

Risk management, corporate governance and financial performance of the banking system in Romania

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Abstract. *The recent global financial crisis has raised a number of questions with regard to corporate governance of banking financial institutions. There was a series of “voices” that expressed their concern and even the lack of confidence in the role of corporate governance at the banking system level, and not only, in preventing the effects of this crisis. The main objective of this research is constituted by the study of the corporate governance influence at the banking system level in Romania on the risks management area and of banking financial performances. The used research methodology is predominantly quantitative. This methodology is based on a descriptive statistics, having as objective the analysis of corporate governance characteristics, the appreciation of the risks management level and the performances recorded at the level of the Romanian banking system. In the realisation of this study, the calculation of central tendency indicators, dispersion and form of distribution were used with the help of the SPSS software under Windows (Descriptive Statistics).*

Keywords: supervision, corporate governance, financial performance, risk management, banking system.

Introduction

While scandals such as Enron and Worldcom have mainly determined the evolution of accounting practices, the financial crisis initially occurred in the United States of America led to the increase of the awareness degree and to the necessity of new risks management techniques and to the development of structures within the banking financial organisations. In the quantitative risk management, the accent consists in taking the necessary measures to improve the measurement and management of specific risks, such as the liquidity risk, the credit risk and the market risk.

The previous specialty literature regarding risks management was focused on unique types of risk, in which there was no interdependence between these risks (Miller, 1992). Thus, it was only in the 1990s when specialty literature started to focus on an integrated vision in what concerns risk management (for example, Miller, 1992; Miccolis and Shaw, 2000; Cumming and Mirtle, 2001; Nocco and Stulz, 2006; Sabato, 2010).

Moreover, the decision-makers around the world started to question the adequacy of corporate governance applied to banking-financial institutions, especially the role and profile of risk management at their level.

In a series of policies and procedures, the risk management framework was presented in association with the recommended governance structures (for example, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008; FSA, 2008; IIF, 2007; Walker, 2009). A common recommendation of these procedures is noticed, respectively that of "emphasizing wide risks at the level of organisations" by the creation and adaption of appropriate structures at their level. This may involve a series of different actions. As already stated by the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Law in 2002, the financial expertise (experience, competence) is considered to have a significant role. Other measures, more specific, involve either the creation of a dedicated risk committee or the designation of a CRO position (Chief Risk Officer) that has the responsibility to supervise all relevant risks that may occur at the organisation level or to which it is exposed (for example, Brancato et. al., 2006; Sabato, 2010).

Mongiardino and Plath (2010) appreciate that risks management within large-sized banks has known an improvement to a limited extent, in the context of pressure exercised by increased regulation, a regulation induced by the crisis occurred at the level of credits. Authors highlight the best practices in terms of governance of banking risks and the necessity to establish at management level a committee dedicated to risks, within which most members must be independent and the CRO (Chief Risk Officer) must be part of the competence of the Executive Committee / bank's Directorate. Until the financial crisis of 2007, 2008, the vast majority of banks did not have a CRO position, but a manager/head of the risks management structure who, usually, was subordinated to a CFO (Chief Financial Officer), without having, however, any influence on the short-term or long-term bank strategy (including in what concerns the risks management to which the banking company is exposed).

Literature review

Two studies of the authors Beltratti and Stulz and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), respectively, analyse the influence of corporate governance on banking performances during the crisis occurred at the credit level. The most important is that they proved that, at the level of banks with a high number of shareholders that are part of their boards, the "Corporate Governance Coefficient" (CGC) obtained from the Risk Metrics recorded a descendant evolution during the crisis, which indicates that the general understanding of "good governance" must not be regarded as being in direct connection with the shareholders' interest.

Beltratti and Stulz argue that "before the financial crisis, banks were pushed by their boards to maximise the fortune of shareholders, not taking into account the risks to which they were exposed and thus, they paid a quite expensive price for the fortune of shareholders" (p. 3).

Minton et al. (2010) investigated the risk-taking and the performance of banks from the USA and the results of their studies indicated that they are closely linked to the independence of board members and their financial expertise/experience.

