After the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially on NATO’s deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe’s security. At the same time, it looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European allies about Russia’s new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a transformed world, with the accent on Europe, that is constantly developing new security conditions while tackling new challenges and threats.
Even though many would have bet on NATO’s demise after the Cold War and consider it now to be an archaic, antiquated alliance - as the reality that led to its formation no longer exists to justify its purpose - the need for collective defence in an increasingly complicated security environment stands as grounds for its ever-growing importance and its need to adapt to a spectrum of challenges that is becoming more diversified. NATO has long surpassed its military defensive role and has adapted to new challenges and new threats, while it has broadened its security agenda accordingly. The ‘out of area’ missions that dragged the Alliance out of its borders brought more meaning to the community of shared values, whilst allowing it to become both a security exporter, and a values and norms exporter. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan comprises NATO’s transformation and adaptation to the new security challenges and its diffusion of norms in the ‘near abroad’.
The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the “New Cold Warriors” (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the “Pragmatics” (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine “New Cold Warrior”, while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one.
The article covers journalism-related crimes as a relatively distinct category of offences. The importance and purpose of isolating the concept of journalistic criminality under conditions of globalization in the modern theory of legal thought, the rapid development of the information society, and the embodied increase of the role of information and knowledge in human life are emphasized. Attention is paid to the factors affecting the dynamics and development of crimes in the area of professional activities of journalists, which primarily includes the environment of hybrid war. The destructive impact of the social consequences of journalistic crimes on society is evident in the case of Ukraine, which has suffered in the past and to this day experiences the latest information manifestations of hybrid war. The proposition to criminalize the intentional spreading of false information in the media by journalists is discussed. The reasons, basis and conditions for such criminalization are analysed. The existence of criminalization grounds for such an offence is substantiated in the article. However, conclusions are drawn on the inappropriateness of such criminalization due to its non-correspondence with certain conditions associated with difficulties in adjudication and with the problem of proving this type of behaviour. Other means of counteracting the deliberate dissemination of false information are considered.
Since its declaration of independence Kosovo has clearly postured itself towards Euro-Atlantic integration with NATO, keeping its door open towards Western Balkan states. This integration process faces major challenges stemming from different dimensions: NATO’s internal unity and its stance towards Kosovo’s political status having direct impact in consensual decision making processes; current geopolitical tensions from a global perspective, particularly between the West and Russia; and Kosovo’s ability to fulfil NATO’s standards and criteria. These challenges might prove very difficult to overcome at least in the current global political and security environment. The objective of this paper is to discuss from legal and geopolitical perspectives the relations between Kosovo and NATO and the challenges, dynamics and perspective of NATO opening a formal integration process for Kosovo.
This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was a motive for Russia’s action. NATO’s enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, politicalpsychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether Russia’s pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula.
Shortly after the Crimea crisis of March 2014, NATO started a process of strategic reflection and a series of actions under the umbrella of the ‘Pivot to East’. On the South of its Eastern flank, the Black Sea region looms as one of the most unstable areas, with a number of frozen conflicts in non-NATO countries as well as an increasing unrest overall. This article explores the political discourses, commitments and attitudes towards NATO of the three allies at the Black Sea, namely Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, as well as exploring their role in regional security. The purpose of the research is to compare NATO’s representation in the mainstream politics of these countries. Based on discourse analysis and the comparative method, the paper examines to what extent stability, ambiguity and change are present in the Southeast allies’ discourses on NATO.
NATO’s enlargement in the Western Balkans (WB) has been the focus of a number of debates for almost two decades. Opinions and positions regarding this question range from serious doubts, criticisms and opportunistic press releases to enthusiastic support for membership. This paper assesses Bosnian reforms and policy changes, as well as the country’s efforts to join NATO. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has made significant steps in moving towards NATO’s military and political standards, but not sufficiently. Although BiH is viewed by some observers as a country approaching the point of joining the Membership Action Plan (MAP), this prospect remains uncertain. The findings of this research suggest that BiH is different from other WB countries and that it is not suitable for understanding the NATO integration challenges in the WB. In order to understand Bosnian ‘specifics’, it is necessary not only to view the challenges through the prism of technical and other domestic issues in BiH. A wider approach must be adopted. Through understanding the Bosnian specifics, the dilemmas related to the NATO membership of BiH become more obvious and clear. Bosnian specifics illustrate why BiH is not able to take significant steps towards long-term stabilization and NATO membership.
In this article, I compare constitutional and administrative models in terms of their implications for the EU legal order’s interaction with other legal regimes. I aim to make a twofold argument on the implications of the EU’s constitutional self-image to the world political order. First, as the CJEU adopts an identity-centred strong constitutionalist position on the Union’s external relations, it implicitly frames the EU legal order’s interaction with other legal regimes as in a federated order. Yet the strong political implications of federation are likely to bring about more inter-regime conflicts and provoke reactions from Member States. Second, I provide a critique of the administrative model in the light of GAL’s intervention in inter-regime relations, suggesting a post-identity constitutional alternative in times of crisis. Freed from the value-laden concept of constitutional identity, but without de-constitutionalizing itself, the EU can have the benefits of both the constitutional and administrative models by moving towards a weak-form constitutional order. In the event, the debate, as to whether to conduct the EU’s external relations according to the constitutional or the administrative model, is misconceived.
The robustness of the EU’s constitutional framework – and its ability to accommodate democratic politics – is challenged as never before. The growing disconnect between formally democratic procedures and substantive choice is well illustrated by the Greek crisis. Since its first bailout in May 2010, Greece has held four general elections and a referendum. Yet, the anti-austerity preferences of the Greek electorate have not been effectively translated into policy.
This article uses the Greek crisis to analyse the EU’s democratic deficit, and the related issue of the locus of legal and political sovereignty in the EU. It argues that the EU’s constitutional framework is not sufficiently responsive to changing material conditions or to the changing preferences of Europeans. Thus, EU constitutionalism needs to be refashioned in order to strike a better balance between democratic and technocratic governance, as well as between the needs of individual citizens, national citizenries, and states.