

**‘The Value of Infused Love: Nygren, Brümmer and Aquinas on *Agape* and *Caritas*’**

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**THE VALUE OF INFUSED LOVE**  
**Nygren, Brümmer and Aquinas on *Agape* and *Caritas***

*Marcel Sarot*

***Eros and Agape***

To what extent is love self-seeking? On the romantic ideal of love, love is completely disinterested. Probably to his own surprise, to St Paul belongs the honour of formulating the main creed of this ideal:

Love is kind and patient,  
never jealous, boastful,  
proud, or rude.  
Love isn't selfish  
or quick tempered.  
It doesn't keep a record  
of wrongs that others do.  
Love rejoices in the truth,  
but not in evil.  
Love is always supportive,  
loyal, hopeful,  
and trusting.  
Love never fails! (1 Corinthians 13: 4–8a CEV)

Triggered by Dawkins's concept of the selfish gene, on the other hand, evolutionary biologists often seem to suppose that self-interest is the ultimate engine of all behaviour, including love.<sup>1</sup> Economists and psychologist have, on various grounds, argued the same, and have shown that partner choice, for instance,

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ross Buck, "The Genetics and Biology of True Love: Prosocial Biological Affects and the Left Hemisphere", *Psychological review* 109/4 (2002), 739–744 (741–742).

seems to be motivated by self-interest. The connection between self-interest and love has long been noticed; that self-interest plays a role in erotic love was a theme already in Plato.<sup>2</sup>

Some theologians unhesitatingly apply to God *all* aspects of human love, including self-interest and even the pursuit of sexual relief. The most extreme example that I have come across is that of the British Roman Catholic Theologian Murdoch Dahl. He argues:

If it is legitimate to use analogy in talking about God, it seems inescapable to me that we should admit that God is a 'sexual' God. Sex is his invention; it must say something about his nature. ... The orgasmic experience ... is the most exquisite physical experience anyone can have ... , ... heavenly bliss. I use the word 'heavenly' advisedly. ... God is a sexual God. If a 'big bang' started the universe, as most astro-physicists now claim, then I believe it may be described, without irreverence or salaciousness, as God's mighty ejaculation.<sup>3</sup>

Fortunately, few theologians have displayed this degree of bad taste in their characterization of God. But the idea that God is motivated by self-interest is not alien to theology. The Reformed theologian Richard Mouw, for instance, claims that:

Needless to say, from a Reformed perspective, the kinds of objections that can be lodged against psychological egoism as a general theory of *human* motivation do not apply when adapted as an account of the divine psyche. God has every right in the universe to think exclusively in terms of divine self-interest. So, if God's recognition of God's basic desire for self-glorification turns out to be best understood in terms of God's complete self-absorption, so be it.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Vincent Brümmer, *The Model of Love*, Cambridge: CUP, 1993, 110–118.

<sup>3</sup> Murdoch Dahl, *Daughter of Love*, Worthing: Churchman Publishing, 1989, 277–278, 280.

<sup>4</sup> Richard J. Mouw, *He Shines in All That's Fair: Culture and Common Grace*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001, 63. More on divine self-interest in Sandra L. Gravett, Karla G. Bohmbach, F.V.

The majority of the Christian tradition, however, has always asserted that God's love is disinterested and self-giving, not self-interested. This has been nicely articulated by C.S. Lewis in the Introduction to his *The Four Loves*. There, Lewis distinguishes between need-love and gift-love:

The typical example of Gift-love would be that love which moves a man to work and plan and save for the future well-being of his family which he will die without sharing or seeing; of the second, that which sends a lonely or frightened child to its mother's arms. ... Divine Love is Gift-love. The Father gives all He is and has to the Son. The Son gives Himself back to the Father and gives Himself to the world, and for the world to the Father, and thus gives the world (in Himself) back to the Father too.<sup>5</sup>

