



CONFRONTATION AND COOPERATION

1000 YEARS OF POLISH–GERMAN–RUSSIAN RELATIONS

THE JOURNAL OF KOLEGIUM JAGIELLOŃSKIE TORUŃSKA SZKOŁA WYZSZA
VOL. II: 63–84

DOI: 10.1515/conc-2015-0006

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Poland towards the German leadership in the European Union*/**

Key words: Poland, Germany, European Union, leadership, Eurozone crisis

To answer the question concerning Polish attitude towards the German leadership in the European Union requires working out the definition of the term. In this work it will mean the ability of a political subject (in this case the Federal Republic of Germany) to get its political will through the union institutions (by the means of the union institutions) and making decisions on their agenda (imposing its agenda on them), whether by attracting other states and institutions of EU with its “soft power”, i.e. its own attractiveness (German), ready to take the burden of projects proposed by itself, or with “hard” political pressure and forcing obedience using available political and economic instruments. The differentiation between the German will of leadership, and on the other hand the will to influence¹ without being

the leader, however interesting from philosophical perspective and prolific in intellectual way, will not be the object of this analysis, for the sake of which both ways of forcing or promoting the interests of German Republic have been recognized as the actual performing of the leader’s function, taking into consideration the extent of German influence on the shape of the union policies.

The question of German leadership in the European Union is a politically incorrect issue in Poland. Polish elites have made an immense effort during the last 20 years to convince the Poles that there is no place for the leadership of one state in the European Union. There is actually “a German-French engine of the European integration”² they admitted, but “shared sovereignty”³ (with the union institutions, i.e. with other member states) is the foundation of this integration, which reduces the meaning of national states, none of which is

* In the content of this article in the footnotes referring to the Internet issues of newspapers the particular sites haven’t been given, instead there is only the abbreviation (int.) referring to the character of the publication and providing only the date.

** This paper is slightly modified English version of the article published in „Przegląd Zachodni”.

¹ M.A. Cichocki, *Zmiana niemieckiego paradigmatu w Europie, „Analizy Natolińskie”* (further: „AN”), nr 2(54), 2012, p. 4–5.

² More broadly about the shaping of it see: S. Parzymies, *Przyjaźń z rozsądku – Francja i Niemcy w nowej Europie*, Warszawa 1994, p. 179–202.

³ Comprehensive studies on the issue of sovereignty in the context of the European integration see: A. Marszałek, *Suwerenność a integracja europejska w perspektywie historycznej. Spór o istotę suwerenności i integracji*, Łódź 2000, p. 300–351.

“fully sovereign”⁴. If so, perceiving political game on the union forum in terms of leadership, or this or that state, would be itself the display of “shameful” euroscepticism, or at least “the evidence of ignorance and misunderstanding of the essence of the European integration.” Admitting that the leadership is or could be held by Germans, would be the pure anti-union “freakness” and “using anti-German phobias based on historic motifs”⁵.

This initial state of the development (or rather its lack) of the Polish public debate on the subject in question, was enforced by the heated argument of two main political parties dominating on Polish political stage, PO and PiS. It makes any possible opinion on the place of German Republic within the construction of the European Union, and the attitude towards it or Poland as a state, or finally towards political opponent (“PO serving the Germans”⁶ or “PiS overwhelmed with German phobia”)⁷ useful weapons in struggle between the parties. It made and still makes it difficult to start any serious debate on a real role Germany plays in the EU and Polish attitude towards the growing importance of Berlin in this organization. Therefore, asking the question referring to both issues⁸ by Instytut Zachodni (the

⁴ See the example: M. Ostrowski, *Co dzisiaj znaczy suwerenność. Pytania o suwerenność*, „Polityka.pl”, 9.04.2012, (int.).

⁵ The examples of this type of rhetoric see: Smolar: *Absurdalne słowa PiS*, „Gazeta Wyborcza” (dalej: „GW”) 12.12.2011. Compare: W. Szymański, *Czy Jarosław Kaczyński pod Chrobrym pokocha Niemców?*, „Gazeta.pl Wrocław”, 28.06.2010, (int.) and K. Niklewicz, B.T. Wielński, *Kampania w (niemieckim) amoku*, „GW”, 27.05.2009.

⁶ The examples of this type of rhetoric see: *Rząd oddaje Świnoujście Niemcom*, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 05.09.2013, <http://www.pis.org.pl/article.php?id=22075>. Also *Prezes PiS: Rząd zbyt uległy wobec Niemiec*, „Dziennik Gazeta Prawna”, 04.03.2009.

⁷ In such rhetoric, although not referring to the EU, like in the above mentioned case (footnote 5), but in the context of disagreement around the activity of German minority in Górnny Śląsk (Upper Silesia) and the activities of RAŚ, were the words of the representatives of the highest Polish authorities, the spokesman Paweł Graś (*PiS w ohydny sposób dzieli Polaków. Gra na antyniemieckich fobiach, to pierwszy akcent kampanii*”, „Polska The Times”, 3rd April 2011 and the interview of minister Nowak published on the official website of the president of the Republic of Poland: *Nowak: Prezes PiS stale dzieli ludzi na prawych i nieprawych*, 4th April 2011, *Prezydent.pl*, <http://prezydentwww.ires.pl/kancelaria/aktywnosc-ministrów/art,25,nowak-prezes-pis-stale-dzieli-ludzi-na-prawych-i-nieprawych.html>.

⁸ It was one of the questions asked by Instytut Zachodni (the Western Institute) at the conference organized by it: *Rola Niemiec w Unii Europejskiej i świecie – Poznań*, 3rd June 2013, which inspired this text.

Western Institute) in Poznań, should be perceived as a necessary, however courageous move.

The assumptions of this study is based on three essential theses, which can be summarized in a statement that Polish attitude towards the German role in the process of European integration, including its possible leadership in it after 1989, has been and still is:

- 1) variable in time,
- 2) poorly conceptualized,
- 3) not homogenous, i.e. dividing the Polish political scene.

Since Polish foreign policy started to regain its independence the attitude towards Germany has been influenced by the thesis of the supposed threat concerning Polish western border in the context of German reunification. It has dominated the public discourse to such an extent that in the first year of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in office and minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski as the head of the foreign affairs ministry it affected the delay of announcing Polish demand to withdraw the Soviet army from the territory of Poland till 12th September 1990. They were treated up to then as, “the guarantor of the territorial integrity of Poland in the reality of reunifying Germany”⁹. As a result of fear of imagined German revisionism our country was the last in the region to forward such a demand, and the last to be left by the Russians (17th September 1993). In this process we were overtaken not only by Hungary

⁹ More broadly see: J. Strzelczyk, *Ucieczka ze Wschodu. Rosja w polskiej polityce 1989–1993*, Warszawa 2002, p. 67–86 as well as P. Malewicz, *Polska polityka wschodnia w latach 1989–1991*, Toruń 2008, p. 233 i 237. It led to the policy of finlandization of Poland. P. Malewicz, op. cit., p. 127–145. Sf. J. Strzelczyk, op. cit., p. 110–114 as well as A. Dudek, *Finlandyzacja po polsku*, Plus Minus, „Rzeczpospolita” (further: „Rz”), 14–16.08.2009, p. P4–5. Ambassador Jerzy M. Nowak denies the thesis of finlandization and playing the Soviet card against Germany (*Od hegemonii do Agonii. Upadek układu Warszawskiego. Polska perspektywa*, Warszawa 2011, p. 155–192), he was, however, co-executor of this policy and it’s obvious that he defends it. He doesn’t undermine any facts presented by the above mentioned authors. His thesis claiming the disagreement on finlandization clearly expressed during the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meetings would have to be accepted with good faith, since, as he writes himself, “these discussions and contemplations weren’t minuted” (p. 191). Nowak’s thesis on the lack of the Soviet army card towards Germany differs from what I remember personally from what the vice minister of national defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz said on TV, who explained in the spring of 1990 the necessity of the presence of the Soviet army in Poland facing the fact of German reunification.

and Czechoslovakia (19th and 25th 1991), but even by Lithuania (1st September 1993)!

About a year later (16th December 1991) Poland signed the Europe Agreement with the European Communities¹⁰, completing this way the first stage on the way to the membership in the European Union, whose establishing treaty, had been accepted just a week before (the European Council in Maastricht 9th–10th December 1991)¹¹. At this time Germany had become the main supporter of making the Polish Republic closer to the Communities/EU. Their first leader act made after the reunion and against the other member states of the Community (recognizing Slovenia and Croatia – 23rd December 1991)¹², was promptly forgotten by the Polish general public, and during the following years of real support of the Federal Republic of Germany for Polish integration with both EU and NATO, wasn't interpreted in terms of German leadership in the EU. Germany itself was just learning its new "weight". The Union, on the other hand, was more balanced internally, and the domination of the Federal Republic of Germany wasn't so vivid, as it is now, i.e. during the banking and financial crisis in the Eurozone.

On 13th December 2002 Poland had completed the accession negotiations¹³. It deprived the main member

states of the EU an effective means of political pressure towards the Republic of Poland¹⁴ and already on 30th January 2003 resulted in Polish presence among the ones who signed so called the letter of the eight¹⁵.

Warsaw, like the majority of the member states of the European Union, explicitly rejected the French-German leadership, choosing the pro-American camp, led by Great Britain. Opposing the USA Germany (along with France) usurped the position of the leader, representing the EU¹⁶. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced at this occasion that Germany had made the choice of *deutscher Sonderweg*¹⁷, which meant break-

Wiadomości, 14.12.2002 (int.). Political reflection: T. Maziowiecki, A. Ajnenkiel, M. Przeciszewski, *Po szczytce kopenhaskim Unii Europejskiej – perspektywy i problemy. Zapis dyskusji, „PwE”*, no. 1(43) 2003, p. 37–59.

¹⁴ An excellent illustration of this instrument is presented in the interview of the European Commissioner for Enlargement from the 1990s Günter Verheugen, published in „GW” on the fifth anniversary of EU enlargement. Verheugen states there: „...the most dramatic was the disagreement over the freedom of purchasing land in Poland by the EU citizens. I remember when slowly and peacefully, which probably enforced the gravity of my words, I told my Polish interlocutors: «The member states cannot accept Polish proposals. Let's go out to the journalists to tell them we've suspended the accession negotiations». I will never forget the complete silence that everybody lapsed into. We could clearly hear birds outside. And then there was the breakthrough, we managed to negotiate the compromise transitory periods.” *Unia bez Polski byłaby słabsza* (T. Bielecki – the talk with Günter Verheugen), „GW”, 25th May 2009, p. 13. More broadly on the EU policy towards the candidate states of Middle Europe see: B. Płonka, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Europy Środkowej*, Kraków 2003, p. 33–118. And P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Rosji a interesy Polski 1991–2004*, Kraków 2008, p. 424–427.

