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COMMENTS ON THE ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF SENTENCES IN THEOLOGY

Abstract. This work is interdisciplinary as it lies at the crossroads of three disciplines: philosophy, theology, and logic. The article attempts to discuss the way in which sentences (judgements) are accepted and rejected within theology. First, the role of the argument of authority in theology is discussed. Subsequently, the most important types of theorems with certain degrees of theological certainty were identified. Finally, censorship was presented as a means of rejecting theorems in theology. Finally, censorship was indicated as a model for philosophical-logical research on denial.

Keywords: notae theologicæ, certainty, rejection, argument ex auctoritate, censures.

0. The criteria for accepting and rejecting sentences in theology are unique because of the particular cognitive status of theological knowledge. This special status is interesting both from a logical and a methodological point of view. Here, we limit ourselves to the preliminary analysis of the indicated criteria. The result is the identification and formulation of some basic principles for the acceptance and rejection of sentences in theology, as well as rules deeming sentences unsolvable in theology.¹

We raise questions about the criteria according to which the Church:

- Accepts a sentence (proposition),
- Rejects a sentence,
- Considers a sentence undecidable.²

In addition, we ask:

- whether, on account of the differing grounds of acceptance, there are different methods of acceptance.

Theology here is understood, generally speaking, as a system of rational knowledge obtained through methodical reflection on God's Revelation in its Catholic understanding.

Not every sentence of the knowledge system language is a statement of this knowledge system. Such statements are those sentences that are ac-

cepted by the knowledge system. The issue of the rules of acceptance is the subject of the methodology. Acceptance rules can be formulated explicitly, as is the case with formal systems, in which a sentence belongs to the knowledge system if it has evidence (carried out with explicit formulated rules in place). In practice, acceptance rules are intuitive and are the result of practice and criticism from the scientific community of a given discipline, as is the case with e.g. mathematics. Mathematicians practice their discipline in the conviction that their evidence can be reformulated in accordance with the rules of the formal system of which the subject is a particular mathematical discipline.

The system of theological knowledge is not formalised, although attempts at formalisation have been made.³ However, from a methodological point of view, it is important to try to define the principles that theologians follow when accepting sentences. In theology, it is also possible to point out principles which require the rejection of certain sentences, as well as principles according to which a sentence could be considered unresolvable by man, because they are a mystery of God.

Considering the fact that the system of theological knowledge contains rules for the rejection of sentences, can it be inferred that such a system does not, by definition, trivialize, and guarantee the absence of contradictions? This is not the case. Moreover, this system has an additional source of possible contradictions, namely the rules. If the rules of acceptance were to require the acceptance of a sentence and the rules of rejection were to require its rejection, there would be a contradiction. Problems with undecided sentences would be an additional source of complications. Such a situation could be regulated by conflict-of-law rules, as is the case with legal provisions. This preliminary analysis already shows how fruitful and interesting it can be to deal with this subject.

Theological considerations have proved fruitful for the development of formal sciences, especially the logical ones. It is to be hoped that this may also be the case with this issue.⁴

1. Every learning process has to cope with the question of how to accept certain sentences, and such processes may be heterogeneous within a discipline or specialty. For example, in empirical sciences, this method is formulated by conducting experiments, the results of which are subjected to the principle of incomplete induction, which allows for the appropriate generalisation. In the strict sciences (formal sciences), the intuitive truthfulness method is usually used for the recognition of axioms, while in the remaining sentences, the proof method is used, i.e. a sentence is accepted, as long as

it has evidence within the given science. Acceptance of sentences based on a science method should be subject to the following natural condition: if sentences A and B are accepted (symbolically: $U(A)$ and $U(B)$), $U(A \wedge B)$ should be recognised in the knowledge system. To summarize this paragraph, in order to establish terminology, it can be assumed that: any sentence A is a theorem of the established science N if, and only if, it has been accepted by means of the acceptance methods for N ; ($U(A)$).⁵

