

Original Contributions - Originalbeiträge

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## Bridging Heterodox Views on Language and Symbols: Gilbert Durand's *Imaginaire* and Mark Johnson's *Image Schemata*

### Introduction

In recent decades, there has been a great deal of progress in the research concerning our brain and how it 'images' reality. The fact that 'imaging' may also be at the core of logic or language, traditionally considering purely abstract and conceptual tools, transforms images into a form of knowledge. In this sense, there are some important theories on the study of images and imagination that have not yet been linked to embodied cognition. This paper analyzes Gilbert Durand's<sup>1</sup> anticipations to Mark Johnson's theories about imagination and the formation of meaningful structures because, to my mind, the theoretical ground of Durand's model is of great importance in analyzing literature (and other arts) within a cognitive frame, to which Durand would have unconsciously contributed. For the purposes of this paper, I am using a comparative methodology that will contrast Durand's anthropological thesis about symbolism and Johnson's cognitive approach to language. The aim of this comparison is twofold: first, to show that the use of different terms to study the same phenomena does not alter commonly accepted positions in important theories regarding human representative tools and second, to bridge concepts from different research fields in the structural analysis of the roots of human language and symbolic representation. These aims are based on the rediscovery of Durand's contributions of the physical and perceptual basis of meaning and symbolization processes.

Relatively recent approaches have given attention to the role played by bodily sensations and perceptions in language and symbolism; many of them give relevance

<sup>1</sup> Gilbert Durand was a French specialist in myth-criticism and symbolic anthropology. He was a disciple of the philosopher Gaston Bachelard, from whom he inherits his views on the importance of space in the study of artistic creation. Durand was also a member of the Circle of Eranos founded by Jung and, as a consequence, a practitioner of literary, mythological and cultural criticism, which has been mostly deemed unorthodox due to the epistemological distance that the members of this Circle establish against the predominant rational materialism in the twentieth-century scientific disciplines. The Circle of Eranos provided an importance to imagination and images, which were at odds with traditional Western thought and its consideration of imagination as an inferior means of knowledge.

to the physical nature of cognitive phenomena as Durand did. This is the case of Mark Johnson's ideas on embodied cognition and his approach to language. One of Johnson's main works in regard to cognitive linguistics, entitled *The Body in the Mind* (1987), aims to demonstrate how the semantic meaning of words depends on preconceptual and non-propositional elements. Although these elements are not explicitly bound to the body, there are scattered references to the basic rule of the body in the process of meaning and symbolization.

My analysis of the similarities between the views of Durand and Johnson is structured in two sections: in the first one, I affirm that 'image' is a means of knowledge following the reasoning of both Durand and Johnson, and I also comparatively discuss the notion of 'image schemata' by Johnson and that of 'axiomatic scheme' by Durand interpreting them as gestalt structures. This is a clear case of terms that could coalesce as they describe the same phenomena under very similar categories. In the second section, I illustrate the relationship between embodiment and the process of symbolization and meaning as outlined in the theories of Durand and Johnson. The relation of the two theoretical perspectives will help to highlight the relevance of Durand's anthropological regimes of the *imaginaire*<sup>2</sup> for the literary, anthropological and cultural criticism, which is explained in the last section. His model of studying symbols is extensible to the analysis of arts, such as literature (García Berrio, 1994, 635) and painting (García Berrio, 2009), as we will see later on.

### Images and Schemes: Theoretical Resemblances in the Accounts of Mark Johnson and Gilbert Durand

A good part of Johnson's embodied cognition deals with the notion of 'image schemata'. Images play a crucial role in the emergence and consolidation of knowledge. This idea is radically different from what was claimed by classic Western epistemology and its derisive consideration of images and imagination, which were thought to be less valid than *logos* and 'disembodied' reasoning. In recent decades, this epistemological restraint has been vanishing, and the importance of images has grown in relevance. I consider, together with Gamoneda (2015, p. 7), that *analogos*<sup>3</sup> can be useful to achieve knowledge in those cases in which *logos*

<sup>2</sup> I would like to specify that the term *imaginaire* is used in French here. It means a set of imaginary symbols produced by a human being.