¹⁵ More broadly see: D. Eggert, *Przewartościowania w stosunkach transatlantyckich w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa w czasie prezydentury George'a W. Busha, „Stosunki Międzynarodowe”*, no. 3–4 (30)/2004, p. 122–123.

¹⁶ This statement might seem surprising at first, especially considering the tone of the political debate and the comments in media in Poland and Europe, suggesting that EU opposed the USA in the Iraq matter, and only the group of „American Troyan horses” rejected this standpoint. The reality was, however, quite contrary. It was Berlin and Paris that were the leaders of the minority group splitting the EU, usurping the right to speak on behalf of Europe. P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Czy Unia Europejska może/powinna mieć spójną politykę wobec USA?*, (in:) *Polska w grze międzynarodowej. Geopolityka i sprawy wewnętrzne*, J. Kłoczkowski (ed.), Kraków 2010, p. 112.

¹⁷ Ł. Adamski, *Niemiecka droga. „Deutscher Weg” Gerharda Schrödera – czy niemiecka polityka ulega renacionalizacji?*, „Puls Świata”, no. 1–2/2005 (11–12), (int.); K. Ma-

¹⁰ *Układ europejski ustanawiający stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską, z jednej strony, a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich Państwami Członkowskimi, z drugiej strony, sporządzony w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r., „Dz.U. RP”, 27.01.1994.* O stowarzyszeniu Polski ze WE see: S. Trzeciak, *Gra o Europę. Negocjacje akcesyjne Polski z Unią Europejską*, Warszawa 2010, p. 71–79. Patrz też: B. Koszel, *Francja i Niemcy w procesie integracji Polski ze Wspólnotami Europejskimi/Unią Europejską (1989–2000)*, Poznań 2003, p. 21–33. Compare: J. Sielski, *Polska wobec procesu stowarzyszenia z Unią Europejską. Kształtowanie się relacji preferencji*, (in:) *Proces integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, P. Dobrowolski, M. Stolarczyk, O. Szura (eds.), Katowice 2001, p. 276–292.

¹¹ *Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Maastricht 9 and 10 December 1991*, “Bulletin”, 16.12.1991, PE 157.540, p. 2.

¹² More broadly see: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Upokorzona Europa. Unia Europejska wobec konfliktów bałkańskich w latach 1991–1999*, (in:) *Świat po Kosowie*, A. Magdziak-Miszewska (ed.), Warszawa 2000, p. 70–72.

¹³ More broadly on the negotiations and their outcome see: S. Trzeciak, op. cit., p. 88–91. Compare: B. Koszel, op. cit., p. 115–134. The government assessment of the negotiations outcome: *Raport na temat rezultatów negocjacji o członkostwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, grudzień 2002. First press relations see: *Koniec negocjacji, polskie postulaty spełnione*, PAP, wp.pl

ing up with 50-year long tradition of German Atlantic policy dating back to the times of Adenauer¹⁸. A famous sentence of Chirac's about Poland, "wasting an excellent opportunity to keep quiet"¹⁹, caused that from the Warsaw perspective the role of Berlin had been overshadowed by Paris, and the controversies over Iraq appeared more as the argument with the French-German core of the EU rather than the act requiring taking the position towards the "leading role" of Germany in this organization. However, it was a serious conflict dividing Europe into "old" anti-American and "new" pro-American²⁰, with a variety of motifs directing their orientation towards Washington, from Anglo-Saxon cultural heritage and/or tradition of the transatlantic solidarity (Great Britain, Denmark, Holland, Portugal, Italy), the need to balance the power of stronger European partners (Spain in relation with France), to the fear of Russia and hope that by demonstrating the ally loyalty towards the USA would grant the favour of Washington and help to carry out the second extension of NATO (Poland and other countries of the Middle Europe). The anti-American and pro-Russian policy of Germany towards Russia, despite the memory of its role as the supporter of the Polish interests in the EU in the previous decade, greatly destroyed the political capital of Germany that had been built up by the Christian Democrats governments²¹. Along with France Germany had questioned seriously the very existence of the political community of the West in the shape known since the cold war period²², this West Poland had just joined

linowski, *Przemiany niemieckiej polityki bezpieczeństwa 1990–2005*, Poznań 2009, p. 363–390. Compare: K. Miszcak, *Polityka zagraniczna, bezpieczeństwa i obrony koalicji rządowej SPD – Sojusz 90/Zieloni w okresie 1998–2005*, Warszawa 2012, p. 229–245, 306–341.

¹⁸ More broadly see: W. Bokajło, *Koncepcja Europy Konrada Adenauera i jej realizacja w praktyce politycznej w latach 1945–1954*, Wrocław 1995, p. 213. On the essence of Adenauer's views on the issue of cooperation with the USA see: ibidem, p. 158.

¹⁹ On the Chirac's statement see the comments of Polish and foreign politicians as well as numerous comments by publicists „GW”, 19th Feb. 2003 as well as „Rz”, 19.02.2003. The complete translation of Chirac's statement from 17th Feb. 2003. See: *Polityka. Polskiejutro.com*, <http://www.polskiejutro.com/art/a.php?p=43polityka&m=r> with comments: M. Rutulska, „Cicho siedzieć” – ceremonia dyplomacji plemiennej.

²⁰ J. Kiwerska, *Świat w latach 1989–2009. Wydarzenia – konflikty – procesy*, Poznań 2009, p. 343.

²¹ K. Malinowski, op. cit., p. 143.

²² D. Lynch, *Russia Faces Europe*, „Chaillot Papers”, ISS, no 60, May 2003, p. 7–8, 13.

after many years of attempts. Such a leadership could in no way be accepted by Warsaw.

The era of Schröder was also a significant period for the conditions referring to the Polish-German relations, as far as the politicians involved were concerned and the generation, for whom the feeling of guilt from the times of WWII was a vital element of the awareness concerning their own limitations²³. The break of the millenniums was then a moment of important mental transformation when it came to the German awareness of the international position and role of Germany. The process also included the fact how the German role in the EU was perceived, and we may even risk a statement that it referred mainly to this issue, opening the way for the next cabinets in Berlin to be bolder in emphasising the national interests and ambitions towards other nations²⁴. Germany started to play the role of

²³ On the changes in German mentality after the WWII see: A. Wolff-Powęska, *Pamięć – brzemię i uwolnienie. Niemcy wobec nazistowskiej przeszłości (1945–2010)*, Warszawa 2011. On the period after 1990.: Z. Krasnodębski, *Zwycięzca po przejściach. Zebrane eseje i szkice V*, Kraków 2012, p. 47–58, 66–79. According to the survey of „Stern”, every fifth German between the ages of 18–29 doesn't know that Auschwitz was a German concentration camp, and almost 33% don't know where it was located. It is known, however, by almost all (circ. 95%) Germans over 30. P. Jendroszczyk, *Adolf Hitler superstar*, „Rz”, 27th Jan. 2012, p. A11. Compare.: idem, „*Mein Kampf*” w niemieckich kioskach, „Rz”, 16th Jan. 2012, p. A11 and *Świat w skrócie, Europa*, „Rz”, 26th Jan. 2012, p. A8.

²⁴ On the process of the mentality changes when it comes to the identity of German foreign policy see: K. Malinowski, op. cit., p. 539–586. Compare.: J. Habermas (*Pakt dla Europy czy przeciw Europie?*, „GW”, 9th – 10th April 2011, p. 17), who writes, “The reunification put into motion the process of mentality change in Germany, which in the foreign policy leads to focusing more on its own interests. Since the 1990s there has been the growth of self-confidence of «the medium-seized power» appearing in the world as a significant participant. The new identity, basing on the military power, replaces the so far dominant culture of cautiousness of a civilian power, which cared for curbing the rivalry between the states in legal rules. This evolution is clearly seen especially since the change of the cabinet in 2005 and also refers to European policy. The vision of «European mission» directed on the cooperation of Germany which was the priority for Hans-Dietrich Genscher, gives way to conspicuous desire of leadership of «European Germany in Europe shaped according to German tastes». The unity of Europe has been the German interest since the beginning. Yet the conscience of our historical and moral heritage fostered diplomatic cautiousness, the readiness to take into consideration the views of the others, solving conflicts by making concessions. For Angela Merkel these rules might be of some importance in

a “geo-commerce” or “geo-economic” power, basing its international importance on a mighty and still increasing economy, which is founded on foreign commerce²⁵.

The fact that Gerhard Schröder made a German-Russian strategic partnership a leverage of the Europe distanced towards the USA, and emphasised the indispensability of Russia in the European architecture of safety which, according to the German chancellor, couldn’t be constructed “without or against” Kremlin (despite courteous remarks about our state²⁶), even after the experience of victorious “roses revolution” in Georgia and “orange revolution” in Ukraine, couldn’t have been encouraging for Warsaw.

Anti-American²⁷ and pro-Russian Schröder’s Germany, on the one hand characterized by the opposition towards the US action in Iraq²⁸, whereas on the other by cooperation with Russia in constructing the Nord Stream²⁹, were certainly not accepted in Poland as the

the relations with Israel. However, the priority of national interests has never been so vivid as in the resistance of the Lady chancellor, for weeks (till the capitulation on 8th May 2009) blocking the European assistance for Greece and establishing a rescue umbrella for Euro. The newest packet has been completed by the economic top of the class with so little sensitivity that in the nearest future the neighbor states will direct their accusations not at «Brussels», but «Berlin».

²⁵ M.A. Cichocki, op. cit., p. 2–4.

²⁶ Niemiecka odpowiedzialność, *Przemówienie Kanclerza Federalnego RFN Gerharda Schroedera wygłoszone na otwarciu 41. Monachijskiej Konferencji o Polityce Bezpieczeństwa, Monachium, 12 lutego 2005 r.*, „Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny” (dalej: „MPP”), no. 2(12)/2005, p. 95.

²⁷ K. Miszczak, op. cit., 257–271, 306–341. Compare: J. Kiwerska, *Nowe elementy w stosunkach amerykańsko-niemieckich i ich wpływ na politykę Polski*, (in:) *Polityka zagraniczna Polski. Unia Europejska, Stany Zjednoczone, sąsiedzi, J. Czaputowicz (ed.)*, Warszawa 2008, p. 253–260.

²⁸ K. Malinowski, op. cit., p. 363–379, 558–566; idem, *Konsekwencje kryzysu irackiego. Niemcy wobec nowego kształtu stosunków transatlantyckich*, „Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego” (dalej: „ZESZYTY INSTYTUTU ZACHODNIEGO”), no. 34/2004, p. 38. Compare: J. Kiwerska, *Stosunki niemiecko-amerykańskie (1992–2002)*, „ZESZYTY INSTYTUTU ZACHODNIEGO”, no. 32/2003, p. 36–43; idem, *Świat w latach 1989–2009...*, p. 342–346; M. Tomczak, *Elity niemieckie wobec „wojny z terroryzmem”*, „ZESZYTY INSTYTUTU ZACHODNIEGO”, no. 35/2004, p. 14–15. Also: K. Barysch, *The EU and Russia. Strategic partners or squabbling neighbours?*, London 2004, p. 39; P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Rosji...*, p. 237–240.