One of the consequences of the scientific nature of theology (as we have assumed), or of the even weaker assumption that theology is a rational system of knowledge, is that there has to be a way of accepting certain sentences as belonging to it.⁶ In theology, this method is quite special, as the acceptance of theorems (*obiectum formale fidei*) is based on an argument from authority (personal). The argument from authority is known in the theory of argumentation, and it can be expressed by a schematic diagram in the following form: [X claims that p // therefore: p]. The range of the variable X in the schema is the names of persons or institutions, and the range of p is the sentences. The *ex auctoritate* argument is not deductive, which means that the conclusion p does not follow logically from the premise “ X claims that p ”, i.e. one can imagine a situation when “ X claims that p ” is true, while it is not true that p . However, specific cases of this general scheme, which will make it reliable, or deductive, can be provided. An exemplary case is when we only allow tautologies to be substituted for the variable p . It is then not possible to think that “ X claims that p ” is true and p is false, because tautology is logically true. Another way of making the schema of the argument from authority deductive is to substitute the term ‘God’ for the variable X . Then it is impossible that “God claims that p ” is true and p itself is false. This impossibility stems from the accepted understanding of the term “God,” which refers to the Cartesian understanding, and from the way the corresponding term functions in Catholic theology. Descartes, in order to argue in favour of proving the existence of a world external to cogito, required the existence of God with the property “veracitas,” from the noun “verax”. This is why the French philosopher spoke of “veracitas Dei,” i.e. God who will not mislead man in cognition, and, as a result, he came to the conclusion that God’s authority is true. It is also worth noting that the rule of authority remains deductive for ascending authorities, i.e. for such Y that ‘ Y claims that p ’ implies that ‘ X claims that p ’, while not retaining deductive power for descending authorities, i.e. for such Y that ‘ X claims that p ’ implies ‘ Y claims that p ’. Since the form of the argument which we have extracted from the argument from authority is deductive, its material truthfulness is sufficient in order to obtain theological theorems.

Not all theorems are accepted with the help of an argument from authority, and this only applies to the most basic and theologically important theorems, which, generally speaking, are not themselves conclusions of other, previously accepted theorems. From the point of view of Catholic theology, there are other forms of detailing the general form of the argument from authority that are not deductive. They arise when, for the variable X , another subject, who is a theological authority, such as the Pope, officials of important Roman dicasteries, or groups of theologians (theological faculties), is substituted in the argument from authority schema.

2. Theology is also characterized as the doctrine of faith, in the sense of the content of faith (*fides quae creditur*), as well as the act of trust in God (*fides qua creditur*). This is because theology shows a kind of dualism. On the one hand, it accepts and declares theorems justified on the basis of (the analysis of) divine revelation, and on the other hand, it deals with the perception of the preached theorems on behalf of the believers, since one of the main goals of theology is to bring believers to salvation. This is not only a specific property of theology, but also its essential property.⁷ This state of affairs results in two theological approaches to certainty:

- The Church, which preaches claims that are recognized on the basis of authority, attributes so-called degrees of certainty to them;
- Believers are obliged to accept particular statements with a certain degree of certainty of faith.

The foundations of the doctrine of the degrees of theological certainty (*notae theologicae*) were developed within theology for practical reasons of concern for the purity and freedom of the doctrine of the Church (CC), including the teaching of theologians of various views which have particularly misled the faithful (led them “astray of faith”). This traditional science was developed mainly on the basis of neo-scholastic theology and traditional metaphysics, and after the Council of Vaticanum Secundum, interest in it declined, and it was even reclassified as a science of the ‘hierarchy’ of truths, which caused its essence to become blurred.⁸ The types of theological statements are ordered according to their degree of certainty, derived from the credibility of the authority from which the theorems originate. The following authorities can be mentioned in the CC:

- the authority of God as manifested in Scripture or Tradition;
- the authority of the Church’s Magisterium;
- the authority of the Fathers of the Church;
- the authority of the theological school (theologians);
- the authority of natural reason⁹.

