Mauricio Olavarria-Gambi[1]

Policy Implementation: Lessons from the Chilean Policy on Public Management Modernization

ABSTRACT: *This paper analyses the implementation of public management modernization policy between 1990 and 2013, applying the taxonomy by Hasenfeld and Brock (1991). Information analysed in this study comes from 67 interviews with actors who have played key roles in the implementation of modernization initiatives, as well as from official documents, and academic literature. The findings of the study suggest that taxonomy is useful in characterizing the organizational and inter-organizational behavioural patterns that influence policy implementation; also, that the prevalent driving forces help to understand the dynamic of implementation and what capacities, abilities and strategies are required to put into practice a concrete public policy, which appear to be linked to the context in which implementation takes place.*

INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this article is to identify the organizational and inter-organizational behavioural patterns, or driving forces, that determined how the Chilean public management modernization policy (PMMP) has been implemented, and to explain how different stakeholders participating in the implementation process understand these patterns. The identification of the most influential driving forces helps to characterize the implementation process of a particular policy and, subsequently, to understand the circumstances and conditions under which the policy was put into practice.

To identify the forces driving the implementation process, this study takes the taxonomy suggested by Hasenfeld and Brock (1991), which is especially useful because it synthesizes the organizational and inter-organizational behavioural patterns in the policy implementation efforts. This taxonomy was previously tested by McGrath (2009) in an analysis of the implementation of a Children Insurance Program in three US States, but it has neither been tested outside USA nor beyond the borders of a redistributive social policy. Thus, the article does not focus on explaining the successes or failures of the policy,[2] but rather – as a secondary goal – in examining the effectiveness of that taxonomy to identify and characterize the organizational and inter-organizational behaviours influencing the implementation process that involves complex institutional changes, such as that of the Chilean PMMP.

Another secondary goal is to gauge what would explain the differences in organizational and inter-organizational behavioural patterns influencing the implementation of policies. Analysing the implementation of a redistribute health policy, McGrath (2009) found that the main driving forces influencing implementation were not the same as those identified by Hasenfeld and Brock (1991). Then, if any differences are detected, an assessment of the resultant conceptual implications will be made. as to what conceptual implications arise as a result. Analysis of the driving forces that play an important role in the execution of policy mandates not only contributes to understand the role of implementers but also contributes to realize whether there is common ground in the implementation of policies of a similar type or from different sectors of government activity.[3]

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1 Mauricio Olavarria-Gambi: Centro de Estudios de Gobierno, Universidad de Santiago de Chile. Email: mauricio.olavarria@usach.cl

2 For policy success and/or policy failure, see McConnell (2010a), Birkland (2009), McConnell (2010b), Marsh and McConnell (2010), Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (1999), among others.

3 The expression, 'sectors of government activity' refers to actions undertaken by the executive branch of government, mainly through ministry activities. It relates to areas, or sectors, such as social issues (health, housing, education, social development), political issues (interior government and public security, the relationship with Congress, and executive branch communications), as well as mining, finance, the economy and tourism, transport and telecommunications, issues affecting women, foreign affairs, agriculture, public works,

The implementation of PMMP refers to the collective efforts aimed at putting into practice changes to structures, central government working procedures and organizational routines. The purpose thereof has been to ensure greater effectiveness in how the central government functions.

Specific endeavours in the context of Chile's PMMP have addressed a number of areas. These include: the management control system; the public procurement system; the civil service and the hiring of senior public managers in a merit-based selection system; transparency and access to public information; and the program called Chile Gestiona (meaning 'Chile Manages'), which is aimed at improving the results and productivity of public agencies.

The Chilean PMMP is rather endogenous, since neither is it founded on the demands of the public, nor is it directly related to the politician's interest. Rather, it derives from the concerns of authorities and senior public officials about how to ensure that the State becomes more effective in implementing other policies directly related to the improvement of general public's well-being. On the other hand, the Chilean PMMP is a policy endeavour, which includes a variety of initiatives and programs undertaken between 1990 and 2013, spanning five democratic administrations with different ideological outlooks.

Chile's public management is said to be a case that distinguishes in Latin America because of the improvements it showed in effectiveness and the high level of professionalization achieved (Iacoviello & Strazza, 2014). Thus, an analysis of the Chilean PMMP provides an opportunity to identify the main factors driving the implementation of a policy that has improved the effectiveness of the government administrative apparatus; and, at the same time, to identify the driving factors behind that, as well as to realize whether the Hasenfeld and Brock's taxonomy is useful to identify the forces of an implementation effort that occurred in a different context from those in which it has been tested previously.

The following sections of the article include an explanation of the theoretical framework, a description of the methodology and data used in the analysis, a presentation of the evidence of Chilean PMMP implementation, and a discussion on its conceptual implications. The final section provides the main conclusions from the study.

ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Research into policy implementation has a long tradition. Saetren (2005, pp. 561 – 569) challenges the common understanding that, 'no research under the explicit label of implementation was carried out before the publication of Pressman and Wildavsky's seminal book titled "Implementation" in 1973.' Saetren shows that studies in this field began in 1930s, mainly through doctoral dissertations, and that the publication of books and journal articles on this issue, 'can be traced back to at least the mid-1950s and even earlier.' Policy analysis in Latin America has concentrated on formulation issues (see, for instance, Scartascini, Spiller, Stein, & Tommasi, 2011; Stein, Tommasi, Spiller, & Scartascini, 2008; Boeninger, 2007; Stein, Tommasi, Echebarría, Lora, & Payne, 2006; Aninat, Landregan, Navia, & Vial, 2006). Indeed, the topic of policy implementation has only recently begun to be addressed (see, for instance, Ardanaz, Scartascini, & Tommasi, 2010; Cortazar, 2007).

