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Jan Woleński

Abstract

The paper discusses the concept of adequacy central for Pertażycki’s methodology. According to Petrażycki any valuable scientific theory should be adequate, that is, neither limping (to broad with respect its actual scope) nor jumping (too narrow with respect to its actual scope). Consequently, adequacy of a theory is a stronger condition than its truth. Every adequacy theory is true, but not conversely. However, there is problem, because scientific laws are conditionals (implications). This suggests that adequacy is too strong conditions, because the consequence of an implication has a wider scope than its antecedent. Thus, laws should have the form of equivalence. The paper shows how model-theoretic characterization of theories allows to recognize truth and adequacy, consistently with Petrażycki’s claims.

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Elena Lisanyuk and Evelina Barbashina

Abstract

In this paper we discuss L. Petrażycki’s idea of norm as a normative relation and show its repercussions in two perspectives connected to each other, in the legal theory in the framework of which it was originally introduced and where its role was straightforward, and in logic where it played a shadowy role of a fresh idea which in his expectation would have been the core of the novel logical theories capable of modelling reasoning in law and morals. We pay attention to the scholarly environment in which Petrażycki has proposed those ideas and to the unlucky fate of his academic legacy which is now being rediscovered.

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Andrzej Waleszczyński, Michał Obidziński and Julia Rejewska

Abstract

The characteristic asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality in causing side effects, known as the Knobe effect, is considered to be a stable model of human cognition. This article looks at whether the way of thinking and analysing one scenario may affect the other and whether the mutual relationship between the ways in which both scenarios are analysed may affect the stability of the Knobe effect. The theoretical analyses and empirical studies performed are based on a distinction between moral and non-moral normativity possibly affecting the judgments passed in both scenarios. Therefore, an essential role in judgments about the intentionality of causing a side effect could be played by normative competences responsible for distinguishing between normative orders.

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Adrian Mróz

Abstract

he process of decision making is predictable and irrational according to Daniel Ariely and other economic behaviorists, historians, and philosophers such as Daniel Kahneman or Yuval Noah Harari. Decisions made anteriorly can be, but don’t have to be, present in the actions of a person. Stories and shared belief in myths, especially those that arise from a system of human norms and values and are based on a belief in a “supernatural” order (religion) are important. Because of this, mass cooperation amongst strangers is possible.

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Andrew Schumann

Abstract

In decision making quite often we face permanently changeable and potentially infinite databases when we cannot apply conventional algorithms for choosing a solution. A decision process on infinite databases (e.g. on a database containing a contradiction) is called troubleshooting. A decision on these databases is called creative reasoning. One of the first heuristic semi-logical means for creative decision making were proposed in the theory of inventive problem solving (TIPS) by Genrich Altshuller. In this paper, I show that his approach corresponds to the so-called content-generic logic established by Soviet philosophers as an alternative to mathematical logic. The main assumption of content-genetic is that we cannot reduce our thinking to a mathematical combination of signs or to a language as such and our thought is ever cyclic and reflexive so that it contains ever a history.

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Sławomir Tkacz

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to outline the general oversight of the concept of law in Leon Petrażycki’s legal theory. On the example of the principles of law, an attempt was made to answer the question, what Petrażycki’s theory proposes to modern science. In the first part of the presentation, the Author presented the current state of theoretical knowledge in the field of principles of law. The attention was paid to the problem of various characteristics of legal principles. In further considerations, an attempt was made to answer the question about adoption of models proposed by Petrażycki in the contemporary theoretical discourse. The summary presents general conclusions of the paper.

Open access

Andrew Schumann

Abstract

It is a Preface to Volumes 7:3 and 7:4 (2018) consisting of articles presented at the International Interdisciplinary Conference Ideas and Society on the 150th anniversary of the birth of Leon Petrażycki, held on November 24, 2017, in Rzeszów, Poland.

Open access

Małgorzata Obrycka

Abstract

The conception of the paper is connected with bringing forward the reflection of Leon Petrażycki on intuitive law. For this purpose I analyze the genesis and dynamics of this phenomenon on the cultural-historical level, as well as with reference to issues belonging to the scope of positive law. In addition, I broaden the research field with the range of problems touching on intuitionism, morality, and also independent ethics of Janusz Kotarbinski. The starting point of the methodological optics I assume is constituted by the multi-aspectual transformations surrounding us in the sphere of axiology. Hence, if the pedagogical aspects are taken into account, it seems to me justified to undertake some actions in order to search for the logically consistent, sensible and universal solutions, which can become an ethical guide-post for the contemporary human being.

Open access

Andrzej Dąbrowski

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to examine the nature of moral and legal norms in a broader context: first, taking into account logical and methodological assumptions, second, in the perspective of psychology of emotions and legal policy. The basic subject of the research carried out by Leon Petrażycki was represented by law. Originally, it had a psychological character, not an objective, eternal, and unchanging one. To fully understand the genesis and nature of morality and law, Petrażycki addressed the study of mental phenomena, especially emotional experiences. First, however, he developed appropriate rules of logic and scientific methodology. Then he developed a new classification of mental phenomena, among which the fundamental role is played by bilateral (passive-active) emotions. At some stage, emotions begin to cooperate with cognitive processes, first of all with imaginations. Imaginations of acts, such as theft, betrayal, murder, can cause repulsive emotions, and type imaginations, such as truthfulness, charity, justice can evoke apulsive emotions. On the basis of such associations, judgments are created over time, the content of which becomes a basis for fundamental rules of conduct, that is, for norms. There are two fundamentally different types of norms: moral norms and legal norms. The norms of the first type are imperative and represent the nature of validity (they are obeyed), while the norms of the second type are imperative-attributive and they also always entitle someone to something, i.e. they give someone a right. This division determines a fundamental difference between morality and law.

Open access

Krzysztof Majczyk

Abstract

Efficient thinking is the foundation of efficient operation. The correct definition of concepts, especially the basic ones for a given field, in order to reach the truth, is a condition for the development of science and its social utility. The Petrażycki’s research methodology of law is a thoroughly modern method, as it enables effective examination of the accuracy of contemporary legal theories created after Petrażycki’s input. A model contemporary theory susceptible to an examination through the research methodology of law by Petrażycki is the normative theory of legal rules and non-legal standards by Dworkin. For this purpose some falsifications will be subject, i.e. selected ad hoc among many others, two important theories of normative law theory Dworkin. The first one is the thesis classifying legal norms into two groups of norms, namely legal rules and non-legal standards. The second one is a thesis about the existence of who are capable of discovering and issuing lawful and, at the same time, fair (just) court decisions, which are also the only ones for resolving particular court disputes. Unfortunately, owing to the seemingly cognitive research methodology of Petrażycki, both Dworkin’s deformed division of legal norms as well as Dworkin’s Hercules judges - cannot stand the test of authenticity. Due to the Petrażycki’s methodology, the legal-normative theory of Dworkin does not lose an innovative outlook on the existence of social norms, which are being discovered by judges in the jurisprudence, indifferently to the doubts over their proper classification (be it non-legal standards or, perhaps, outright standards supplementing statutory and sub-statutory legal regulations). Moreover, Dworkin’s theory is placed between naive theories, regardless of whether they are considered realistically naive theories (towards the Hercules judges) or nihilistically naive theories (when it comes to the existence of the only judgments in the given court cases which are also the just ones.) A few random reflections on the well-known work of Dworkin with the help of Petrażycki’s methodology serve to provide a new perspective on the contemporary legal normativity.