<sup>3</sup> *Analogos* here makes references to the process of creating knowledge in science by means of imaginative structures that stress the similarities between two different objects, with one of them being an object of scientific study. What I am stating here, following Gamoneda's ideas, is that analogical thinking can be useful (if not unavoidable) for imagining objects and concepts as a means for creating knowledge about them, especially when there is an urge to overcome the limitations of *logical* enquiry, made by propositional ideas developed in a coherently connected linear way. For instance, the solar system image used to represent and understand the relational connection between electrons around the nucleus of an atom is a useful analogy to *imagine* the objects of study and, as a consequence, to progress in our knowledge about them.

do not help. This idea is partially in sync with Johnson's findings about the value of images in embodied schemes, which are present even in purely formal logical deductions (1990, p. 39).

Johnson's notion of image schemata dates back to Kant: even though Kant is one of the 'objectivist' thinkers who are responsible for propagating Cartesian dualism, it is true that the philosopher certainly approached imagination in an innovative fashion, since he understood *schemata* as 'non-propositional structures of imagination' (1990, p. 19) able to 'connect concepts with percepts' (1990, p. 22). Referring to Kant, Johnson defines *schemata* as recurring patterns structuring our actions, perceptions and conceptions. Schemata 'emerge as meaningful structures for us, chiefly at the level of bodily movements through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions' (Johnson, 1990, p. 29); they are structures preceding and enabling perception at the same time (Escobedo Bermúdez, 2017, p. 405). New meanings, according to Johnson (1990, 170), come from these structures when they are activated by imagination in a process of 'projection', a concept that will later be used by Turner (2014) to explain *blending* as the origin of ideas. Imagination then fills the skeleton structure of the schemata in order to understand and *mean* reality. A very similar process had been described by Durand explaining how images and symbols 'constellate' axiomatic schemes derived from bodily experiences. By way of example, Durand sets copulation movements and digestion, both kinaesthetic in their nature, as sources of the production of schemata during the nocturnal regime of images, which will be explained in the next section.

One of the most relevant points of Johnson's description of image schemata has to do with their gestalt nature. He states (1990, p. 170) that schemata are 'image' structures guiding our understanding of reality. These schemata build the basis for further 'imagining', i.e. allow the projection of these structures into a network creating meaning. Different schemata enable different ways of connecting ideas. These schemata are forms with an internal structure that allows the creation of inferences and their connection with aspects of our experience. The structural nature of Durand's axiomatic schemes enables the configuration of images and the classification of their apparently immense diversity in a reduced number of categories. Johnson's and Durand's schemata are similar because they build a recurrent basic pattern. According to Durand, this recurring pattern can be grouped in 'constellations' of images by means of homology (Durand, 1981, pp. 37–38). Therefore, the products of the human *imaginaire* can be classified in a reduced number of homologous structures. One of the most relevant qualities of these structures is their capacity of projection, which is essential to many phenomena studied by cognitive theories. For Johnson, projection activates the metaphoric power of image schemata, although his view is neither complete nor

exhaustive since it does not include all metaphoric phenomena, as Escobedo Bermúdez points out (2017, p. 411).