So the love of God is pure gift-love. As often, Lewis is perceptive, not original. The distinction between need-love and gift-love is indebted to, if not identical with, Anders Nygren's classic distinction between *agape* and *eros*. *Eros* is the desire for an absent good that I need in order to obtain happiness, *agape* the gift of oneself in service to the other. In his analysis of *eros*, Nygren draws on Plato. *Eros* is born out of a lack and strives for a good: it desires beauty, goodness, friendliness, warmth, etc. According to Plato, we love other persons for the sake of the goods we can acquire through them: we love a physician, the rich for the sake of wealth, the strong for the sake of support. This means that we do not love people for the sake of themselves, but for the sake of the goods that they bring with them.<sup>6</sup> For the concept of *agape*, on the other hand, Nygren draws on St Paul.<sup>7</sup> While *eros* is an upward movement, *agape* comes down. *Eros* is

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Greifenhagen & Donald C. Polaski, *An Introduction to the Hebrew Bible: A Thematic Approach*, Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008, 453.

<sup>5</sup> C.S. Lewis, *The Four Loves*, Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, <sup>27</sup>1989, 7.

<sup>6</sup> Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, rpt. London: SPCK, 1982; cf. Brümmer, *Model of Love*, 110–118.

<sup>7</sup> Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 105–145.

the aspiration of human beings towards the higher, *agape* 'is the attitude of the higher in stooping down in service to the lower'.<sup>8</sup> Eros is born from want: it aims for the good which it lacks; agape is born from abundance: an abundance of good, from which it gives to one who has not. Thus, *eros* 'recognises value in its object', while *agape* 'creates value in its object'.<sup>9</sup> The idea is, that there is no way from human beings to God; we cannot reach God by our own initiative. But God can reach us, and He does so in *agape*; out of *agape*, God offers us His grace.<sup>10</sup> For Nygren, then, agape and eros are incompatible: they are 'two fundamentally opposed types of religion and ethics'.<sup>11</sup> It is important to note that, while human beings can have *eros*, God cannot; and while God can have *agape*, human beings by themselves cannot:

If it is asked what motive there is for Christian love towards one's neighbour, what inspires it end sets it in motion, there can only be one answer: God Himself. ... Since God is Agape, everyone who is loved by him and has been gripped and mastered by His love cannot but pass on this love to his neighbour.<sup>12</sup>

In the life that is governed by Agape, the acting subject is not man himself; it is ... God.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, human beings become a kind of tube through which God hands on God's love to our human neighbours.

There are various problems with Nygren's views to which Vincent Brümmer, a contemporary colleague and friend of Ferdinand de Grijns, the founding father of the Thomas Institute, has drawn attention.<sup>14</sup> I shall focus here on one of these, the criticism that *agape*, far from excluding *eros*, needs it to be able to create value:

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<sup>8</sup> Brümmer, *Model of Love*, 128.

<sup>9</sup> Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 210.

<sup>10</sup> Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 80–81.

<sup>11</sup> Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 205.

<sup>12</sup> Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 216.

<sup>13</sup> Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 129.

<sup>14</sup> Brümmer, *Model of Love*, 131–134, 159–160.

It is impossible to oppose need-love and gift-love in the way Nygren does, since in crucial respects they are identical: it is only by needing that we can give. It is only through need-love, which desires your good as well as your love, that I can bestow value and identity on your person and your love and so 'secure your self-esteem and give body to your sense of identity'. The Beatle Paul McCartney expresses his desire still to be loved 'when I get older losing my hair, many years from now', in the words: 'Will you still need me, will you still feed me, when I'm sixty-four?' Obviously feeding is not enough; we also need to be needed. If I am not needed, I am nothing. To be loved and have literally nothing asked of one, and to be made to feel that there is no way in which one can ever give back anything of any value, is to be made into a pauper. Nygren is correct in his claim that love creates value in its object, but mistaken in thinking that this creative function belongs to *agape* rather than to *eros*. This also applies to the love of God. Only by needing us can God bestow value on us and upon our love for him. If God does not need us, we become infinitely superfluous.<sup>15</sup>