Cornett et al. (2010) investigated the relation between different corporate governance mechanisms and bank's performances, elaborating a study on a sample of approximately 300 banks from the USA, banking companies listed on the stock exchange. Unlike Erkens et al. (2010), Beltratti and Stulz, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011),

they consider that there is a positive association between a better corporate governance (appreciated by the independence of the members of Supervisory Boards) and the financial performance of banks.

Although the role and importance of the CRO and the governance of risks in general at the banking sector level were emphasized in the media, in different reports (Brancato et. al., 2006), and in practitioners' studies (for example, Banham, 2000), this has been largely neglected in the literature so far.

Some other aspects related to corporate governance in banks, such as the characteristics of the board, of CEO (Executive Chairman) remuneration and the ownership, were approached in a few academic studies (for example, Beltratti and Stulz, future; Erkens et. al., 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Minton et. al., 2010). However, specialty literature on corporate governance and the effect of evaluation of corporate governance at the level of banking companies is still very limited.

Moreover, banking companies have different particularities, such as the accentuated regulation (Levine, 2004), particularities that require a distinct analysis of the aspects related to corporate governance. In this context, constantly, Adams and Mehran (2003) and Macey and O'Hara (2003) underline the importance of taking differences into account regarding corporate governance between banking companies and non-banking entities.

All these studies, by the results obtained, only confirm the particularly important role of corporate governance on how to manage risks to which entities are exposed, the specialty literature being much broader in the area of companies outside the banking (non-banking) financial sector than in the banking sector.

Objectives, variables and research methodology

The main objective of this research is constituted by the study of the corporate governance influence at the banking system level in Romania on the risks management area and on the banking financial performances. Thus, we will describe in the following lines each variable considered in the appreciation of corporate governance characteristics, but also in the manner of the management of risks and of performance indicators of the banking sector.

The research methodology used is predominantly quantitative. This methodology is based on a descriptive statistics, having as objective the analysis of corporate governance characteristics, the appreciation of the risks management level and the performances recorded at the banking system level in Romania.

In the realisation of this study, central tendency indicators, dispersion and form of distribution were used with the help of the SPSS software under Windows (Descriptive Statistics).

The central tendency indicators express in a synthetic and generalizing manner what is normal in a distribution from the point of view of a statistical variable. The central tendency indicators are present on types of variables.

The mean is the point of balance of all the values of a distribution. For an X variable, the mean is calculated according to the relations:

$$\mu = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N x_i}{N}, \text{ for a population of } N \text{ volume;}$$

$$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{n}, \text{ for a sample of } n \text{ volume.}$$

The median (M_e) is the central point of a distribution, the value separating the assembly of the data of an ordered series in two equal parts, 50% from observations are found below this value and 50% are over this value. Finding the median involves the direct discovery of the central value. In the case of discrete numerical variables with equal frequencies between them, the calculation is direct, using the relation:

$$M_e = x_{\frac{n+1}{2}}, M_e = \frac{x_{n/2} + x_{(\frac{n}{2})+1}}{2},$$

In the case of continuous variables, finding the median is realised by interpolation, using the relation:

$$M_e = x_{i-1} + d \frac{U^{Me} - N_{i-1}}{n_i}, \text{ where:}$$

$$U^{Me} = \frac{n+1}{2}, N_{i-1} = N_i - n_i, \text{ iar } N_i = \sum_{h=1}^n n_h.$$

The sample subject to the research is composed of 28 banks that are active in the banking system in Romania, the information being accessed from the official websites and from the website of the National Bank of Romania.

In order to reach the objectives of this study, two series of variables were defined:

- variables regarding the corporate governance and respectively
- variables related to the appreciation of the risks management activity and the financial-banking performance.

The defined variables *regarding the corporate governance* are the following:

- A first variable used in the research carried out is a dummy variable, respectively if the CRO (the one that holds the position of Chief Risk Officer at bank level) is part of the Executive Committee or the banking company's Directorate. It is considered that if it is part of the Executive Committee or the bank's Directorate, then its influence and authority (decision power) are greater than if it would not be a member of them;
- The second variable is also a dummy variable, respectively, if at the credit institution level, a committee dedicated to risks management and monitoring (risk committee) is established. Thus, if it exists, then this variable has value 1 and, in case of companies where a risk committee does not exist, the value of this variable is 0;
- A third variable reflects the size of the Boards of Directors/Supervisory Boards, measured as a natural logarithm (Ln) of its number of members at the level of banks included in the sample subject to the research. Yermack (1996) appreciated the existence of a negative relation between the size of the Boards of Directors and the value of the organisation measured through the Tobin Q coefficient. Adams and Mehran (2003) believe that at the level of banking companies, the Boards of Directors have larger sizes than those within non-banking companies. Authors appreciate that this situation can be explained by the requirements, and respectively the regulation differences that are imposed to banks in order to ensure effective corporate governance at their level.
- The fourth variable on corporate governance highlights the independence of board members of banking companies, appreciated by the share of independent / non-executive members in the total of members of the Boards of Directors/Supervisory Boards.