A further similarity between the notions of schemata in the works of Durand and Johnson has to do with dynamism. According to Johnson, schemata are *plans*, since they are ‘malleable structures of perception and motor programs’ (Johnson, 1990, p. 21). Schemata need to be dynamized in order to be functional, to form new images and, ultimately, to comprehend reality. In Durand’s opinion (1981, p. 26), imagination organizes schemata dynamically in order to homogenize the representations resulting from the process of projecting internal schemes onto reality. As his mentor Gaston Bachelard suggested, Durand believes that we should abandon the aim of finding the universal and unilateral meaning of symbols and study instead the trajectory drawn by them in the *imaginaire*. Focussing on the trajectory highlights the dynamism at the base of symbols; in other words, the basic scheme and its projection imply a movement that is derived from the body. The same idea is to be found in Johnson’s theory, attesting that schemata are directly derived from the perceptions of bodily movement and they define the basic directions of our perception. Some examples of the most relevant movement schemata are the PATH, the FROM–TO (Johnson, 1990, p. 28) and the IN–OUT orientation schemes (1990, p. 32). The latter underlies many linguistic structures, like ‘I spoke my feelings out’ or ‘The idea came to my head suddenly’. The experiential basis of this in/out orientation relies on the bodily experience of perceiving our bodies as containers with boundaries (Johnson, 1990, p. 22). This experiential basis is also found in the development of the idea of the *self* and the idea of *you* (Turner, 2014). However, long before Johnson and Turner, the experiential basis had already been used by Bachelard to define his ‘axiomatic metaphors’, on which Durand based his ‘axiomatic schemes’ (Tejo Hernández, 2015, p. 39) when studying symbolism. According to Durand, symbols are the result of the process of dynamizing bodily perceptions into their corresponding motion schemes. Durand conceives that bodily experiences produce first archetypes (evidencing his attention to Jungian theories), which are then considered as joining points between imaginary and rational processes (Durand, 1981, p. 55). Archetypes are the most general (or ‘naked’) structures, and in the process of symbol emergence, they are transformed into schemes, which still maintain an abstract nature, although they are the product of bodily perception. Finally, following the archetype and the scheme, the symbol itself is the last step in the process of materializing bodily perceptions into images, which are completely perceptible and concrete. Durand highlights (1981, p. 55) that the symbol is the most fragile element in the chain of materializing the archetype because it is a sensible object that has been more prone to transformation throughout history. Symbols change through time, they evolve and new ones are created, while schemata and archetypes are limited and fixed.

## The Body in Symbolic Imagination

The theories of Durand and Johnson overlap in their claim that imagination plays a role in the construction of human knowledge. Durand regrets the predominance of an iconoclastic attitude in Western epistemology, since images were considered as a source of erroneous and misled thinking (Durand, 1981, p. 17). In Western tradition, the *imaginatio vera*, i.e. the ‘good’ imagination produced by resorting to archetypes considered to be eternal (Rivière, 2006, p. 220), are secondary in comparison with the relevance conferred to *logos*. Nevertheless, today imagination has regained the position it deserves in the formation of rational thinking. Around the eighties, the decade when Johnson started to put forward his theories, the biologists Varela and Thomson had already stated that imagination plays a determining role in constructing knowledge in terms of memory, judgment, projection and creativity (Gambino & Pulvirenti, 2018, p. 104). In this innovative atmosphere, Johnson (1990, xxvi) proposed his theory of embodied imagination rooting it on the slippery grounds of preconceptual and the prelogical, a process analogous to Durand’s purpose of overcoming the rupture between rationality and imagination (Durand, 2007, p. 95). What Durand calls ‘pre-reflective’ is comparable to Johnson’s notion of ‘preconceptual’, another coincidence in terminology explained by their emergence in different disciplines (anthropological symbolism and philosophy of language), which apparently prevents them from being coalesced, although both of them are useful for analyzing similar phenomena.

This integrative approach to imagination and reason matches the relationship between body and symbols. Some scholars understand that Durand sets the ground for a ‘psychophysiology’ that studies the action of the whole body in the constitution of symbols (Tejo Hernández, 2015, p. 43). One of the consequences of this theoretical perspective is the belief in the existence of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified (Tejo Hernández, 2015, p. 36), which is at odds with the arbitrary bond assumed by Saussure at the dawn of structuralism. This seems to be the core of idea of Durand (1981, p. 375) when he disagrees with the structuralist Roland Barthes, who deemed symbols and myths as subsidiary to conceptual language (Barthes, 1980, p. 242). Durand disregards Barthes’ view of the literal meaning as chronologically previous to figurative meaning. This criticism puts Durand in some way close to deconstructive claim by Derrida (1978) about meaning and language, which was developed in 1967, two years before the publication of *Les structures anthropologiques de l’imaginaire* by Durand.

