In recent centuries Christians of various denominations have endorsed many different political philosophies that they see as being truly biblical in their approach. Over this time there has been an increasing hostility, by some Christians, towards free markets and political philosophies that hold human liberty as the highest goal such as libertarianism and classical liberalism. This criticism is unwarranted and misplaced as libertarianism and free markets are not only compatible with Christianity, they are also the most biblically sound of all economics systems and political philosophies endorsed by Christians today. Therefore, this paper will argue that Christians of all denominations should endorse free markets and libertarianism if they wish to create a world that follows biblical principles and the teachings of Jesus.
This paper presents a fundamental difference between negative semantics for free logics and positive ones regarding the logical relations between existence and predication. We conclude that this difference is the key to understand why negative free logics are stronger, i.e., they prove more, than positive free logics.
This paper analyzes the symbolism of George Kennan’s famous “X” article relative to the challenges of contemporary post-socialist and post-conflict transitions. It unpacks recent developments in the field of contemporary political discourse, discussing the critical application of practices such as thinking with your heart, parrhesis, and pathos, as well as Kennan’s suggestion of the significance of uncertainty and reflection for global relations. The central question is: What would Kennan write in an X Article to the societies and states in transition? While various definitions of the term “parrhesis” exist, this paper employs both the definition suggested by Michel Foucault who understood it as “fearless speech” and Eric Voegelin who closely follows Plato’s meaning linking it with “heart”, i.e. vision of the spiritual, an existential (dis)order of representatives of a society.
The concept of Intentional Action is at the core of Praxeology, as developed by the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises. Under this unique approach, defined as the science of human action and designed to study the field of the social sciences, Mises create “action axiom”: the contention that every acting man more satisfactory state of affairs for a Austrian scholar is able to derive the fundament human action; such as value, scale of value, scarcity, abundance, profit, loss, uncertainty and causality, among others. This paper intends to present the praxeological perspective on intentional action and its epistemologic implications; it also attempts to answer objections to this thesis.
Questions about the nature of reality and consciousness remain unresolved in philosophy today, but not for lack of hypotheses. Ontologies as varied as physicalism, microexperientialism and cosmopsychism enrich the philosophical menu. Each of these ontologies faces a seemingly fundamental problem: under physicalism, for instance, we have the ‘hard problem of consciousness,’ whereas under microexperientialism we have the ‘subject combination problem.’ I argue that these problems are thought artifacts, having no grounding in empirical reality. In a manner akin to semantic paradoxes, they exist only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of their respective ontologies.
The article concerns selected problems related to the postulates of equalizing the level of positive liberty. The classic understanding of individual freedom, called as negative (freedom from), identified with a lack of compulsion, can be in opposition to the so-called positive liberty (freedom to). The last notion is generally defined by an ability, which brings its relation with a concept of power. The postulate of equality in “freedom to” can be justification for conducting a social redistribution of goods. The cases of voluntary and compulsory donation are considered in the text, whose aim is to visualize consequences resulting from a compulsory expansion of the scope of positive liberty.
This paper addresses the problem of extending ethical obligations toward usable things. The first part reconstructs current debates on the metaphysical and ethical status of artifacts. Next, drawing upon Tadeusz Kotarbinski’s reism, I describe artifacts as concretes, focusing on the possibility of their damage and destruction. The core part of the article analyzes ethical implications of the following issues: 1) using artifacts, 2) their production, 3) purchase and sale of artifacts, and 4) the post-use period.