Dimitrakopoulos and Richardson (2001, p. 336) define policy implementation as 'the complex process of putting a policy into practice by a variety of mechanisms and procedures involving a wide and diverse range of actors'. Later, they argue that this 'is the stage of the policy process where the underlying theories of policy decisions, the choice of policy instruments and the resources allocated during the formulation process are tested against reality.'

Thus, an analysis of policy implementation would include the identification of factors that are mainly influencing what people or targeted groups actually receive from the state or by means of government intervention.

The search for these driving factors has led to the rise of different perspectives on how implementation analysis should be undertaken. From a top-down perspective, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), for instance, suggest that there are three sets of variables involved in the implementation processes: tractability of the problem, ability of the statute to structure implementation, and non-statutory variables affecting implementation. Bardach (1977), in turn, sees implementation as a game in which the actors behave strategically to influence the implementation of a program with the purpose of protecting their interests; and accordingly, those in charge of implementing the policy should structure the game in such a way that the desired outcome can be obtained. Others

management of national/public properties, culture, labor, justice, defense, energy, environment, and sport. In Chile, the Ministry of Finance has traditionally headed the public management modernization policy.

have moved in the opposite direction, such as Lipsky (1980), who argues that street-level bureaucrats play a major role in policy implementation, since they design routines and mechanisms to fill the omissions of the policy.

In turn, Elmore (1979-1980) distinguishes two clear approaches to the analysis of policy implementation: forward mapping and backward mapping. The former approach assumes that 'implementation begins at the top of the process, with as clear a statement as possible of the policymaker's intent and proceeds through a sequence of increasingly more specific steps to define what is expected of implementers at each level' (Elmore, 1979-1980, p. 602). Backward mapping, alternatively, begins at the lowest level and backs up through the organizational structure to gauge the ability of the implementing agency to accomplish policy goals. According to Elmore (1979-1980, p. 605), backward mapping assumes that, 'the closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater is one's ability to influence it.'

Seen in perspective, both approaches may be regarded as complementary, since taken together they provide a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of implementation (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). In turn, Elmore (1985) argues that the combination of both approaches helps to understand the selection of means and tools made by the policy designers, as well as the motivation of those putting the policy into practice.

These factors or variables might be located at the macro or micro level, at the top or bottom of the structure, and may be identified through a forward or backward mapping analysis.

The idea of driving forces refers to the set of observed organizational or inter-organizational patterns of behaviour in the process, whereby attempts are made to ensure the fulfilment of policy goals. Hasenfeld and Brock (1991, p. 451) call these the 'driving forces', which they define as 'explanations offered by the observed patterns and consequences of implementations'.

After examining 37 studies on the implementation of United States' social policy (including top-down, bottom-up and iterative analysis), Hasenfeld and Brock (1991) identify five types of patterns which play key roles. They call these 'driving force domains'. According to these authors, policy implementation may be characterized as the dynamic interaction of the following driving force domains: the pursuit of rationality, organization-policy fit, bureaucratic discretion and adaptation, power relations, and leadership and competence.

A pursuit of rationality refers to the act whereby implementation 'is driven by a chain of goal-means relations' and/or, 'the ability of the statute to structure the implementation process' (Hasenfeld & Brock, 1991, p. 453). This driving factor focuses on how the relationship between goals and means allocated to the policy is understood, and whether the implementers thereof behave in accordance with the policy statute. This implies that there is a previous process of learning, based on evaluations and experience, from which a set of actions have been deliberatively chosen to ensure the more effective fulfilment of policy goals.

Organization-policy fit refers to 'a function of the organization's ability to develop structures and processes that fit the institutional, economic, and dominant patterns of service provision in the policy environment' (Hasenfeld & Brock, 1991, p. 454). It focuses on the organizational structure and procedures in which the policy is being implemented. Organizational setting plays a major role in implementing the policy, because the 'organizations tend to develop routines, or standard operating procedures, by which personnel interact in regular and predictable ways to solve regular and predictable problems' (O'Toole & Montjov 1984, p. 492). Accordingly, this driving force focuses on how the organizational elements favour, or impede the fulfilment of policy goals.

Bureaucratic discretion and adaptation is understood as, 'the amount of discretion exercised by bureaucrats who are at the front line of service delivery' (Hasenfeld & Brock, 1991, p. 454). It refers to the ability of street-level bureaucrats to shape the actions of an organization when implementing a policy. Accordingly, Elmore (1980, p. 605) argues that, 'the problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate'.

From the driving force of power relation perspective, 'implementation is viewed as an arena in which interest groups compete, bargain, coalesce in order to obtain or control resources … [which], in turn, determines the fate of the implementation process' (Hasenfeld & Brock, 1991, p. 454). This driving factor focuses on conflicts, and whether, and to what extent power (as imposition, negotiation or cooperation) is used to overcome difficulties and proceed with implementation.

Leadership and competence as a driving force refers to how and what type of leadership may guide the implementing organization to fulfil their policy mandate. It includes, 'the leadership qualities, interpersonal skills and competence of implementers' (Hasenfeld & Brock, 1991, p. 455). Hondeghem and Vandermeulen (2000, p. 342), in turn, describe competencies, 'as a combination of specific, integrated and applied skills, knowledge and abilities, which are essential to realize the strategic policy of the organization'.