Taking into account the aforementioned authorities distinguished in the theology of the CC as well as the types of faith of its members in the form of: theological faith (*fides divina*), ecclesial faith (*fides ecclesiastica*), and human faith, a list of several types of statements is compiled below. Some of their names indicate the type of faith the believers should make use of to recognize the given type of theorem preached by the Church (points 1 to 4). The end of each point of the list below contains the type of sin which the Church attributes to the proclamation of truth opposite to the type of Catholic truth mentioned in the point (except for points 7 and 8):

1. a) **De fide** – Truths revealed by God in Scripture or Tradition, although the Church has not expressed itself in a dogmatic form on the subject: e.g., “Christ descended to the dead” b) **De fide catholica** – Truth revealed by God in Scripture or Tradition, and the Church has expressed itself in a solemn form or as a mere teaching on the subject; a mortal sin directly against faith; c) **De fide divina et catholica definita** – Truths revealed by God in Scripture or Tradition, and backed by the Magisterium through solemn teaching; although the Church has not expressed itself in dogmatic form on this subject; a mortal sin directly against faith;
2. **De fide ecclesiastica (definita)** – A teaching of the Church which is not directly a part of God’s revelation, but was infallibly proclaimed by the Magisterium and provided to believers to believe in; a mortal sin directly against faith;¹⁰
3. **De fide divina** – A teaching that has been revealed but not proclaimed by the Church; a mortal sin directly against faith;
4. **Sententia fidei proxima** – A teaching of the Church which was almost unanimously accepted by theologians as a part of God’s Revelation (Scripture or Tradition), but was not defined as such by the Magisterium despite being close to such a definition, such as in the case of the Baptism of Desire; a mortal sin against faith;¹¹
5. **Doctrina catholica** – A teaching, often without the characteristics of infallibility, provided to the faithful but not necessarily having a strong connection to the Revelation: e.g., the validity of baptism carried out by any human being; a mortal sin indirectly against faith;
6. **Sententia theologicæ certa** – A teaching of the Church, present in theological schools, which has an internal and logical connection with the revealed doctrine, although not yet provided officially to be believed in. The revealed character of such theological conclusions is indirect or virtual, and is logically derived from two premises, one of which is revealed directly, while the other can be sourced from natural rea-

soning (e.g. the existence of God can be proven) or be of historical character; a mortal sin against faith;¹²

7. **Sententia communis**; – A theological teaching received and preached by the schools of theology and derived indirectly from the Revelation;
8. **Sententia communior**; **sententia probabilis**; **sententia probabilior**; **sententia pia**; **opinio tolerata**; A teaching at a low level of certainty, as it is not apparent or necessary on the basis of the revealed evidence, as it is only probable, and sometimes only tolerated. In certain cases, for good cause, claims to the contrary may be accepted.¹³

The types of statements in 1 and 3 have the highest degree of certainty and are accepted with divine faith (*fides divina*). The type of statements mentioned in point 2 are accepted with ecclesial faith and also have the highest degree of certainty.¹⁴ Those in points 4 to 6 also apply to believers, especially theologians, and should be accepted with “religious witness of reason and will”. The types of statements 1–7 should be recognized by believers as subject to cardinal sin, for they are either revealed by God or provided by the Church for the purpose of faith. The other statements (point 7) should be respected by believers, and the last types (point 8) are subject to open debate among professionals and are free to be accepted.

3. In various disciplines and scientific specialties, in addition to acceptance, the opposite course of action can also be discussed – the rejection of statements.¹⁵ Moreover, it must be stated that rejecting statements is a necessity in all sciences, at least in the context of discovery. We encounter it in the context of the empirical sciences, where the basis for rejecting a claim is its falsification, which in such case is considered the rejection of a hypothesis, while in formal sciences, such a basis is given by counterexample or by *reductio ad absurdum*.¹⁶ Rejection of sentences in theology is connected with the aims of the Church through the proclamation of its doctrine: the first aim is to convey to the faithful the truth revealed by God, and the second aim is to condemn any errors the believers may endure. The latter goal is pursued by way of the rejection of certain accepted statements which are harmful, that is, which for some reason (often falsity – understood primarily as non-compliance with the interpretation of the revelation) endanger the welfare of believers. The condemnation of the harmful claim or its collection (doctrine) is a complex canonical procedure, which ultimately results in placing censorship on the investigated statement.¹⁷ According to the classical textbook, theological censorship is “a statement that characterizes a claim concerning the Catholic Faith or

