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Abstract

Scientific interest in religion often focusses on the “puzzle of belief”: how people develop and maintain religious beliefs despite a lack of evidence and the significant costs that those beliefs incur. A number of researchers have suggested that humans are predisposed towards supernatural thinking, with innate cognitive biases engendering, for example, the misattribution of intentional agency. Indeed, a number of studies have shown that nonbelievers often act “as if” they believe. For example, atheists are reluctant to sell the very souls they deny having, or to angrily provoke the God they explicitly state does not exist. In our own recent work, participants who claimed not to believe in the afterlife nevertheless demonstrated a physiological fear response when informed that there was a ghost in the room. Such findings are often interpreted as evidence for an “implicit” belief in the supernatural that operates alongside (and even in contradiction to) an individual’s conscious (“explicit”) religious belief. In this article, we investigate these arguably tenuous constructs more deeply and suggest some possible empirical directions for further disentangling implicit and explicit reasoning.

Abstract

In this work, no denying the role, or even more so, the value of rational thinking, it is assumed that it is not the only effective tool for man to achieve his valuable goals. It is conjectured here that sometimes irrational thinking is an equally good (and sometimes even better than rational thinking) means of achieving them. In the light of these assumptions, the goal of my work is to indicate the benefits that may be the result of irrational thinking in the colloquial (i.e. unscientific) domain of everyday human practice. The given examples of irrational thinking come from research in the field of cognitive and social psychology and behavioural economics. Their results prove that irrational behaviours (including thinking) are neither accidental nor senseless, and on the contrary systematic and easy to predict, they constitute important arguments for considering the phenomenon of irrational thinking. I also discuss this issue although only to a limited extent.

Abstract

The author stands that thinking by analogy is a natural instrument human have because of the mirror neurons in our brain. However, is it that infallible to rely on? How can we be sure that our hidden biases will not harm our reflections? Implicit Association Bias (IAB), for instance, is a powerful intruder that affects our understanding, actions, and decisions on the unconscious level by cherishing the stereotypes based on specific characteristics such as ethnicity, sex, race, and so on. To check if there is a correlation between the IAB effect and the people’s capacity to reason logically, the author had created an online-survey. The focus was on analogical reasoning and IAB tests concerning the question of gender equality in science and everyday life and age prejudices.

Abstract

In this paper, I will analyse the relation between a sense of agency and free will. It is often proposed that by investigating the former, we can find a way of judging when an action is voluntary. Haggard seems to be one of the authors believing so. To answer if this assumption is correct, I will: 1) analyse the categories of free will and agency; 2) define the sense of agency; 3) describe ways of investigating the sense of agency; 4) describe models of emergence of the sense of agency; 5) analyse the relation between agency and responsibility. I will end by discussing the actual possibility of using the sense of agency measurements (as described in experimental sciences) as markers of free will.

Abstract

Augustyn Jakubisiak (1884-1945), Polish priest, philosopher and theologian, undertook polemics with Jan Łukasiewicz, whom he knew personally. A dispute concerning the so-called logistics (mathematical logic) and its relationship with philosophy developed between the two. The most important arguments were laid out, primarily in the following works: in the case of Jakubisiak, in the book From Scope to Content and in the case of Łukasiewicz, in the texts Logistics and Philosophy and In the Defense of Logistics. Jakubisiak criticized logistics for its anti-metaphysical, anti-theological and anti-religious attitude, which was based on neo-positivist philosophy, and led, in consequence to atheism. He also claimed that one should focus on what is concrete, avoiding idealization and abstraction (meaning the content of concepts, not their scope). Łukasiewicz defended logistics claiming that it possesses its own methods based on intellect, and is also an area of independent knowledge (but not completely detached) from philosophy, due to the fact it can consider the most important philosophical problems such as finiteness and infinity. This dispute, as the researchers identified, basically concerned the reduction of philosophy to the study of language (analytic philosophy) and initiated one of the most important discussions concerning the relationship between philosophy and logic. This debate was crucial because it also concerned questions related to fundamental metaphysical issues (naturalism – supranaturalism, rationalism – irrationalism) and epistemological issues (realism – idealism, boundaries and structure of cognition).

Abstract

In constructing the three-valued logic, Jan Łukasiewicz was highly inspirited by the Aristotelian idea of logical contingency. Nevertheless, we can construct a four-valued logic for explicating the Stoic idea of logical determinacy. In this system, we have the following truth values: 0 (‘possibly false), 1 (‘necessarily false’), 2 (‘possibly true’), 3 (‘necessarily true’), where the designated truth value is represented by the two values: 2 and 3.

Abstract

This paper discusses the main logical ideas put forward by Jan Łukasiewicz within their historical context and further development.

Abstract

The paper revisits metaphysical and deontological stances on moral considerability and offers a new criterion for it – “affectability”, that is a capacity of an agent to affect a considered entity. Such an approach results in significant changes in the scope of moral considerability and is relevant for discussing the human position in the Anthropocene. This concept, given especially the assumption of the directness of moral considerability, is also substantial for the decision making process on the ethical, as well as the political plane.

Abstract

The title of the article was inspired by the novel by John Steinbeck “Of Mice and Men” (1937) and the poem by Robet Burns about the deception of human plans. Even the best of them often lead astray, or their far-reaching negative effects are revealed. As it seems, nowadays nature (“mice”) and men (people) are in a breakthrough period – in the geological sense between the old and the new era, the Holocene and the Anthropocene, in the cultural sense – between the analogue and digital era that can be – and it should actually be called a digit. Levi-Strauss in his essay “Raw and cooked” points to the groundbreaking for the emergence of human culture the use of fire in the preparation of food, and therefore the transition from nature to culture, and its foundation – the kitchen []. At present, this new phase of transition can be seen in the digitization of interpersonal communication and its current correlation – cross-linking. It was announced by the famous Turing machine (1936), a computer design and layout, which was realized in the 1940s and 1950s, and enter in mass production at its end, networked on a global scale in the 1990s and make mobile in the second decade of the 21st century in the form of a smartphone