Tab. 1: Driving Forces

Driving Forces	Definition
The pursuit of rationality	It pays attention to the coherence between goals and means allocated to the policy
Organization-policy fit	It focuses on whether the organizational elements, such as structure and procedures, serve the policy goals
Bureaucratic discretion and adaptation	It refers to how and to what extent the bureaucrats in charge of the implementation appropriate the policy
Power relation	It focuses on conflict and how power is used to overcome it
Leadership and competence	It refers to how qualities and competences of the senior public official in charge of the implementation serve the policy goals

Source: author's creation from Hasenfeld and Brock (1991)

Thus, the following sections of this article will test the extent to which these driving forces are present in the implementation of efforts to modernize public management in Chile.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This case study aims to identify the main organizational and inter-organizational behavioural patterns that have played key roles in the implementation process of the Chilean PMMP, to characterize it and to describe how stakeholders understand these driving forces. An explanatory case study enables identification of the best explanation (among several) of a set of events, which can later be applied to similar situations pertaining to the same phenomenon (Yin, 1994, p. 5). In addition, the word 'case' refers to 'experiences in which events involve interventions that may lead to changes in the policy on public management' (Barzelay, Gaetani, Cortazar, & Cejudo, 2003, p. 23).

The hypothesis tested by this study is that, given the characteristics of the Chilean PMMP, rational elements should have been more influential in the implementation of that policy. Then, the driving forces as a pursuit of rationality and organizational-policy fit would be of more explanatory power of the concrete situations faced in the implementation of this policy than those focused on conflict. This also implies to hypothesizes that the context and type of policy in which implementers operate might be determining which driving force is the prevalent one in a specific case of policy implementation.

Following the example of Hasenfeld and Brock (1991), the unit of analysis in this study is the organizational and inter-organizational network in which PMMP has been implemented. Regarding this, O'Toole and Montjoy (1984, p. 492) state that 'converting policy intention into action requires that those charged with execution cooperate toward the achievement of the policy, [which means that] … individuals, whether in one or in multiple agencies, work together toward a common policy product.'

Data comes from four sources: interviews; official documents; an academic bibliography; and the press. Sixty-seven interviews were conducted to obtain a comprehensive view of the PMMP implementation. The list of potential interviewees was devised from public information taken from the internet, relating to people who have served in relevant positions. These include senior-level public officials, members of Congress, public managers, senior-level advisors, leaders of public sector trade unions, experts and scholars (see table 1). The snowballing method was applied in case the potential interviewees from the original list proved unavailable. This approach enabled the collection of different perspectives and experiences from those involved in the process. It also ensured that the most influential patterns of interactions in terms of the implementation of this policy were identified. Interviewees were selected as per theoretical sampling and theoretical redundancy criteria. This enabled the collection of wide-ranging testimonies and information. It also meant that relevant analytical categories and previously known information could be identified, as well as for data with no analytical value to be disregarded (Valles, 2007).

Tab.2: Types of Actors Interviewed

Position of Actor Interviewed	Number
President	1
Ministers	7
Undersecretaries	4
Heads of Public Agencies	12
Advisors & Public Managers	28
Members of Congress	2
Interest Groups	3
Experts & Scholars	5
TOTAL	67

Source: Author's records.

With an aim of identifying the main driving forces of the implementation process, the interviews included open questions on the following areas: strategies; concepts and objectives guiding the implementation; fostering factors and obstacles faced; the main characteristics of the process; the main actors and their roles; the main decisions made; what those in charge of the policy did to implement these; and how the organization and employees reacted to these decisions. Questions eschewed references to successes or failures, so that respondents could describe the implementation process in which they participated in a more objective manner and avoiding any possible evaluative judgment. All interviews were held at different times between 2008 and 2013, depending on the availability of interviewees.

Although the group of interviewees does not constitute a representative sample, a key aspect of identifying the perceived relative importance of each force domain was to determine how often the interviewees referred to issues related to these force domains. Interview analysis allowed for the identification of specific sentences of the interviewees relating to each major force domain. These sentences were grouped according to the role fulfilled by the interviewee during the implementation process (senior public official, advisor or public manager, and others) and then tallied (table 2). Since each interviewee may have made more than one reference to issues relating to a main force domain, the number of sentences collected was far greater than the number of interviewees. The recurrence with which an interviewee referred to a particular driving factor was understood as the importance that he/she placed on that factor. In addition, an analysis of the relationship between these force domains and how the interviewees perceived them was also undertaken.

The aim of the analysis of official documents was to identify government goals regarding the policy, as well as the interventions undertaken by authorities, and the roles played by other policy actors. Academic literature, expert documents and think tank reports were examined with the aim to understand the debate on the issues addressed by the relevant policies, the implementation of which is analysed in this article.

IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC MANAGEMENT MODERNIZATION POLICY

According to Barzelay et. al. (2003, p. 20), 'Public Management Policies are government-wide institutional rules and routines … (which) … relate not only to people, organizations, and procedures but also to planning, execution, auditing, and review of public expenditures … (These) policies fall into the following categories: expenditure planning and financial management, civil service and labour relations, procurement, organization and methods, and audit and evaluation'.

