This article presents the person–environment analysis as a framework for participatory and holistic research. By using common methods of qualitative research and analysis, it is possible to capture the present situation of a person. The person–environment analysis is built on Kurt Lewin’s field theory and a further development of its system of visual representation of the life space. It is argued that the person–environment analysis offers a frame to represent the perceived subjective situation of a person, which can be used in research, yet offers the possibility of counseling and intervention.
This paper examines the experimentum crucis under the light of the Duhem’s holistic thesis. This methodological instrument is not usable in physics, because physical theories are always logically connected to many assumptions. On the contrary, it is usable in psychological research oriented to perceptual laws, when these laws are, without any hypothetical term, isolated systems. An application of experimentum crucis in Experimental Phenomenology of perception is presented. In conclusion, the role of perceptual knowledge as an essential assumption in other scientific disciplines that have a high degree of theoricity is also underlined.
The human being as a constituted objectivity is a fragile ‘figure’ who lives in through their individual and shared experience. As a constituted objectivity, it influences our experiences, actions and the constitution of our community. Nevertheless, it appears to us, who actually constitute it, as a completely independent and immutable object, as a mere fact our experience has to comply with, and as a normative representation of the human being. This paper inquires - from a phenomenological point of view - about the structure that underlies the norm at work in our experience, as well as in the high- and low-level dimensions of the intersubjective community. Indirectly, such a structure can be identified through the connection between Husserl’s understanding of normality and objectivity. My claim is that normativity can be understood as a necessary function and thus can be distinguished from objectivity and normality. Normativity appears, therefore, as a function of objectivity, which allows one to distinguish the latter from normality. As such, normativity should not be confused with an active agreement or regulation, but rather identified as a necessary constitutive structure arising from experiential intersubjective sense-borrowing performance. At the same time, due to its connection to objectivity, normativity also appears to strongly influence the social production of validity, therefore being endorsed by institutions.
A phenomenological approach to anthropology should not propose a static definition of man, but inquire into specific human motivations, which never occur isolated. Therefore, the autonomy-dependency connection is presented as a possible human motivational ground. The notion of autonomy, presented with reference to the Kantian idea of the self-determining reason and to the Husserlian account of self-constitution, reveals in itself elements of dependency. On the other side, the notion of vulnerability and reliance is displayed through different approaches of Gehlen, MacIntyre and Toombs in order to illustrate dependency not as a mere capitulation of the subject, but as one of its intrinsic possibilities, which does not exclude autonomous will.
I start with an immanent critique of Husserls 5th Cartesian Meditation that reveals the weakness of the constitutional Analysis in this text, especially in the view of genetic phenomenology. First I argue for a methodically differentiation in concern to different privileged parts of our lived body. Hands and feet seems to be much more suitable for analogical apperception than facial expressions, because we do not know so much about our own mimics. My special interest is a specific genetic phenomenological analysis of our access to the other that is oriented on the function of the type. The type somehow carries all our experiences with others in it and I will argue that the layers of this history are also functioning in every apperception of an other.
This article refers on a recent discussion with the question of the relationship between individual memory and collective history. It is claimed a constitutive role of memory in history. This thesis is examined on the basis of the question according to the value of the autobiography as a historical source. It is shown here that a reference to the collective history is already guaranteed in the relationship between memory and narrative. Four observations shall justify the arguments, they concern (i) the role of intuition in historical narrative, (ii) the relationship between historical actor and his deeds, (iii) the transcendence of memory, and (iv) the role of fiction in the historical narrative. The last observation leads at the end on the role of fantasy in the historical memory.
In this article, I point out the hermeneutical implications of the Philosophy of Jósef Tischner, a modern Polish philosopher. In his early writings, the author of the Ethics of Solidarity strongly criticized the claim of the historicity of understanding as developed in Heidegger’s Being and Time and Gadamer’s Truth and Method. Later, however, he dismissed his critical attitude and recognized in both, Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s concepts, an important source of inspiration for a new formulation of the question of the other. At the same time, he tried to stay true to the tradition of the Philosophy of Dialogue (M. Buber, F. Rosenzweig, E. Levinas) as well as to the transcendental method of asking for the last “conditions of possibility” elaborated by Husserl. Thus, in his late work, he took into account some aspects of the hermeneutic concepts of the historicity of understanding and at once fundamentally transformed their meaning. In the last part of my article, I compare his concept of the hierarchy of ideas and values, which determines human relationships, with Gadamer’s notion of prejudices and tradition.