

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AS AN AUGUMENTATIV FACTOR IN SOCIAL RESILIENCE

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Abstract: *The society is in a turmoil neither because globalization, high technology or immigration crises, but rather from the race of regional (China and Russia) or world power (US) to develop a new strategies to influence the countries. Europe is not bypassed by these phenomena because Russia as a regional actor is trying to create new sphere of influence at its periphery (especially in Baltic States, Poland and Romania). Romania, as NATO and European Union member, is one of the Russia's targets not only because geographically it is in the Russia's proximity, but because it is an area of American's interests. Russia is developing a real hybrid war, using all the line of effort: political, economical, but specially the social one. The social field is covered by propaganda, promoted by mass-media, as a tool of political power. To counter-attack Russia's hybrid war, NATO decided, at the Warsaw Summit to develop some operational lines, one is being strategic communication and the second is related with social resilience. The political, administrative and educational institutions are asked to apply this strategy, to find the way to educate people (almost via mass-media) in what is resilience and more important how it works when it is realized.*

Key words: hybrid war, strategic communication, resilience, education, state.

INTRODUCTION

Whether or not contemporary society is still manifested through political leaders' decisions in a political, economic and military confrontation (between states or alliances) whose purpose is the manifestation of democracy to the detriment of authoritarian state administrations or perhaps vice versa.

Not just the differences in the political approach are contradictory elements but also the way some states tend to defy their area of manifestation in global geography.

It is no secret that today we are witnessing a geopolitical conflict between the US, interested in developing democracy in the eastern states of Europe and Russia, interested in restoring its influence in its former empire (Russian or Soviet alike).

Geopolitics is the manifest result of the awareness of one's own state geography

(and of its neighbors), concerted into an action strategy designed to gain advantages for its own state and prepare it to overcome the struggle for advantages, struggling with other state actors singles or in unions and alliances).

From Mackinder's theories about the fight for the Heartland (Eurasian) control, more than a hundred years have passed, and it seems that the manifestations of the state actors have not changed much.

Kaplan's analysis of the role of geography in the geopolitical arrangements and Friedman's views on US interests in the East of the European continent seem to confirm that political games are being made and are constantly being rebuilt.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Mackinder considered the geographic pivot of the world to be Eurasia, and said that

whoever controls this region has the ability to defeat any maritime power.

They will follow Mahan's theories about the need for the United States to develop a sea basin system (on different continents) to control the seas and oceans of the world, and implicitly the land.

Such theories (even if they were initiated more than a hundred years ago) are still manifest today and note that there is a concern of the maritime powers (especially the United States and the UK) to influence the behavior of Central and Eastern European states east, not to mention that the ultimate goal would be to control Eurasia.

As a reaction to American theories, Aleksandr Dughin [1], analyzing Russia's position in this game, claims that the empires are either thalassocratic or tellurocratic. The first involves the presence of the metropolis and colonies, and the second, the capital and the province on land in general.

Starting from this reality, some specialists believe that on the Eurasian continent Russia was and remains the main representative of tellurocracy, while the United Kingdom (and in the last hundred years US) were the main representatives of the thalassocracy and therefore recommends a balance between the two great powers.

America, however, wants to keep its eastern European countries (especially Poland and Romania), because these countries can be geographically a buffer zone to keep Russia blocked in the land. This is not new behavior because the US has cultivated this kind of relationship (also confirmed by the positive attitude of the states in the East vis-à-vis the Gulf War since 2003).

Here is a rather complicated problem of the need to create a sanitary cord (reinterpreted in a positive sense) that would guarantee that America's interests are first in relation to Western ones, but especially those of Russia.

The theory of the sanitary cord also functioned in the middle of the nineteenth century (at least in the case of the Romanian lands), solving, for a certain

moment in history, the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the limitations of Russian power in the Black Sea and at the mouth of the Danube of the British Empire from the pre-war period) or was a space of maneuver to separate the interests of Austria-Hungary or Germany from Russia (during the two world wars).

Today, the geopolitical choice of Romania is an Atlantic one, fulfilling its role as a health cordon in favor of the US and does not want to be on the side of continentals (i.e. Russia) as a country with an old European identity.

According to the theory of the Russian analyst Dughin, Romania, through this pro-Atlantic behavior, would be a weakening factor for European unity and an element of support for Americanism in Europe.

A brief analysis of Romania's behavior can lead us to the conclusion that the chosen option is not condemnable for both the state and the union.