In turn, state reform and public management modernization are two related, albeit different concepts. State reform refers to a change process with a politically defined end. It demands an intense and profound action to be taken on one or more sectors of the State, and in which this intensity also characterizes the administrative functioning of the State itself (Pollit & Bouckaert, 2004). Public management modernization, on the other hand, is related to bounded changes to the functioning of the State, included into government agendas, aimed at a physical, organizational or technological rejuvenation (Garretón & Cáceres, 2003).

Characterization of Public Management Modernization Policy

The Chilean PMMP relates to a government policy involving a wide variety of public organizations, focused on improving the functioning of the administrative apparatus of the State. Its implementation was an incremental process, and the landmarks of which include: the management control system; the procurement system; the civil service and the merit-based selection system of senior public managers; transparency and access to public information; and the Chile Gestiona program.

The management control system was the first initiative implemented, which focused directly on the modernization of public management. Its implementation formally began in the mid-1990s with the creation of the Inter-Ministry Committee for the Modernization of Public Management, under the administration of President Frei Ruiz-Tagle.

According to the Chilean Budget Office, the objective of the management control system is to contribute to the efficient allocation of public resources to different programs, projects and organizations and stimulate improvements in public management (Guzmán, 2005, p. 16). It includes the following instruments: performance indicators; comprehensive evaluation of program and organization expenditure; the management-improvement program; and the comprehensive management balance (Guzmán, 2005, p 16).

The establishment of the procurement system, as well as the civil service and the merit-based selection system of senior public managers, arose as a consequence of the 'Political-Legislative Agreement for the State Modernization, Transparency, and Economic Growth Promotion' reached between President Lagos and the opposition. This agreement, signed in January 2003, was regarded as a way to resolve a political crisis produced by several corruption scandals during the first part of the Lagos Presidency (Olavarría, Navarrete, & Figueroa, 2011; Navia, 2004).

The Chilean Civil Service was created with the mission of, 'promoting and contributing to State modernization and public management improvement, through advice to public organization and government authorities in the strategic management of public personnel ' (Servicio Civil, 2014). Its duties are organized into two main areas: the Council for the Senior Public Management and the Office for Personnel Development.

The Council carries out the selection process of public managers responsible for implementing public policies. It proposes between three and five candidates to the relevant political authority with the legal capacity to appoint public managers. It subsequently prepares the performance agreement, which needs to be signed between the political authority and the public manager, as well as following up on the fulfilment of that performance agreement. The selected nominee is appointed for a three-year term and the appointment may be renewed on no more than two occasions.

The Office for Personnel Development advises public organizations in the design, implementation and upgradation of their public personnel development policies; it generates, upgrades and disseminates a code of good labour practices among public organizations; and it gives the Annual Award for Excellence in Public Management, which involves a monetary incentive for personnel belonging to the successful organization. This Office has increasingly taken on the role of mediation between the public-sector trade unions and the Ministry of Finance. As a result, it has increased its legitimacy and has adopted the role of validating two components of the management-improvement program: public personnel training and performance evaluation (Cortázar, 2011).

Transparency and access to public information was enacted through Law 20.285. This legislation declares that all acts and decisions of public organizations and their supporting or complementing documents, the procedures followed for making the decision, and all information prepared using the public budget, as well as any other information in the hands of a public organization, are to be accessible to the public, except if a law specifically declares otherwise (Chile 2008, art. 5). This law created the Council for Transparency, which is responsible for the following: promoting transparency in public administration; monitoring the fulfilment of norms on transparency and the publication of information stemming from public organizations; and guaranteeing the right of citizens to access public information (Chile 2008, art. 32). The Council began operating on 29 April 2009.

The Chile Gestiona Program focuses on the role fulfilled by every Undersecretary in implementing coordination mechanisms within his/her sphere of influence, similar to those used by a CEO of a holding company. Its aim is the delivery of comprehensive strategic reports to each interested party involved in the management control system (MINDHA, 2012). The Program also requires the Chief of public organizations to deliver accountability reports (monthly and quarterly) on the main activity indicators used in day-to-day management. According to the Program, every Undersecretary must ensure the following: to monitor the management of public organization under his/her authority; to actively promote the use of relevant indicators of the main activity of those organizations; to monitor periodically the fulfilment of individual performance agreement of public managers appointed through the Senior Public Management System; to foster the improvement and standardization of human resources information systems; and to establish practices for frequent composition of accountability reports.

The Collected Evidence: The Influence of Driving Forces

Implementation of PMMP has been a long-term endeavour. It consists of several stages corresponding to the policy landmarks mentioned in the previous section. This characterizes the PMMP as an incremental policy effort, in which initiatives can be seen as sequential steps or rungs of the same ladder.

Within this process, the identification by Hasenfeld and Brock (1991) of five driving force domains helps to understand the implementation efforts of these initiatives. Table 2 outlines interviewee opinions regarding the relative importance of each driving force domain behind the implementation of the Chilean PMMP. Data is based on the recurring number of times they addressed these force domains, per sentence, during the interview.