- The fifth variable is the one related with the financial experience of members, measured by the share of members with financial-banking experience in the total of members of the Boards of Directors. As mentioned in the Sarbanes-Oxley Law of 2002, a financial expert has, among others, "a good understanding of the generally accepted accounting principles and of financial situations". At the level of the Romanian legislation, the Law No. 29/2015 for the approval of the Government Emergency Ordinance No. 113/2013 on some budgetary measures and for the modification and completion of the Government Emergency Ordinance No. 99/2006 on credit institutions and capital adequacy of Art. 108., provides that: *"Each of the members of the board of directors and managers or, as appropriate, the members of the supervisory the board and of a credit institution's directorate, as well as the persons designated to provide the management of structures that concern the activities for the management and control of risks, internal audit, legal, compliance, treasury, crediting, as well as any other activities that may expose the credit institution to significant risks must have at all times a good reputation of the knowledge, skills and experience appropriate to the nature, scale and complexity of the credit institution's activity and entrusted responsibilities and must carry out its activity in compliance with the rules of a prudent and healthy banking practice. The composition of the respective credit institutions bodies must reflect, overall, a sufficiently wide range of relevant professional experiences."*

The defined variables regarding *the banking performance and the risks management activity* are the following:

- ROA, respectively return on assets of the bank, appreciated by the report between the net profit (net result) and the total assets value recorded at bank level;
- ROE, respectively return on equity of the bank, measured through the report between the net profit (net result) and the volume of bank's equity;
- The size of the bank appreciated by the total assets volume (total assets); this indicator is measured as being a natural logarithm from the total asset value;
- The share of bank deposits in relation to the total assets volume represents another variable of appreciation of the banking performance;
- The share of credits granted in the total volume of bank assets;
- Level I own funds; they comprise (acc. to the NBR Regulation No. 18/2006):
 - Subscribed and respectively, paid-up share capital;
 - Tangible assets revaluation reserves, adjusted with the afferent tax obligations, foreseeable at the time of calculating own funds;
 - Indefinite duration titles and other instruments of the same nature that cumulatively meet a series of conditions;
 - Other elements that meet the established conditions on the elements of basic level 2 own funds.

In Table 1, the variables used, as well as their evaluation manner are presented.

Table 1. List of the analysed variables

Analysed variable	Used symbol	Evaluation
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<i>On corporate governance</i>		
Existence of the Chief Risk Officer position at bank level	CRO	1 , if it is part of the Executive Committee or the bank's Directorate 0 , if it is NOT part of the Executive Committee or the bank's Directorate
Existence of a risk committee at bank level	COMITET_RISC	1 , if there is a risk committee at bank level 0 , if there is NOT a risk committee at bank level
Size of the Boards of Directors or Supervisory Boards	DIMENS_CA	natural logarithm (Ln) of the number of the members of the Board of Directors or of the Supervisory Board at bank level included in the sample subject to the research
Independence of the members of the Boards of Directors or Supervisory Boards	INDEPENDENȚA_CA	the share of independent / non-executive members in the total of the members of the Boards of Directors or of the Supervisory Board.
Financial experience of the members of the Boards of Directors or the Supervisory Board	EXPERIENȚA_CA	the share of the members with financial banking experience in the total of the members of the Boards of Directors
<i>On the banking performance and the risks management activity</i>		
Return on assets of the bank	ROA	report between the net profit (net result) and the total value of assets recorded at bank level
Return on equities of the bank	ROE	report between the net profit (net result) and the volume of bank's equities
Total volume of bank assets	ASSETS	natural logarithm from the total asset value
Share of bank deposits	DEPOZITE/ACTIVE	share of banking deposits relative to the total volume of bank assets
Share of granted credits	CREDITE/ACTIVE	share of credits granted in the total volume of bank assets
Own funds at basic level I	FP_NIVEL_1	total own funds at basic level I, recorded at the level of each bank

Source: Authors' own research.