²⁹ More: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Rosji...*, p. 26–28, 83–85, 201, 206, 210, 223–225, 250–255, 277–283, 289–292, 301–302, 316, 322–323, 441, 512–513, 585. Compare: *Stosunki Rosja – Niemcy w latach 1998–2005*, „Raport OSW i CSM”, Warszawa 2006.

candidate for the leader of the European Union. The common strategic targets of Poland and Germany, shaping (despite minor differences) mutual relations of both countries in the former decade, disappeared between 1999 (Poland joined NATO) and 2003 (the factual end of the accession process and the Iraq conflict, and in fact the conflict on American hegemony in the European safety architecture). Apart from the Iraq issue it wasn’t however the confrontational suppressing, but the result of the success of both accession processes (the union and NATO ones). “Political fuel” driving the cooperation so far, “had burnt out”. The state of the European Union didn’t, however, make Poland face the challenge of the growing domination of Germany. Yet, there was the issue of German-French hegemony. It was, however, traditional and obvious “spiritus movens of the integration” and was treated as such.

The coldness in Polish-German relations, started in 2003, increased in the following years due to the conflict about the system of decision making in the EU Council (“Nice or Lisbon”)³⁰ and promoting by the core states of the EU, including Germany, the idea of “closer cooperation”, “pioneer group”, etc., which Poland was opposing fearing the EU of “two speeds”³¹.

³⁰ More on Polish diplomacy see: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polityka polska na forum Unii Europejskiej 2005–2007 a cele polityczne Rzeczypospolitej – próba oceny*, (in:) *Rzeczpospolita na arenie międzynarodowej. Idee i praktyczne dylematy polityki zagranicznej*, J. Kłoczkowski, T. Żukowski (eds.), Warszawa – Kraków 2010, s. 182–189; idem, *Konsekwencje katastrofy smoleńskiej dla pozycji międzynarodowej Polski*, (in:) „Katastrofa. Bilans dwóch lat”, J.F. Stanisłko (ed.), Warszawa 2012, p. 131–132; J. Kranz, *Podejmowanie decyzji większością kwalifikowaną w Radzie*, (in:) *Traktat z Lizbony. Główne reformy ustrojowe Unii Europejskiej*, J. Barcz (ed.), Warszawa 2008, p. 159.

³¹ K. Miszczak, *Niemcy i Polska wobec europejskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” (further: „SM”), nr 1 (LVIII), 2005, p. 99–101. The example of such discrepancies was a cold attitude of Warsaw towards the summit in Tervuren (29th April 2003) – so called „praline summit”, aiming at making EU a military power independent from the USA, and at the same time exclude pro-American European members of NATO from the decision making system EPBiO. On the summit see: *European defence meeting – ‘Tervuren’*, *Meetings of the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxemburg and Belgium on European Defence*, Brussels, 29 April 2003, (in:) *From Copenhagen to Brussels – European defence: core documents*, Vol. IV, “Chaillot Paper”, N° 67, 01 December 2003, ISS EU, ed. by A. Missiroli, p. 76–80.

This phenomenon wasn't, however, of bilateral character since Poland was acting here against the standpoint of all the big EU states, and not only against Germany. The Lisbon system (originally included in the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Union) privileged most of all the mostly populated European Union state, Germany with the population of 82 million, placing it in the position of a power capable of over voting solely all the "new" member states of the EU from the 2004 extension, which was impossible in the Nice system even for the German-French coalition. The two-point advantage of votes between Berlin and Warsaw (29:27) transformed into the crushing supremacy, reflected in the proportion (82:38). In other words, Poland having in the old system 93% of the Germany voting power, in the new one held only 43%. What was more, Germany the supporter of a simple demographic indicator, deciding the strength of votes in the EU Council, appeared as a hypocrite, promoting in the Union solutions, which in its own federal system it would consider as unacceptable in relations between the lands³². Initially, it arose the agreed opposition of the majority of the Polish political stage, both PO and PiS. The prominent politician of the first party, Jan Maria Rokita, preparing for the post of the Prime Minister at that time, announced in the Parliament "Nice or muerte!" (Nice or death), and its leading union policy specialist, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, was the main supporter of the compromising Jagiellonian concept (elaborated upon at the Jagiellonian University), based on the root predictor³³.

The following years brought the fundamental change of the basic conditioning of Polish position towards the new, not only factual (resulting from the potential), but also anticipated (institutionalized in the Lisbon treaty) formal dominance of Germany in Europe.

The internal Polish conflict between PO and PiS ended in 2005 the agreement of basic Political powers in Poland concerning strategic directions of the Polish

³² More: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Nicejska równoważa*, „Polska w Europie” (further: „PwE”), no. 1(45) 2004, p. 23–41. Compare: R. Trzaskowski, *Dynamika reformy systemu podejmowania decyzji w Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 2005, p. 245–370.

³³ W. Słomczyński, K. Życzkowski, *Kompromis Jagielloński – system głosowania dla Rady UE*, „MPP”, no. 2(18)/2007, p. 15–32. Compare: T. Sozański, *Nowa analiza systemów głosowania w Radzie UE*, „MPP”, no. 2(18)/2007, p. 34–52. See also: A. Bielawska, „Nicea albo śmierć”, czyli polski dyskurs polityczny na temat Traktatu ustanawiającego Konstytucję dla Europy i jego wpływ na stosunki polsko-niemieckie, „Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne”, vol. 2, 2012, p. 237–257.

foreign policy that had lasted since 1989. The need of differentiating, imposed by the logics of this conflict, made PO change its attitude in the discussed issue and make the idea of prompt ratification of the Lisbon treaty the symbol of the pro-European direction of this party, presented as the opposition of the "anti-European" PiS³⁴. Beforehand, the change of cabinet in Berlin and the growing erosion of the pro-American idea in Poland, had created a new mental situation, in which the approval of the "main current of the European policy"³⁵, identified with the positions of Germany and France cooperating with each other within the tandem of so called "Merkozy" (Merkel and Sarkozy)³⁶, had become profitable when it came to politics and elections. Still, it did't impose to ask openly a question of Polish acceptance (or its lack) for the leader's role of Germany in the European Union. The German presidency in the EU in 2007³⁷ coincided, however, with two events of significance for the relation between Berlin and Warsaw. These were: 1) the signing of the Lisbon treaty, which established a new, so far contested by Poland, and supported by Germany, system of decision making in the EU Council. (Modifications negotiated by Polish President Lech Kaczyński referred to the schedule of its introduction, and not the contents)³⁸; 2) Polish-Russian conflict concerning the Russian embargo on Polish agricultural commodities, resulting in the Polish veto on the negotiation mandate of the European Commission, indispensable in opening the talks on the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia. The would-be PCA was one of the main priorities of the German presidency in the EU³⁹.

³⁴ E. Olczyk, D. Kołakowska, *Bitwa o przyjęcie traktatu z Lizbony*, „Rz”, 12.08.2008. Compare: *Tusk spokojny o ratyfikację traktatu z Lizbony*, „Rz”, 13.08.2008.

³⁵ „We want Poland to be in the main current of the European policy when it comes to this issue”. These words were used by minister Radosław Sikorski in his argument with president Lech Kaczyński on the recognition of Kosovo by Poland (which was advised against by the president). *Sikorski: ws. Kosowa premier spotka się z prezydentem*, „Gazeta.pl”, 10th Feb. 2008, (int.).

³⁶ B. Koszel, *Niemiecko-francuskie przywództwo w Unii Europejskiej w okresie rządów kanclerz Angeli Merkel*, „Przegląd Zachodni” (further: „PZ”), 2012, no. 2, p. 21–44.

³⁷ M. Żurek, *Niemieckie prezydencje w Radzie Unii Europejskiej*, „PZ”, 2011, no. 3, p. 21–44.

³⁸ *Mandat konferencji międzynarodowej*, Rada Europejska, Bruksela, 26.06.2007, (OR. en) 11218/07, POLGEN 74, p. 5; P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Katastrofa. Bilans dwóch lat...*, p. 131.

³⁹ A. Drzewicki, *Niemiecka koncepcja Europejskiej Polity-*

“Spoiling” by Poland the looked forward success of Berlin, resulted in German accusations of Poland claiming that, “it took the whole Union as a hostage in its relations with Russia”⁴⁰. The final outcome of this tough attitude of the Polish government (then dominated by PiS) was, that the chancellor Angela Merkel at the EU–Russia summit in Samara in May 2007 “spoke the voice of Poland”⁴¹ and in this sense was no doubt accepted as the leader of the European Union by Warsaw.

The change of the cabinet in Poland in November 2007 started anew ear in the Polish-German relations. The proclaimed by Donald Tusk warming up of the relations with Moscow⁴², eliminated one of the reasons why Poland was perceived in Berlin as an obstacle in the development of the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia⁴³. Still in April 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucarest the disagreement concerning MAP (Membership Action Plan – the perspective of a membership in the Treaty) for Georgia and Ukraine placed Poland and Germany on opposite sides⁴⁴, yet it was the

last chord of the past Polish foreign policy based on Washington directed orientation, and a “Prometean” eastern policy founded on it. The change in the White House and the announcement of the “reset” in the relations between America and Russia⁴⁵, resulting in the withdrawal of Washington from the competition policy towards Moscow in the eastern Europe, made Poland look for the new protector. Unlike the pro-American PiS, the coalition of PO-PSL which had been in power for a couple of months, chose the Union option, i.e. French-German one. In the aspect of eastern policy it meant recognizing the leader position of Germany in the EU by Poland. The German rule Russia first which had been promoted for years and the leading one in the eastern policy of the Union, started to be shared by Warsaw. The German leadership when it came to the relation of the EU with its eastern neighbors was accepted as the obvious and desirable context of the Polish eastern policy⁴⁶. The Eastern Partnership⁴⁷ established

ki Wschodniej doświadczenia i wnioski dla Polski, „PZ”, 2011, no. 3, p. 45–66.

⁴⁰ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polityka polska na forum Unii Europejskiej 2005–2007 a cele polityczne Rzeczypospolitej – próba oceny*, (in:) *Rzeczpospolita na arenie międzynarodowej. Idee i praktyczne dylematy polityki zagranicznej*, J. Kłoczkowski, T. Żukowski, (eds.), Warszawa–Kraków 2010, p. 190–193; *idem*, XXX szczyt UE – Rosja. Zderzenie z rzeczywistością, „Komentarze Natolińskie”, no. 1(11)/2007, p. 1–4.

⁴¹ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Geopolityka – siła – wola. Rzeczypospolitej zmagania z losem*, OMP: Kraków 2010, p. 368; *EU – Russia Summit – Samara, 18 May 2007, The EU's relations with Russia, External relations*, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/summit_05_07/index.htm.