Tab. 3: Relative Importance of Driving Forces Domains

Driving Force Domains	Interviewee Position						TOTAL	
	Senior Public Officials		Advisors & Public Managers		Others			
	Nº of Sentences	Weight	Nº of Sentences	Weight	Nº of Sentences	Weight	Nº of Sentences	Weight
Rationality	64	23.36%	18	17.65%	…	…	82	20.92%
Organization- Policy Environment Fit	58	21.17%	25	24.51%	2	12.50%	85	21.68%
Bureaucratic Discretion & Adaptation	47	17.15%	11	10.78%	9	56.25%	67	17.09%
Power Relation	46	16.79%	11	10.78%	3	18.75%	60	15.31%
Leadership & Competence	59	21.53%	37	36.27%	2	12.50%	98	25.00%
TOTAL	274	100.00%	102	100.00%	16	100.00%	392	100.00%

Source: Author's calculations

As Table 2 shows, overall, the interviewees identified leadership and competence as the main driving factor in implementation, followed by organizational policy fit, rationality, and bureaucratic discretion and adaptation. Power relations seem to be less important than the other four driving force domains. However, senior public officials pay most attention to rationality, followed by leadership and competence, and organizational policy fit. Advisors and public managers are primarily concerned with leadership and competence, followed by organizational policy fit. And public sector trade union leaders, members of Congress, and experts and scholars are far more concerned with bureaucratic discretion and adaptation factors.

The results shown in Table 2 are not surprising. On the one hand, senior public officials focus their attention on the transformation of policy goals and purposes into activities, as well as the ability of the individual heading the process. On the other hand, advisors and public managers are more concerned with how to mobilize groups and/or the organization towards policy goals and purposes, in addition to what organizational adjustments should be made consequently. The main concern of trade union leaders, members of Congress, and experts and scholars, meanwhile, is how public management modernization affects the roles, status and organizational routines of public employees. Chilean members of Congress did not become involved with PMMP because they perceived it as a technocratic initiative, not related directly to the people's demands. Even the centre-left Concertación was not in favour of the initiative on 'Senior Public Management'[4] (a highly significant modernizing initiative). Rather, they felt this plan was a right-wing

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4 The center-left coalition 'Concertación de Partidos por la Democracria' was in power from 1990 to 2010, backing Presidents Aylwin, Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Lagos and Bachelet. Notwithstanding the fact that during the Frei Ruiz-Tagle administration, the 'merit-based selection system for Senior Public Management' became an initiative included in the modernizing efforts, it could not be implemented due to the lack of political support within the Concertación. It was subsequently enacted in the following administration, of President Lagos, in the context of a severe political crisis and as part of the negotiations with the opposition to resolve that crisis (see Olavarría, Naverrete, & Figueroa,, 2011).

initiative and that it would affect the public workers who constitute their primary electoral base (Olavarría, Navarrete, & Figueroa, 2011).

It should be noted that leadership and competence, rationality, and organizational policy fit are the driving factors which more accurately represent a top-down perspective of implementation. This coincides with the expected opinion of interviewees who undertook roles as senior public officials, advisors or public managers. Conversely, bureaucratic discretion and adaptation, as well as power relations are the driving factors consistent with a bottom-up perspective, which, as explained previously, is of principal concern to the representatives of public employees, members of Congress and scholars.

How Implementers Express Driving Forces

This section discusses the findings of the interviews conducted for this research. It analyses the response of the implementers interviewed, including the actions and situations they experienced in terms of the aforementioned driving forces throughout the PMMP implementation process.

Leadership and competence. According to their testimony, the respondents see leadership as a set of qualities belonging to the individual in charge of a group or organization responsible for implementation. They see competence as primarily relevant to the domain of technical knowledge. According to the interviewees, key qualities of an implementing leader are self-motivation, ability to motivate others, and commitment to the policy itself. An expert who worked on the implementation of PMMP in a public organization explained that, 'yes, we had very bold leaders. Speeches by the one heading my organization were very motivating. He was very capable; we joined public service because he sold us the idea; we were convinced by his motivation; he was convincing; one listened to his speeches and his discussions and concluded that he was very clear about the aim of the policy implementation, and he also had good listening skills '.

Though motivation is considered to be important, it is not a widespread characteristic among public managers. Accordingly, a key advisor to the Minister leading PMMP implementation explained that, 'we concluded that … a fraction of the senior public managers was self-motivated, were highly professional and (successfully) fulfilled the goals; but they were in a clear minority'.

In addition, as per the interviewees, motivation takes place in conjunction with commitment to the policy being implemented. Regarding the impetus of modernization, a Presidential advisor explains that the public organizations to have implemented modernization had done so because, 'they had leaders who took risks, made organizational changes, improved performance, the work environment and salaries, and stayed for a long time as the leader… [and] this allowed them to secure political support and to generate legal changes. That is what made the entire difference.'

Regarding the risks taken, one former public manager, recognized as highly effective in implementing PMMP, pointed out, '[the authorities] were angry with me because they claimed I was a very conflictive person, albeit an effective one. They also saw that my organization went further in modernization. Then, of course, when things paid off, they claimed the successes of my organization as their own, even though they had previously seen me as a threat, as I could potentially make them to lose votes.'

On the other hand, since competence is associated with expert knowledge, competent leaders prefer that implementation is guided by technical and legal criteria, based on autonomy and the absence of political interference. A public manager who implemented PMMP in his organization said, 'internal leadership is very important', adding, 'not politicizing public organizations is also very important. You might appoint the people at the request of some politician, make decisions based on politics and, of course, you might do that and be highly popular for a few months. But ultimately, the actual quality of the implementation wouldn't be so good.'

Senior public managers interviewed also claimed that the message they received from the authorities regarding the implementation of PMMP was, 'to do what you can, but not to cause any problems,' which seems to be in accordance with the autonomy they assert. One of these senior public managers added, 'I myself set the goals I pursued as Director; nobody told me what I had to do, neither the President nor the Minister'.

