Theodore the Studite resolved the logical problem posed by the second Iconoclasm in an explicitly paraconsistent way, when he applied to Jesus the definition of the human hypostasis while stating that there is no human hypostasis in Jesus. Methodologically he was following, albeit without knowing, Eulogius of Alexandria. He, in turn, was apparently followed by Photius, but in a confused manner.
Novels and thought experiments can be pathways to different kinds of knowledge. We may, however, be hard pressed to say exactly what can be learned from novels but not from thought experiments. Headway on this matter can be made by spelling out their respective conditions for epistemic failure. Thought experiments fail in their epistemic role when they neither yield propositional knowledge nor contribute to an argument. They are largely in the business of ‘knowing that’. Novels, on the other hand can be an epistemic success by yielding ‘knowledge how’. They can help us to improve our competences.
In decision making quite often we face permanently changeable and potentially infinite databases when we cannot apply conventional algorithms for choosing a solution. A decision process on infinite databases (e.g. on a database containing a contradiction) is called troubleshooting. A decision on these databases is called creative reasoning. One of the first heuristic semi-logical means for creative decision making were proposed in the theory of inventive problem solving (TIPS) by Genrich Altshuller. In this paper, I show that his approach corresponds to the so-called content-generic logic established by Soviet philosophers as an alternative to mathematical logic. The main assumption of content-genetic is that we cannot reduce our thinking to a mathematical combination of signs or to a language as such and our thought is ever cyclic and reflexive so that it contains ever a history.
he process of decision making is predictable and irrational according to Daniel Ariely and other economic behaviorists, historians, and philosophers such as Daniel Kahneman or Yuval Noah Harari. Decisions made anteriorly can be, but don’t have to be, present in the actions of a person. Stories and shared belief in myths, especially those that arise from a system of human norms and values and are based on a belief in a “supernatural” order (religion) are important. Because of this, mass cooperation amongst strangers is possible.
The characteristic asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality in causing side effects, known as the Knobe effect, is considered to be a stable model of human cognition. This article looks at whether the way of thinking and analysing one scenario may affect the other and whether the mutual relationship between the ways in which both scenarios are analysed may affect the stability of the Knobe effect. The theoretical analyses and empirical studies performed are based on a distinction between moral and non-moral normativity possibly affecting the judgments passed in both scenarios. Therefore, an essential role in judgments about the intentionality of causing a side effect could be played by normative competences responsible for distinguishing between normative orders.
In this paper we discuss L. Petrażycki’s idea of norm as a normative relation and show its repercussions in two perspectives connected to each other, in the legal theory in the framework of which it was originally introduced and where its role was straightforward, and in logic where it played a shadowy role of a fresh idea which in his expectation would have been the core of the novel logical theories capable of modelling reasoning in law and morals. We pay attention to the scholarly environment in which Petrażycki has proposed those ideas and to the unlucky fate of his academic legacy which is now being rediscovered.
The paper discusses the concept of adequacy central for Pertażycki’s methodology. According to Petrażycki any valuable scientific theory should be adequate, that is, neither limping (to broad with respect its actual scope) nor jumping (too narrow with respect to its actual scope). Consequently, adequacy of a theory is a stronger condition than its truth. Every adequacy theory is true, but not conversely. However, there is problem, because scientific laws are conditionals (implications). This suggests that adequacy is too strong conditions, because the consequence of an implication has a wider scope than its antecedent. Thus, laws should have the form of equivalence. The paper shows how model-theoretic characterization of theories allows to recognize truth and adequacy, consistently with Petrażycki’s claims.
Expert knowledge - a concept associated with Ryle’s distinction of knowledgethat and knowledge-how - functions in distinct areas of knowledge and social expertise. Consisting of both propositional (declarative) and procedural (instrumental) knowledge, expertise is performative in its essence. It depends not only on expert’s experience and cognitive competences, but also on his or her social and institutional position. The paper considers the role of heuristic and intuitional abilities, including particular experts’ cognitive biases, as the vital and indispensable part of expertise. On the basis of selected managerial and juridical examples (procedures, standards, norms and institutional regulations) it analyzes the epistemological issues: the autonomy versus dependence of expert knowledge as well as the influence of social-cognitive circumstances on expertise.