Moral Teaching as contrary to the Faith, or at least as questionable.”¹⁸ It can therefore be assumed that the statements which are theologically rejected are those which were assigned a censorship, i.e. (*A* is theologically rejected if, and only if, *A* is assigned a censorship).¹⁹ The process of attributing censorship is, generally speaking, twofold, where it must firstly be established that the claim is false and how it opposes the teachings of the CC in matters of faith or morality, followed by censorship and possible additional canonical punishment. This second step of the procedure can only be carried out by the Church, specifically by designated institutions which, similarly to a court, have the right to issue decisions rejecting certain theological statements. Such institutions include, for example, the Pope, the General Council, the Roman congregations, and, in particular, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Depending on the institution that announces the imposition of censorship, there may be a theoretical problem of a logical nature, since legal theological censorship is a theological statement concerning theological statements, making the meta-language of the theological language itself a part of the language of theology.²⁰ This does not seem to lead to a paradox, even though the theological language, by being able to express self-reference, allows for situations which can logically lead to paradoxes. Legal censorship may not be imposed privately by individual theologians or groups of theologians. This is a significant difference from other sciences, where rejection is, in principle, available to any specialist in the field. It is also worth noting that in the case of censorships concerning the claims contained in the first group of theological theorems present in the list above, i.e. *de fide*, *de fide catholica*, *de fide definita et catholica*, the Church sometimes includes canonical punishment (excommunication), and in the case of each censorship, an explanation is provided as to what kind of sin is committed by a believer under a particular censorship, which is a separate issue.²¹ The censorship referred to herein mainly concerns the content or substance of theological statements, and does not concern the way in which the condemned claim may be expressed or the consequences that it may have for the faithful, although such aspects of theological statements may also be the basis for censorship of a different nature. The following list presents the types of censorship that can be attributed to theological statements if they are considered to be contrary to the doctrine of the Church or if they are highly questionable from the point of view of that doctrine. The numbers in brackets refer to the list of types of theological theorems, listed according to their degree of theological certainty. Censorships a. and b. also result in exclusion from the CC community.

- a. Haeresis contra fidem divinam (Anathema) – when the claim contradicts a claim explicitly defined by the Church as belonging to the revelation (1);
- b. Haeresis contra fidem ecclesiasticam (Anathema) – when the claim contradicts a claim not declared by the Church as belonging to the revelation, but declared by the Church as necessary to be believed in (2);
- c. Error in fide – when the claim contradicts a claim whose matter is revealed but not proclaimed by the Church (3);
- d. Errori proxima – when the claim is not in contradiction with a claim explicitly proclaimed by the Church, but with a claim which is unanimously recognized by theological schools (4);
- e. Error in theology – when the claim denies a certain claim, which results in the denial of a claim with a high degree of certainty, e.g. a dogma (6);
- f. Saltem temeraria – when the claim does not contradict the Word of God, but the teaching contained e.g. in encyclicals (5);
- g. Temeraria – when a claim opposes the common teaching of schools or some less direct conclusions from the truth revealed, e.g. what is contained in the doctrinal documents of the Roman congregations (7);
- h. Nulla – no censorship, complete freedom is assured (8).²²