By taking all the collected testimonies into account, it appears that leadership, competence, motivation and commitment are all key elements in PMMP implementation. Interestingly, the testimonies gathered seem to correspond with the two classical scholarly approaches to leadership. On the one hand, the great majority of respondents were clearly inclined to pay attention to the characteristics of the individual fulfilling the role of leader. This included emphasis on aspects such as ability to motivate others, expert knowledge, commitment to the policy, inclination to take risk, to make organizational changes and to improve organizational performance. Denis et. al. (2005) refer to this perspective as the 'entrepreneurial view', while Hughes (2012) calls it 'leadership as a personal attribute'. Kettl and Fesler (2005, p. 206) summarize this view by asserting that, 'at the core of all of these reforms is [the]

central concept: high performance in public agencies depends on leadership by top officials; [and that] no system … – whether it is a civil service system or not – can work without strong and sustained direction'.

On the other hand, the testimony of the Presidential advisor regarding the lack of self-motivation and the high standards of performance by most of the senior public managers seems to reflect the 'stewardship view'. This perspective states that, 'the legitimacy of public leaders comes from their conformity to the wishes of democratically elected politicians' (Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2005, p. 451).

Furthermore, the two types of testimony can be used to gauge the different rhythms in the implementation of public management modernization. While those individuals emphasizing the attributes of the leader belonged to organizations that were on the front line of the reform, the testimony of the Presidential advisor mainly refers to public agencies showing slower progress regarding the modernization policy. Accordingly, Halligan (2012, p. 104) points out that leadership is contingent upon different organizational context and demands, which relate to the scale of change (incremental to transformational), the style of change (ranging from consultative to directive) and commitment to the civil service (e.g., custodian and guardian).

The pursuit of rationality. Leadership and competence appear to be associated with the pursuit of rationality. Leaders and their close aides are highly concerned with ensuring that implementation is effective in fulfilling their policy mandate. In doing so, the focus is placed on policy design and its coherence with regard to the problem addressed, as well as its expected goals. Focus also falls on the business model and the strategic planning required to implement the policy, as well as devising indicators with which implementation can be monitored and evaluated.

In this context, an advisor from the Ministry driving PMMP explains that, 'we try to have an ex-ante evaluation done, a proper and coherent design that allows you to make a good ex-post evaluation'.

The concerns of individuals responsible for implementing PMMP included establishing a clear roadmap, which would help to identify the work required in the future. Strategic planning and building of business models appear to be important tools to ensuring the increased involvement of members of the organization responsible for implementation and stakeholder identification. A senior public manager noted, 'the first thing we did was to conduct a process of strategic planning, in which all the executive team and key personnel participated. Our concern was to establish short, medium and long term trajectory.'

The setting of indicators was aimed at establishing goals for public organizations, as well as impelling them to fulfil the committed targets. Indicators also allowed the leading implementers to gauge the genuine state of public organizations and to establish what needed to be done in order to proceed with the modernizing efforts. An advisor from the Ministry of Finance, who was leading PMMP efforts, pointed out that, 'from our perspective, we want public organizations to set themselves relevant indicators, demanding goals; we cannot be the only ones pushing for this.' She continues: 'when we first arrived, we thought we had to look at not only program design but also management and, more specifically, results.' Another advisor from the same Ministry added, 'we introduced the "Improvement Management Program (IMP)", which was mainly a set of performance indicators. The IMP became a ruling instrument.

As indicators began showing that modernization of public management could go no faster, those heading the process realized that PMMP implementation would be a long-term endeavour that had to be conducted across several stages. A key advisor of the Ministry of Finance explains, 'We went step by step because we wanted to make sure we were on the right track. This has taken us 10 years so far.'

Therefore, the testimonies show that senior and mid-level public managers chose the managerial tools they deemed to be most appropriate for fulfilling policy goals, as well as those for putting initiatives such as the IMP, which has the same aim, into practice.

Organization-policy environment fit. According to the testimony of the interviewees, organization-policy environment fit appears to be linked to leadership and competence, as well as the pursuit of rationality. In fact, the organization fit to the policy environment seems to be a rational action for those leading implementation efforts to ensure policy effectiveness. Strategic planning, adjustment of organizational structure and the design of procedures to better achieve policy goals appear to be the chosen tools for putting the plan and the rational decisions consistent with these goals into practice.

A key element of this driving force seems to be the organizational adjustment to policy goals. An expert working on PMMP implementation in her organization pointed out, 'first, it was a change of infrastructure, then a change of structure and then a change to the face of the organization'. A Director who was interviewed explained, 'I hired a consultant to help me with the organizational design (because) we needed a more flexible organization, one that was more in line with what the government was asking us to do '.

Implementers are, therefore, also concerned with the coherence between strategic definitions and organizational design. An expert who played a key role in implementing PMMP in his organization stated, 'We began setting our fundamental strategic declarations and procedures, and we identified our organizational structure according to the strategic goals and procedures we had defined.'

Another key step in adjusting an organization to policy goals is to institutionalize mechanisms created by PMMP. A senior advisor from the Ministry of Finance stated that, 'from the year 2000, this started to take a more institutionalized shape; the division of management control was created, procedures began to be defined, and mechanisms were designed to put recommendations from evaluations into practice. The idea was to create institutional mechanisms to follow up on the results of evaluations and make evaluated programs for responding to the recommendations, internalize them and improve performance'.

The driving force of the organizational-policy fit appears to be, in fact, a kind of rational action focused on the organizational structure, the working procedures and routines, and the institutional mechanisms available to implementers in order to further policy execution. If the conclusion is reached that these organizational elements represent a constraint to efforts at fulfilling policy goals, they will be modified. This will be done as a way of seeking to bring the organization in line with its policy mandate.