This brings us back to where we began: to the idea that God's love is, in a sense, self-seeking. While Dahl made this point in a crude way, Brümmer does so in a sophisticated way. He makes the conceptual point that love creates value *by* needing the other, and applies this to God as well. If Brümmer is correct, we are confronted with the following alternative: Either we deny the value-creativity of God's love, or we affirm that God's love includes *eros*, while simultaneously explaining how this is compatible with God's self-sufficiency, God's transcendence and the other things we believe of God. Brümmer chooses the second alternative,<sup>16</sup> and in his wake I have done so in the past.<sup>17</sup> But is Brümmer correct? One might hope and expect that the line of thought that Brümmer is criticizing has in the course of the

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<sup>15</sup> Brümmer, *Model of Love*, 241–242; cf. Brümmer, "Bestowed Fellowship: On the Love of God", in: Gijsbert van den Brink & Marcel Sarot (eds.), *Understanding the Attributes of God*, Frankfurt aM: Peter Lang, 1999, 33–52, esp. 51–52.

<sup>16</sup> Brümmer, *Model of Love*, esp. 237.

<sup>17</sup> Sarot, *God, Passibility and Corporeality*, Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992.

Christian tradition been articulated in ways that render it less vulnerable to criticism than the articulation that Brümmer has selected as his target. Aquinas's theory of love as a theological virtue seems a likely candidate for various reasons. Not only is Aquinas conspicuously absent in Brümmer's book on love, but also might it be argued that in the theology of Aquinas many strands and loose ends from previous thinkers are focused into one powerful beam. Therefore I shall in the next section have a look at Aquinas's theology of love, and try to find out whether he has explained how *agape* can be value-creating without including *eros*.

### Aquinas's Theology of Love

Love is a complex phenomenon, and by the term 'love' we refer to various distinct realities. We did not need Anders Nygren to discover this and to distinguish between various forms of love; already Aquinas was aware of the complexity of love and distinguished between various forms. The most fundamental distinction that Aquinas introduces is that between love as a passion of the soul and love as a theological virtue. In Latin, these are distinguished also by the words used: Aquinas calls the passion of the soul *amor* and the theological virtue *caritas*.<sup>18</sup> In English, the same distinction is sometimes made by using the words *love* and *charity*. I will not follow this practice here, since *charity* in English has for a long time meant something else. Already in 1945, C.S. Lewis warned against the use of *charity* in theology. *Charity*, he said, 'means (a) alms (b) a "charitable organization" (c) much more rarely – indulgence (i.e. a "charitable" attitude toward a man is conceived as one that denies or condones his sins, not as one that loves the sinner in spite of them)'.<sup>19</sup> I will use *love* both for *amor* and *caritas*, then.

<sup>18</sup> On the other terms Aquinas uses for love, see Aquinas, *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 3 co; Jeanrond, *Theology of Love*, 78.

<sup>19</sup> C.S. Lewis, "Christian Apologetics" (1945), in: Lewis, *Compelling Reason*, London: HarperCollins, 1996, 64–80, esp. 73. Even

The passions of the soul correspond roughly to what we would nowadays call emotions. A contemporary philosopher, William Lyons, defines ‘emotion’ as ‘a physiologically abnormal state caused by the subject of that state’s evaluation of his or her situation’.<sup>20</sup> Aquinas claims virtually the same about passions of the soul when he states that in them, the soul apprehends something suitable or harmful and is drawn towards the suitable or repelled by the harmful. This leads to a bodily change,<sup>21</sup> by which the soul is in turn indirectly affected.<sup>22</sup> By the way, this also explains why Aquinas calls this sort of passion *passio animalis*: It is the only kind of passion that is (efficiently) caused by the soul.<sup>23</sup>

Among the emotions, there is a certain order, and the primary emotion, from which all other emotions spring, is love:

All other motions of appetite and will presuppose love; it is like their very root. No one desires an object or rejoices in it unless it be a good that is loved. Nor is there any hatred except for what is contrary to a thing loved, and the same applies to grief and the rest: they all come back to love as to their primordial source.<sup>24</sup>

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more negative about the usefulness of ‘charity’ in Christian theology is Nicholas Lash, *Believing Three Ways in One God*, London: SCM, 2002, 74: Charity is “a term which has degenerated into the preferred description of those devices by means of which connivance at injustice wears the mask of generosity.”