The key to understanding censorship is the notion of contradiction or opposition to the Church's teaching of a statement, or the emergence of doubts in regard to its conformity with the Church's teaching in the scope of faith or morality. When a claim *A* explicitly (directe) and directly (immediate) contradicts a claim *B*, one of the following situations usually occurs: ($A \equiv \neg B$) (*A* is a negation of *B*); (*A* is contrary to *B*) (in syllogistics *contrarietas*, i. e. both cannot be true simultaneously); or (*A* differs in meaning from *B*)²³ (difference in meaning).²⁴ It is not necessarily *direct* and *immediate* to deny the assertions of the CC with a lower degree of certainty, as contained on the list above, and sometimes it takes an effort to find discrepancies. For example, a statement which is a *sententia certa*, as in the sixth point of the above list of types of certainty of theological theorems, can be derived as a conclusion from at least two premises, one of which comes from natural reason. This type involves Pius X's statement, "The General Revelation of God ended with Christ and the Apostles." This statement is the Church's response to the Protestant statement: "The revelation, which is the object of the Catholic faith, did not end with the Apostles".²⁵ By performing an analysis, with the help of some logical effort, we can easily derive a contradiction from these statements in the ordinary sense. It seems that a general hypothesis can be made, although there is no convincing argument that any opposition to any of the claims made in the teaching of the CC ultimately

leads to a mere contradiction in logic in the sense of *contradictio*, which can be demonstrated by (usually simple) logical reasoning. In a slightly more formal form: if A opposes B , then $\{A, B\} \vdash (C \wedge \neg C)$. In terms of censorship from a chronological point of view, it should be stressed that the temporal consequence between a theological statement and the possible censorship associated with it may vary. Most often, however, a controversial statement is given first, followed by censorship, although the order may also be reversed. As some theologians (e.g. St. Augustine) point out, the first one of these time orders (heresy \Rightarrow censorship) had a positive effect in the history of the Church, providing for a better understanding of some truths of the Catholic faith, as it forced theologians to formulate their own positions more clearly. This is because, in general, the Church's teaching does not have to be strictly cumulative, unlike in the formal sciences, and therefore, depending on whether it is synchronised or diachronised, we can obtain different results from censorship research. The diachronic examination must take into account the possible change in the position of the CC in a particular case, in particular regarding the imposition of censorship on particular claims.²⁶

The mere rejection of statements (sentences) is a phenomenon which, especially in the last two decades, has been on the minds of logic philosophers.²⁷ Rejections are always made for a reason, the most common being false sentences. The classic approach to the relationship between rejection and negation most probably stems from this observation, as maintained by Frege: A is correctly rejected if and only if $\neg A$ is correctly accepted.²⁸ Curry comes to the same conclusion, although in his general reflections on negation in formal systems, he first studies its pre-models (a form of protonegations) in the form of non-demonstrability (negation-as-failure), refutability (minimal logic), absurdity (intuitionistic logic), and falsehood.²⁹ Curry, having the following predictions at his disposal in the metalanguage: R – corresponding to the refutability of sentences, and U – corresponding to the sentence's assertion, introduces negation in a classic way – $R(A)$ wtw $U(\neg A)$. In this approach, negation appears in the subject language as secondary to rejection, and its properties can only be defined by the system. Curry's approach shows and justifies the embedding of denial in negation (negation embeds denial), somewhat confirming what we consider as a factual state in natural language. The equivalence thesis establishes a connection between rejection and extensional negation in the form of: it is not true that (from the stoic *apophatikon* from Gr. ἀποφασίς). Philosophical research has shown that an insufficiently restricted use of the concept of rejection for intuitively obvious principles of rationality can lead to paradoxes.³⁰ Ripley (p. 4) sceptically claims that it is difficult to indicate an ob-

ject of natural language which would correspond to the purely theoretical denial from philosophical logic.³¹ He also claims that research on denial is rather more introducing in character than discovering (p. 4). The answer to Ripley's two claims is that censorship is the model of language for denials.³² We will argue in favour of our assumption on the current rejection model. For censorship, understood as rejection, the classic relationship of rejection with negation from theological claims – the equivalence thesis – is unsustainable. There are no particular logical relationships between censorships (understood as rejections), which means that censorship is logically independent. Our list contains eight items (let us call them C_1, C_2, \dots, C_8), and if Frege's classical understanding of rejection was to be employed, eight different negations, although related, could exist in theology: $C_i(A)$ if and only if $U(\neg A)$; where $1 \leq i \leq 8$, and A is a sentence. There is no guarantee that these negations have the same properties in every case, that is, that they are the same negation, but such an occurrence would not be in conformity with the factual state of theology. The main part of the argument is constituted by the following sequence of sentences:

- a. We have two theological sentences regarding faith or morality: A and B ;
- b. B is contrary to sentence A (these sentences cannot be true at the same time);
- c. A has a degree of certainty corresponding to point 1 of the list of theological theorems (*notae theologice*);
- d. B meets additional conditions of falling into censorship, e.g. it is stubbornly or consciously proclaimed, etc.;
- e. The Church pronounces: $C_1(B)$.

It follows, however, that B is false, i.e. $\neg B$, which may be justified by the denial rule: "Deny A only if A is false" (Ripley, p. 5). However, $U(\neg B)$ does not follow from $C_1(B)$, since $\neg B$ does not necessarily have to appear in the above reasoning, and therefore the question of its recognition or acceptance does not arise at all. In our censorship list, a special role is played by its last point, where *nulla* 'censorship' is placed. Strictly speaking, this is not censorship, but the lack of censorship, with reference to some of the theological statements mentioned in point 8 of the list of degrees of theological certainty. It does, however, play an important role in this comparison, as it shows that the CC either does not express itself, suspends its opinion, or tolerates certain sentences that concern matters of faith and morality, such as the *sententia communior* (the more common opinion), the *sententia propabilis* (probable opinion), the *sententia propabilior* (the more probable opinion): *sententia tuta*, and the *sententia tolerata* (safe opinion, tolerated opinion).³³ This shows that censorship does not satisfy the law for any theo-

logical sentence A : $C(A) \vee C(\neg A)$, where $C(A)$ means as above, and $C(A)$ if, and only if, there is an i : $1 \leq i \leq 8$ that $C_i(A)$. Such a state of affairs allows for the existence of truth-value gaps, or simply *gaps*. Censorship does not meet the condition for any theological sentence A : $U(A) \vee C(A)$, where U is the operator of the acceptance of sentences.

The names of the censorships in our list have their own meaning, which is to indicate the reason why a given censorship is imposed. For example, the following name: *haeresis contra fidem divinam (anathema)* expresses that the statement is heretical in contradiction to divine faith, because the statement to which this heresy opposes should be accepted with such faith, and also results in exclusion from the Church (*anathema*).

The material implication is to imitate, in a sense, the relation between the result and the metalanguage in the subject language. This implication is only false if the predecessor is real and the successor is false. On this basis, a general (simplified) observation is sometimes made that the purpose of logic is to make it impossible to take falsehood out of truth, even though it does allow taking falsehood out of falsehood, truth out of falsehood, and truth out of truth. For this reason, logic is essential to the functioning of theology, even in the most basic sense. At the heart of theology are theorems based on the *ex auctoritate* argument of divine revelation, and theology considers these theorems to be absolutely certain and true. This collection of theorems is a deposit of faith (*fidei depositum*) for the baptized. Therefore, theology allows the use of logic to recognize other theorems, but in such a way so as not to lose the truth, which is what logic has to guarantee to the Church.³⁴ In short, logic is a safe tool to broaden the scope of teaching. Moreover, since, according to the doctrine of the CC, the revelation of God is complete, no teaching or doctrine can, in fact, be new in the proper sense. It may, however, be ‘new’ in the sense that it has not yet been proclaimed, and then the Magisterium may examine such a doctrine and decide whether it is consistent with the doctrine of the CC or not. This observation applies to theological statements which are “new” in the indicated, particular sense, or to claims adopted on the basis of natural reasoning, e.g. historical reasoning. In such cases, the Church also uses the apparently coherent criterion of truth, which, however, does not allow the claim that the Church accepts the coherent theory of truth as its proper theory.³⁵