Bureaucratic discretion and adaptation. This driving force seems to be a meeting point between the rational efforts of those heading the implementation and the reaction of employees towards the new organizational design. A former front line advisor to the Director of a public organization added, '[in implementing PMMP] we launched a change management project, which was very innovative in the public sector; we are talking about an organization of four thousand workers where we had to develop a new language first, make the workers learn new competencies, install a new management model, and persuade and [then] convince the workers [to accept the change]".

Despite these efforts, their reaction could have been seen as an obstacle that PMMP had to overcome. Accordingly, an expert explained, 'the modernization project implied that we redesign the technological model, [to ensure] procedures to better serve our users, and this was strongly resisted by groups of personnel.'

A senior public manager, described in detail his experience of modernizing the public organization: 'At the very beginning it was hard. I arrived at an organization that was good at making things, but that was also making many useless things; it was very bureaucratic, but not corrupt. Old employees saw the hiring of engineers and changes I introduced at the beginning with a critical eye. In my first staff meetings at the organization, people complained a lot and asked me to increase their salaries. But to their surprise, the new procedures started to work very well and, as a result, step-by-step, we achieved a greater level of confidence among the staff. My collaborators and I increasingly valued the knowledge of older employees regarding the organization. They were clever and fast people. Some years later, meetings with the staff were only about suggestions of how to improve things, about trials they were conducting … until the most junior staff member was thinking about ways to make working procedures more effective. They were people who felt capable of being able to change the way in which things were done in their particular work sector in Chile. As a result, the organization became empowered.'

Regarding the same modernization experience, the president of the trade union of employees from the same organization expressed his opinion, as follows: 'There is clearly a distinction of roles in the process. We believe that the management of organizations requires high levels of participation from workers in different sub-systems within the organization, particularly in the human resources sub-system but also in substantive sub-systems and those overseeing the institutional mission. Our opinion is that when senior managers have actually understood and opened participation to workers, not only to unions but to workers, this is when the organization has managed to align and to generate a convergence [of visions] inside the organization in order to advance corporate goals.'

Bureaucratic discretion and adaptation is frequently seen as the street level predisposition of bureaucrats to maintain existing working routines (Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977), which may generate organizational conflict. However, as preceding paragraphs indicate, discretion and adaptation by bureaucrats may also be understood as the influence they wish to exercise in order to bring about their interests which, regarding policy implementation, might be aligned with those of the organization.

Power relations. The analysis of the driving forces of power relations shows, on one hand, a nucleus of power within government and, on the other, tensions and conflicts of interest arising externally, even with regard to a technocratic policy like PMMP. Two main sources of power appear to be critical in PMMP implementation: the Presidency and the Ministry of Finance. A senior official of the Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency pointed out that, 'Presidential empowerment is relevant for anything relating to the generation of some type of stimulus to get a job done.'

However, despite Presidential support for modernization efforts, the political ability of senior public officials to implement PMMP appears to be important in fulfilling policy goals. An advisor from the Presidency explained that, 'the President empowered Undersecretaries, through the Chile Gestiona program, to ensure better indicators of effectiveness of their own Ministry and their dependent services, but those with political trajectories were very often those who obtained better management results.'

The Ministry of Finance appears to be a key source of power, because it both leads the modernization efforts and manages government resources. A Ministry of Finance advisor pointed out that, 'in any implementation problem we faced, we designed a strategy; first of all, we asked whether we had political capacity, the Ministry of Finance is risk averse, except that political conditions

change. When a senior official of the Ministry of Finance signed something, it was because they had political power to do so, it was not the will or a whim of a Minister, [and] nothing was done without political backing.'

On the other hand, political parties and public employee unions were among those primarily pushing for their interests or views to be heard by the implementers. An ex Chair of the Civil Service stated, 'Political parties were a thorn in our side because they were used to sending lists of people to be appointed as heads of public services, without any consideration of merit, … sometimes, one does not realize but the pressure is enormous.' Later s/he adds, 'Ministers had to negotiate appointments (in public organizations) with political parties in order to get laws approved in Congress; then, if you are giving certain positions in government to some political party, you are committing that party to support you when you introduce a bill.'

Besides leadership, rationality, organizational fit and bureaucratic discretion, PMMP implementation also reveals itself as an arena of tension and conflict. This is clearly expressed by the words of a highly reputable senior manager who led one of the most effective modernization efforts. S/He stated that, 'Without conflict, there is no transformation … ours was a success story, but also one of conflict: conflict with employees, many strikes, fights, takeovers of our facilities by employees, conflict with the Ministry of Finance, with the Budget Office, with Congress.'

Given the conflicts that arose during PMMP implementation, a natural reaction among those heading modernization efforts in public organizations was to seek political backing. The testimony of one of these modernizers explains how s/he obtained this support: 'The fights were always with the Concertación (the coalition in power at the time), they criticized me a lot, and I thought, well, here nobody protects me, I'm going to have to join a political party. I joined the least demanding party, the one with no requisites to join. Therefore, the next time I was faced with conflict, at least, the party would defend me. But, it was always an instrumental relationship; I participated in just a few party meetings because I found them so boring. I received support from the party, which was in my own interest, and the party was interested in having well qualified members, doing a good job in government to secure a good image in terms of public opinion. Therefore, we mutually used each other.'

