A well-known (roughly Fregean) strategy for dealing with Kripke’s 1979 Pierre-puzzle is to appeal to differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of Pierre’s beliefs. However, differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of an agent’s beliefs conceal, in this context, another equally challenging puzzle about disagreement. Apparently therefore, theorists are required to pay attention to both sorts of puzzles in order to offer a satisfactory solution to the Pierre case.
Forbes, Graeme. 1987. A dichotomy sustained. Philosophical Studies 51: 187-211.
Frege, Gottlob. 1980. Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Edited by Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Christian Thiel, Albert Veraart and Brian McGuinness and translated by Hans Kaal. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2009. Pierre and circumspection in belief-formation. Analysis 69: 653-55.
Heck, Richard. 1995. The sense of communication. Mind 104: 79-106.
Kripke, Saul. 1979. A puzzle about belief. In Meaning and Use, ed. by Avishai Margalit, 239-83. Dordrecht: Reidel.
MacFarlane, John. 2007. Relativism and disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132: 17-31.
Richard, Mark. 1990. Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.