In line with this view, after rejecting the first Saussurean principle regarding the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign when studying symbolism, Durand (1981, p. 27) proceeds to reject also the second: the linearity of the signifier. In his

terms, the symbol is not developed in just one dimension, as conceptual language is, neither do symbols form chains made by sequential units. By virtue of this non-linear quality, symbols do not conform to logical thinking, which is characterized by the concatenation of propositions in a coherent chain. This reasoning connects with the imagistic nature underlying language according to Johnson, since for this philosopher, many semantic phenomena rely on non-propositional structures, as we mentioned before.

Linearity is also rejected in Johnson's characterization of image schemata. The reason for this is the codependency between bodily perceptions and the internal structures of image schemata, since images (like symbols) are not linear signs but the result of a series of homogeneous perceptions of phenomenal reality. In his opinion, there is a clear relation intertwining human imagination and body physicality, a statement proved to be true: today, we positively know that linguistic production is enabled by the activation of brain areas devoted to both perception and movement (Faschilli, 2012).

### **Reviewing the Regimes of the *Imaginaire* by Durand**

Durand approaches a kind of psychophysiology when he formulates his proposal of perceptual schemes, or axiomatic schemata, governing the consolidation of every human symbol. He reduces these schemata to two 'anthropological regimes' (diurnal and nocturnal), around which infinite images (or symbols) converge. In this sense, there is a clear difference from Johnson's theory, which does not establish a finite number of image schemata operating in human imagination.

Durand's regimes are rooted in the 'dominant postures' studied by the School of Leningrad, formed by W. Bechterev, J.M. Oufland and A. Oukhtomsky,<sup>4</sup> among others, who at the same time based their theoretical grounds on Ivan Pavlov's studies on animal behaviour. They believed that there were two dominant postures that are manifested in the human beings since their birth: position and nutrition, both of them described by the Russian physiologist Oukhtomsky (1925, p. 26). These two basic complexes of sensorimotor reflexes would feed human symbolism. The position posture has to do with verticality and horizontality and is experienced by the baby, especially during its efforts to achieve the vertical position. The nutrition posture is manifested in all the lip and head movements required for breastfeeding and swallowing, and it is caused by hunger or other external stimuli. Together with these two dominant postures, there is a third

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<sup>4</sup> The reflexologist theories on which Durand grounds his argumentation are partially outdated. The works by these reflexologists have not been object of new editions in the recent decades, so their sources are scarce. I quote them by using the work of Durand (1981) himself, who does not specify the publishing house editing the volumes, although he mentions the place of publication: Moscow and Leningrad. This is the reason why this information is missing in the bibliography of this paper.

one described by Oufland (1925), which is named 'copulative'. It has a cyclical nature, is affected by hormone secretion and governs the motor system involved in coupling. This system is not dependent on local nerves but on the 'erotization of the nervous system', as Morgan (1949, p. 553) explains. The intimate experience of coupling and the rhythm associated with it determines symbols derived from this postural dominant. As I will detail later, these rhythmical experiences determine images based on cycles and time, like the tree, the son, the seed or the moon. Although the theories by the School of Leningrad are outdated today, it is surprising to observe how Durand's works, based partially on them, are revaluated, thanks to the similarity of his ideas and nowadays positions of cognitivism, as it is being explained here.

The idea behind the term 'dominant' is the prevalence of efforts made in order to maintain the posture associated with it and their implied sensorimotor requirements. When a subject is taking one of the dominant postures, he/she inhibits and coordinates the rest of the motor reflexes. In the position dominant, the effort to attain verticality subordinates the reflexes that are not central to keep it. Wallon (cfr. Bachelard, 1948, p. 364) reminds us the extraordinary effort that every child has to make in order to achieve the vertical position, and he also understands that the notion of verticality as a stable axis of things is related to this postural effort. In the nutrition-dominant, the postures which coordinate the remaining reflexes are swallowing and defecating. Both also require a learning process from children of an early age. Even the foetus learns to swallow amniotic liquid during its gestation. The baby has to learn how to combine breathing and swallowing to relieve its hunger adequately. Finally, in the sexual dominant, movements and reflexes needed to couple dominate the others.