Consequently, the driving forces of power relations express conflict in the policy implementation process. They also show how power is used to overcome obstacles, to receive protection and to expedite the accomplishment of policy goals.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Beyond methodological differences, the analysis of policy implementation based on the driving force domains helps us to see the complexities to develop a theory of policy implementation and suggest that, most likely, policy implementation should be explained at a micro level, through case studies. Redistributive social policies analysed by Hasenfeld and Brock were highly conflictive, which determine that power relations and even bureaucratic adaptation, a kind of power relation according to them, are the force domains driving the policy implementation. The analysis by McGrath on implementation of the State Children Health Insurance Program, another type of redistributive social policy but much less conflictive, led to identify the pursuing of rationality and organization-policy fit as the most influential driving forces. The analysis of Chile's PMMP identified leadership as the most prevalent driving force. PMMP is a kind of endogamic and technocratic initiative, neither directly related to the demands of the people nor the politician's interests, focused on the improvement of government effectiveness, which usually requires expert knowledge on managerial models and public administration. This means that capacities and abilities required to implement modernization efforts are more closely associated with leadership and technical capabilities.

According to McGrath (2009, p. 329), the context '– programmatic history, institutions, economy and the prevailing ideology – would led to some driving forces being more explanatory than others in each' case. He additionally argues that his evidence would suggest that implementation would be a combination of political factors, such as expediency and commitment, and policy factors, such as capacity and experience. Politics involves conflict, negotiation, feasibility, agreement and commitment, which, in other words, may be expressed as 'power relation', as this was previously defined in this article. Similarly, regarding policy factors, capacity and experience may be referring to those heading the process, then the force domain would be that of leadership and competence; if they are referring to institution, the force domain may be that of organization-policy fit; and if they refer to street level bureaucrats, the force domain may be that of bureaucratic discretion and adaptation. Then, a key point is how the context – the combination of characteristics of the government sector of activity and type of policy – determines which driving forces would be prevalent in a particular policy implementation process.

Furthermore, the identification of the prevalent driving forces seems to shed light on capacities and abilities, as well as the implementation strategy needed to put the policy into practice.

A natural question that arises from the findings of this article is why competent leaders were so important in the implementation of PMMP. As stated previously, the raising and formalization of this policy was very much influenced by modernizing actions undertaken by a small set of senior public managers who believed that 'the State can do better' (interview with one of these public managers). The reform of public organizations they headed not only persuaded politicians to acknowledge the need for modernization and to launch a formal policy at a subsequent date, but it also established the basis for its implementation strategy: incrementalism and micro-reforms.

As explained earlier, PMMP has been implemented on a step-by-step basis. The micro-reforms strategy was executed through the appointment of senior managers (where the position was vacant), who had a solid professional background and experience in heading organizations and/or big projects. As a former Minister interviewed pointed out, 'we pushed where we could; when we had the opportunity, we appointed people who would undertake the (modernizing) job and we strongly supported him/her.' On the other hand, the testimonies also indicate that these senior public managers imposed a seal of rationality, not only in selecting the means by which they deemed the realization of policy goals more effective, but also because they fostered organizational adjustments to the policy mandate received, including the structures, procedures and routines.

Despite the prevalence of protests and strikes in the context of PMMP implementation, conflict has not been a common feature of the process. This may be attributed to the fact that PMMP did not lead to a reduction in either public jobs or salaries of public workers. In addition, public sector unions agreed with the creation of the Civil Service, while the introduction of the management control system was accompanied with the creation of the 'Improvement Management Program' (IMP). This latter scheme allowed public workers to obtain additional amounts of variable income depending on the fulfilment of periodic goals. New organizations in the context of PMMP, such as the Council for Transparency and Chile Compra (meaning 'Chile Buys', the program which manages the procurement system), were created as small and highly professional organizations. This process has succeeded in implementing these systems across Chilean public administration with very low levels of conflicts.[5]

The Hasenfeld and Brock taxonomy has proved to be useful in characterizing the organizational and inter-organizational behavioural patterns that influences policy implementation. In turn, those driving forces that were identified as the most influential ones appear to be linked to the policy context in which implementation occurred. Thus, the identification of the prevalent driving forces helped to understand the dynamic of implementation and what capacities, abilities and strategies are required to put into practice a concrete public policy. Paraphrasing McGrath (2009, p. 331); at the overall level, this led us to 'understand what affected the decisions policy makers made (in implementing the policy) and why.'

On the other hand, in cases of policy implementation where the dominant driving forces have been power relation and/or bureaucratic discretion, a bottom-up approach would be more suitable for understanding its own particular implementation dynamic, while technocratic policies, those involving more rational elements, high levels of agreements and leader's capacities might be more appreciated through a top-down approach, as modernization initiatives are usually launched from the top level of government and/or organizations.

This type of analyses helped us to see the difficulties in attempts to formulate a comprehensive theory of policy implementation, because implementation expresses a dynamic interaction among policy actors – individuals and/or collective – which varies across different types of policies and sectors of government activity. This also suggest the need to conduct implementation studies at a micro level – where things happen – in order to recognize the facts and circumstances faced in the execution of policy mandates because the dynamics developed at that level led to the understanding of why a particular policy is, in concrete terms, as it is.

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5 A survey on the perception of transparency among public sector workers reveals that the implementation of the law on transparency was primarily viewed in terms of an increase in employee workload. However, a majority simultaneously believed that the benefits of its implementation surpassed any of the associated costs (time, workload and risk). (Council for Transparency, 2013).

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