

DEPLOYABILITY OF ARMED FORCES IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

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Abstract: *The use of a conventional military force is increasingly difficult in today's armed conflicts. "Complex" civil-military force, which is still suffering from the lack of cooperation, is generally preferred. So-called irregular warfare demands different skills of the military forces compared to conventional warfare. Preparation of armed forces to conditions of irregular surroundings requires new approaches to education, training and deployment.*

Keywords: capabilities, irregular environment, irregular warfare

1. Introduction

Education, training and deployment of armed forces present a challenge for many experts in the department of the use of armed force. New problems with the use of armed force for the crisis resolution arise, both at the beginning and course of the crisis.

The question is how to define the use of the armed force in individual parts in conflict spectrum because the determination of the character of the military operation is dependent on it. An effort for completion of established military aim and therein an effort to generate presumptions for completion of a political goal presents the next step in the realisation of the operation.

2. Specific warfare

Even though irregular warfare is an old matter, in theory, modern times have brought completely new attributes into it, and therefore, made it a totally new dimension. Consequently, it becomes a challenge for the whole military community, especially when it comes to preparation of „boots on the ground“.

The context of irregular warfare appears more difficult for civil parts of means for crisis management as well. It is mainly because the core of counterinsurgency is in civil resources and strategies, not in a military operational art and tactical competencies, which are used just for supporting functions.

For the current armed forces, it means the need for implementation of a number of innovations and application of a flexible approach that would allow, if necessary, a fast and effective response to an emergency situation. [7]

Even though the need for the higher amount of soldiers and crew elements trained for counterinsurgency arose, the need for “big war” readiness and use of “heavy weapons” is being vindicated. [6]

From the perspective of a small state, the interests for “small wars” are usually less developed since they are considered as a “remote problem”. Small states are usually orientated on war and other armed forces on their own territory. From time to time, the question of personal freedom is raised, or even the question of life or death through

the prism of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in distant problematic countries, however, in general, it does not have a big impact, especially not on country's own civil personnel.

If it is claimed that irregular warfare is supposed to have a stronger direct link to power fight compared to regular conventional fight; it should have a fundamental impact on the political sphere. It could be a beginning of a revaluation of the main structure of a “forces” in state's arsenal. The “big war” presents an open collusion of states and therefore, presents a traditional “military war”. Irregular warfare is comprised of more dimensions and influences - more “force structures” are incorporated in it. [5]

It is possible to consider these four means for the basic arsenal of policymaking:

- diplomacy,
- military,
- intelligence actions,
- secret actions

Hidden and influencing activities have their position in a global fight for power, or if the state is seriously threatened or occupied. At present, global power is predominantly considered by the ability to influence the decision-making and conduct of other states or actors in international security relations. [4]

The mentioned four means should be taken into consideration when entering an environment of irregular warfare. This raises questions; is there a place for one of the mentioned means in the environment in question before the international forces arrive? If yes, who, where and how? It has to be reminded that civil security forces, as well as that the secret structures of various intelligence organisations are out of the influence of a military forces commander and military operation.

On horizontal line, para-military police dimension is between the means of military force and means of humanitarian help. For the internal security, police - with its many forms, is fifth mean necessary for the existence of a country.

The fundamental triangle of a country with an administration on the top position and military and police forces at the lower positions is the most important dimension of an organised endeavour in irregular warfare and in counterinsurgency. Here, it is necessary to state that the intelligence component with its secret and hidden functions has strong ties with an already mentioned triangle. All of the means have to be firmly managed and supervised

The fact is that the operation is led by police and intelligence services and it is expected that the military forces are a support. Armed forces control the space and protect it against the further attack of irregular forces. The police are organised and start to carry out police work almost immediately. In this moment the biggest difference between forms of use of military and police are shown.

It is very important that the police work well, with the right numbers and experience, and so it is quickly involved in the planning of the operation. The problem is, police organisations usually work on a tactical level; just some parts of police have operational or strategic levels.

Therefore, there is a need for a synchronisation of police units into one singular police force with an adequate structure of management.

Open actions of armed forces and daily diplomacy overlap concurrently in a vertical direction together with structures of the grey area. Here, intelligence organisations and actors of hidden or secret diplomacy with competencies of active actions/special operations are available.

The link between the irregular warfare and warfare with the use of special operations generally illustrates areas of unconventional warfare. This highlights the case of today's discussions about who should be the one to handle the development of capabilities for the unconventional warfare.

This kind of warfare could be the new key to success in irregular warfare. If it is our case, the challenge is to whom and where

should this old-new capacity be assigned and who will have a right to manage these resources and command them within a coalition context. Since even being in command of Special Forces parallel with conventional forces is a difficult issue.