⁴² B. Cichocki, P. Świeżak, *Co Polska może na Wschodzie? Raport, „Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”*, no. I-II–2008/7–8, BBN, p. 65–68. Compare: J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, *Reset w stosunkach z Rosją*, „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, 2011, no. 3(61), p. 73–84. Political comment: W. Waszczykowski, *Polski reset z Rosją*, „Gazeta Polska” (further: „GP”), 21.03.2012, p. 24.

⁴³ M. Leonard, N. Popescu, *Rachunek sił w stosunkach Unia Europejska–Rosja*, Londyn–Warszawa 2008, p. 64–66; P. Buras, B. Nowak, A. Dzieszkowska, J. Trojanowski, *Polska – Niemcy: Partnerstwo dla Europy? Interesy, opinie elit, perspektywy*, Warszawa 2013, p. 24–26, 29. Compare: I. Janicka, op. cit., p. 106.

⁴⁴ R.D. Asmus, *Mała wojna, która wstrząsnęła światem. Gruzja, Rosja i przyszłość Zachodu*, Warszawa 2010, p. 225–228; R. Grodzki, *Wojna gruzińsko-rosyjska 2008. Przyczyny – przebieg – skutki*, Zakrzewo 2009, p. 150–154. Compare: A. Szeptycki, *Nowa odsłona polskiego mesjanizmu na Wschodzie*, (in:) *Polityka zagraniczna Polski po wstąpieniu do NATO i do Unii Europejskiej. Problemy tożsamości i adaptacji*, S. Bie-

leń (ed.), Warszawa 2010, p. 295–296; idem, *Polityka Polski wobec Ukrainy*, „Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2009”, p. 162–163. Also: J. Pawlicki, *Ukraina i Gruzja poczekają przed drzwiami NATO*, „GW”, 06.03.2008; *Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008*, Press Release (2008) 049 Issued on 03 Apr. 2008, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm?mode=pressrelease.

⁴⁵ A. Åslund A. Kuchins, *Pressing the “Reset Button” on US – Russia Relations*, Russia Balance Sheet, “Policy Brief”, CSIS, Nr PB09–6, March 2009; L. Aron, *The Russian Pause, How Putin Stalled the Reset*, “Foreign Affairs”, August 15, 2013; J. Kiwerska, *Fiasco „resetu” w stosunkach amerykańsko-rosyjskich?*, „Buletyn Instytutu Zachodniego”, no. 138/213, 13’09’13.

⁴⁶ P. Buras, B. Nowak, A. Dzieszkowska, J. Trojanowski, op. cit., p. 27–28.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 23–24; P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Partnerstwo wschodnie Unii Europejskiej – główne, czy pomocnicze narzędzie polskiej polityki wschodniej? / The Eastern Partnership of the EU – main or supporting tool of Polish Eastern Policy?*, (in:) *Partnerstwo Wschodnie w kontekście Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa i agendy Grupy Wyszehradzkiej / The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighbourhood Policy and V4 Agenda*, I. Albrycht (ed.), Instytut Kościuszki – Kraków 2010, p. 37–51/37–50. Compare: *Idem, Okręt flagowy czy statek widmo?*, „Nowa Europa Wschodnia”, no. 2 (XVI) 2011, p. 209–216. See also: seminar materials OSW, Warszawa 1–2.07.2010: *Doświadczenia współpracy w ramach Procesu Barcelońskiego – Unii dla Śródziemnomorza (EUROMED) – inspiracje dla Polski i Niemiec jako głównych orędowników projektu Partnerstwa Wschodniego*, <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/wydarzenia/unia-dla-srodziemnomorska-a-partnerstwo-wschodnie>.

with the decisive support of Berlin which influenced on it greatly looking after its interests⁴⁸, was the representation of this line. The stand point of Berlin resulted also from the will to reach its political goal, which was slowing down the French initiative in Union to support the Mediterranean⁴⁹. The breaking of the German-French tandem (then still incidental) justifies the statement that at this very moment Warsaw oriented itself not at the Union duet of Paris and Berlin, but clearly at the latter one as the leader in the EU.

The establishing of Economic and Monetary Union, and a common European currency within it had its roots in politics. Although its instruments were of economic character, it aimed at deeper political integration. Euro was to be its tool, forcing the characteristic for the economic and currency union standardization of fiscal, monetary, budget, social policies, which were to be coordinated by new common institutions allowing the modifications of national governments' competences⁵⁰. Initially, the Economic and Monetary Union was to make unifying Germany anchor stronger in the European structures. From the Paris perspective it was one of the condition for its agreement on the reunifi-

⁴⁸ Germany feared the transfer of too much of the Union means to the south D. Pszczółkowska, *Sarkozy Śródziemnomorski*, „Gazeta.pl”, 14.07.2008, (int.).

⁴⁹ The main point of German aims was accepting the rule that PW couldn't antagonize Russia and oppose the development of strategic Union-Russian partnership, which is the priority for Germany and the accent on the need to deepen economic relations with the partner states. Germany was also against establishing “European perspective for the partner states” i.e. recognizing their ambitions for the full EU membership, claimed by Georgia, Moldavia, and Ukraine. It is for this reason that Germany was the leader of the group of EU countries which had most objections towards the text of Common Declaration accepted at the inaugural summit of The Eastern Partnership in Prague (7th May 2009). Germany forced the name “east-European partners” instead of “European states”, to make it impossible for the mentioned countries to refer to the rule in art.

⁵⁰ European Union Treaty, on the right of every European state to the EU membership after meeting its criteria. Berlin was also against calling new expanded treaties between the EU and a partner state “the access treaties”, since it didn't want any analogies with European Agreements signed with Middle and East Europe in the 1990s. These treaties were introduction for the further membership of these countries in the EU. J. Gotkowska, *Niemcy wobec Partnerstwa Wschodniego*, „Komentarze OSW” (further: „Kom. OSW”), no. 37, 18.06.2010, p. 1–6. The German assessment of The Eastern Partnership realization see: I. Janicka, op. cit., p. 101–104.

⁵¹ Integracja europejska i nowy ład gospodarczy, M. Dunin-Wąsowicz (ed.), Warszawa 2012, p. 17, 26–27.

cation⁵¹. Gradually, however, more and more powerful Germany with its potential and partly unintentionally made it that,” it was no longer the process of integration that determined the German development, but German needs that started to shape up the perspectives of further integration”⁵².

The application of the Treaty of Lisbon changed the balance between the powers in the Union and the Union institutions. The first ones benefited from it. The existence of the European Union ceased to be an obvious answer for the historic, as it had seemed in the previous decades, question – “European Germany or German Europe”⁵³.

The financial crisis of 2008 which had come to Europe from the USA, and from 2010 appeared as an autonomous phenomenon, destroying the finances of the Eurozone states, made Germany the real EU leader. It is Germany that carries the bulk of financial burden of struggle against the crisis⁵⁴. This fact is in no way questioned in Poland and is accepted as an element of the reality. The stability of the Eurozone, and most importantly the good economic situation of Germany, which absorbs the lion share of Polish export⁵⁵, are considered a vital elements of development of Polish economy. The truth of the above statement is confirmed by the fact that unlike in the previous years, when the economic growth of Poland based mainly on the internal demand, since 2012 its functions as the main stimulus has been taken over by the external demand⁵⁶. Political effects of such a situation are not, however, equally simple. The weakening position of France, the financial crush of the southern members of the Economic and Monetary Union, the increasing feelings against the Union and Germany⁵⁷ from Portugal to Greece place the issue of

⁵¹ M.A. Cichocki, op. cit., p. 5–6; M. Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Suwerenność i pieniądz w Europie 1870–2002*, Warszawa 2009, p. 229–257.

⁵² M.A. Cichocki, op. cit., p. 7; M. Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Suwerenność i pieniądz...*, p. 257–287.

⁵³ K. Wójcicki, *Niemcy i stosunki z Polską w dobie europejskiego kryzysu*, „SM”, no. 3(LXV), 2012, p. 27; compare: M.A. Cichocki, op. cit., p. 1.

⁵⁴ T.G. Grossé, *Dylematy unii bankowej*, „AN”, no. 2(60) 2013, p. 5.

⁵⁵ *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego 2013*, GUS, Warszawa 2013, p. 43, 117.

⁵⁶ *Przedsiębiorcość w Polsce*, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Warszawa, 2013, p. 6.

⁵⁷ *Wściekły Grek. Grecja budzi Europę do nowego życia – z muzykiem Milo Kurtisem rozmawia Grzegorz Soczyński*, „GW. Magazyn Świąteczny”, 19–20.11.2011, p. 14–15. Compare: *Merkel persona non grata*, „Rz”, 7.11.2012; *Prote-*

German hegemony in the EU in the new geopolitical context. Noticing this, on the other hand, stops to be the prerogative of “extreme powers”.

Germany is not only the donator of means to fight back the crisis. It is also the biggest beneficiary of the existence of the Eurozone⁵⁸. Hence, it makes out of the considerable part of the homogenous union market of commodities and services, which is wide open for German producers, a market of consumers possessing artificially inflated purchasing power. This in effect generates huge export excess of Germany⁵⁹, “sucking out” from less affluent countries of the south work places, and in consequence unemployed youth – a priceless asset for Europe coping with demographic problems. There are again strong assumptions to be afraid of the fact that Germany (along with smaller “healthy” states of the Economic and Monetary Union) will become the only functioning democracy in the EU. The instructions of fighting against the crisis recommended by it all have in common a rule stating that financial decisions should be excluded from the democratic control of the citizens of peripheral states⁶⁰. The issues that can be decided upon by Bundestag, Bundesrat⁶¹ or Constitutional Tribunal from Karlsruhe⁶² are to be beyond the competences of

sty Portugalczyków podczas wizyty Merkel, „Rz”, 12.11.2012; M. Zatyka, *Portugalia. Chaos komunikacyjny i protesty podczas wizyty Merkel, „GW”*, 12.11.2012.

⁵⁸ T.G. Grosse, *Kryzys europejskiej waluty. Konsekwencje polityczne, „AN”*, no. 3(51) 2011, p. 3.

⁵⁹ K. Popławski, *Niemieckie nadwyżki wciąż problemem dla strefy euro i dla świata, „BESTOSW”*, no. 37(280), 20.11.2013.

⁶⁰ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Ewolucja Unii Europejskiej w warunkach kryzysu finansów strefy euro – agonia czy przesilenie?*, (in:) *Kryzys Unii Europejskiej. Polska i czeska perspektywa*, J. Kłoczkowski, O. Krutík, A. Wołek (eds.), Kraków 2013, p. 91–96.

⁶¹ K. Frymark, K. Popławski, *Bundesrat wstrzymuje ustawę implementującą pakiet fiskalny w RFN, „BESTOSW”*, no. 19(262), 13.03.2013. Compare: *Szczerski: polityka Tu-ska jest polityką antypolską*, „Stefczyk Info”, 2.03.2013, <http://www.stefczyk.info/publicystyka/opinie/szczerski-w-polsce-panuje-wysoki-poziom-klientelizmu-wobec-europy,6839724858>.