Not only the continental geography of Romania is important, but also the Black Sea, an inner sea that has become critical in the competition between the West and Russia due to the events of the last years (annexation of the Crimean peninsula, Turkish coup, immigration crisis, etc.).

Russia, through the powerful personality of President Vladimir Putin, plays all possible options, pursuing the isolation (by excluding US influence) and the division of Europe, the establishment of a strategic safety belt (by maintaining in a politico-economic and military chess of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia), the development of a bridgehead in the Black Sea (through the Crimean Peninsula) for later (through the ports and airports of Syria and Cyprus) access to the Mediterranean and then to the oceans of the world.

In order to achieve its first objective of separating and breaking Europe, Russia does not hesitate to use (and cultivate) the leaders of some European countries (such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, but even Germany) and has no restraint in exploiting the economic needs of some countries (such

as Greece, Cyprus and even Hungary) who need strategic Russian investments.

THE HYBRID WAR NEEDS RESILIENCE.

The specific goals pursued by an entity generally depend on hard power, while generic goals are more efficiently achieved by the use of complementary powers, whether diplomatic, economic or social, soft power.

Rapid change of regime and immediate access to state resources calls for military intervention with clearly defined objectives, which will prove to be the most effective solution and even less expensive.

But if it is aimed at redefining alliances and gaining support from the general public, including change in social mindsets and values, then strategies will opt for soft power resources, because it is easier, more efficient and less social tension to attract people to a certain type of social order (democracy, socialism, capitalism, etc.) than to impose it authoritatively.

In the electoral campaign for his current mandate, Vladimir Putin would define for the first time that the use of soft power tools to improve Russia's image abroad is one of his priorities, context in which he remembered the values of Orthodoxy and the strengthening of the status of Russian [2].

Given this behavior of the leader of the Kremlin palace, as well as the actions taken by Russia since 2008 (the war in Georgia) and culminating in 2014 (the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine), it is very difficult to find a solution for the peoples in the vicinity of Russia to be prepared for any possible scenario.

In the opinion specialists, the hybrid character of the new ones security threats must be seen on two plans, first is organizational - both state actors, and non-state actors use threats hybrid when the situation and conditions o require, and second refers to the methods and means - the actors involved use both conventional means, as well as unconventional,

combined depending on the requirements imposed by achieve success.

About the new paradigm of the war, Frank van Kappen states that hybrid war represents a combination of classic war with use new elements. The state that leads one hybrid war, concludes agreements with non-state executors, like fighters, groups of the local population, organizations, the turn is totally denied. These executors can carry out actions that he himself the state would not allow them [4].

Hybrid war, explained in military terms, could be defined as a form by which diplomatic, informational, military and economic dimensions are used in a comprehensive approach to influence the opponent's political, military, economic, social, and informational dimensions.

There is nothing new about how to carry wars in peacetime, proximity wars, carried out through third parties, but it is interesting how the dimensions are developed, used and combined.

Nowadays, it is easy to discover that Russia has developed a true doctrine through which politics and diplomacy have become redemptive weapons in challenging decisions, countering actions, manipulating facts, and ultimately conditioning future decisions in relation to the adversary.

The information dimension involves the use of intelligence structures for misinformation and media and social media manipulation with the sole purpose of reducing the trust of the population in their own political and administrative leadership, by devising their people and their actions.

The military dimension, due to the legendary presence of the special forces of the former militaries, now mercenaries, acts on the adverse armed forces through manipulation or blocking actions, as well as on the population through actions of recruitment, influence, training and use for insurgent actions.

The economic dimension is used to weaken the opponent by influencing markets, especially energy resources.

If we are to refer to the genesis of war hybrid, as a using term, we should believe that the phenomenon refers to the determination period place of the Russian Federation both at the level regional and worldwide.

Thus, the Russian Federation through classical scenarios of conflict maintenance frozen such as the Transdnister one in the Republic of Moldova, Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia is currently using resources as well energy as elements of the hybrid war.

President Putin is convinced that the period of loss of geopolitical and geostrategic positions of the Russian Federation and influence political-international relations in the European space as a result of the expansion of the NATO bloc and of the EU, have to be forgotten, and Russia have to use all the means to achieve the main goal, to be a global power.

The target countries of such a war have at hand the political, military, economic, social and informational elements as reaction formulas.

The most important element to be developed and protected is the social one because if it is weak, then all government actions are weakened.