Considering unorthodox techniques and a small insight into activities of Special Forces, the distrust in conventional military expertise, in the area of civil humanitarian activities and not to mention in hidden activities is certainly evident. The key word is trust, and here the very essence is found in activities of irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, special operations and intelligence as well as in other hidden activities of short intelligence targets. [8]

Vertically (from bottom to top) and between the soldiers and people, trust has to be not only present but also cherished, since it is a key factor. The gaining of trust requires time; however, rotation principle of 6-12 months is not helpful. Peacebuilding is “fight” between people with an aim to shape the condition. It is not a fight on a traditional battlefield, where the objective is to destroy the military forces of the opponent. Modern conflicts have a tendency to be a never-ending fight with the effort to retain the power. Multinational armed groups are the core of the fight on one side, and non-state based groups and parties on the other side.

In a sense, irregular warfare with a use of typical guerrilla modus presents only a fight in local conditions and principally on the tactical level. Paradoxically, taking into consideration the regular armed forces, this situation is welcomed. Although, deployed forces do not know the local conditions and personnel of opposition, almost entire absence of supplementation of resources and personnel would not enable the growth of their numbers and increase of competency.[3]

It is up to politicians of today's diplomacy with a worldwide reach to do so, in order to restrict the development and revitalisation of opposition for the purpose of delivery of tools

of power which would eliminate the existing forces. Today's western politicians do not know or do not want to restrict the support of opposition's forces and on the other hand, they still operate armed forces on “day to day” deployment basis with a long commitment. In a sense, the opposition has adapted to it really well so far.

The problem on the irregular battlefield is that it is not static. The fact which is usually commonly shared is that tactical and in a way also operational formations and competencies still stagnate. That is maybe right under an influence of an idea that conventional competencies have an important place for the provision of the traditional armed tool of power.

However, the challenge is to achieve the whole spectrum of capabilities. How it is possible to generate units which are able to provide activities from the typical military (infantry) to clearly civilian. We need training teams for personnel of own security forces and members of elite special forces of “the first category”. These personnel should have the skills and capabilities for unconventional warfare ready for deployment directly to action whenever and wherever it is strategically and operationally needed. [2]

3. Development of armed forces capabilities

Military machinery should be leaded from planning to realisation with the use of civilian sources, which form the majority of “comprehensive” approach. The need for higher adaptability of military and civilian formation for irregular warfare is obvious.

The military has been resolving the function of its structures and system of command and control in it for decades. A similar process has to be applied to the creation of civilian formation, or military-civilian formation. Complex command and control in civilian hands have to present strong and ingenious structure of civilian capabilities. [9]

If that will not be the case, complex

frictions will persist, just like clearly shown in Iraq and Afghanistan and unfounded pressure on military forces will continue. We will try for an action in a hybrid irregular environment with a use of inadequate military force “waiting for civilian assistance”.

The common understanding of multinational and multi-functional dimension of civilian party strengthening will probably take a lot of time. During that period, in every individual country, we will see the separate military function with the different stage of mature thinking and correspondent capabilities for warfare in the irregular environment. It can be said that it will be an uneven narrowing of military scope.

Narrowing down of armed component raises a lot of questions. All services have to probably analyse current attitudes, training and tactics. The military will operate in an environment where the use of infantry, as well as special training units, is expected. It means the units which provide a training of forces in supported/occupied countries. Additional armed police forces (gendarmerie is not part of armed forces) can be part of this training.

Intelligence has to pay bigger attention to analytical training and generally deal with competencies of ISTAR units with an aim to provide action-ready products - all of this with dealing with problems of the collaboration of coalition intelligence. Air and navy forces enter the process as well.

For land forces, during irregular warfare, it is not simply a tactical issue – it has a potential to become a common problem. It can be just a question of time when tactical dimension turns into operational. Navy expedition and logistic effort, and following land and air sources present double-service operations with Special Forces used as the key elements against real irregular opponents.

4. Training for unconventional operations

Organisation and training of military forces for the use of counterinsurgency operations

present a big challenge. Not only when it comes to what to train and how to use the soldiers. The problem is in really small defence forces, which remained in most of the countries in Europe. It seems that deployment in counterinsurgency operations is understood as a general competency such as some infantry units is specialised for mountains, arctic and urban environment and activities of military police.

The question is if units focused solely on this capability will be created. If yes, how big are these units supposed to be - battalions, brigades. If not, conventional brigades/battalions will have to be prepared and trained for this after finishing of training for conventional warfare. Then, the training period for this double capability will have to be long enough. The extent of a training, which is without a doubt necessary to accomplish for the purpose of sustaining of achieved capabilities, is seen as an added problem.

