We analyze the changing relationship between education and assortative mating over the course of educational expansion in Switzerland between 1970 and 2000. The overall rate of educationally homogamous partnerships has remained rather stable, while partnerlessness increased and became less educationally selective. An analysis taking the opportunity structure into account reveals that the inclination toward educationally homogamous partnerships is most pronounced in lower educational groups, but that the differences between educational groups decreased over time.
How is educational expansion associated with increased educational homogamy and income inequality? Using SOEP and SHP panel data, we randomly match couples and compare the resulting income distribution to the observed one. Educational homogamy thereby has had only a marginal impact on earnings-based income inequality between couples, which is largely due to the endogenous decision-making of couples concerning working time.
According to status-caste exchange theory, intermarriages involve transactions in which higher educated immigrants trade status for the ethnic advantage of the less-educated native partners. Looking at 2 836 currently married Swiss immigrants, we find that the highly skilled “exchange” their status only when pairing with a medium-educated native. Results also show that younger cohorts of immigrants are more likely to choose hypogamy when marrying a same-origin immigrant than when partnering a native.
This paper examines the association of education and family forms based on data of the German microcensus 1996–2012. The investigation shows that highly educated women in western Germany had a higher probability of living in a nonmarital instead of a marital union. With an increase in the share of nonmarital births, the association has reversed. Likewise, the highly educated couples were initially the vanguards of living in nonmarital unions with children, but they are nowadays the least likely to do so. Patterns differ between eastern and western Germany, though.
This study examines the association between educational attainment and separation risks in marital or non-marital first partnerships to query the extent to which educational expansion has affected trends in partnership stability. Because the educational gradient in separation changed from being positive for women (and, to a lesser extent, for men) to being statistically non-significant at the same time as educational expansion took place, the latter can only serve as a minor explanation of the exceptional rise in breakup rates in Switzerland.
We study whether educational homogamy has increased following the rise of women’s educational attainment and of egalitarian couples in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. From the analysis of data from the European Union and Swiss Labour Force Surveys over a 15-year period (1999–2013), we observe that educational homogamy did not increase across cohorts, although we find substantial differences in the degree of homogamy according to couple arrangements.
The paper begins with an examination of three ideal types citizenship which are not necessarily mutual exclusive. The first type is national citizenship, typically associated with ethno-nationalism. The second form is social citizenship or ‘welfare citizenship’ refers to the creation of social rights and is closely connected to civil-society institutions rather than to the state or market. The third form of citizenship identifies the citizen with participation in the work force emphasizing self-reliance and autonomy. In this discussion, I argue that with economic globalization and the development of neo-liberal strategies the various forms of citizenship have converged towards a new model of passive citizenship in which the state is or has withdrawn from commitment to full employment and the provision of social security, especially universal provision of welfare services, and civil-society institutions have been eroded. The result is the emergence of the apolitical,isolated citizen as consumer. The fourth model of citizenship presupposes a consumer society, a weak state and the decline of civic institutions, where the passive citizen becomes a consumer of privatized goods and services. The rise of a fourth model of citizenship – the consumer-citizen – can be interpreted as a logical consequence of financialization.
This introductory paper to our first issue provides reflection on the concept of critical global citizenship at both theoretical and practical levels. We maintain that ‘citizenship’, irrespective of its level of articulation (i.e. national, international, global, etc.) remains an issue that reflects a status, a feeling and practices that are intrinsically interlinked. As a legal status, formal citizenship allows individuals to form a sense of belonging within a political community and, therefore, empowers them to act and perform their citizenship within the spatial domains of the nation-state. Critical global citizenship, asks these same individuals not so much to neglect these notions of belonging and practice to a particular locale, but to extend such affinities beyond the territorial boundaries of their formal national membership and to think critically and ethically about their local, national and global relationship with those who are different from themselves. Making a case for a critical global citizenship, however, also requires acknowledging material inequalities that affect the most vulnerable (i.e. migrants, asylum seekers, those experiencing poverty, etc.) and which mean that efforts to cultivate global citizenship orientations to address social injustice are not enacted on an even playing field. As such, a critical global citizenship approach espouses a performative citizenship that is at once democratic and ethical, as well as being aimed at achieving social peace and sustainable justice, but which is also affected by material conditions of inequality that require political solutions and commitment from individuals, states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations.
For decades, Turkish Islamists have failed to attract the votes of large sections of society and remained marginal. As a result of this failure to come to power, and due to domestic and international constraints and windows of opportunities, they have declared that they have jettisoned Islamism. Many Turkish Muslims whose religious disposition was shaped by the pluralistic urban Ottoman experience and small-town Anatolian traditionalism, and by the contesting currents of cosmopolitan pluralism and rural social conservatism, voted in favour of these former Islamists who have become “Muslim Democrats”. This paper elaborates on the genealogy of Turkish Islamists and their political trajectories and argues that when the forces and constraints of domestic and external social, political and economic conditions disappeared and the opportunities derived from being Muslim Democrats no longer existed, the former Islamists easily returned to their original ideology, showing that despite assertions to the contrary their respect for democracy and pluralism had not truly been internalised. This paper also aims to demonstrate that similar to other authoritarian populists, Erdoganists perceive the state and its leader as more important than anything else and as being above everything else, which has culminated in a personality cult and sanctification of the state. As long as Turkey’s economy continued to boom, almost everyone was happy that Turkey could readily market the “Muslim Democrats” story to the whole world for a long period as a major success story, or as an “exemplary Muslim country” or “model”. Yet, Middle Eastern elites and Western forces got carried away and learnt the hard way just how naive their view was in perhaps the first great transformation movement of the twenty-first century – the Arab Spring. Likewise, the Turkish Spring turned all too quickly towards autumn and then winter.