Decreasing the trust of the population in the government leads to its non-involvement and even to its positioning with the opponent.

At the 2016 Summer Summit in Warsaw, NATO has determined that a comprehensive process is needed to develop the resilience of states in the event of Russia's aggression.

Resilience, defined in general terms, is the capacity of an individual, household, community, country or region to resist, adapt and recover quickly after constraints / pressures and shocks.

ROMANIAN STRATEGY FOR RESILIENCE

Romania has identified in the security documents a series of vulnerabilities given by the geographical position, the state of the economy and the capacity to react to the

structures of the National System of Defense and Public Order and has established that there is an urgent need to develop the capacity to counter the threats hybrids, including sustaining resilience.

The Military Strategy of Romania underlines that resilience implies the ability of the National Security System to resist an attack and to recover from it, developing sufficient capabilities to anticipate and counteract a threat, to ensure victory conditions and optimal solutions to answer.

The main measures to strengthen resilience, not only at military level, are: identifying vulnerabilities and associated risks, developing an interagency decision-making process, civilian training and military support for the measures taken, resources / reserves available.

Faced with these types of threats, where the possibilities for intervention by the authorities are limited, a prepared population with a high level of social resilience can be an important asset, both in limiting the consequences of disasters and in post-traumatic recovery of communities affected.

Romania is also a member of the EU since 2007, and should strengthen the idea that the economic factor will be decisive in the development of popular resistance if our country is involved in a conflict with Russia.

These assumptions become problematic if we think that besides the idea of decisional reason, in society it is necessary to analyze the emotions, not only because they separate individuals as decisions but also because collective emotions are often generating events that we did not imagine them.

Reporting only historical and philosophical arguments, and excluding the human factor from discussion, can be a dangerous approach, because here we have to deal with a psychological complex that is difficult to interpret. If we take a simple look at the multitude of discussion groups in the virtual space, it can easily be noticed that the perception of the community of

believers in a global context in which polarization has reached worrying odds and the last hope of the poor remains faith, . People are in a state of confusion and because the psychology of the Romanian people, that of waiting for a state decision to adopt a certain type of behavior, remains a constant.

The current picture of the psychology of the Romanian people was highlighted in the study by the professor Daniel David in his work on the psychology of the Romanians and emphasizing that: the psychological profile of the surface is in some incomplete segments developed, not expressing the potential we have. Thus, the high potential for cognitive / emotional intelligence, creativity and learning is not exploited.

From the psycho-cultural point of view, the Romanians are looking for social power, but hypocritically, according to a collectivist culture, and then the use of power is done in a feminine paradigm characterized by discussions and seeking consensus, but no concrete plans are reached, and leadership- is often denied due respect.

The Romanians have a repressive and avoided cultural style, which makes them defensive, expressing complexities of inferiority, and if they are compensated they become complex of superiority. The small ones from values such as universalism (concern for the general good), benevolence (benevolence, concern for the well-known ones), hedonism (search for pleasure), stimulation (search for the new) and self-determination (autonomy / independence), demonstrate that the Romanians attach a certain importance to these values, but they seem to do so for a good impression [3].

Once Romania joined NATO and the European Union, we have joined the Western values, but here too we have a complex problem because except Romanians who have a psycho-social profile - collectivist culture, all other states, with different accents, have an autonomous-individualist profile.

The causality of this ethos could be bidirectional and interactive, starting from our history, presence on the periphery of empires, and acting as a battle theater (we have developed defense mechanisms in this context). Thus, the provision for lasting and lasting construction has been diluted, trust in people, especially foreigners has diminished, and indiscipline has become a form of resistance for the weak, to protect the culture from the strong.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION - A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

Strategic communication, by way of organization, influences the political business process, therefore, if a country is successful in implementing strategic communication, it will certainly notice a positive effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. On the contrary, if a country either does not implement a strategic communication system, or implements it in a way that is desirable, it will record a negative effects.

The main objective of strategic communication is to demonstrate the creation and maintenance of the relationship between the country's strategy and the strategic leadership image, on the one hand, and the management of the feedback needed for the country, on the other hand.

To organize and exercise communication management, a new structural approach is required, and it is community orientation. For the time being, communication can use both the target and intermediate political leadership-based structure and the convergence-based and target communities. Converged communities are always latent in the constitution process and represent a combination of at least two of the three types of communities: target or intermediate, permanent or latent communities. Content may be affected by convergence of groups and / or intermediate communities. Convergence is mainly caused by channel convergence.