Data processing and analysis

The information on corporate governance variables and respectively risks management and banking performance, defined and abbreviated according to those previously mentioned, are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Corporate, risk management and banking performance variables

banks	CRO	RISK COMMITTEE	size	INDEP	EXP	ROA	ROE	assets	DEP/ASSET	CRED/ASSET	FP level 1
b1	1	1	1.95	1.00	1	0.98	11.11	17.89	0.68	0.56	0.13
b2	1	1	2.20	0.78	1	0.78	6.25	17.70	0.78	0.56	0.11
b3	1	1	1.95	0.14	1	1.74	15.05	17.18	0.80	0.59	0.14

b4	1	1	2.30	1.00	1	0.44	4.67	17.17	0.69	0.59	0.14
b5	1	1	1.95	1.00	1	1.22	11.73	17.39	0.47	0.32	0.16
b6	0	1	1.10	1.00	1	-0.86	-14.03	14.99	0.89	0.32	0.11
b7	0	1	2.40	0.55	1	0.21	2.79	17.15	0.91	0.43	0.13
b8	0	1	1.95	0.57	1	1.20	4.26	15.17	0.29	0.43	0.64
b9	0	1	1.10	0.33	1	0.11	1.32	13.11	0.91	0.65	0.07
b10	1	1	1.95	0.71	1	-1.13	-9.25	16.29	0.78	0.63	0.13
b11	0	1	2.20	0.67	0.75	0.18	1.48	16.01	0.58	0.73	0.11
b12	1	1	2.20	0.67	1	0.01	0.12	15.92	0.76	0.65	0.13
b13	1	1	1.95	0.57	1	-0.69	-7.31	15.73	0.86	0.68	0.14
b14	1	1	1.79	0.17	0.33	-1.58	-15.35	15.37	0.79	0.67	0.13
b15	1	0	1.95	0.71	0.50	-2.98	-22.63	14.71	0.84	0.64	0.10
b16	1	1	2.20	0.22	1	-0.82	-14.27	16.65	0.81	0.66	0.12
b17	1	1	1.10	1.00	1	-13.85	-36.91	12.45	0.53	0.35	0.32
b18	1/0	1	1.79	0.00		-5.87	-29.45	15.31	0.71	0.65	0.13
b19	0	0	1.61	0.00	1	1.07	21.64	14.82	0.91	0.15	0.47
b20	1	1	2.20	0.56	1	-4.24	-29.83	14.02	0.64	0.79	0.18
b21	1/0	0	1.61	0.80	0.75	-3.10	-52.61	14.06	0.90	0.67	0.13
b22	0	0	1.10	0.00	0.50	-0.31	-1.41	15.32	0.66	0.51	0.21
b23	0	0	1.39	0.00	0.33	2.10	13.21	13.85	0.81	0.11	0.05
b24	0	1	1.95	0.57	1	-0.25	-2.16	14.34	0.88	0.63	0.14
b25	1	1	1.61	0.00	1	-10.41	-86.79	13.66	0.74	0.32	0.07
b26	0	1	1.61	0.60	1	-2.17	-8.37	12.71	0.22	0.79	0.37
b27	0	1	1.61	1.00	1	0.61	6.60	14.24	0.64	0.86	0.15
b28	0	0	1.10	0.67	1	0.33	2.53	13.18	0.86	0.21	0.05

Source: Author's conception.

In the table below (Table 3), the descriptive statistics are presented both for the variables by which the corporate governance is appreciated and for the indicators of risk management activities and bank performance measurement at the level of banks included in the sample subject to the research.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics

Variables	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic
CRO	28	0.00	1.00	.50	.51	.26
COMITET_RISC	28	0.00	1.00	.79	.42	.17
DIMENS_CA	28	3.00	11.00	6.36	2.31	5.35
INDEPENDENȚA_CA	28	0.14	1.00	.61	.27	.07
EXPERIENȚA_CA	28	.50	1.00	.90	.18	.03
ROA	28	-13.85	2.10	-1.33	3.58	12.81
ROE	28	-86.79	21.64	-8.13	22.94	526.09
ASSETS	28	12.45	17.89	15.23	1.56	2.44

DEPOZITE/ACTIVE	28	.22	.91	.73	.18	.03
CREDITE/ACTIVE	28	.11	.86	.54	.20	.04
FP_NIVEL_1	26	.05	.64	.18	.13	.02

Source: Author's conception.

