Intelligence is the traditional element of interest when measuring the human cognitive abilities. However, intelligence is complex and researchers are constantly finding new angles of looking at it. One such angle is reflective reasoning. Sometimes individuals choose to override the intuitive answer and by engaging in further reflection they reach the correct answer. The cognitive reflection test (CRT) measures a person’s ability to suppress their incorrect intuitive answer in favor of reflection that should then lead to the correct response. The test contains three short mathematically based problems, which measure, among others, cognitive ability, mathematical abilities and cognitive reflection. Using a sample of 195 students from a state university, one of the largest universities in Romania, we explore the extent to which a variety of phenomena and trends identified by previous findings on CRT show similar results on our sample.
Auld, M. C., Sidhu, N. (2005) Schooling, cognitive ability and health, Health Economics, 14(10), 1019–1034
Baron, J., Scott, S., Fincher, K., Metz, E. (2015) Why does the Cognitive Reflection Test (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things)?, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4(3), 265–284
Benbow, C. P., Stanley, J. C. (1980) Sex Differences in Mathematical Ability: Fact or Artifact? Science, 210(12 December), 1978–1980
Brañas-Garza, P., Kujal, P., & Lenkei, B. (2015). Cognitive Reflection Test: Whom, how, when. Working Paper.
Campitelli, G., Gerrans, P. (2014) Does the cognitive reflection test measure cognitive reflection? A mathematical modeling approach, Memory & Cognition, 42(3), 434–47
Campitelli, G., Labollita, M. (2010) Correlations of cognitive reflection with judgments and choices, Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 5, No. 3, June 2010, pp. 182–191
Cokely, E. T., Kelley, C. M. (2009) Cognitive abilities and superior decision making under risk: A protocol analysis and process model evaluation, Judgment and Decision Making 4(1), 20–33.
Evans, J., Curtis-Holmes, J. (2005) Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning, Thinking & Reasoning, 11(4), 382–389
Evans, J., Frankisch, K. (2009) In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Eysenck, H. J. (1979) The structure and measurement of intelligence, Springer-Verlag, New York
Frederick, S. (2005) Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42
Gervais, W. M., Norenzayan, A. (2012) Reminders of secular authority reduce believers’ distrust of atheists, Psychological Science, 23(5), 483–91
Halpern, D. (2004) A cognitive-process taxonomy for sex differences in cognitive abilities, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13(4), 135–139
Hedges, L., Nowell, A. (1995) Sex differences in mental test scores, variability, and numbers of high-scoring individuals, Science, 269(5220), 41–45
Herrnstein, R. J., Murray, C. (1994) The bell curve: intelligence and class structure an American life, Free Press.
Hyde, J. S., Fennema, E., Lamon, S. J. (1990) Gender Differences in Mathematics Performance : A Meta-Analysis, Psychological Bulletin, 107(2), 139–155
Jensen, A. (1980) Bias in Mental Testing, Free Press.
Juanchich, M., Dewberry, C., Sirota, M., & Narendran, S. (2016). Cognitive Reflection Predicts Real-Life Decision Outcomes, but Not Over and Above Personality and Decision-Making Styles. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 29, (52-59).
Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York
Kahneman, D., Frederick, S. (2002) Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgmen, Heuristics of Intuitive Judgment: Extensions and Applications
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(3), 263–291
Liberali, J. M., Reyna, V. F., Furlan, S., Stein, L. M., Pardo, S. T. (2011) Individual Differences in Numeracy and Cognitive Reflection, with Implications for Biases and Fallacies in Probability Judgment, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(4):361-381
Lubinski, D., Humphreys, L. G. (1997) Incorporating general intelligence into epidemiology and the social sciences, Intelligence, 24(1), 159–201
Marincas, D., David, O. A. (2013) Psycho-social Predictors of Baccalaureate Performance of Romanian Students: what Makes the Difference between Students who Fail and those who Succeed?, 14(2), 209
Moro, R. (2009) On the nature of the conjunction fallacy, Synthese, 171(1), 1–24
Oechssler, J., Roider, A., Schmitz, P. W. (2009) Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72, 147–152
Paxton, J. M., Ungar, L., Greene, J. D. (2012) Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment, Cognitive Science, 36(1), 163–177
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Koehler, D. J., Fugelsang, J. (2015) Is the cognitive reflection test a measure of both reflection and intuition?, Behavior Research Methods, 48(1), 341–348
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., Fugelsang, J. A. (2012) Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief, Cognition, 123(3), 335–346
Popa, C. A., Bochiş, L. (2016) The influence of baccalaureate average score on academic achievement of undergraduates, Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Psychologia-Paedagogia, 61 (1), 95-106
Primi, C., Morsanyi, K., Chiesi, F., Donati, M. A., Hamilton, J. (2016) The Development and Testing of a New Version of the Cognitive Reflection Test Applying Item Response Theory (IRT), Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 29(5), 453–469
Shenhav, A., Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D. (2011) Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 141(3), 423–8
Sherman, J., Gawronski, B., Trope, Y. (2014) In two minds, Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind, ebook: The Guilford Press.
Simonton, D. K. (1996) Genius: The natural history of creativity, Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34(4), 395
Sloman, S. A. (1996) The empirical case for two systems of reasoning, Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 3–22
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F. (2000) Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(5), 645-665-726
Toplak, M. E., Stanovich, K. E. (2002) The domain specificity and generality of disjunctive reasoning: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill, Journal of Educational Psychology, 94(3), 197–209
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., Stanovich, K. E. (2011) The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks, Memory & Cognition, 39(7), 1275–1289
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test. Thinking & Reasoning, 20(2), 147–168
Travers, E., Rolison, J. J., Feeney, A. (2016) The time course of conflict on the Cognitive Reflection Test, Cognition, 150, 109–118
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1983), Extension versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment, Psychological Review. 90 (4): 293–315
Zhang, D. C., Highhouse, S., & Rada, T. B. (2016). Explaining sex differences on the Cognitive Reflection Test. Personality and Individual Differences, 101, 425–427.