⁶² The Constitutional Tribunal in Karlsruhe was consulted both when it comes to the Lisbon treaty and the fiscal pact.. On the first one see: R. Formuszewicz, *Wyrok niemieckiego Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w kwestii ratyfikacji traktatu lizbońskiego*, „Biuletyn PISM”, nr 48 (580) from 12th August 2009. On the other: 37 thousand German citizens signed constitutional complaints concerning the non-conformities with the constitution of Germany ratification bills of the fiscal pact. As a result the case was proceeded by the Constitutional Tribunal of German Republic. P. Jen-

alogical institutions of the states under crisis. States with healthy financial situation, strong democratic tradition (Great Britain, Scandinavian countries, Benelux) are to preserve similar prerogative, yet only concerning themselves. Germany (though informally) are to have it also towards other states. The common institutions of the EU, so far perceived in Poland as a tool limiting the strength of union powers and the ally of smaller states, now start to be seen as the “transmission line “of Berlin’s political will. (The project of Irish budget, before presentation to the parliament in Dublin, was given over to be assessed in the European Council, where it leaked from to the German Ministry of Finance, and to the budget commission of Bundestag!⁶³ On the other hand, the budget of Greece, according to German demands, was to be under the control of a commissioner appointed by the EU. The German minister of finance Wolfgang Schäuble stated in the autumn of 2012, “Whatever happens Greece is to stick to the agreed program. The new government, old government, new elections or referendum: the form is of no importance.”) Similarly, referring to Portugal, sounded the talk between Schäuble and the minister of finance of this country Vitor Gaspar broadcast by the Portuguese TV⁶⁴.

Polish government accepted this role of Germany, joining the fiscal pact, although (under the influence of France) according to it the place of Poland in the decision making process was merely the one of an observer of some summits of the Eurozone states, i.e. the state deprived not only of a decisive vote, but even the right for the permanent position at the discussion table, the state whose opinion might be taken into consideration or not, depending on the political will of the Euroland states⁶⁵. In the situation of the crisis in the Eurozone,

droszczyk, *Ratyfikacja ESM niemal pewna, „Rz”*, 7th September 2012, p. A13. More about the decision of the Tribunal from Karlsruhe see: K. Frymark, *Niemcy mogą ratyfikować EMS i pakiet fiskalny, „BESTOSW”*, no. 29(230), 12th September 2012. Also see: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Tak z zastrzeżeniami, „Gazeta Polska Codziennie”*, 15th–16th September 2012, p. 10.

⁶³ M. Magierowski, *Trzecie samobójstwo Europy, „Rz”*, 29.11.2011, p. A14; compare: S. Dowling, *Ireland’s budget leak to Germany brings home some harsh realities*, “The Guardian”, 18.11.2011.

⁶⁴ P. Rożyński, *Długi zabierają suwerenność, „PlusMinus”*, „Rz”, 27–28.10.2012, p. P6.

⁶⁵ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Wpływ kryzysu w strefie euro na Wspólną Politykę Zagraniczną i Bezpieczeństwa oraz Wspólną Politykę Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej. Ocena przydatności instrumentarium unijnego z punktu wi-*

attempts to place its costs in banking sector on the most affluent states (mainly on Germany) or the ones with a relatively good (better than Eurozone member states of southern Europe deep in crisis) situation in this sector, are a vital element of political-economic game in the EU between its member states. Poland is included in the second group⁶⁶. Its access to the fiscal pact and the promise to allocate 6.27 billion euros to stabilize the finances of the Eurozone mean accepting by Poland the policy of burden sharing, which is obviously the interest of Germany. Such moves should be treated then as not only rhetorical approval of German leadership in the EU, but also the demonstration of material support when necessary by Warsaw. It was seen as such in Germany⁶⁷. The Berlin speech of minister Radosław Sikorski (28th November 2011)⁶⁸, presented during the negotiations over the fiscal pact, however over interpreted when it came to his pro-German attitude⁶⁹ (Sikorski referring to state budgets and federal budget in the USA called in to make the debts of the Eurozone⁷⁰ common, which is against the German stand point as well as the attitude of German public opinion⁷¹), was a significant manifestation of Polish support for the German leadership in the EU. It was perceived as such not only in Poland, but also in German media⁷². The

dzenia jego użyteczności jako narzędzia polskiej polityki zagranicznej, „AN”, 5(57) 2012, p. 44–46.

⁶⁶ T.G. Grosse, *Dylematy unii bankowej...*, p. 5.

⁶⁷ I. Janicka, op. cit., p. 104.

⁶⁸ Polska a przyszłość Unii Europejskiej. Przemówienie ministra spraw zagranicznych Radosława Sikorskiego Berlin, 28 listopada 2011 r., „SM”, no. 1(LXV) 2012, p. 93–104. Komentarze do tego wystąpienia patrz: J. Barcz, *Wiarygodnie i aktywnie w Unii Europejskiej*, „SM”, nr 1(LXV) 2012, p. 105–109, P. Świeboda, *Polska wizyjna*, „SM”, no. 1(LXV) 2012, p. 116–119.

⁶⁹ Minister złożył hołd berliński, Polskie Radio.pl, 30.11.2011, <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/489515,Minister-zlozyl-hold-berlinski>. Compare: Andrzej Dera: *Sikorski złożył swoisty hołd berliński*, „Wiadomości24.pl”, 30.11.2011, http://www.wiadomosci24.pl/artykul/andrzej_dera_sikorski_zlozyl_swoisty_hold_berlinski_219049.html.

⁷⁰ Polska a przyszłość Unii Europejskiej. Przemówienie ministra..., p. 97.

⁷¹ K. Popławski, *Niemcy nie zgadzają się na projekt unii bankowej*, „BESTOSW”, no. 24(267), 24.07.2013. Compare: P. Buras, *Republika berlińska i prawdziwy koniec epoki powojennej*, „Kom. OSW”, no. 67, 07.12.2011, p. 1; *The independent ECB is dead*, „Presseurop”, 7 September 2012, „Die Welt”, „Süddeutsche Zeitung”, (int.).

⁷² I. Janicka, *Niemieckie komentarze prasowe o przewodnictwie Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej*, „PZ”, 2012, nr 2, p. 107–110.

speech by Sikorski confirmed the orientation on Berlin, started by Warsaw in 2008. Before, a significant sign of this attitude in Polish policy was the Polish position taken in 2011 concerning the NATO intervention in Libya, which was actually modeled on the German one. Breaking up with the tradition, Poland had backed Germany⁷³ against France and Great Britain, supported by the USA. Additionally, Prime Minister Tusk announced this decision in a particularly awkward way, accusing the intervening European powers of hypocrisy⁷⁴. German reserved attitude towards the American BMD⁷⁵ as

⁷³ R. Formuszewicz, *Niemcy wobec kryzysu w Afryce Północnej*, „Biuletyn PISM”, nr 26(775), 15.03.2011. M. Janowski, *Niemcy wobec kryzysu w Afryce Północnej*, „Biuletyn Opinie”, No. 8/2011, 4.04.2011, p. 2–13.

⁷⁴ Premier Tusk dla pięciu wielkich gazet: *Europa na ciężkie czasy*, Donald Tusk w rozmowie z dziennikarzami „Gazety Wyborczej”, „The Guardiana”, „Le Monde”, „El País” i „Der Spiegel”, „GW”, 08.04.2011. Compare: J. Pawlicki, M. Wojciechowski, *Sikorski: Polityka to nie poezja czy publicystyka*, „GW”, 17.03.2011.; *Interview with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk: I'm Incapable of Getting Angry with Angela Merkel*, „Spiegel Online International”, 8.04.2011, (int.); *Poland – Libya. Tusk criticizes Europe for its “hypocrisy” and low protection of civilians*, „EuropaRussia.com”, 12.04.2011, <http://www.europarussia.com/posts/2393>. Comments – see: *Polish PM chides Europe over Libya “hypocrisy”*, Reuters, Sat. April 9, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/09/poland-eu-libya-idAFLDE73806T20110409> J. Onyszkiewicz, *Izolacjonizm po polsku*, „Rz”, 14.11.2013. More on conflict in Libya: J. Dobrowolska-Polak, *Particularna polityka państwa Unii Europejskiej wobec interwencji w Libii*, „PZ”, 2011, nr 3, p. 111–132. Compare: P. Buras, B. Nowak, A. Dzieszkowska, J. Trojanowski, op. cit., p. 20, W. Waszczykowski, *Tropolis – Warszawa, wspólna sprawa*, „GP”, 30.03.2011, p. 25.

⁷⁵ K. Piątkowski, *Tarcza antyrakietowa – opcje strategiczne wyboru*, (in:) J. Czaputowicz (ed.), *Polityka zagraniczna Polski...*, p. 141; M. Kaczmarski, *Obrona przeciw rakietowa Stanów Zjednoczonych i jej implikacje międzynarodowe*, Toruń 2004; K. Hołdak, *Polska w amerykańskim systemie obrony przeciw rakietowej*, vol. I, BBN, Warszawa 2007, ida, *Amerykański system obrony przeciw rakietowej i jego implikacje dla Polski*, „Kwartalnik «Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe»”, no. 1/2006, p. 111–132. Compare: P. Rebizant, *Tarcza antyrakietowa i stosunki amerykańsko-rosyjsko-europejskie*, „Arcana”, nr 60(6/2004), p. 94–114; M. Chorośnicki, A. Gruszcak (eds.) *Wpływ tarczy antyrakietowej na pozycję międzynarodową Polski. Konsekwencje umieszczenia elementów systemu obrony przeciw rakietowej Stanów Zjednoczonych na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Kraków 2008. Also: W. Waszczykowski, *Polska – USA – tarcza*, (in:) *Racja stanu. Janowi Olszewskiemu*, Poznań 2011, s. 296–307; idem, *Obyśmy dostali kolejną szansę*, „Rz”, 6.06.2009, p. A13, idem, *Zgrane chwytu Sikorskiego. Rozmowa z Witoldem Waszczykowskim*, „Nasz Dziennik”, 24.05.2011, p. 5. Compare: T. Hypki, G. Hołdanowicz, M. Likowski, *Nie będziemy tarczą?*, „Raport”, no. 10/2009, p. 4–16.

well as hopes associated in Berlin with the modernization of Moscow under the rules of Miedwiediew⁷⁶ were in sync with the new policy of Warsaw. In this situation the German leadership concerning the eastern policy of the EU was fully approved by Poland. The visit of the heads of the Ministries of foreign affairs of Poland, Radosław Sikorski and Germany Guido Westerwelle in Belarus (2nd November 2011)⁷⁷, promoting by minister Radosław Sikorski so called Kaliningrad Triangle (German, Russia, Poland)⁷⁸ and a political favour for the German game towards Russia with the union visa policy (i.e. the agreement on cross-border traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast⁷⁹) confirm this thesis. It is also

⁷⁶ P. Buras, B. Nowak, A. Dzieszkowska, J. Trojanowski, op. cit., p. 32.