Where: N = number of banks included in the sample;

Minimum and *Maximum*= minimum and maximum value of the selected variable;

Mean= mean of the selected variable;

Std. Deviation= Squared deviations from the mean, also called the maximum value of the selected variable

Variance =Variance

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Thus, in what concerns the corporate governance variables, it is found that 50% from the banks included in the sample have a Chief Risk Officer that is part of the Executive Committee or the bank's Directorate. This share is slightly higher compared to previous studies in the field (Brancato et. al., 2006; Ross, 2005), a situation justified by the measures to prevent and diminish excessive exposures to risks manifested at the level of banks based on the financial crisis recorded worldwide after 2008.

At the banking system level in Romania, it is noticed that for 79% of the banks included in the sample, there is a dedicated committee for monitoring and managing the risks to which they are exposed, a preoccupation supported by the national banking legislation (NBR Regulation No. 5/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions).

In what concerns the size of the Boards of Directors or of the Supervisory Boards, it is noticed that it records an average of 6.36 members, with minimum 3 and maximum 11 members. This variation depends on the size of the banks, the higher the number of assets, the higher the number of members of the Board of Directors or of the Supervisory Board, given that a higher level of the bank's structure also involves a more complex activity and decisions that must be assumed at the level of their boards.

At the level of the banks included in the studied sample, it is found that, in what concerns the independence of the members of the Boards of Directors or of Supervisory Boards, although an average of 61% of the share of independent members is recorded in their total composition, there is still a number of 4 banks at the level of which this share is less than 50%.

In what concerns the financial experience of the members of the Boards of Directors or of Supervisory Boards, there is an average share at the level of banks comprised in the studied sample of 90% of the members with relevant financial experience. The maximum recorded value is of 100% (all members have financial experience), being found at the majority of banks subject to the research and the minimum level is of 50% from the total of the members of the Boards of Directors or Supervisory Boards.

It is noticed that, in what concerns the level of ROA and ROE indicators, for the banks included in the studied sample, their averages record negative values (-1.33 and respectively -8.13), with a maximum of 2.10 and respectively 21.64. This situation is due to the introduction of the new capital requirements according to the European Directive CRD IV (Capital Requirements Directive) (CE, 2013), a fact that determined a series of "movements" within the Romanian banking system, the tendency of banks to be more prudent in exposing to risks, including mergers and withdrawals of banks from the Romanian market.

At the level of the other analysed variables (the size of assets, the share of credits and respectively of deposits in the total volume of bank assets and level 1 own funds) at the level of banks included in the sample subject to the research, their concern to meet solvability requirements is noticed, as a consequence of the prudential regulation and surveillance measures adopted by the NBR.

In what concerns the situation of variables related to banking performances and respectively the risks management activity, depending on the level of variables of the “Existence of the position of Chief Risk Officer at bank level”, “The existence of a risk committee at bank level” and “The financial experience of the members of the Boards of Directors or of Supervisory Boards”, the research results are presented in the Annexes *Case Summaries 1, 2, 3*.

Thus, it is noticed that the existence of the position of Chief Risk Officer and its inclusion within the Executive Committee or the bank’s Directorate, as well as the existence of a risk committee at bank level have a positive influence, especially on the size of bank assets, of the report of credits granted in the total of assets and on the level of own funds at level 1. It is noticed from the annexes that the averages of active variables, the credit report/assets and level 1 own funds are superior in the case of banks whose CRO is part of the Executive Committee or the bank’s Directorate and respectively who have a dedicated Committee for risks management.

This result supports our initial idea that corporate governance, in general, and the CRO reporting line, especially, are important for the performance and management of banking risks. Our empiric results support a series of qualitative affirmations with regard to the importance of an efficient reporting line of the position of Chief Risk Officer to the board of directors (for example, Mongiardino and Plath, 2010; Sabato, 2010).