4. The above considerations may be surprising for some philosophers because of their main subject, theology, which also happens to be Catholic. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in theology on the part of

philosophy, which has not been particularly noticeable until now, and can be divided into the following areas: philosophy of theology and philosophical theology. This intention of this article is to belong to the former, even as far as being a form of postulating for the appearance of such a speciality. Its main task was to describe the way of accepting and rejecting sentences in theology from a logical-philosophical point of view and to show the gradual character of these procedures in theology. There was also an attempt to show, surprisingly, that the rejection of sentences in theology is unique when compared to other sciences and can serve as a real model for the theoretical concept of rejection (denial). This may confirm our assumption and foretell that theology contains many more gems with which it could enrich and surprise philosophy.

NOTES

¹ These considerations are related to a large extent to Catholic theology, which was developed in a neo-scholastic spirit until the Second Vatican Council. After the Council, a number of simplifications and changes have been made, some of which are still taking place. This is not very clear in theology and requires research in the scope of theology itself. However, for example, the “Catechism of the Catholic Church” (abbreviated to: CCC), 90, maintains the doctrine of the «Hierarchy» of truths of the Catholic doctrine, but only within dogmas. Cf. also: Vatican Council II, Decree on Ecumenism – “Unitatis Redintegratio”, 11th. Also the document of the Holy See of 29 June 1998: Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, “Doctrinal Explanation on the Final Part of the Formula of the Creed” refers to, develops, and clarifies the doctrine of the degrees of certainty. The four main degrees of theological certainty are indicated therein. Some theologians disagree with my approach to the question of degrees of certainty and consider it out of date. Cf. also Egan, pp. 133–140.

² The issue of unresolved sentences in theology does exist, but is of a different nature than logic. It is mainly because the theorems do not form a system of deductions in the logical sense. This matter is side by side with the main considerations, and in the last part of the paper, the reader can see in what way the sentences are not resolved and what role they play in theology.

³ To this end, among others, the Kraków Circle (1936) was established. These issues were especially dealt with by Polish thinkers: Fr. J. Salamucha, Fr. I. Bocheński, Fr. E. Nieznański, and many others.

⁴ I would like to thank Prof. K. Trzęsicki for his help in preparing the introduction to this work.

⁵ In strict sciences, a special sign is used that precedes sentence *A* and distinguishes the sentence itself from ‘*A* is a theorem (proved) in the system’. In this paper I will not use a fixed and precise term referring to what is accepted or rejected in theology. This *something* will be called: *sentence*, *statement*, *claim*, *proposition* and even *theorem*; see the next footnote.

⁶ Often, in the classic approach to the relationship between philosophy (metaphysics) and theology, it is believed that metaphysics ends with proof of God’s existence. It is not uncommon to consider theorems in theology or in the Church’s teaching, but truths, truths of faith, or doctrines are considered more often.

⁷ Cf. L. Ott, pp. 1–3.

⁸ After the Second Vatican Council, the interest in this doctrine decreased because i.a. of the departure of the CC from judging certain views as heresy. This is a complex issue which we will not be getting involved in at present. I mention that the description of theology in this paper is adequate to the contemporary state of theology. Compare the document mentioned above: Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Doctrinal Explanation of the Final Part of the Faith Religion Formula”.

⁹ This kind of authority has a slightly different character than the others.

¹⁰ Cf. F. Carrasquillo, “Ite ad Thomam”, cf. Cartechini, pp. 134–135.

¹¹ F. Carrasquillo, ‘Ite ad Thomam’.

¹² There is some confusion in the literature about this degree of certainty.

¹³ Cf. L. Ott, p. 9; also F. Carrasquillo, “Ite ad Thomam” and F. Diekamp, K. Juessen, pp. 72–77, cf. Cartechini, p. 134–135. This classification differs quite significantly among authors. Because it does not affect our deliberations in a decisive way, I leave the presentation of the problem at its present, imperfect level.