These three dominants correspond to two 'anthropological regimes' that Durand finds in every culture. Their universality is rooted in these universally shared position experiences. The first anthropological regime is the diurnal one. Durand finds that the position dominant requires lighted and visual matters and calls for distinction, separation of objects and, eventually, purification. The core symbols associated with these dominants are convex and represent weapons like arrows and swords. This regime is very much dependent on light and the experience of space. The presence of light consolidates the existence of space surrounding the subject, since any subject develops his/her position in relation to space. According to García Berrio and Hernández Fernández (1988, p. 154), one of the main explorations carried out by babies has to do with the extension of their hands towards a blurry space, full of strange objects placed at poorly calculated distances. The postural exploration of the space requires the distinction of diurnal light.



The second and third dominants govern the nocturnal regime of images, divided into two subregimes: digestive and copulative. On the one hand, sensations caused by the descent of digested food determine images dealing with the experience of darkness, not only with the annihilation of space and the confusion derived from it but also with mystical internalization. Symbols depending on these sensations have a concave structure such as chests, caves, cups, shields, and any container item. This regime is obviously opposed to the diurnal since the experience of night and the abolition of light is the central matrix for the construction of these kinds of symbols. As stated by García Berrio and Hernández Fernández, in the nocturnal regime, the dissolution of light causes a non-space consciousness in which the subject feels the annihilation of space together with “the shapeless density of universal night” (García Berrio & Hernández Fernández, 1988, p. 154). While the diurnal regime provides the vital safety of perceived space and forms, extreme experiences of the night lead to the annihilation of one’s self into shapeless and boundless darkness. On the other hand, the sexual dominant governs the copulative subregime, concerning rhythmical gestures whose natural model is sexuality, which is projected even to seasonal rhythms reflected in astronomical objects. The materialization of this rhythmical experience gives birth to symbols such as the wheel, the flint lighters and the potter’s wheel (Durand, 1981, p. 49) and also symbols that manifest biological cycles, like trees or vegetable wands (Durand, 1981, p. 267). All of these forms have in common their possible reduction to rhythmical intervals, shapes or sounds, and they also have a nocturnal quality that contrasts with the digestive dominant since time is abolished here by means of procreation and reproduction. A more detailed explanation of the nocturnal quality of the copulative dominant goes beyond the limits of this paper but can be read in Durand’s works (cfr. Durand, 1981, pp. 267 ff.)

After presenting Durand’s classification of the dominants, it is clear that a network of primary gestures rooted in bodily motor processes underlies the basis of every symbolic process. Durand refines his theory defining sharp distinctions between movement and schemes that would be very similar in their basic structure, such as fall and descent. Both have a vertical trajectory drawn by a vector and are different, in appearance, in regard to the speed of the position change. However, symbols and images of falling would belong to the diurnal regime, as they imply the existence of a particular space in which the fall develops, whereas images of descent would belong to the digestive subregime.

In order to clear the terms of this theory applied to symbols and mythology, we will examine the fall of Icarus. Falling from the sky implies a movement towards the ground (up to down), and it determines a sudden change in Icarus’ body. Durand’s dominant posture meets here the concept of counterforce described by Johnson (1990, p. 46) since Icarus’ body meets an element (the ground)



blocking his trajectory, causing his death. However, a mythological descent into the underworld, like that of Orpheus, implies the same trajectory (up to down), but it overcomes the counterforce (the ground), thanks to the gestalt of enablement, explained by Johnson (1990, p. 47) in his work. The hero can enter the underworld by virtue of some special ability (in the case of Orpheus, his musical skills) or after accomplishing some task. The position changes at a very different speed from the fall, and the caves and caverns where an underworld is normally situated connote something different from the ground on which Icarus falls: it is earth from which wisdom can grow, whereas the ground of Icarus is synonymous of punishment because knowledge acquisition is impossible. The gestalt scheme of enablement, as described by Johnson (1980, p. 47), lacks an actualized force vector, but it is formed by a potential force vector and a potential path of motion, which is free from barriers or blocking counterforces. This gestalt scheme sustains the image of descent and could also underlie in many symbols of the nocturnal digestive regime that connote wisdom, like the well, as described in the third meaning given for the word in *Dictionary of Literary Symbols* by Chevalier and Gheerbrant (2007, p. 850). Although the *Dictionary* does not refer to cognitive studies, it draws conclusions that could be clarified resorting to modern cognitive theories and Durand's views. We have to consider that movement in these symbols is obviously metaphoric, but it has a physical basis, like in Durand's 'dominants' and later in Johnson's 'schemes'.