In what concerns the level of banking performance indicators and of those of appreciation of the risks management activities, the research results show that (according to annex 5.3) the level of financial experience/expertise of the members of the Board of Directors or of the Supervisory Board have a positive influence at the level of banks included in the sample subject to the research. Thus, it is noticed that ROA and ROE indicators, as well as the volume of level 1 own funds record superior average values within the banks whose Boards of Directors or Supervisory Boards have in their componence a high share (almost 100%) of the members with high financial experience/expertise.

This result of this research, respectively of a direct positive relation between the financial expertise of the members of the Boards of Directors and the banking performance, as well as the manner of managing risks, are in compliance with the findings of Minton et. al. (2010). They show that the financial expertise level among the members of the Board of Directors is positively related to risk-taking and better performance in the banking system.

Conclusions

This study was conceived so that to provide an analysis of the corporate governance influence at the banking system level in Romania over the risks management area and of the banking financial performances. The aspects related with corporate governance and its impact on the financial performances of entities were debated over time (and especially after 2007, the year of the global economic and financial crisis) but the

originality of this research consists in the approach of risks management elements in the corporate governance context.

At the same time, this study is dedicated to a segment less approached in the specialty literature, respectively the financial-banking market, a market that is quite affected by the effects of the economic and financial crisis, from the impact on financial performances to affecting banks' reputation, their "image".

Thus, within this research, a special attention was granted to the role of the characteristics of corporate governance elements, of the position of monitoring structures and risks management at the banking system level, of their influence on the financial performances of the banks in Romania.

At the same time, this research has a series of limits, caused mainly by the reduced size of the sample of banking companies subject to the analysis, but also by the fact that the information afferent to only one calendar year was captured (end of 2016).

At the same time, we appreciate that all these limits mentioned above can constitute challenges of future researches, the studies of new series of indicators from the risks management area to which banks expose themselves, being able to be approached more thoroughly and respectively the ways of preventing and reducing their exposure, leverages for the correct sizing of the capital adequacy ratio to the credit, market or liquidity risks.

Thus, we believe that this research can represent a useful source of reflection and analysis for practitioners from the banking area, being at the same time a challenge for a more thorough approach of subsequent researches.

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Annex 1

Case Summaries^a

		ROA	ROE	ASSETS	DEPOZ_ASSETS	CRED_ASSETS	FP_NIVEL_1
COMITET_RISC	,00						
	Total N	6	6	6	6	6	6
	Minimum	-3.10	-52.61	13.18	.66	.11	.05
	Maximum	2.10	21.64	15.32	.91	.67	.47
	Std. Deviation	2.13814	27.10752	.77332	.09121	.25428	.15930
	Std. Error of Mean	.87289	11.06660	.31571	.03724	.10381	.06503
	Variance	4.572	734.818	.598	.008	.065	.025
	Mean	-4817	-6.5450	14.3233	.8300	.3817	.1683
	1,00 1	.98	11.11	17.89	.68	.56	.13
	Total N	22	22	22	22	22	22
	Minimum	-13.85	-86.79	12.45	.22	.32	.07
	Maximum	1.74	15.05	17.89	.91	.86	7.00
	Std. Deviation	3.88820	22.37268	1.64187	.18682	.15954	1.46027
	Std. Error of Mean	.82897	4.76987	.35005	.03983	.03402	.31133
	Variance	15.118	500.537	2.696	.035	.025	2.132
	Mean	-1.5632	-8.5609	15.4750	.6982	.5845	.4855
	Total N	28	28	28	28	28	28
	Minimum	-13.85	-86.79	12.45	.22	.11	.05
	Maximum	2.10	21.64	17.89	.91	.86	7.00
	Std. Deviation	3.57901	22.93673	1.56173	.17810	.19738	1.29645
	Std. Error of Mean	.67637	4.33463	.29514	.03366	.03730	.24501
	Variance	12.809	526.094	2.439	.032	.039	1.681
	Mean	-1.3314	-8.1289	15.2282	.7264	.5411	.4175