⁷⁷ Ibidem, p. 24. Compare: J. Gotkowska, *Dwutorowa polityka RFN wobec Białorusi*, „Tydzień na Wschodzie” (further: „TnW”), OSW, no. 37(155), 04.11.2010, p. 4–5.

⁷⁸ Wizyta Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP w Królewcu, Wiadomości, 20.05.2011, MSZ RP, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/wizyta_ministra_spraw_zagranicznych_rp_w_krolewcu; S. Bielen: *Triathlon niemiecko-polsko-rosyjski, czyli o idei „trójkatu kaliningradzkiego”*, „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, no. 2/2012, p. 5–27.

⁷⁹ This treaty has several aspects. The positive ones being: the increase of the turnout in commerce and services in regions near borders and influencing on the mentality of the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast by giving them opportunity of contacts with not post-Soviet world. The negative ones on the other hand are: the threat of the increase of trans-border criminal activity, breaking solidarity with Lithuania which didn't enter the system established by Poland and Russia as well as breaking the rule that a Russian passport under no circumstances should be a better document allowing free movement around Poland (EU) than the Ukrainian one (cross-border traffic zone in relations with Ukraine is narrower and because the negative EU attitude doesn't include Lwów, which is of importance for Poland). Concession of Poland (EU) towards the Russian endeavors concerning the opening of the Union borders for citizens of the Russian Federation is convenient for Germany (the main destination of illegal immigration, thus the main opponent of liberal attitude towards the border regime and the visa policies of Schengen Group). It is so since it lets the EU (Germany) reject Russian requests, by pointing out that EU (Poland) has already made a goodwill gesture (expanding the zone of cross-border traffic on the border between Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast), and now it's Russian turn (pricy and difficult conditions include amongst the others: the introduction of biometric passports, making the borders with Central Asia tighter, cooperation with the EU when it comes to protecting common borders, immigration policies, etc.). So Germans can claim and they actually do, with the Polish cooperation, that the EU, including German Republic, is ready to abolish visas for Russians and is waiting for

confirmed by the silence of the government and Polish media supporting it when it comes the issue of the agreement between Rheinmetall and the Russian Ministry of Defense from June 2011 concerning the building of the training centre for the land military forces in Mulino near Niznyj Novogrod and the sale of the license to build similar centres⁸⁰. (A similar transfer of the French military technology to Russia– Mistral warships– received unfriendly comments in Poland)⁸¹.

Solidarity with the German standpoint had acquired advanced forms. When on 19th May 2011 President Obama summoned Israel to withdraw to the borders from 1967⁸², the following day at the meeting of the Weimar Triangle⁸³ minister Sikorski supported this appeal in the company of the heads of diplomacy of Germany Guido Westerwelle and France Alain Juppé⁸⁴. In fact, this situation was against the interests of Poland which was accepting by one of the US allies (Poland) undermining by Washington the territorial integrity⁸⁵

the move from Moscow. *Niemcy pod presją Rosji w sprawie wiz*, „TnW”, OSW, nr 38(156), 17th November 2010, p. 14. Compare: *Polska i Niemcy opowiadają się za zniesieniem wiz z Rosją*, „Głos Rosji”, 10.05.2013, (int.). See also: *Niemiecki europosel: UE i Rosja dalej od złagodzenia wymogów wizowych*, Onet, PAP, 3.10.2013, <http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/niemiecki-europosel-ue-i-rosja-dalej-od-zlagodzenia-wymogow-wizowych/7ybek>. On the threat of higher crime rate: W. Waszczykowski, *Polski reset z Rosją...*, p. 24.

⁸⁰ A. Wilk, P. Żochowski, *Francja i Niemcy zacieśniają współpracę wojskową z Rosją*, „TnW” OSW 2011, no. 22 (182), p. 3–4. Compare: Vladimir Socor, *Arms Transfers to Russia: An Internal Challenge to NATO*, „Eurasia Daily Monitor”, vol. 8, no. 125 (june 2011), (int.).

⁸¹ A. Wilk, P. Żochowski, op. cit., p. 3–4; G. Povolockij, *Rossijsko francuzsko vojennoe sotrudnichestvo: «Mistral» napolnil parusa doverija*, „Meżdunarodna žizn”, 5.01.2011, (int.); *Interesy Paryża. Wieści z UE*, „GP”, 2.02.2011, p. 17.

⁸² M. Landler, S.L. Myers, *Obama Sees '67 Borders as Starting Point for Peace Deal*, “New York Times”, 19.05.2011.

⁸³ B. Koszel, op. cit., p. 135–140.

⁸⁴ *Trójkat Weimarski poparł Obamę*, TVP. Info, 20.05.2011, [http://tvp.info/informacje/polaska/trojkat-weimarski-poparl-obame/4539737](http://tvp.info/informacje/polска/trojkat-weimarski-poparl-obame/4539737).

⁸⁵ On the grounds of legalism one may state that the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel aren't the integral part of Israel and therefore appealing for withdrawal doesn't undermine its territorial integrity. According to international law it is so. Here, however, we're talking about political and not legal reality. Israel considers West Jerusalem as the integral part of its capital city, and similarly the strategically significant Golan Hills. Undermining this facts, so crucial for Israel for the identity reasons (Jerusalem) or military ones (Golan Hills), by allied USA is unprecedented, which should be worrying for other allies of the United States.

of another one (Israel). Making with Germany any declarations concerning Jewish issues must also be perceived as a big mistake. In such an atmosphere a year later the government was confronted with the appeal of the German president Joachim Gauck to boycott Ukraine during Euro2012⁸⁶, which was the icon of the Polish government's propaganda success. This action of the head of the German state was deeply confusing for the government circles in Warsaw⁸⁷, and on the other hand supported by the opposition (PiS)⁸⁸.

The role of Germany as the main promoter of the common/union eastern policy had been noticed in Poland since 1990. Germany as the main donator, financing the bulk of all union policies, had to be taken into consideration by Poland at all times, since its concept of shaping the foreign policy of the EU was and still is based on an inefficient formula "we've got an idea, you give us money for it." Till 2008 Poland had contested excessive, in its opinion, caring for the Russian interests by Berlin, basing of the cooperation with the power beyond the Union, i.e. the United States. The above mentioned "reset" in American-Russian relations on the one hand, and the change of cabinet in Warsaw on the other were the turning point for this policy. It was clearly pro-German one. It was also favored by the personalization of the foreign policy goals by PO-PSL government, meant as aiming at gaining the prominent positions in the EU for Polish politicians⁸⁹. Supporting

Germany in this case was a sine qua non condition, as could be seen in the choice of Jerzy Buzek for the President of the European Parliament.

The point of disagreement between Poland and Germany, however, no matter who is in power in Warsaw is energetic and climate policy of the Union promoted by Germany⁹⁰. It was Poland ruled by PO-PSL that was the leader of the coalition of the member states of the European Union, which were in similar situation, and at EU summits in Brussels (15th-16th October 2008⁹¹,

pejskiej? „Jest zdecydowanym faworytem”, <http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/tusk-na-szefa-komisji-europejskiej-jest-zdecydowanym-faworytem,316252.html>. This topic was gradually disappearing (*Tusk zastąpi Barroso w Komisji Europejskiej? Jest decyzja premiera, „Dziennik Gazeta Prawna*, 11th June 2013 and reappearing in Polish media (*Hipoteza Kolendy-Zaleskiej: wraca temat szefostwa Komisji Europejskiej dla Donalda Tuska. Możliwe scenariusze*, 300 Polityka, 30th October 2013, <http://300polityka.pl/news/2013/10/30/hipoteza-kolendy-zaleskiej-wraca-temat-szefostwa-komisji-europejskej-dla-donald-a-tuska-mozliwe-scenariusze/>). Some time before Polish diplomacy was making attempts at getting the post of the Secretary General of NATO for R. Sikorski (*Rząd nie zgłosi kandydatury Sikorskiego na szefa NATO*, RMF24, 3rd April 2009, <http://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-rzad-nie-zglosi-kandydatury-sikorskiego-na-szefa-nato,nId,166013>). This issue came back in media in 2013 (*Syria może pomóc Sikorskiemu w zdobyciu międzynarodowego stanowiska*, RMF24, 13th September 2013, http://www.rmf24.pl/raport-konfliktwsyrii/fakty/news-syria-moze-pomoc-sikorskiemu-w-zdobyciu-miedzynarodowego-sta,nId,1026806?utm_source=paste&utm_medium=paste&utm_campaign=firefox). The Secretary General of the European Council for W. Cimoszewicz (W. Szacki, *Cimoszewicz na Sekretarza Generalnego Rady Europy*, „GW”, 06th March 2009). The attempts for the position of the President of the European Parliament by J. Buzek and the position of vice-governor of The Council of Europe Development Bank for M. Dowgielewicz proved effective (*Mikołaj Dowgielewicz elected Vice-Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, News, 30th March 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/mikolaj_dowgielewicz_elected_vice_governor_of_the_council_of_europe_development?printMode=true). The attempts to influence public opinions in Poland with this action rather than setting up more serious goals of foreign policy of the state was successful to great extent.

⁸⁶ P. Buras, B. Nowak, A. Dzieszkowska, J. Trojanowski, op. cit., p. 34–38; *Prezydent o przyszłotygodniowym szczycie w Jałcie*, Prezydent.pl, 5.05.2012, <http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wizyty-zagraniczne/art,173,prezydent-o-przyszlotygodniowym-szczycie-w-jalcie.html>; *Komorowski jedzie na bojkotowany szczyt do Jałty*, Interia.pl Fakty, 4.05.2012, <http://fakty.interia.pl/polscena/news-komorowski-jedzie-na-bojkotowany-szczyt-do-jalty,nId,915954>.

⁸⁷ P. Buras, B. Nowak, A. Dzieszkowska, J. Trojanowski, op. cit., p. 48–66, compare: I. Janicka, op. cit., p. 104.

⁸⁸ Jarosław Kaczyński: *PiS opowiada się za bojkotem Euro 2012 na Ukrainie*, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Aktualności, Parafia, 03.05.2012, <http://www.pis.org.pl/article.php?id=20197>.