<sup>20</sup> William Lyons, *Emotion*, Cambridge: CUP, 1980, 58.

<sup>21</sup> *De Ver* q. 26, a. 2 co: “nam huiusmodi per apprehensionem et appetitum animae peraguntur, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutatio.” Cf. q. 26, a. 9 co: “passio animalis ... causatur ex hoc quod anima aliquid apprehendit ex quo appetitus movetur, cuius motum sequitur quaedam transmutatio corporalis.”

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Rémi Tittley, “La Douleur Sensible Est-Elle Une Passion Corporelle ou une Passion Animale selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin?”, unpublished diss. Montréal 1967, 69; Journet D. Kahn, “A Thomistic Theory of Emotion”, unpublished diss. Notre Dame, Ind. 1957, 33.

<sup>23</sup> Sarot, *God, Passibility and Corporeality*, 109. On the following (the order of the emotions) see *ibid.*, 113.

<sup>24</sup> *STh* I, q. 20, a. 1 co: “omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, quasi primam radicem. nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum



Thus love is the primary emotion and the principle of all the other emotions.<sup>25</sup> As Robert Miner has noted, ‘The primacy of love among the passions in 1a2ae points ahead to the place of *caritas* among the theological virtues in the 2a2ae’.<sup>26</sup> In *STh* II-II, Aquinas explains that *caritas* is the most excellent of the theological virtues (q. 23, a. 6).

The distinction between the emotion of love and love as a theological virtue lies not – as one might expect<sup>27</sup> – in the objects of love, as if love for men was an emotion, love for God a theological virtue. The emotion of love is discussed in the first part of the second part of the *Summa Theologiae*, where Thomas discusses the movement of human beings towards God;<sup>28</sup> this emotion, then, may be directed to God (*STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 3 ad 4).<sup>29</sup> And love as a theological virtue comprises both love of men

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amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter tristitiam, et caetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri, sicut in primum principium.” Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 25, a. 2; q. 29, a. 2, *De Ver* q. 26, a. 5 ad 5.

<sup>25</sup> Contrary to this, it could be argued that *joy* is the first of the emotions, because joy is the final end of all passion. Aquinas responds to this argument by making a distinction between the order of execution and the order of intention: ‘In the line of execution and attainment love is the first passion, but in the line of intention joy is prior to love and is the reason for loving’. *De Ver* q. 26, a. 5 ad 5: “Ad quintum dicendum, quod in via exequendi vel consequendi, amor est prima passio; sed in via intentionis gaudium est prius amore, et est ratio amandi.”

<sup>26</sup> Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, Cambridge: CUP, 2009, 139.

<sup>27</sup> Sarot, *God, Passibility and Corporeality*, 111.

<sup>28</sup> Jeanrond, *Theology of Love*, 78.

<sup>29</sup> It does not go without saying that we can love God in an emotional way, since the passions of the soul belong to the sensitive appetite only, and the objects of the sensitive appetite are sensible objects only. God, however, is no sensible object. But in *STh* I-II, q. 26, a. 3 ad 4 Aquinas states: “amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitive. ... Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam

and love of God; it is directed towards God, but we may find God in our neighbour as well (*STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 12 obj. 4, q. 25, a. 1). Even loving our enemies is included. Not that charity requires that we love our enemies *as enemies*; that would be absurd. We can, however, love our enemies *as neighbours*; when we love our neighbours, this includes our enemies, so that *implicitly* we love them as well. All our neighbours bear the image of God; we love the image of God in them. If we reach the *perfection* of *caritas*, however, we love individual enemies as well. Aquinas provides a helpful example here: When we love a particular couple, we must love their children as well, even though they are unkind to us. We love them for the sake of their parents. Thus, Aquinas implies, we should love particular enemies as well, when we become aware of the way God is related to them (*STh* II-II, q. 25, a. 8)<sup>30</sup>.

Thus, there is a huge overlap between the possible objects of *amor* and the possible objects of *caritas*: both can be aimed at God and at lovable human beings. *Caritas* goes further, however, in also including persons who display no lovable characteristics; we may love them *for the sake of God*. A second difference between *amor* and *caritas* is that while *amor* springs from our natural inclination to love the lovable, *caritas* is a gift received from God: *caritas* is infused love.