Taking in consideration that strategic communication main goal is, on the one hand, to develop the thrust on political and military national leadership, in national institution power, and in the other on the international (NATO and EU) engagement in real political and military support if it is needed, the strategy have to cover six stages [5].

First stage should be planed to include communication management as part of an integral strategic political management. This process implies that integrated strategies for preparing the population and the country for resistance and the struggle against an adversary using the political, economic and social dimension are unitary and comprehensive.

Seconde step have to exemplifie how the national strategy should be transformed into a communication strategy. This stage has also demonstrated the importance of people in this process. People represent the primary target community where the leadership has direct and immediate access. Here the important role belongs to the political leaders who have to guarantee that they have a great credit of social trust and also that they can prove that all the resources necessary for a long-term resistance process are assured.

The next step opens the series of three checks or checks and signs of difficult situations. National communication specialists should check if communities understand the national strategy for resilience and/or if the understandable strategy is put into practice by the government. In this step, we need to engage state institutions, presidency and government, and above all their communication tools. Particularly important are the media that will be feed-back both for the perceptions of the population and for the achievements / unrealisations of the institutions.

Stage forth analyzes key positions within the communities of formal and informal leaders and journalists. This step is extremely important because the approach

is long-lasting, with a harder-to-identify feed-back and especially because it presumes selection risks. In a atomized society, where individuals are predisposed to educational activities only if they have benefits, and where the media is more prone to getting the public than to educating the public, finding the vectors is difficult.

In order to achieve a cohesive process, political leaders are called upon to identify the vulnerabilities of society, to clarify their threats and their degree of risk, and to persuade the academic, institutional and media trusts to turn them into real vectors of awareness and education.

The fifth stage targets all target communities and offers a new feedback system. Finally, their views and behaviors determine the real image of resilience, through culture, identity, threats perception and / or community thrust in government.

In this sense, it is necessary to corroborate the results obtained from the perception of danger corroborated with the peer to the potential of the government to withstand the aggression, along with the perception of the possible and necessary European allied or European support.

In stage six, it is possible to check if the strategy is reflected in the expectation of the nation . It is obvious that a channel convergence will result in a high speed of the process.

The final step is extremely important not only for the corrections to be introduced, but also because the insured feed-back will have to straighten some social and governmental realities that influence resilience.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS

Resilience requires knowledge and the belief that what political leaders say is truth, and their desideratum is becoming a national desideratum.

In order to develop trust, it is necessary that those who lead the destiny of states are educated personalities for self-sacrifice in the service of the nation.

The education of society must be directed towards the cultivation of altruism, the transition from material to immaterial, from annoying, everyday life to one of history's builders.

The self-esteem of a people, the recognition of the role of a state and the prestige of a country, are given by the manifestations of the whole, but are seen in the behavior of the elites. If elites do not have the awareness of their own value, if they have no vision, they do not see the interests of the people and the opportunities of history, that state is condemned to isolation.

In society based on technology, but more in the future society based on knowledge, the role of elite education will increase. It is impossible to influence history in favor of your people or in favor of the European community if you are strange to context, do not visualize interests, if you do not imagine what will happen, and especially if you do not have the skills to negotiate what is beneficial to society.

The area of knowledge is diversified, amplified, directed from itself to the others. This knowledge is marked by the master's old age but remains vigorous, clear and corrective, lacking in selfishness or inoculation, meditative and analytical desire, and transformative ideas are enunciated as variants and not necessarily as truism.

This framework does not accept imposture, nor does it have any limitations on

intellectual space, and more so geographically, because here humanity meets its cultural values, here is the progress, in this crucible are put together science, culture and implicitly religion.

In this context, education should focus on the knowledge, appreciation, and evaluation of life, family, moral Christian values, and social ethics as existential axiology.

The perception and manifestation of the need for security is a decisive element in the education of the new generation as it prepares the person for two great challenges, eliminating fear and assuming risks. Fear has an important role in social behavior because it subjects people to it, forces them to rely on authority and, more than that, makes them easy to handle. The educated man will always know his rights and obligations and what is the right relationship with authority. Knowledge of history provides individual political intelligence, brings man into the field of causal analysis, determines him to take realistic solutions to current problems, and helps him to influence the future.

An important role in eliminating the idea of fear is the BOR, which is called to be free, surely and consistently in the relationship with the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, noting clearly that Russia has no right and cannot limit Romanians' freedom of conscience on both sides of the Prut.

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