Browse

You are looking at 81 - 90 of 326 items for :

  • History, Philosophy and Sociology of Law x
Clear All
Open access

Agnė Margevičiūtė

Abstract

The definition of the word ‘bullying’ diverges based on the field of practice and research, in the absence of an agreed-upon overreaching definition. The latter would allow maximum flexibility in contributing to the variations in findings of various academic studies. Some argue that the lack of comprehensive definition is a factor of inaccuracy in estimating the prevalence of bullying itself. The ‘definition’ per se [of bullying] is in general recognized by the state law of the United States as one of the key components of any policy adopted by the states and local educational agencies, and which is required to be consistent with the definitions specified in state law. This article presents an overview of the definitions of bullying beyond the legal sphere in general as well as from a legal perspective. Special focus is dedicated to the state laws of the US as the main national jurisdiction that has adopted education law that contains explicit definition of bullying, as well as some of the aspects of defining bullying within the general and legal context of Lithuanian jurisdiction.

Open access

Jozef Valuch, Tomáš Gábriš and Ondrej Hamuľák

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as “war” if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived “only” as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a “war” proper, in its new, postmodern sense.

Open access

Jolanta Bieliauskaitė and Vytautas Šlapkauskas

Abstract

The EU lacks the legal ideology as a social instrument that could satisfy the spirit of liberal democracy and would help to consolidate different societies to a solid European demos. Although the existence of an ideological system alone does not guarantee social consensus, it helps to manage dissension within the limits of particular values and norms. It is because a legal ideology provides the structure for social thought that individuals and social groups are able to interpret the nature of emerging conflicts and the interests they support.

The article demonstrates that the neoliberal way of thinking that prevails in contemporary Europe does not meet the spirit of the constitutionalism of the EU Member States; the article introduces some aspects of Aharon Barak’s legal ideology that could be relevant for the formation and development of European demos and constitutionalism. In order to achieve this aim, the research is focused on issues that emerge in the area of three main pillars of constitutionalism: (1) adherence to the rule of law, (2) limited and accountable government, and (3) protection of fundamental human rights.

Open access

Karina Kim Egholm Elgaard

Abstract

Value-added tax (VAT) grouping schemes, whereby several legally independent entities are treated as a single taxable person for VAT purposes, are well known, though their detailed rules differ from country to country. This article deals with specific tax avoidance and fiscal competition aspects of VAT grouping schemes in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The article gives examples of tax abuse and avoidance by using various VAT grouping models, with the main emphasis on the practice in Denmark, which may be indicative of similar problems in other countries. The article shows that there are significant differences in the rationales for national VAT grouping schemes, and these indicate that there are mismatches between the national schemes of the EU Member States and the original intention of the EU scheme. Finally, an examination of the different national rationales shows the necessity of striking a balance between combating tax avoidance and preventing distortion of competition.

Open access

Ian Loveland

Abstract

This paper assesses Scalia’s contribution to a series of cases, spanning much of his thirty years tenure on the court, which addressed issues relating to sexual orientation discrimination. The argument put forward is that these cases severely undermine any claim that Scalia might make to having been a distinguished judge in an intellectual or juridical sense. The pervasive theme of Scalia’s opinions in these matters is that of a constant failure to respect traditional tenets of legal reasoning and a compulsive inclination to engage in abusive castigation both of the litigants challenging the discriminatory laws and his judicial colleagues who did not agree with his viewpoint.

Open access

James E. Pfander

Abstract

Perhaps no single Justice fashioned as many changes to the law of standing as that most gifted originalist, Antonin Scalia. It was Justice Scalia who first deployed twentieth century standing rules to invalidate a citizen suit provision; who promoted the prudential rule against the adjudication of generalized grievances to constitutional status; who pressed to constitutionalize the adverse-party rule; who reconfigured informer litigation to preserve the injury-in-fact requirement; and who recently re-packaged the Court’s old prudential standing doctrine as a merits-based inquiry into the plaintiff’s statutory right to sue. That he has done so much to re-work modern litigation in the name of fidelity to the workways of eighteenth century lawyers “in the English courts at Westminster” testifies to his considerable rhetorical skills. In this essay, I evaluate Justice Scalia’s contributions to this important body of jurisdictional law and then step back to consider his legacy.

Open access

James Allan

Abstract

In this article the author explains why Antonin Scalia was one of his favourite judges. It starts by excerpting some of Justice Scalia’s most biting and funny comments, both from judicial and extra-judicial sources. Then it explains the attractions of an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, though arguing that the intentionalist strain is preferable to Scalia’s ‘original public meaning’ or ‘new originalism’ approach. Finally, it argues that within the confines of a constitutional structure with an entrenched bill of rights, Scalia was a strong proponent of democratic decision-making to resolve key social policy decisions, unlike many other top judges.

Open access

Richard A. Epstein

Abstract

The late Justice Antonin Scalia sensibly pushed his powerful originalist agenda as a bulwark against activist justices of any persuasion from enacting their policy preferences into law. But while this commitment to originalism may explain what the justices should not do, it does not explain, affirmatively, how they should interpret constitutional texts in accordance with the originalist agenda. One area in which this is most critical is the law of takings, which polices the boundary line between private rights and public power. Here it is necessary to integrate explicit constitutional provisions dealing with the terms “taken,” “private property,” “just compensation,” “public use,” and the implied “police power” into a coherent whole. The law of takings is relatively straightforward when the government takes private property into public possession. But it is far more difficult to explicate when private parties retain some interests in property after the government either occupies or regulates the use and disposition of the rest. Justice Scalia’s application of takings law to such cases of divided interests has fallen short in four key contexts: the permitting process in Nollan; rent control in Pennell; development rights in Lucas; and environmental protection schemes in Stop the Beach Renourishment. In these cases, Justice Scalia often reached the right result for the wrong reasons, often on ad hoc grounds. The correct analysis requires a far more thoroughgoing protection of private property interest in the context of both regulatory and possessory takings. This article explains how he should have handled these missed opportunities.

Open access

Brian Christopher Jones and Austin Sarat

Abstract

Perhaps no single judge in recent years has embodied the intricacies and difficulties of the cultural life of the law as much as American Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. While common law judges have traditionally acquired status—and cultural relevance—from the significance, eloquence and forcefulness of their judicial opinions, Justice Scalia took an altogether different route. Both on and off the bench, he pushed the limits of legal and political legitimacy. He did this through a strict adherence to what we call a “judicial mandate,” flamboyant but engaging writing, biting humor and widespread marketing of his originalist and textualist interpretative theories. This article chronicles these features of Scalia’s jurisprudence and public life more generally, ultimately characterising the late justice as a “sacred symbol” in American legal and political circles, and beyond.