Both of these differences between *amor* and *caritas* point to the identity of *agape* and *caritas*.<sup>31</sup> *Caritas* is no *eros*: it is no value-seeking love and it is not distinguished by the fact that it moves upward. It may just as well stoop downward. It loves the beloved irrespective of his or her actual merits. Moreover, only God can give us the virtue of *caritas*.

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dilectio." I take this to mean that God can use sensible means to draw human beings by *amor* to Godself; in this sense, *amor* can be directed towards God.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1 ad 2.

<sup>31</sup> Here I disagree with the statement of Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 620. Nygren, however, though he mentions Aquinas, restricts the analysis from which he draws this conclusion to Dante. And when later on he does discuss Aquinas' views, the *theological virtue* of love never really comes into focus.

### **Aquinas on the Value of Infused Love**

Now that I have established the identity of *caritas* and *agape*, it is time to return to the question that drove us towards Aquinas: Can Aquinas's analysis of *caritas* explain how love can create value without being based on a lack or a need?

In order to answer this question, I would like to return to the example of loving the unsympathetic children of one's friends. If I may tease out the meaning of this example just a little bit further, there are two reasons why we should love the children of our friends, even if they are not sympathetic to us. The first reason is the importance they have to our friends; we cannot love our friends and oppose what is of uppermost importance to them. And the second is that, however hidden the likeness of these children to their parents may be, there must be some likeness, and since we love the parents, we must love the likeness in the children. The same applies *mutatis mutandis* to our love for particular enemies: we *must* love them, both because they are God's creatures and God loves them and because they bear God's image, even though they may be very imperfect image-bearers.

Both of these aspects, I think, can help to explain how *caritas* can create value without being born out of a lack. Firstly, if we define an internal relationship as a relationship of X to something or someone else without which X would not be X, and an external relationship as a relationship of X to something or someone without which X would still be X, being a creature of God and being loved by God are internal relationships. Let me explain this in some more detail. When I am standing on a platform waiting for the train to Amsterdam and a tall man in a green coat is standing beside me, I am related to him in the sense that we stand next to each other. Without this relationship, however, I would be the same person; it is an external relationship. This does not apply to the relationship 'being a child of my parents'; without that relationship I could not be I. And still less would it apply to the relationship expressed in 'being a creature of God'. If I were not a creature of God, I would not be at all, so I believe. These are internal relationships.

Now if I love a person for an external relationship that love is not value-creating. To give an example: If I fall in love with a woman because of the library she owns,<sup>32</sup> reason would require me to stop loving her if she lost her library. In fact, one might say, I love her library rather than her. Such love is not value-creating! If, on the other hand, I love a person for an internal relationship, a relationship without which that person would not be that person, a relationship that is somehow constitutive for that person, there is no possibility that this person would lose this relationship. It is essential to her identity. Thus I love her for something that is really hers, that is part of her identity. Being a creature of God, I would argue, is precisely this type of relationship.

But there is one problem that is not solved this way: Since all of us are creatures of God, if I love a person because she is a creature of God, I still do not love her for her unique characteristics, and she is still replaceable by other beloved creatures of God. To give the floor to Brümmer once more:

Your love for me ... bestows intrinsic value on my person by looking on me *as an irreplaceable individual*. If you reject my fellowship, you reject me as a person and in so doing you threaten my ability to conceive of myself as intrinsically worthy, whereas in loving me you bestow a value on my person which I cannot give it myself. It means that my person ... not only matters to me but also to someone else apart from me, and that therefore receives a significance which it is beyond my power to bestow on it myself. Your love bestows value on me which I would otherwise not have. It does not merely recognize a value which I already have apart from this recognition. In this sense Nygren is correct in his observation that love creates value in the beloved, and does not merely recognize it.<sup>33</sup>

My friends will love each of their children with a different love; their love will be directed towards their childrens' particular individualities. But if I love my friends' children *merely because*

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<sup>32</sup> This is what Aquinas would call *amor concupiscentiae*. See *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1 co.