The metaphoric potential of these basic structures provides the high degree of complexity of Durand's symbols classification. Icarus' fall is actually a literal fall, as we know from the myth, but there are moral consequences deduced from it. Ambition (or the desire of 'reaching too high') might have the opposite effect: falling to the ground (the lowest place), self-destruction and even death. Fall is, therefore, one of the first bodily experiences felt by the new-born baby. This primary experience could also contribute to the association of fall with fear, an association also observed by Bachelard (1948, p. 350). He believed that the image of falling condenses the most fearful aspect of time: the 'destructive time' (Bachelard, 1948, p. 352). Durand (1981, p. 107) refers to explanation of myths by Krappe (1952, p. 287) to claim that falling is the basic motor experience behind many images developing moral ideas. The scheme of falling acts as a punishment in a number of moral systems. This scheme is opposed to another symbol derived from the position dominant: the ladder, which commonly means spiritual ascension (Durand, 1981, p. 119). We find climbing steps in biblical tales like Jacob's ladder, but they are also present in frequent mountain climbs and pilgrimages undertaken to test not only the pilgrim's physical strength but also his/her will and determination to approach the divine. This connection between high places and the divine could also be explained in terms of the spatial orientation metaphors, such as GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN or VIRTUE IS UP

and DEPRAVITY IS DOWN, described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 16) in their work, which also provides a coherent model to analyze myths of fall similar to the unfortunate story of Icarus.

### **Restoring the Body in the Symbol**

In conclusion, Durand's theory about the bodily root of symbol construction seems to allow on an anthropological basis the connection of linguistic expressions to motor perceptions. This is the same basic concept on which Johnson's cognitive theory about language seems to be grounded. Moreover, in the field of modern semiotics, González de Ávila (2015, p. 181) points out that bodily experiences, such as emotion and cognition, coalesce in the first stages of the production of meaning, which occurs in articulated language and symbolism as well. Mark Johnson also draws a similar conclusion: 'Before abstract thinking, before reasoning and speech, there is emotion' (cfr. Escobedo Bermúdez, 2015, p. 277). There is a line in semiotics connecting this cognitive approach, which blends language with bodily experience, a line that can be traced back to German Romanticism (Gambino & Pulvirenti, 2018, 22). Some philosophers of this movement aimed to widen, correct or even demolish the body/mind dualism that was so relevant for traditional Western epistemology since Descartes and Kant. By way of illustration, Baumgarten (1982, p. 176) developed a theory of representation that claimed that the 'bottom of the soul' relates with the body and therefore the human being is able to represent the universe in accordance to the position of his/her body.

In conclusion, bodily perception is intended to be the basis of language, if we follow the cognitive approach applied by Johnson, as well as bodily positions explain the formation of symbols in Durand's anthropological theory. We have seen here how two important theorists basically agree on the bodily grounds active during the formation of linguistic and symbolic processes, although they resort to different terminologies. In Durand's view, as Tejo Hernández (2015, p. 45) says, imagination and images are not mere ornaments for human beings and constitute the very basis of logical thinking, like modern cognitive approaches tend to confirm. It has taken decades for orthodox scholars to accept some of the propositions of heterodox accounts about imagination, feelings, language and symbols. The gap between research fields and terminology can be filled only by comparing the basic ideas and theories like in the case we examined here of Durand and Johnson.