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Annex 2

Case Summaries^a

		ROA	ROE	ASSETS	DEPOZ_ASSETS	CRED_ASSETS	FP_NIVEL_1
CRO	,00						
Total	N	14	14	14	14	14	14
	Minimum	-5.87	-52.61	12.71	.22	.11	.05
	Maximum	2.10	21.64	17.15	.91	.86	.64
	Std. Deviation	2.03780	18.44212	1.20566	.22987	.24131	.17415
	Std. Error of Mean	.54462	4.92886	.32223	.06144	.06449	.04654
	Variance	4.153	340.112	1.454	.053	.058	.030
	Mean	-4.821	-3.8714	14.5900	.7264	.5100	.1971
1,00							
Total	N	14	14	14	14	14	14
	Minimum	-13.85	-86.79	12.45	.47	.32	.10
	Maximum	1.74	15.05	17.89	.86	.79	7.00
	Std. Deviation	4.57141	26.71147	1.65369	.11419	.14354	1.83192
	Std. Error of Mean	1.22176	7.13894	.44197	.03052	.03836	.48960
	Variance	20.898	713.503	2.735	.013	.021	3.356
	Mean	-2.1807	-12.3864	15.8664	.7264	.5721	.6379
Total	N	28	28	28	28	28	28
	Minimum	-13.85	-86.79	12.45	.22	.11	.05
	Maximum	2.10	21.64	17.89	.91	.86	7.00
	Std. Deviation	3.57901	22.93673	1.56173	.17810	.19738	1.29645
	Std. Error of Mean	.67637	4.33463	.29514	.03366	.03730	.24501
	Variance	12.809	526.094	2.439	.032	.039	1.681
	Mean	-1.3314	-8.1289	15.2282	.7264	.5411	.4175

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Annex 3

Case Summaries^a

		ROA	ROE	ASSETS	DEPOZ_ASSETS	CRED_ASSETS	FP_NIVEL_1
EXPERIENTA	,33						
	Total N	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Minimum	-5.87	-29.45	15.31	.71	.65	.13
	Maximum	-1.58	-15.35	15.37	.79	.67	.13
	Std. Deviation	3.03349	9.97021	.04243	.05657	.01414	0.00000
	Std. Error of Mean	2.14500	7.05000	.03000	.04000	.01000	0.00000
	Variance	9.202	99.405	.002	.003	.000	0.000
	Mean	-3.7250	-22.4000	15.3400	.7500	.6600	.1300
	,50						
	Total N	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Minimum	-2.98	-22.63	13.85	.66	.11	.05
	Maximum	2.10	13.21	15.32	.84	.64	.21
	Std. Deviation	2.54111	18.02100	.73853	.09644	.27622	.08185
	Std. Error of Mean	1.46711	10.40443	.42639	.05568	.15948	.04726
	Variance	6.457	324.756	.545	.009	.076	.007
	Mean	-3.967	-3.6100	14.6267	.7700	.4200	.1200
	,75						
	Total N	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Minimum	-3.10	-52.61	14.06	.58	.67	.11
	Maximum	.18	1.48	16.01	.90	.73	.13
	Std. Deviation	2.31931	38.24741	1.37886	.22627	.04243	.01414
	Std. Error of Mean	1.64000	27.04500	.97500	.16000	.03000	.01000
	Variance	5.379	1462.864	1.901	.051	.002	.000
	Mean	-1.4600	-25.5650	15.0350	.7400	.7000	.1200
	1,00						
	Total N	21	21	21	21	21	21
	Minimum	-13.85	-86.79	12.45	.22	.15	.05

		Maximum	1.74	21.64	17.89	.91	.86	7.00
		Std. Deviation	3.89875	23.23548	1.75342	.19676	.19656	1.49260
		Std. Error of Mean	.85078	5.07040	.38263	.04294	.04289	.32571
		Variance	15.200	539.888	3.074	.039	.039	2.228
		Mean	-1.2248	-5.7548	15.3219	.7167	.5319	.5157
Total	N		28	28	28	28	28	28
		Minimum	-13.85	-86.79	12.45	.22	.11	.05
		Maximum	2.10	21.64	17.89	.91	.86	7.00
		Std. Deviation	3.57901	22.93673	1.56173	.17810	.19738	1.29645
		Std. Error of Mean	.67637	4.33463	.29514	.03366	.03730	.24501
		Variance	12.809	526.094	2.439	.032	.039	1.681
		Mean	-1.3314	-8.1289	15.2282	.7264	.5411	.4175