⁸⁹ The positions of the President of the European Commission for D. Tusk and the head of the Union diplomacy for R. Sikorski were discussed. *Tusk na szefa Komisji Euro-*

11th–12th December 2008⁹², 29th–30th October 2009⁹³ and 10th–11th December 2009⁹⁴) resisted the attempts to overburden them with the ideological costs of the climate policy of the “old” Union, with Berlin at its head⁹⁵. Although PO-PSL government was trying to diminish the extent of political disagreement with Germany also in this matter, still Poland didn’t include the climate issues into the list of its presidency priorities in 2011. Polish presidency in the EU Council when it comes to the energetic policy of the Union was focused exclusively on its external aspects (safety) and infrastructure projects⁹⁶. Indeed, it could be interpreted as avoiding the controversial issue when there was the lack of political will to start the conflict with a more powerful partner over the issue of disagreement. Nothing, however, implies that the opposing attitudes but also interests⁹⁷

⁹² The established coalition of eight states under the leadership of Poland persuaded the main promoters of climate packet to start intense negotiations during the preparation period for the meeting of the Council of Europe (J. Bielecki, *Prezydent Francji może ustąpić Polsce, „Dziennik”,* 12th November 2008, p. 4 i P. Jędrozyczk, *Pół rządu Niemiec w Warszawie, „Rz”,* 9th December 2008, p. A11). At the summit the Middle European group of the opponents of strict emission norms and financial burdens was effectively supported by Italy J. Bielecki, *Unia uratowała jedność, ale kosztem ekologii, „Dziennik”,* 13th–14th December 2008, p. 9.

⁹³ According to the statement by D. Tusk: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania agreed upon a stand point (minimizing financial burdens P.Ż.G.) in the issue of climate, and Slovenia considers their postulates with „friendly neutrality”. *Na szczytach UE nowe kraje chcą wywrzeć presję ws. klimatu, „Gazeta.pl”,* 29th October 2009, (int.). Compare: *Polska nie wyklucza weta na czwartkowo-piątkowym szczytach UE, „EurActiv”,* 29.10.2009, <http://www.euractiv.pl/eurowybory/artykul/polska-nie-wyklucza-weta-na-czwartkowo-piatkowym-szczycie-ue-001361>. Despite its efforts at the EU forum Poland didn’t defend its position and it was only when the USA, China, and India opposed that the Copenhagen summit turned out a fiasco. The beyond Union factors, the United States as one of the most important, acted in the interest of the new EU member states, including Poland *Negocjacje klimatyczne w UE: Polska nie przekonała partnerów, „Gazeta.pl”,* 21st October 2009, (int.).

⁹⁴ *Biedne kraje bez pieniędzy na klimat, TVN24.pl, http://www.tvn24.pl/1,1633113,druk.html*

⁹⁵ R. Bajczuk, *Ochrona klimatu – specjalność niemieckiego eksportu i dyplomacji, „Kom. OSW”,* no. 104, 03.04.2013, p. 1–7.

⁹⁶ T.G. Grosse, *Polityka energetyczno-klimatyczna. Podmiotowe wyzwanie dla polskiej prezydencji w UE, „AN”,* no. 2(50) 2011, p. 1–13.

⁹⁷ K. Obłodecki, *Zmiany w sektorze energetycznym czołowych państw Unii Europejskiej jako wyzwanie dla polityki polskiej, „Arcana”,* no. 97(1/2011), p. 38–48.

between Poland and Germany concerning the climate policy of the Union have been removed.

The idea of introducing Poland into “the group of decision makers of the EU” – “the great six” (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Poland)⁹⁸, which was promoted by the Polish government recently, appealed to the imagination of the part of Polish public opinion. Regardless the fact that this political ideas was faulty in itself from the perspective of Polish interests. Poland would have been isolated in such a group, without possibility of building up coalitions with smaller neighbours from the region of middle-east Europe, and therefore condemned for the role of German client, under the threat of being removed from the club of “directors”. What is more, it would have been warranting the practice of transferring the real decision making centre of the EU beyond the Union treaty structures, which would have been a disadvantage for Poland. Poland could be the part of “European directorate” only as the protege of Germany, and not as opposition side, which it frequently had been before in disagreements over the hegemony of the USA in the European architecture of safety, the extent of Russian interests accepted by Brussels, the openness of Union on the issue of integration aspirations of Ukraine⁹⁹ and defending the rule

⁹⁸ This concept has appeared in the public discourse for several years in various forms. In 2009 the minister of foreign affairs of Italy Franco Frattini in his interview for „Il Sole-24 Ore” supported the idea of the directorate of the European „6” with the participation of Poland and Spain. „Il Sole-24 Ore”: „Polska powinna być w gronie głównych decydentów UE”, 26th September 2009, Polskie Radio.pl, <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/115/Artykul/175206,Il-Sole24-Ore-Polska-powinna-byc-w-gronie-glownych-decydentow-UE>. After Great Britain had refused to sign the fiscal pact, minister Sikorski suggested in megalomaniac way that by joining the pact Poland will take the place of the United Kingdom in the group of the main decision makers of the EU. *Sikorski: Polska może dołączyć do grupy decydentów, z której Wielka Brytania właśnie wyszła, Wiadomości, „Gazeta.pl”,* 24th January 2013, (int.). Earlier the concept of Poland in the „group of decision makers” was mentioned by Sikorski at the PO convention. *Przemówienie Radosława Sikorskiego Więcześwodniczącego i Koordynatora Programowego PO wygłoszone w Gdańsku podczas Konwencji z okazji X-lecia działalności Platformy Obywatelskiej, Konwencja z okazji X-lecia Platformy Obywatelskiej, Radosław Sikorski, Oficjalna strona posła na sejm RP, http://www.radeksikorski.pl/aktualnosci/konwencja-z-okazji-x-lecia-platformy-obywatelej/*

⁹⁹ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Stosunki UE – Ukraina – studium niepowodzenia wysiłków Kijowa na rzecz uzyskania obietnicy stowarzyszenia z Unią Europejską, (in:) Proces akcesji do Unii Europejskiej, P. Żurawski vel Grajewski (ed.), Łódź 2001, p. 190–191.*

of overestimating small countries in the EU Council. Between 2003–2007 it earned Poland the opinion of troublemaker (Störenfried)¹⁰⁰ in Germany.

The crisis in the Economic and Monetary Union, changing the balance of powers within the Union, had blighted the plans connected with the concept of “great six”. Italy and Spain deep in financial problems dropped out from the group of candidates, Great Britain refused to join fiscal pact¹⁰¹, and the election of François Hollande for the president of weakening France, strongly disturbed French-German tandem¹⁰². (Polish attitude towards the internal French competition between Sarkozy and Hollande was, which is worth mentioning, close to the German one, i.e. supporting Sarkozy)¹⁰³. In such a situation the vision of a sole hegemony of Germany in the EU had become real and the question about Polish attitude towards it justified.

A significant part of Polish political class as well as public opinion is convinced about an irremovable weakness of Poland as a participant in international affairs.

¹⁰⁰ I. Janicka, op. cit., p. 106.

¹⁰¹ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Pozycja Wielkiej Brytanii w Unii Europejskiej w świetle odrzucenia przez Zjednoczone Królestwo paktu fiskalnego*, „Nowa Politologia”, 3.01.2013, <http://www.nowapolitologia.pl/politologia/europeistyka/pozycja-wielkiej-brytanii-w-unii-europejskiej-w-swietle-odrzucenia-przez-zjednoczone-krolestwo>

¹⁰² Czy Francja pozostaje najważniejszym partnerem Niediec?, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, <http://www.isp.org.pl/programy,program-europejski,obszary-tematyczne,czy-programy-wspominaja-o-francji,966.html>.

¹⁰³ France is getting weaker economically losing the AAA clause in ratings. It has also withdrawn politically from the Middle Europe giving way to German Republic. The division of tasks (Germany-east, France-south) didn't turn out lucky for Paris. The initiative of Sarkozy concerning the Union for the Mediterranean sank in the chaos of „the Arabian spring”. The decreasing popularity of the head of France resulted in the public support of Chancellor Merkel for Sarkozy in the oncoming elections, which was an unprecedented involvement of German Republic in the internal policy of French Republic. See: P. Jendroszczyk, *Merkizo to nie fikcja*, „Rz”, 7th February 2012, p. A7. Compare: P. Semka, *Brutalni, subtelní, skuteczní*, „Rz”, Plus-Minus, 25th –26th February 2012, p. P3 and P. Jen(dro)szczyk, *Sarkozy liczy na Merkel*, „Rz”, 7th February 2012, p. A1. Poland behaved in a similar way. Prime Minister Tusk refused to meet Hollande during his visit in Poland, like other politicians of Christian Democrats in the EU cooperating within the European Parliament dominated by Germany. It was, however, balanced by the audience the candidate for the French president received from president Bronisław Komorowski, breaking out from the group of other politicians associated with Christian Democrats in the Union. P. Wroński, *Komorowski z Hollandem jak Tusk z Merkel*, „GW”, 7th May 2013.

Finding place in a stronger structure e.g. the European Union and finding a wealthy protector is supposed to be a remedy for this. Hence, if Americans don't intend to be one, Germans can take their place. This opinion, although seldom expressed in public, is dominant in the circles supporting the policy of the present government. Amongst the opposition, however, it is strictly rejected. The leader of PiS Jarosław Kaczyński during the discussion at the congress “Polska Wielki Projekt” (Poland the Great Project) in May 2012 said that the German hegemony in the EU, ... is a thing that cannot be realized in the long-term perspective. (...) Germany itself is too weak for this for different reasons, both when it comes to the mild hegemony of American type (...) as well as to (...) tough one, imposed, since luckily Germany is not in possession of the tools for such a hegemony¹⁰⁴. Therefore the hegemony of Germany in the EU is perceived by PiS not only as undesirable, but also inefficient, i.e. because of the lack of the potential unable to solve the oncoming challenges and problems. In this part of Polish political scene there prevails an opinion that Germany, despite its economic power, is not able to stabilize the situation in the Economic and Monetary Union and the EU on its own¹⁰⁵, and reaching for the domination increases aversion towards itself, which additionally makes the task more difficult. When it comes to the foreign affairs policy of the EU the vision of the German-Russian strategic partnership determine the fate of the Middle Europe is perceived by PiS circles as the black scenario, which should be fought against by any means¹⁰⁶. It is difficult not to agree with this.

The nature of international game is dynamic. The traditional German rule of eastern policy Russia first has weakened significantly in the recent years. It is the result of: German disappointment with the failure of the concept of “the partnership for modernization” supported by Berlin when Dymitrij Miedwiediew was the president¹⁰⁷, the relative weakening of the German-Russian

¹⁰⁴ J. Kaczyński, *Nie odzwierzajmy Cesarstwa Niemieckiego*, „Rz”, 8.12.2011.

¹⁰⁵ J. Kaczyński in „Polska Wielki Projekt”, Warszawa 11.05.2012 r., <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SicFSRN-TIOQ>.