<sup>33</sup> Brümmer, *Model of Love*, 235 (my italics – MS).

*they are their children*, I will love all of them with the same love, irrespective of their particular individualities. And if I love God's creatures merely because of their being created by God, I will love each of them with the same love. But that, according to Brümmer, is not the type of love that creates value.

For that, I suggest, we must concentrate on the second reason to love one's friends' children or God's creatures. One loves God's human creatures because they bear the image of God. In a perceptive analysis, Kevin O'Reilly has shown that the image of God in Aquinas is characterized both by a factual element (he – not Aquinas – calls this “the likeness of analogy”) and by a normative element (“the likeness of conformation”). The likeness of analogy is actualized by creation; it is the image of God in so far as it already is there. The likeness of conformation will be actualized in the eschaton; it is the likeness of God that is potentially there, but has not yet been fully actualized.<sup>34</sup>

If we love our enemies because they bear the image of God, this must mean that in their case we do not perceive much of the likeness of analogy; if we did, they would not be our enemies, but our friends. But the Spirit<sup>35</sup> helps us – remember that this type of love is infused – to glimpse the analogy of conformation: a potential likeness that is not yet fully actualized. Here, I would argue, the individual character of the person that we love *does* come into play, for the image of God that is potentially but not actually present, will differ from person to person. We do not all have the same talents, the same potential for image-bearing. To say it otherwise: There are many ways of becoming more like God, ways that differ not only in degree<sup>36</sup> but also essentially.<sup>37</sup> One might even say that there are so many forms of becoming like

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<sup>34</sup> Kevin Eamonn O'Reilly, *The Hermeneutics of Knowing and Willing in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Leuven: Peeters, 2013, 23–44, and cf. Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 93, esp. q. 93, a. 4; I-II, q. 27, a. 4.

<sup>35</sup> On the role of the Holy Spirit in *caritas*, see Aquinas, *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 2.

<sup>36</sup> *Lumen gentium* 44.

<sup>37</sup> *Lumen gentium* 10.

God as there are people.<sup>38</sup> In *caritas*, it is given to us to glimpse that even those who are currently our enemies have a specific potential for becoming Godlike: a potential for which these people are irreplaceable.<sup>39</sup> Seeing that does not mean loving our enemies *as enemies* (*STh* II-II, q. 25, a. 8): The behaviour that annoys and repels us does not suddenly become attractive to us. But it does mean that we see the good that *is there*, either potentially or actually, and the mere fact that we see this good will either reinforce it, or encourage its actualization. Finally, it may help to transform the enmity by transforming the caricatures that enemies tend to make of each other.

The question with which we started was whether Aquinas's theory of infused love can show how *agape* can have the value-creating characteristics that have often been ascribed to them. The conclusion is that it can: Aquinas argues that infused love can – through the grace of God – help us to focus on the good potentials of those people to whom we feel not naturally drawn, and thus to love them in a way that makes them irreplaceable and this creates value. Thus, Brümmer's critique has been refuted and Nygren's theory vindicated with the help of the theology of Thomas Aquinas, a medieval theologian ignored by Brümmer and dismissed by Nygren.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> See my "A Communal Perspective on the Imitation of Christ", *Doctrine and Life* 63/10 (December 2013), 12–24 (21).

<sup>39</sup> There is an analogy here with other forms of love and friendship, because in these also we identify not merely with the current actualization of the talents of our friends, but with the good potentials that are in them. That is the way in which we can become friends with a thief: Not by identifying with theft, but by arguing that he *really* is better than the behaviour he is displaying, and that it is only the circumstances that have brought him to this. The nice thing is that identifying with the good in a person, rather than condoning the evil, will encourage this person to become a better person. That other people 'believe in us' can be a strong motivation, not to let them down. Cf. Aquinas, *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1 ad 3; q. 25, a. 6.

<sup>40</sup> To be fair, Brümmer includes Aquinas in his discussion in other books, e.g. in *Speaking of a Personal God*, Cambridge: CUP, 1992.