The author proves that rejecting the existence of permissive norms and limitation of norms to prohibitions and commands alone is possible only with reducing the idea of a function. The essence of the function is then the ability of the expression to generate independently the universal norm formation. Such manipulation is easy on the level of logical analysis, but proves risky from other points of view. If we want the deontic logic, which we construct, to consider the fact that permission is pragmatically necessary for the law-maker to convey his normative preferences, we must solve the consequences of the adopted structure of the function of norms, which originate on the socio-linguistic level. It appears, however, that due to a lack of a pragmatic theory useful for lawyers, there is no proof that the pragmatically strong permission can be expressed by means of a lot of prohibitions and commands (dos and don’ts). Besides, reducing permissions only to the language of legal rules is an obligation to accept the structure of an act of communication, which can find its full motivation in the Husserl’s structure of the direct cognition.
This note discusses some problems concerning intended, standard, and nonstandard models of mathematical theories. We pay attention to the role of extremal axioms in attempts at a unique characterization of the intended models. We recall also Jan Woleński’s views on these issues.
Two crucial concepts of the methodology and philosophy of mathematics are considered: proof and truth. We distinguish between informal proofs constructed by mathematicians in their research practice and formal proofs as defined in the foundations of mathematics (in metamathematics). Their role, features and interconnections are discussed. They are confronted with the concept of truth in mathematics. Relations between proofs and truth are analysed.
Reism or concretism are the labels for a position in ontology and semantics that is represented by various philosophers. As Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Jan Woleński have shown, there are two dimensions with which the abstract expression of reism can be made concrete: The ontological dimension of reism says that only things exist; the semantic dimension of reism says that all concepts must be reduced to concrete terms in order to be meaningful. In this paper we argue for the following two theses: (1) Arthur Schopenhauer has advocated a reistic philosophy of language which says that all concepts must ultimately be based on concrete intuition in order to be meaningful. (2) In his semantics, Schopenhauer developed a theory of logic diagrams that can be interpreted by modern means in order to concretize the abstract position of reism. Thus we are not only enhancing Jan Woleński’s list of well-known reists, but we are also adding a diagrammatic dimension to concretism, represented by Schopenhauer.
The Society of Jesus sprang from the devout faith of a sidelined soldier who traded in his weapons to form a militant order of Catholic Reformers sworn to serve the Papacy as missionary soldiers of Christ. Specialization in education led Jesuits to roles as theologians of the 16th Century, including as members of the School of Salamanca, whose Jesuit members mostly took pro-market positions on free enterprise. One learned Jesuit in particular deviated from his order’s default position of papal dirigisme to become an enemy of the state.
This article intends to be a simple guide to understand how Hoppe built the Argumentation Ethics. In my early studies of libertarian ideas, and of Argumentation Ethics in particular, I could not find a unique text that would explain how Hoppe put the necessary bricks together to build the Ethics. As I was curious about this issue, I assumed others would also like to know it. To write this article, I reviewed the main literature on Argumentation Ethics, starting with Kinsella’s Concise Guide . Then, I interviewed Stephan Kinsella and Prof. Walter Block. Finally, I synthesized the main ideas from the literature and the interviews elaborating an interpretative model, presented in this article.
Thick moral terms – such as theft, fraud, and counterfeiting – are terms whose very use implies a definitionally necessary moral evaluation of their content. In this paper, I shall argue that the philosophy of statism – that is, a philosophy grounded in the belief in the normative justifiability and desirability of monopolistic apparatuses of initiatory violence – is necessarily amoral insofar as it cannot apply thick moral terms in a logically consistent manner. By the same token, I shall argue that libertarianism – i.e., the view that only consensual social relations are morally acceptable – is the only general sociopolitical doctrine capable of accomplishing this task, thus, in contrast to statism, making its prescriptions susceptible to genuine moral evaluation.
Most analysts view the United Nations as a positive stabilising force in international affairs. In this paper, I critically assess this opinion of the UN’s peace enforcement actions using the case studies of the Korean War and the Gulf War while relying on the non-aggression axiom of libertarian philosophy. In the process, I shed light on some of the moral considerations at play when deciding on UN-sanctioned military intervention.
This retrospective, covering half a century, is a personal history of modern libertarianism. It provides some historical perspective on the growth of libertarianism and its impact on society, especially for those who were born into an existing libertarian movement, including political and academic paths. As outsiders, Austrians and libertarians can expect more than their share of difficult times and roadblocks, although that situation has improved over time. It also shows the limitations of the political path to liberty and the importance of the Austrian view that society changes via emphasis on sound economic science, its practicality, and its subsequent impact on ideology. Finally, it conveys the importance of solving practical problems and puzzles via the thin, radical version of libertarianism.