¹⁴ Although there are differences among theologians, see the following. F. Carrasquillo, “Ite ad Thomam”, cf. Cartechini, pp. 134–135.

¹⁵ The term denial is often used in addition to rejection. The difference is that the former term is a propositional attitude of rejection, and the latter is a speech act of denial. We will use both of these terms, except for when it could lead to confusion.

¹⁶ I would like to stress that we are talking about science-specific statements here. In these types of sciences, both empirical and formal, rejection is not of special interest.

¹⁷ I explain the Latin term censorship in this way, although the term ‘condemnation’ is also used in Polish. This work concerns the theological censorship of theorems, not the ecclesiastical censorship of individuals. Theological censorship, in turn, is divided into legal and doctrinal theological censorship. Only legal censorships have a church-wide scope of application. The latter are rather of a partially private nature. Cf. Ott, p. 10.

¹⁸ Ott, p. 10.

¹⁹ One of the censorships of the list mentioned in points a.–g.

²⁰ Infallibility is a trait of the decisions of the universal Councils, of the papal decisions *ex cathedra*, and of the universal and ordinary teaching of the Magisterium, which is of a definitive nature. Cf. Otto, p. 10, and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Doctrinal Explanation of the Final Part of the Creed Formula”.

²¹ Cf. Cartechini, p. 135. These sins were mentioned above in relation to the list of degrees of theological certainty.

²² Some censorships such as: male sonans, piarum aurium offensiva, scandalosa, captiva, etc. appear in moral theology texts; cf. Cartechini p. 133.

²³ Of course, *B* cannot be any sentence, but a sentence that deals with the same issue as *A*. There are many difficulties and doubts here, but we will not be focusing on them.

²⁴ The Church does not require the use of literal wording. However, it does require something that is neither very clear nor defined – “to preserve [...] the same sense and the same meaning”, cf. the Constitutions of Council Vat. See also “[...] dogmas [...] to grow/develop (crescant) [...] in the very sense and theorem (in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu eademque sententia)” (Pius IX, Apostolic Constitution, *Ineffabilis Deus*, 1854). These issues are currently being discussed in the CC in connection with the papal exhortation “*Amoris laetitia*”. The aforementioned situations of opposing the teachings of the CC directly and immediately may be more numerous than those mentioned.

²⁵ The premise of natural reason may be of a historical nature. Another clear example of the *sententia theologice certa* is the sentence provided earlier about the possibility of rational proof of the existence of God.

²⁶ For example, there has been a change of attitude towards some of the founders of the Reformation.

²⁷ Cf. Brouwer, p. 4452.

²⁸ Cf. for example Parsons, p. 139; this equivalence is referred to in literature as the equivalence thesis. Frege defended this view in the article entitled “Negation” (1919).

²⁹ Cf. Curry, pp. 254–255.

³⁰ Brouwer provides a clear argument in his work in this respect. Paradoxically, the sentence ‘[R] I reject R.’, p. 4455, is one such intuitively obvious principle: ‘One cannot rationally accept and reject the same proposition’. See also Ripley in this case.

³¹ “In fact, I don’t know of any phenomenon studied outside the realm of philosophical logic that could fill the theoretical role occupied by denial in our philosopher’s theories”. Ripley, paragraph 4.

³² The Ripley article has drawbacks which I am unable to address here. The argument I have put forward refers to his view presented in the previous footnote and needs to be developed further.

³³ Cf. Carrasquillo; “Ite ad Thomam”. For example, the understanding of *sententia tuta*, *sententia tolerata* “an opinion which may be weakly founded or even altogether false, but which the Church has not, at least for the moment, deemed worthy of censure or condemnation: e.g., *Molina’s scientia media*”.

³⁴ This close and intriguing relationship between logic and theology is worthy of a separate study.

³⁵ Of course, the CC does not accept the coherent theory of truth as the only theory of truth. However, it uses elements of the coherent theory of truth, or, in other words, the coherent criterion of truth, which is applied in the teaching of the Church.

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