This article analyzes the labor gender policies and the strategies of “genderization” put forward by the Franco Dictatorship in Spain. The Franco regime understood that women were the touchstone of society and key in both biological and sociocultural reproduction. Legislative regulations and sanctioned discourses accentuated the division between productive-public and reproductive-domestic spheres, relegating women to the latter. Nevertheless, to what extent did women embrace and challenge the regime's idealistic view of gender? This article contemplates female employment within and beyond official discourse. Oral sources used in this article suggest that socioeconomic reality overflowed the narrow limits of normative femininity. Not all women could enjoy the “honor” of embodying the exalted role of “perfect (house) wife” that the Franco regime had entrusted to them. In addition, this article explores changes in the ideal of femininity throughout the dictatorship. The Franco regime underwent crucial transformations during its almost 40 years of existence. This article argues that its adaptation had repercussions on sociocultural patterns and gender policies. Francoism built its early notion of normative femininity on the ideals of domesticity and Catholic morality, but (re)shaped the meanings of womanhood and (re)adjusted the legal system to fit the new circumstances that arose in the Cold War context.
Globalization in the early 21st century can be considered as the age of inequality that splits the world into the rich North and the poor South. From the perspective of language politics, only very few discussed the division across the globe, especially, between Eurasia and the “Rest of the world.” In Eurasia, indigenous languages and scripts are used in official capacity, while the same function is fulfilled almost exclusively by non-indigenous (post/colonial) European languages in the Rest of the world. In the countries where they are spoken, non-Eurasian languages have limited presence in the mass media, education, or in cyberspace. This linguistic imperialism par excellence is a long-lasting and pernicious legacy of European (western) colonialism. The aforementioned divide is strongly associated to the use of ethnolinguistic nationalism in state building across many areas of Eurasia, while this ideology is not employed for this purpose outside the region.
This article focuses on the manifestations of Islamophobia of Czech politicians and political parties on the social networking service Twitter during the 2015 migration crisis. It utilizes the securitization theory of Copenhagen school as a theoretical framework, and through content analysis of relevant tweets aims to provide more data on what role Islamophobia played in the securitization of incoming migrants. We find that although securitization, and much more politicization, of migrants took place, obvious Islamophobia, similar to the one of the Czech Islamophobic movement, happened only in some cases. A number of those politicians who politicized or migrants and Islam usually raised their voices against radical Islamophobes.
In response to the power redistribution in the international system, the United States prepares for long-term Great power competition. It is aiming at strengthening America's network of alliances and partnerships in order to counter a rising China and revisionist Russia. The other states react to greater or lesser extent to the changing constraints and opportunities in the international system. The article examines how Lithuania, being a small state that belongs to the North Atlantic Alliance, is adapting to these systemic pressures. Current NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltic region is something akin to deterrence by the assured response – NATO is sending a signal that if the Russians attacked, NATO would respond in the Baltics. Lithuania, as well as other Baltic countries, has undertaken many legal, procedural, financial and technical measures to boost resilience and deterrence. However, there are not enough national or NATO military forces that would be able to counter conventional Russian forces deployed in the region. There are challenges such as air defence and control of the Baltic Sea. Also land forces are not present in adequate quantities. As a result, Lithuania has to strengthen its own capabilities with the help of the allied countries. It argued in the article that building up a total defence system in Lithuania would be a right effort in this regard.
Defence policy and related activities, such as territorial defence and comprehensive defence, are considered a matter of national priority and consensus in Estonia since its restoration of independence in 1991. The actual meaning and its content have depended on numerous linguistic and cultural factors. Educational traditions and alliance relations have played an important role as well. In some cases, changes in actual defence policy content first required an ability to change military terminology and outlook. The current study analyses the meaning of territorial defence, comprehensive defence and total defence in official documents and based on focus group interviews among officers of BDCOL and EMA.
This article explores how comprehensive defence has been introduced in Latvia, and focuses on society's involvement and tasks in the state defence. This approach envisages a significant change in society's relationship with the armed forces and state defence. Differently from many other countries, Latvia maintains its system without introducing conscription and instead puts efforts towards youth education in defence. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence involves different society groups and NGOs in defining their role in state defence. This article also discusses the concepts of resistance and non-collaboration as part of comprehensive defence.
The article discusses the idea of comprehensive national defence from a wide historical and geographical perspective. Countries facing different security challenges have used the concept of involving the entire society in state defence. From a historical perspective, ‘total defence’, with an emphasis on military components, was used primarily by non-aligned states during the Cold War; the breakdown of the Soviet Union reduced the importance of ‘total defence’; however, the emergence of hybrid threats in the 21st century has contributed to the rebirth of the concept in the form of ‘comprehensive national defence’, for application in circumstances wherein potential adversaries use military and non-military means in an integrated manner.
In this article, we compare the solutions which the largest Polish cities apply to effectively manage and administer public urban transport. We pay attention to the legal, administrative, and political limitations of current activities; we also analyse public transport strategies in terms of plans for the future. We state that large Polish cities prefer to entrust public transport services to fully dependent companies, do not seek to diversify service providers and do not allow the coexistence of public and private operators. Our research is the first comparative study which has used the eleven largest Polish cities as a research sample. Its results are important not only for decision-makers, but also for entrepreneurs in the transport industry. Not only does our analysis prove that, currently, urban transport in the largest Polish cities is carried out mostly by companies which fully belong to cities, but also that the future strategies of the target state will not be determined by political decision makers at all, or no significant changes are foreseen. In the largest Polish cities in the future, the tramway sector will be fully controlled by municipal companies; in the bus transport sector, private carriers will be able to count on a maximum of 20–30% share of transport work while the railway sector will remain under the control of regional administration, not local urban administration.