The bridging idea in anthropology and cognitive studies is that the body is the base of language and symbol formation, which also raises the very daring question whether this relation between perception and movement is actually a neural correlation. Would the contemplation of certain symbols activate motor areas of the brain that were responsible for the emergence of these symbols when they

were created? This could possibly give new therapeutic clues about the use of symbols. Amy Cuddy proved how keeping certain nonverbal ‘power postures’ and expressing self-confidence and capability during a short time lapse raise the level of testosterone and decrease cortisol in saliva samples (Cuddy, Carney, & Yap, 2010). Before her research, it was believed that feelings and emotions (like feeling powerful or weak) determined nonverbal language and body postures, but Cuddy proved that nonverbal language can also modify our attitude and provide, in the long term, a more solid sense of self-confidence or weakness. ‘These findings suggest that embodiment extends beyond mere thinking and feeling, to physiology and subsequent behavioral choices’, she claims (Cuddy et al., 2010). Following Cuddy’s experiments, I suggest that the contemplation of certain symbols might activate the motor processes underlying the origin of their creation. Research done in the field of mirror neurons could perhaps give us more clues in the future.

### Summary

This paper aims to bridge anthropological and cognitivist research undertaken by Gilbert Durand and Mark Johnson, who studied the phenomenon of meaning making in a similar way, although they had to use different terminology as their disciplines demanded. Durand established systematization for analyzing symbolism by taking into account the position of the body and the perceptions determining the underlying schemata of symbols. Two decades later, Mark Johnson described image schemata as *gestalts* having an internal structure derived from bodily perceptions. Owing to these similarities, a comparison between Durand and Johnson’s theories is offered first. In the second place, I reviewed the cognitive value of the anthropological regimes of *imaginaire* described by Durand. During the analysis, the terminology used by these theorists (like ‘image schemata’ or ‘axiomatic schemata’) was comparatively analyzed to find common ground between their positions. In conclusion, the need for recovering theories of imagination proposed by heterodox scholars like Durand is highlighted, since they anticipate the role of images and imagination not only in language, as Johnson demonstrated, but also in the formation of anthropologically relevant symbols, which are of interest for the analysis of literature and other arts.

**Keywords:** Gilbert Durand, Mark Johnson, image schemata, embodiment, *imaginaire*.

## Die Verbindung heterodoxer Auffassungen über Sprache und Symbole.

### Gilbert Durand’s *Imaginaire* und Mark Johnson’s *Image Schemata*

#### Zusammenfassung

In diesem Beitrag sollen anthropologische und kognitive Forschungen von Gilbert Durand und Mark Johnson zusammengeführt werden. Beide untersuchten das Phänomen der Sinnbildung in ähnlicher Weise, obwohl sie im Rahmen ihrer Disziplinen unterschiedliche

Terminologien verwenden mussten. Durand führte zur Analyse der Symbolik eine Systematisierung ein, wobei er die Bedeutung des Körpers und der Wahrnehmungen, die die zugrunde liegenden Symbol-Schemata bestimmen, einbezog. Zwei Jahrzehnte später beschrieb Mark Johnson Bild-Schemata als Gestalten mit einer, aus körperlichen Wahrnehmungen abgeleiteten, inneren Struktur. Auf Grund dieser Ähnlichkeiten wird zunächst ein Vergleich zwischen Durand's and Johnson's Theorien angeführt. Danach überprüfe ich den kognitiven Wert des von Durand beschriebenen anthropologischen Regelwerks *imaginaire*. Im Lauf der Analyse wird die Terminologie, die von beiden Theoretikern verwendet wird (wie "image schemata" oder "axiomatic schemata") verglichen, um Gemeinsamkeiten in ihren Positionen zu finden. Schließlich wird die Notwendigkeit hervorgehoben, Imaginationstheorien von heterodoxen Forschern wie Durand wieder zu entdecken, da diese, wie Johnson gezeigt hat, die Rolle von Vorstellungskraft und Phantasie in der Sprache vorwegnahmen, aber auch der Herausbildung anthropologisch relevanter Symbole, die für die Analyse von Literatur und anderen Künsten von Interesse sind.

**Schlüsselwörter:** Gilbert Durand, Mark Johnson, Bildschemata, Verkörperung, *imaginaire*.

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