On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects

  • 1 University of California, , Davis

Abstract

According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.

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