The paper addresses the family of questions that arose from the field of interactions between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. On the one hand, apparently partial coextensivity of research domain of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences sets the goal of their cooperation and mutual inspiration. On the other hand, there are some obstacles on the path to achieve this goal: phenomenology and the cognitive sciences have different traditions, they speak different languages, they have adopted different methodological approaches, and last but not least, their prominent exponents exhibits different styles of thinking. In order to clarify this complicated area of tensions, the paper presents the results of philosophical reflections of such topics as: 1) philosophical presuppositions and postulates of the cognitive sciences 2) abstraction of some phenomena during idealisation and the dialectical model of science's development 3) argumentation based on prediction of future development of the cognitive sciences. This finally leads to the formulation of a phenomenology-based postulate for adequate model of mind and the discussion of humanistic dimension of cognitive sciences.
1. Arendt, H. The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man. The New Atlantis. Number 18, Fall 2007, 43-55.
2. Auyang, S.Y. Mind in Everyday Life and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001.
3. Bogen, J. 'Saving the phenomena' and saving the phenomena. Synthese 182 (1), 2011, 7-22.
4. Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Penguin, London, 1991.
5. Drummond, J.J. Phenomenology: Neither auto- nor hetero- be, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science 6 (1-2), 2007, 57-74.
6. Duhem, P. To save the phenomena. Dolan, E. and Maschler C. (transl.), Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1969.
7. Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. The Phenomenological Mind. London, Routledge, 2012.
8. Husserl, E. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Research: First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. Kersten, F. (tranls.), Dordrecht, Springer, 1982.
9. Husserl, E. Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man. [in:] Husserl E., Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. Laurer, Q. (transl.), Harper & Row/Torchbook, New York 1965, 49-192.
10. Klawiter, A. Thinking like a philosopher, arguing like a cognitive scientist. Diametros 3, 2005, 176-181. (in polish)
11. Klawiter, A. Why did Husserl not become the Galileo of the science of consciousness?, Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82, 2004, 253-271.
12. Kosman, A. Saving the Phenomena. Realism and Instrumentalism in Aristotle's Theory of Science. [in:] Kosman, A. Virtues of Thought. Essays on Plato and Aristotle. Harvard University Press, 2014, 138-156.
13. Liu, C. A Study of Model and Representation Based on Duhemian Thesis. [in:] Magnani, L. and Li, P. (eds.) Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Western & Eastern Studies. Berlin Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 2012, 115-142.
14. Marbach, E. No heterophenomenology without autophenomenology: Variations on a theme of mine. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science 6, 2007, 75-87.
15. Meixner, U. Materialism Does not Save the Phenomena – and the Alternative Which Does. [in:] Koons, R.C. and Bealer, G. (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 417-437.
16. McGinn, C. Can we Solve the Mind Body Problem? Mind 98 (1989), nr 891, 349-366.
17. Miah, A. The Deep Blue Grasshopper: Playing Games with Artificial Intelligence. [in:] Hale, B. (ed.), Philosophy Looks at Chess. Chicago, Open Court, 2008, 13-23.
18. Merleau-Ponty, M. The Structure of Experience. Fischer, A.L. (transl.), Beacon Press, Boston, 1963.
19. Owen, G.E.L. Tithenai ta Phenomena. [in:] Mansion, S. (ed.), Aristote et les problemes de la methode. Publications Universitaries, Lovain, 1961, 113-126.
20. Rinofner-Kriedl, S. What is Wrong with Naturalizing Epistemology? A Phenomenologist's Reply. [in:] Feist, R. (ed.) Husserl and the Sciences. Selected Perspectives. University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, 2010, 41-68.
21. Roy, J.M. Saving the intentional phenomena: Intentionality, Representation, and Symbol, [in:] Petitot, J., Varela, F.J., Pachoud, B. and Roy, J.M. (eds.) Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press, 1999, 111-147.
22. Roy, J.M., Petitot, J., Pachoud, B. and Varela, F.J. Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology, [in:] Petitot, J., Varela, F.J., Pachoud, B. J. and Roy, M. (eds.) Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press, 1999, 1-83.
23. Searle, J. The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992.
24. Spiegelberg, H. The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction. The Hague, 1965, vol. II.
25. Stalnaker, R. Varieties of Supervenience. [in:] Stalnaker, R. Ways a World Might Be, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, 86-108.