If the land forces are created for both conventional warfare and counterinsurgency, the training of officers will be all the more important. It is in question how to implement it in armed forces of small countries, where the probability of use of this spectrum is low.

The main “security units” for counterinsurgency have to be created and used in combination with police forces (including armed gendarmerie, just like in France). This would also include higher securing of intelligence sources, on which all the operations depend on.

The contribution of armed forces will, therefore, consist of universal infantry units, special units and support units. Headquarters in counterinsurgency has to be established by police with support from the military. However, this will put new requirements on competencies of police command and control and will be above daily working level.

Use of police operation with small military support and its realization directly between

the populations seems to be the most optimal for the counterinsurgency. Achievement of this is probably a long-term vision. Currently, police units do not dispose of the capability of command and control in such operation and in the moment, the only military structure is close to it. If the operation will be controlled by civil, police or military staff has to be decided in the creation of EU/NATO standards.

Irregular warfare presents a problem for general military thinking and de facto for the whole military organisation. Just like the service of public health is organised, trained and equipped for common health problems, the common military organisation is also the same for conventional warfare. Irregular warfare is something special and out of the normal structure, thinking and basic traditions and aims for military units such as it is special for general hospitals to deal with unknown illnesses.

In case of the counterinsurgency, there were no specialists trained or units created. Also, nobody paid attention to this problem in tactics of the after-war period. Materials for the military theory about counterinsurgency and irregular warfare are really shallow and varied.

However, the irregular context for the present is addressed in the transformative process for heightening of expedition competencies of all members. The next step should be “how” it should be done when counterinsurgency “boots on the ground” are deployed on location.

5. Unconventional operation approaches

With an above-mentioned view on future of irregular warfare, some of the unconventional approaches to military operations in the understanding of civilian parameters and complex scope should be introduced. Obvious and hidden activities do not have to be mixed. For understandable reasons, it is not needed to discuss openly (not even as a definition

regarding of own ambition) the whole point of hidden needs.

Rather it belongs under actual sources of “other governmental departments” which will be present there if other nations have such needs and some will probably have them.

This leads us to the need of framing the content of unconventional warfare in a tougher way compared to the original meaning of a concept. We need a comprehensive concept for hidden, secret and also when it is needed, for obvious (on the surface) political, paramilitary and military actions. The whole dimension could be included in one organisation (even though capabilities of shorter or conventional warfare are a contributor of main force). [1]

Two different possible approaches are shaped. It could be about support of unconventional warfare according to new American concept on the civil basis (other nations will strive for it the least). Or the second one could be the building of capabilities of unconventional warfare within structures of forces in special operations, where initial sources could be already found. The second approach seems more probable.

Extension of “package of coalition force” which can be deployed and used in the context of irregular warfare as an expedition force expects the development of at least three different approaches.

First is the most conventional; however the most developed compared to today’s variants. It is conventional in a sense that it is about a use of coalition group, operating under UN/NATO/EU management. It is estimated that more competent approach of soldiers and more complex staff work for multifunctional cooperation in counterinsurgency operations, which is a key to the population.

Adaptation to capabilities for unconventional warfare is predicted from the core of unit forces of special operations, even though they will still have a narrow-

profile focus. The continuing trend of mixing civilian intelligence organisations with units of special operations still presents a coordination challenge for force commander. Hidden actions are not within capabilities or mandate of commander.

The second approach is developed by common force, which strategically, operationally and tactically relies on common doctrine for counterinsurgency. Military forces would be probably developed into the oriented core of infantry units. The civilian component is clearly lacking. The need for forces of special designation is obvious. Commander has clear resources for traditional unconventional warfare under his command. Whether the capabilities of secret actions should be included, not included or supported depends on the opinion of coalition members about advantages or risks.

The third approach is the most revolutionary one, and use of obvious, secret and hidden shaping phases for attaining of the final condition is expected. The use of aggregation in which the core is

formed by police and is backed up with immediate armed contribution from afar is an assumption in this case.

6. Conclusions

The military problem of irregular warfare is multidimensional. The core of the problem is in restricted theoretical apparatus and traditional military approach to this form of war as well as the need for new military means and resources. This approach was constantly neglected despite repeated experiences related to military endeavor in the irregular environment around the world. The described approaches should be perceived as possible examples, not real alternatives. Probably neither of them, as they are explained above, will be applied in real world. Anyhow, the questions asked on how to improve capabilities for counterinsurgency operations are waiting for military answers and political and strategic decisions. Last but not least, the level of unconventional military capabilities is also expecting a discussion within a military system.

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