strongly relates to globalization of foreign trade and especially new economic initiatives between European Union (EU) and India, which was one of the first countries to develop trade relations with EU. According to CEIC data – Financial Data and Economic Indicators, India’s FDI outflow increased slightly to 1.4 billion USD in September 2019 in comparison with 996.5 million USD in September 2018, but it is still below the average of 1.8 billion USD for a period of 2007–2019.1 Very limited number of the scientific research can be found in European literature about India’s FDI outflow to EU countries in period of 2004–2019. Indian economists made some research on that topic. Professor J. Ramachandran (listed among the Best Management Thinkers for the year 2015, the first Bain Fellow in India) from Indian Institute of Management Bangalore in 2004 and Professor Jaya Prakesh Pradhan from Central University of Gujarat in 2008 explored the evolution in Indian outward FDI, referring to a shift in the pattern of overseas expansion and basis of competitiveness of Indian companies. The key point of this article is to explain what really triggers Indian investors to go to Poland and what kind of businesses they form. Some examples of the Indian-based companies are mentioned to support the analysis. The author of this article also researched on different governmental bilateral trade agreements and initiatives, trying to find any direct impacts of that on the India FDI outflow to Poland and other EU countries. He used empirical method of the analysis based on accessible data and literature in that topic and also direct interviews with private Indian investors who made decision to start and run their business in Poland or other EU countries.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), violence should be considered by examining both actual and perceived crime. However, the studies related to violence and internal migration under the Mexican drug war episode focus only on one aspect of violence (perception or actual), so their conclusions rely mostly on limited evidence. This article complements previous work by examining the effects of both perceived and actual violence on interstate migration through estimation of a gravity model along three 5-year periods spanning from 2000 to 2015. Using the methods of generalized maximum entropy (to account for endogeneity) and the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, the results show that actual violence (measured by homicide rates) does affect migration, but perceived violence explains a greater proportion of higher average migration after 2005. Since this proportion increased after 2010 and actual violence, the results suggest that there was some adaptation to the new levels of violence in the period 2010–2015.
Whether and to what extent corruption drives emigration has received growing attention in the literature in recent years, yet the nature of the relationship remains unclear. To test causal claims, we rely on representative global survey data of more than 280,000 respondents across 67 countries from 2010 to 2014. We use two different measures of emigration intentions and individual, as well as country-level measures of corruption, and propose to instrument the endogenous presence of corruption in a country with the prevalence of cashless transactions in the economy to correct for potential estimation bias. We find robust support for the hypothesis that corruption increases emigration intentions across countries. The effect, however, is likely to be underestimated in conventional models that do not account for endogeneity. The results highlight the need to look beyond purely economic, social, security-related, and environmental drivers when assessing the root causes of migration.