¹⁰⁶ Szczerski: *Niemcy chcą zdominować prawnie Unię*, „Stefczyk Info”, 27.08.2012, <http://www.stefczyk.info/publicystyka/opinie/szczerski-niemcy-chca-zdominowac-prawnie-unie,5223503972>. Sf.: Website „GP”, bookmark *Kondominium*, <http://www.gazetapolska.pl/gazeta-polska/kondominium>

¹⁰⁷ P. Buras, B. Nowak, A. Dzieszkowska, J. Trojanowski, op. cit., p. 32.

gas partnership due to the Shale gas revolution in the USA, its perspectives in Europe, the effects of Russian-Ukrainian gas wars, the general weakening of Russia on the market of energetic resources and the decrease of the significance of gas in German energy production¹⁰⁸, the disagreement over Cyprian banks, where the money of Russian oligarchs connected with the Kremlin were deposited¹⁰⁹, revisions in German foundations on the territory of Russian Federation in 2012¹¹⁰, the issue of returning the masterpieces robbed by the USSR during the WWII¹¹¹, disappointment of German business with the conditions of operating in Russia¹¹² as well as presenting by Kremlin the rejection of customary narration dominating in the EU (the case of Pussy Riot¹¹³ or the rights of homosexuals¹¹⁴, the imprisonment of Green-

¹⁰⁸ R. Bajczuk, *Gaz przegrywa z węglem na niemieckim rynku energii*, „BESTOSW”, nr 26(269), 28.03.2013.

¹⁰⁹ E. Fischer, M. Menkiszak, K. Poplawski, „Cypryjskie zwycięstwo” Niemiec?, „TnW” OSW, no. 12(255), 27.03.2013. Compare: P. Tokarski, A. Turkowski, *Problem pomocy finansowej dla Cypru w relacjach UE – Rosja*, „Biuletyn PISM”, no. 32(1008), 27.03.2013, p. 1–2.

¹¹⁰ Zachód krytykuje kontrole w rosyjskich NGO, „Wiadomości” OSW, no. 61, 27.03.2013; compare: W. Radziwiłowicz, *Rosja tropi agentów w organizacjach pozarządowych. Świat protestuje, nagonka trwa*, „GW”, 28.03.2013.

¹¹¹ Spotkanie Putin – Merkel, „Wiadomości” OSW, no. 120, 24.06.2013; compare: V. Astapovich, *Putin, Merkel Pay Controversial Visit to Museum*, „RIA Novosti”, 21.06.2013, <http://en.rian.ru/politics/20130621/181804435.html>.

¹¹² J. Dempsey, *Chancellor Merkel’s Chance to Push Russia*, IHT Rendezvous, “International Herald Tribune. The Global Edition of the New York Times”, October 29, 2012.

¹¹³ *Human Rights in Russia: Pussy Riot takes part in committee debate*, DROI, Press release – External relations – 29-05-2013 – 11:38, European Parliament/News, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130527IPR10553/html/Human-Rights-in-Russia-Pussy-Riot-takes-part-in-committee-debate>; M. Banks, *Russia condemns EU parliament over Pussy Riot nomination*, “The Parliament.com”, 27th September 2012, <http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/russia-condemns-eu-parliament-over-pussy-riot-nomination/#.Ukd-J3-3vU5>.

¹¹⁴ On 11th June 2013 State Duma of Russia passed the bill forbidding „propagating untraditional sexual relationship”, which was criticized by the EU. The text of the decision of Duma and its proceedings see: Законопроект № 44554–6, О внесении изменений в статью 5 Федерального закона «О защите детей от информации, причиняющей вред их здоровью и развитию» и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в целях защиты детей от информации, пропагандирующей отрицание традиционных семейных ценностей, Автоматизированная система обеспечения законодательной деятельности, Федеральное Собрание Российской Федерации, Государственная Дума, офи-

peace activists¹¹⁵), finally the disagreement between the Union and Russia over the consociating of the states of the Eastern Partnership increasing since the summer 2013¹¹⁶. In this last issue France is ready to give way to Russia¹¹⁷, whereas Germany “is going to persuade” Moscow that the Eastern Partnership is not “aiming against its interests”¹¹⁸, which might be interpreted as sustaining the will of its continuation by Berlin. A relatively mild declaration of chancellor Merkel concerning this issue from 23rd November 2013, got a stronger confirmation in the common statement by the ministers of foreign affairs of Germany Guido Westerwelle and Poland Radosław Sikorski, released three days later, in which they announced that both states unchangeably aim at “the European future of Ukraine”, sustain the offer of signing the accession treaty with this country, emphasising its validity, and expressed the support for the demonstrators, demanding in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities the resuming of the process of its accession to the EU. The rhetoric of the authors of this document clearly indicated addressing the Ukrainian people as the potential “main beneficiary of the unprecedented offer presented by the European Union about tight political and economic cooperation”¹¹⁹.

циальный сайт, 29.06.2013, 2356–6 ГД, <http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28Spravka%29?OpenAgent&RN=44554-6&c02>.

¹¹⁵ The imprisonment of Greenpeace activists resulted in the Dutch-Russian disagreement, and not German-Russian one, yet it influenced medially on the German public opinion in unfavorable way for Russia. More on the disagreement see: W. Rodkiewicz, *Diplomatyczny konflikt między Hagą a Moskwą: interesy i wartości*, „TnW”, OSW, nr 33(276), 16th October 2013.

¹¹⁶ A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, *Rosyjska ofensywa przed wieliskim szczytem Partnerstwa Wschodniego*, „Kom. OSW”, no. 115, 30.09.2013. Compare: T. Iwański, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, *Rosja przeciwiała zbliżeniu Ukrainy z Unią Europejską*, „TnW”, OSW, 26(269), 28.08.2013; D. Trenin, *Whether New Eastern Europe?*, Strategic Europe, July 12, 2013, Carnegie Europe, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/07/12/whether-new-eastern-europe/gfc8>.

¹¹⁷ A. Robert, *France says EU – Russia – Ukraine relations are no ‘zero sum game’*, “EurActiv.com”, 21/22 November 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/europees-east/france-supports-association-agre-news-531726>.

¹¹⁸ *Merkel: EU, Russia need to talk to about east ties*, “Miami Herald World Wires”, Saturday, 23.11.2013 (int.).

¹¹⁹ *Wspólna deklaracja szefów MSZ Polski i Niemiec ws. Ukrainy*, 26.11.2013, MSZ RP, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/wspolna_deklaracja_szefow_msz_polski_i_niemiec_ws_ukrainy.

All these moves lead to the thesis that Germany of 2013 with colder relations with Russia, and warmer with the USA (as compared to the Schröeder era) and ready to get involved in Ukraine, even against the Kremlin, are from the Polish perspective more acceptable leader of the European Union than 10 years ago. This state, however, like all the previous ones may change. The Schröeder era is still remembered in Poland, and even today new pro-Russian movements appear in Germany like a marginal party Alternative für Deutschland-AfD¹²⁰ It promotes a Bismarck-Gorczakow vision of the order in Europe, symbolized by the reinsurance treaty of 1887¹²¹, as the most desirable from the perspective of German national interest¹²². It is not a populist party but the party of elites, German opinion making circles, and the continuous crisis in the Eurozone, may increase its significance in the future. Forecasting the future political ability of Germany to pay the costs of the Eurozone stabilization, in other words for the EU leadership, which could be accepted (or not) by Poland, one should remember that the economic interests of Germany, the largest economic power of UGW, are gradually removed beyond Europe. Nowadays already 50% of German export is directed in the markets beyond the Union, and

this indicator has been increasing dynamically in the recent years. It means that Germany may gradually lose its determination to pay the costs of rescue programs for the threatened members of the Eurozone¹²³. The social potential of Euroscepticism may be increasing in Germany, and along with it the significance of parties like AfD, i.e. political movements with programs that in no way can be accepted in Poland.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the above can be summarized in the thesis, that Poland with its present government is ready not only to recognize the German leadership in the EU, but also support it in an active way. Should PO lose the elections (which is getting more and more likely) and the convincing (allowing for independent rule) victory of PiS (not that likely but still not impossible) the stand point of Poland referring to this issue would change completely. Verification of this forecast will take place as the result of the nearest parliamentary elections, which are due in 2015. Till then international situation, the condition of the EU, as well as the position of two main antagonists in Polish politics may undergo significant modification. The fourth factor that should be taken into consideration while forecasting Polish stand point towards the German leadership in the EU is naturally Germany itself. It seems that it is the most stable element of the whole situation. Shortly after the elections in September 2013, which granted the third term for Angela Merkel, we should expect the continuation rather than revolution on the part of Berlin. The situation in Germany doesn't imply violent moves in German policy either towards the Union or Poland, Russia, or the USA, which could influence the future attitude of Poland towards the German leadership. The combination of the above mentioned three dynamic factors and one, at least potentially, static one will finally answer the question of potential readiness of Poland to accept the leadership of Germany in the European Union or not.

¹²⁰ This party, although it didn't get to the Parliament, relatively succeeded acquiring 4.7%, which gives it the potential to rise and doesn't imply its end. More about the situation after the elections in Germany see: A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, M. Zawilska-Florczuk, *Trudne negocjacje koalicyjne po wyborach w RFN*, „BESTOSW”, nr 30(273), 25th September 2013, and M.A. Cichocki, *A broken monolith (Germany after election/September 2013)*, „Komentarze Natolińskie”, nr 4(23)/2013.

¹²¹ More on the reinsurance treaty see: H. Wereszczycki, *Koniec sojuszu trzech cesarzy*, Warszawa 2010, p. 356–387. On the Bismarck's system of alliances and the cooperation between the chancellor of Germany Otto von Bismarck and Russia Aleksandr Gorczakow see: Idem, *Sojusz trzech cesarzy. Geneza 1866–1872*, Warszawa 2010 and idem, *Sojusz trzech cesarzy. Walka o pokój europejski 1872–1878*, Warszawa 2010.

¹²² A. Lachmann, *Die AfD will zurück zu Bismarcks Außenpolitik*, *Positionspapier*, „Die Welt“, 10.09.2013 (int.); compare: *Polityka zagraniczna Bismarcka wzorem dla niemieckiej partii „AfD”*, „Pch24.pl. Polonia Christiana”, 17.09.2013, <http://www.pch24.pl/polityka-zagraniczna-bismarcka-wzorem-dla-niemieckiej-partii-afd-,17734,i.html>; J. Lepiarz, *Niemcy. Eurosceptycy z AfD liczą na wejście do Bundestagu*, „GW”, 20.09.2013. On the party see: K. Jaeger, M. Matzke, *Nowa partia w RFN – Alternatywa dla Niemiec*, „Deutsche Welle”, 13.03.2013, (int.); M. Tujdowski, *Alternatywne ruchy prawicowe w wyborach do Bundestagu – Statystyki – Kalendarium od 28 sierpnia do 16 września 2013 roku*, „Biuletyn Niemiecki”, no. 40, 20.09.2013, p. 3–4.

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A. Åslund, A. Kuchins, *Pressing the “Reset Button” on US-Russia Relations*, Russia Balance Sheet, “Policy Brief”, CSIS, Nr PB09–6, March 2009.

¹²³ T.G. Grosse, *Kryzys europejskiej waluty...*, p. 4.

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